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DOGMATIC THEOLOGY 
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GOD: 


HIS KNOWABILITY, ESSENCE, AND 
ATTRIBUTES 


A DOGMATIC TREATISE 


PREFACED BY A BRIEF GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
TO THE STUDY OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY 


BY 


WV 
THE RT. REV. MSGR. JOSEPH POHLE, Pu.D.,D.D. 
FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE 
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA 


ADAPTED AND EDITED 


BY 


ARTHUR PREUSS 


THIRD, REVIsED EDITION 


B. HERDER BOOK CO. 


17 SournH Broapway, ST. Louis, Mo. 
AND 
68, GreaT RussELL St., Lonpon, W. C. 


1918 


NIHIL OBSTAT 
Sti. Ludovici, die 31 Julu, 1918 
F. G. Holweck, 


Censor Librorum. 


IMPRIMATUR 
Sti. Ludovici, die 31 Julu, 1918 
*kJoannes J. Glennon, 


Archiepiscopus 


St. Ludovici. 


Copyright, Io1T 
by 
Joseph Gummersbach 


All rights reserved 
Printed in U. S. A. 


First impression, IQII 
Second impression, 1914 


Third impression, 1918 


VAIL-BALLOU COMPANY 
BINGHAMTON AND NEW YORK 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO DOGMATIC THE-- 


OLOGY’. 


GOD: HIS KNOWABILITY, ESSENCE, “AND AT- 
TRIBUTES 


Part I. THE KNowaBiLity oF GoD 
Cu. I. Human Reason Can Know God . 


§ 1. Man Can Gain a Knowledge of God from ‘the 
Physical Universe . rf 


Art. 1. The Positive Teaching of Reve A 
Art. 2, The Idea of God Not Inborn . 


§ 2, Our Knowledge of God as Derived from the 
Supernatural Order 


Art. I, The Facts of the Suse eanet Order Con- 
sidered as Premises for Unaided Reason 


Art. 2. The Supernatural Facts as a Preamble to 
our Belief in the Existence of God . 


§ 3. Traditionalism and Atheism . 
Art. 1. Traditionalism a False System 
Art, 2. The Possibility of Atheism 
Cu. II. The Quality of Man’s Knowledge of God hea: 
ing to Divine Revelation ; 
§ 1, Our Knowledge of God as it is Here on Earth . 
Art. 1. The Imperfection of Our Knowledge of 
God in This Life . 
Art. 2. The Threefold Mode of Rhowtug God 
Here on Earth . Why Seats 
Art. 3. Theological Conclusions . . . - 
iii 


AGE 


CONTENTS 


§ 2. Man’s Knowledge of God as it Will be in Heaven ia 
Art, 1. The Reality and the Supernatural Character 
of the Intuitive Vision of God . 80 
Art. 2. The Light of Glory as a Necessary Medium 
for the Intuitive Vision of God . IOI 
ArT. 3. The Beatific Vision in its Relation to the 
Divine Incomprehensibility . . , 107 
§ 3. Eunomianism and Ontologism II3 
Art. 1. The Heresy of the Eunomians . 113 
Art. 2, Why Ontologism is Untenable 116 
Part II. Tue Divine Essence . 133 
Cu. I. The Biblical Names of God Tae me eslag OE Kee 
§ 1. The “Seven Holy Names of God” in the Old 
Testament Be E Asai RR ON Unk a) te eee a eR 
§ 2. The Names Applied to God in the New Testa- 
ment and in Profane Literature — The Sym- 
bolic Appellations . Reigns Met bkarbh un Te. 
Cu. II. The Essence of God in its Relation to His At- 
arth 2 BO RG catalina Nh ee a 
§ 1. False Theories a ivi a Ua CG ater ts or! 
Art. 1. The Herésy of Gilbert de la Porrée and the 
' Palamites a Ma Nt Te ties Tet ic sat ae ae 
Art. 2. The Heresy of Eunomius and the Nomi- 
nalists Le) oe te 148 
Art. 3. The Formalism of the Scotists Tet 
§ 2. The Virtual Distinction Between God’s Essence 
and His Attributes Pa ae He 156 
Cu. III. The Metaphysical Essence of God : 159 
§ 1. Untenable Theories . PORTE A OE . 160 
§ 2. Aseity the Fundamental Attribute of God . 165 
Part III. Tur Divine Properties or ATTRIBUTES . 177 
Cu. I. God’s Transcendental Attributes of Being . 180 
§ 1. Absolute Perfection and Infinity . . 180 
Apt id. God's: Perfection cuit. 4) arr n e 5 og 
ArT. 2. God’s Tatimitys ih ost seg ee 190 


1V 


CONTENTS 


§ 2. God’s Unity, Simplicity, and Unicity (or Unique- var 

HESS Ps RE, est SORA eel hah ingen ak het Oly 

Art. 1, God’s Intrinsic Uiity a RE OA a dae a a 

Art. 2. God’s Absolute’ Simplicity (0's) 0269565. 200 
Art. 3. Monotheism and its Antitheses: Polythe- 

isi aed Ua SEN eR ar giana ae e 

S sinGodithe *Absolutet: Trent eR Peo oe 3. 225 

Arr. 1.'God as Ontological Truth a ie eo aos 


Art. 2. God as Logical Truth, or Absolute le 230 
Art. 3. God as Moral Truth, or His Veracity and 


Paithininess) 70, 0 A Ab Asian (BUC. 6 6) 

Sa nGotas Absolute Goodness ooo 8a el nel etn. ts CAE 
Art. 1. God as Ontological Goodness... ws 241 
-ArT. 2. God’s Ethical Goodness, or Sanctity . . 251” 


Art. 3. God’s Moral Goodness, or Benevolence . . 260* 

§ 5. God as Absolute Beauty. . . . PENA Ty 9 
Cu. II. God’s Categorical Attributes of Bains. ORAP OPN fs 
Sir sod’s: Absolate Substantiality 30.0. ale ve tego 

§ 2. God’s Absolute Causality, or Omnipotence . . 281 
S)3.. Gods incorporestyi 2) tie ee ee ee, ae 
SA iGods\ lnimafability isso ee ee a ie ein ah Os 


SSM ROASY LGLeUTeRry Uh ial Paaorp a ainarna da HON Ck tal An Gi 

§ 6. God’s Immensity and Omnipresence. . H3E5 
Cu. III. The Attributes of Divine Life — Divine Klowt 

edge bhai age SUA gh te ais Nh SHRED GS 20 


§ 1. The Mode of Divine Gudeledes SS URB er Mae CLK) de a Mie 219 
§ 2. The Objects of Divine Knowledge — Omniscience 349 
ArT. I. Omniscience as God’s Knowledge of the 

Purely: Posse soe .\ ise ‘ ite GSE 
ArT, 2. Omniscience as God’s Knowledse of ‘Vision 
of all Contingent Beings — Cardiognosis, 
or Searching of Hearts. . . ah SS 
Art. 3. Omniscience as God’s Hotebiewiedes of 
the Free Actions of the Future . . . 361 
ay 


CONTENTS 


Art. 4. Omniscience as God’s Foreknowledge of in 
the Conditionally Free Acts of the Fu- 
ture, of the “Scientia Media” 4.4 +47, 373 
§ 3. The Medium of Divine Knowledge. . , ie 
Cu. IV. The Attributes of Divine Life— The Divine 
VER rain ate ) Aer 
§ 1. The Mode of Divine Volition Necessity piss 
Liberty: of, the: Divine: Will *.)\ ves (ou aan 
§ 2. The Objects of the Divine Will. . Area . 438 
§ 3. The Virtues of the Divine Will, and in Paice. 
lar, Justice and Mercy . . . wig haa IC a a 
ART iL. Gad'ay Justicg x.) twiue Wary ay Bae ae 
ART 2ulaod $(Merey i uc es a hats | 


INDEX e e e e ® e ° ® @) e e e ie} e ‘e @ ° ® 469 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO 
DOGMATIC THEOLOGY 


Notion, RANK, AND DIvIsION oF DOGMATIC 
‘THEOLOGY 


I. GENERAL DEFINITION OF THEOLOGY.—Dog- 
matic theology forms an essential part of theology 
in general, and cannot, therefore, be correctly 
defined without an adequate notion of the latter. 
Theology, then, generally speaking, is the science 
of faith (scientia fidet). 

a) Like all sciences, theology deduces un- 
known truths from known and certain principles, 
by means of correct conclusions. As a principle 
to reason from in his quest of truth the dogma- 
tician receives, and believingly embraces the in- 
fallible truths of Revelation, and by means of 
logical construction, systematic grouping, and 
correct deductions, erects upon this foundation a 
logical body of doctrine, as does the historian 
who works with the facts of history, or the jurist 
who deals with statutes, or the scientist who em- 
ploys bodies and their phenomena as materials 


for scientific construction. 
1 


ye: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 


It is true that some Scholastics, e. g., Durandus and 
Vasquez, have denied to theology the dignity of a science, 
because it affords no intrinsic insight into the How and 
Why of such mysteries as that of the Most Holy Trin- 
ity, of the Hypostatic Union, and others.t. But neither 
do the profane sciences afford us always and everywhere 
an insight into their highest principles. Enclidian ge- 
ometry, for instance, stands and falls with the axiom of 
parallels, which has never yet been satisfactorily proved. 
In fact, of late years an attempt has been made to estab- 
lish a “non-Euclidian geometry” independent of that 
axiom. To this should be added the consideration that 
there are sciences which derive their basic principles as 
lemmata from some higher science. Such, for example, 
is metaphysics, which is quite generally admitted to be a 
true science. Hence it is plain that the notion of a sci- 
ence, while of course it includes certainty, does not neces- 
sarily include evidence of its principles. According to 
the luminous teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas,? “ Duplex 
est scientiarum genus. Quaedam enim sunt, quae proce- 
dunt ex principus notis lumine naturalis intellectus, sicut 
arithmetica, geometria et huiusmodi; quaedam vero sunt, 
quae procedunt ex principuis notis lumine superioris 
scientiae, sicut perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis 
per geometriam et musica ex principiis per arithmeticam 
notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina [i. e., theologia] est 
sctentia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris 
scientiae, quae scil. est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde 
sicut musicus credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, 
ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo.’ ? 


1 Cfe. Hebr, xi, 1: Fides. &:. 8 Cfr. P. Schanz, Ist die Theolo- 
argumentum non apparentium,” gie eine Wissenschaft? Tiibingen 
2 Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 1, art. 2. 1900. 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 3 


b) Its specific character theology derives from 
the fact that it is the science of faith, taking 
faith both in its objective and in its subjective 
sense. Considered in its object, theology com- 
prises all those truths (and those truths only) 
which have been supernaturally revealed, have 
been included in Scripture and Tradition, and 
are, therefore, in the keeping of the infallible 
Church (depositum fidei). Hence all branches 
of sacred theology, including canon law and pas- 
toral theology, are bottomed upon supernatural 
Revelation. Considered as a science, theology 
necessarily presupposes faith; for the theolo- 
gian’s principle of knowledge is not pure and 
unaided reason, but reason carried as it were be- 
yond itself, elevated, ennobled, and transfigured 
by supernatural faith. It was in this sense 
that the Fathers* insisted on the proposition: 
“Gnosis super fidem aedificatur,”’ just as Scholas- 
ticism was founded on St. Anselm’s famous 
axiom, “Fides quaerit intellectum.” 


Hence there is a sharp distinction between philosophy 
and theology. Philosophy, too, especially that branch of 
it known as Theodicy, treats of God, His existence, es- 
sence, and attributes; but it treats of them only in the 
light of unaided human reason; while theology, on the 
other hand, derives its knowledge of God and divine 
things entirely from Revelation, as contained in Sacred 
Scripture and Tradition, and proposed to the faithful 


4Cfr. Clement of Alexandria, Strom., VII. 


“4 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 


by the infallible Church. To elicit the act of faith de- 
manded by this process, requires an interior grace 
(gratia fidei). While philosophy never transcends the 
bounds of pure reason, and therefore finds itself un- 
able to prove the mysteries of faith by arguments drawn 
from its own domain, theology always and everywhere 
retains the character of a science founded strictly upon 
authority. 


2. THE HicuH RANK oF THEOLOGY.—The- 
ology must be assigned first place among the 
sciences. This appears: 

a) From its inherent dignity. While the 
secular sciences have no other guide than the 
flickering lamp of human reason, theology is 
based upon faith, which, both objectively as Reve- 
lation, and subjectively as grace, is an immediate 
gift of God. St. Paul emphasizes this truth in 
rt Cor. Il, 7 sqq.: “Loquimur Dei sapientiam 
in mysterio, quae abscondita est, . . . quam nemo 
principum hums saeculi cognovit ... nobis 
autem Deus revelavit per Spiritum suum—We 
speak the wisdom of God in a mystery [a wis- 
dom] which is hidden, . . . which none of the 
princes of this world knew, . . . but to us God 
hath revealed by his spirit.” St. Thomas traces 
theology to God Himself: “Theologiae princi- 
pium proximum quidem est fides, sed primum est 
intellectus divinus, cui nos credimus.’’ ® 

b) From its ulterior object. The secular 


5In Boeth, De Trin., qu. 2, art. 2, ad 7. 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 5 


sciences, apart from the gratification they afford 
to man’s natural curiosity and love of knowledge, 
aim at no other end than that of shaping his 
earthly life, beautifying it, and perhaps perfect- 
ing his happiness on earth; while theology, on 
the other hand, guides man, in all his various 
modes of activity, including the social and the 
political, to a supernatural end, whose delights 
“eye hath not seen, nor ear heard.” ° 

c) From the certitude which it ensures. The 
certitude of faith, upon which theology bases all 
its deductions—a certitude that is rooted in the 
inerrancy of Divine Reason, rather than in the 
participated infallibility of a finite, and conse- 
quently fallible, mind—excels even that highest 
degree of human certitude which is within the 
reach of metaphysics and mathematics. 


This threefold excellence of theology supplies us 
with sufficient motives for studying it diligently and 
thoroughly. No other science is so sublime. The- 
ology is the queen of all sciences,—a queen to whom 
even philosophy, despite its dignity and independence, 
must pay homage. Hence the oft-quoted Scholastic 
axiom: “Philosophia est ancilla theologiae.’* The 
more directly a science leads up to God, the nobler, 
the sublimer, and the more useful it necessarily is. But 
can any science lead more directly to God than theology, 
which treats solely of God and things divine? 

62 Cor, ii,:\9. corum sententia philosophiam esse 


7On the true meaning of this theologiae ancillam, |Monasterii 
dictum, see Clemens, De Scholasti- 1856. 


6 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 


We should, however, beware lest our study of the- 
ology degenerate into mere inquisitive prying of the sort 
against which St. Paul warns us: “ Non plus sapere 
quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem — Not to 
be more wise than it behooveth to be wise, but to be 
wise unto sobriety.”* Let us not forget that it is 
punishable temerity to attempt to fathom the mysteries, 
strictly and properly so called, of faith. (Cfr. Ecclus. 
III, 25.) More than any other study should that of the- 
ology be accompanied by pious meditation and humble 
prayer.® 


3. DEFINITION oF DoGmatic THEOLOGY.— 
The notion of dogmatic theology is by no means 
identical with that of theology as the science 
of faith. Moral theology, exegesis, canon law, 
etc., and indirectly even the auxiliary theological 
disciplines, are also subdivisions of theology. 
Nevertheless, dogmatic theology claims the priv- 
ilege of throning as a queen in the center of 
the other theological sciences. From another 
point of view it may be likened to a trunk from 
which the others branch out like so many limbs. 
We shall arrive more easily at the true notion 
of dogmatic theology, in the modern sense of the 
term, by enquiring into the manner in which 
theology is divided. | 

a) On the threshold we meet that most popu- 
lar and most important division of theology into 


8 Rom. XII, 3. Theologia mentis et cordis. Prol. I, 
® On this subject, cfr. Contenson, 2. Lugduni 1673. 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 4 


theoretical and practical, according as theology 
is considered either as a speculative science or 
as furnishing rules for the guidance of conduct. 
Theoretical theology is the science of faith in 
its proper sense, or dogmatics ; practical theology 
is ethical or moral theology. 


Although it will not do to tear these disciplines asun- 
der, because they are parts of one organic whole, and for 
the further reason that the main rules of right conduct 
are based upon dogmatic principles; yet there is good 
ground for treating the two separately, as has been the 
custom since the seventeenth century. A glance into the 
Summa of St. Thomas shows that in the Middle Ages 
dogmatic and moral theology were treated as parts of one 
organic whole. Upon the subdivisions of either branch, 
or the manner in which historical theology (either as 
Biblical science or Church history), is to be subsumed 
under the general subject, this is not the place to des- 
cant. 


b) Dogmatic theology naturally falls into two 
great subdivisions, general and special. General 
dogmatics, which defends the faith against the 
attacks of heretics and infidels, is also known 
by the name of Apologetics, or, more properly, 
Fundamental Theology, for the reason that, as 
demonstratio christiana et catholica, it lays the 
foundations for special dogmatics, or dogmatic 
theology proper.° Of late it has become cus- 
tomary to assign to fundamental theology a 


10 Cfr. Ottiger, S. J., Theol. Fundamentalis, I, 1 saa. Friburgi 1897. 


8 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 


number of topics which might just as well be 
treated in special dogmatics, such as, e. g., the 
rule of faith, the Church, the papacy, and the 
relation between faith and reason. This com- 
mendable practice grew out of the necessity of 
fairly dividing the subject-matter of these two 
branches of theology. The topics named really 
belong to the foundations of dogmatic theology 
proper, and besides, being doctrines in regard to 
which the various denominations differ, they re- 
quire a more detailed and controversial treat- 
ment. 

We purpose to follow this practice and to ex- 
clude from the present work all those subjects 
which more properly belong to general dog- 
matics. We define special dogmatics, or dog- 
matic theology proper, after the example of 
Scheeben,"? as “the scientific exposition of the en- 
tire domain of theoretical knowledge, which can 
be obtained from divine Revelation, of God Him- 
self and His activity, based upon the dogmas of 
the Church.” By emphasizing the words theo- 
retical and dogmas, this definition excludes moral 
theology, which, though based upon divine Reve- 
lation and the teaching of the Church, is yet 
practical rather than theoretical. A dogma is a 
norm of knowledge; the moral law is a standard 


11 Dogmatik, I, 3; Wilhelm-Scan- ogy Based on Scheeben’s “ Dog- 
nell, 4 Manual of Catholic Theol- matik,” I, t sqq., London 1899. 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 9 


of conduct; though, of course, both are ultimately 
rooted in the same ground, viz., divine Revela- 
tion as contained in Holy Scripture and Tradi- 
tion, and expounded by the Church. 

c) Another division of dogmatic theology, that 
into positive and Scholastic, regards method 
rather than substance. Positive theology, of 
which our catechisms contain a succinct digest, 
limits itself to ascertaining and stating the dog- 
matic teaching contained in the sources of Reve- 
lation. Among its most prominent exponents 
we may mention: Petavius, Thomassin, Lieber- 
mann, Perrone, Simar, and Hurter.*? Thomas- 
sin, and especially Petavius, successfully com- 
bined the positive with the speculative method. 
When positive theology assumes a polemical tone, 
we have what is called Controversial Theology, a 
science which Cardinal Bellarmine in the seven- 
teenth century developed against the so-called 
reformers. 

Dogmatic theology is called Scholastic, when, 
assuming and utilizing the results of the positive 
method, it undertakes: (a) to unfold the deeper 
content of dogma; (b) to set forth the relations 


of the different dogmas 


12 Hurter’s admirable Compen- 
dium has been adapted to the needs 
of English-speaking students by the 
Rev. Sylvester Joseph Hunter, S, J., 
in his Outlines of Dogmatic Theol- 
ogy, three volumes, London 1894, 


2 


to one another; (c) by 


and, still more succinctly, for the 
use of colleges, academies, and high 
schools, by the Rev. Charles Coppens, 
S. J., in his Systematic Study of 
the Catholic Religion, St. Louis 
1903. 


_ 10 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 


syllogistic process to deduce from given or cer- 
tain premises so-called “theological conclusions ;” 
and (d) to make plausible, though, of course, 
not to explain fully, to our weak human reason, 
by means of philosophical meditation, and espe- 
cially of proofs from analogy, the dogmas and 
mysteries of the faith. These four points, 
since St. Anselm’s day, constituted the pro- 
gramme of mediaeval Scholasticism.** In order 
to do full justice to its specific task, dogmatic 
theology must combine both methods, the posi- 
tive and the Scholastic; that is to say, it must 
not limit itself to ascertaining and expound- 
ing the dogmas of the Church, but, after ascer- 
taining them and setting them forth in the most 
luminous manner possible, must endeavor to 
adapt them’as much as can be to our weak human 
reason. 


The great mediaeval Scholastics, notably St. Thomas 
Aquinas and St. Bonaventure, treated what are called 
dogmatic truths as generally known data;—a safe pro- 
cedure in those days because collections of Biblical and 
Patristic proofs for each separate dogma were then in 
the hands of every student. As the most useful in- 


strument for the speculative treatment of dogma, they 


seized upon, not the Platonic philosophy, but the system 
elaborated by the great Stagirite. In preferring Aris- 
13 Cfr. J. Kleutgen, Theologie der 14 Cfr. Pesch, S. J., Praelectiones 


Vorzeit, 2nd ed., V, 1 sqq. Miin- Dogmaticae, Vole I, 3rd ed., p. 24. 
ster 1874. Friburgi 1903. 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION II 


totle, Scholasticism did not, however, antagonize the 
Fathers and early ecclesiastical writers, who, as is well 
known, had a strong predilection for Plato. Both Plato 
and Aristotle may be said to lean on their common 
master, Socrates, who had grasped with rare acumen 
the fundamentals of natural religion, wherefore Socratic 
philosophy, despite its incompleteness, has justly been 
extolled as the “Philosophia perennis.” * It cannot 
be denied, however, that theology in all its branches, owes 
a wholesome impulse to modern philosophy, which, espe- 
cially since Immanuel Kant (d. 1804), sharpened the 
critical spirit in method and argumentation, deepened the 
treatment of many dogmatic problems, and made “ the- 
oretical doubt ” the starting-point of every truly scientific 
inquiry. Since the Protestant Reformation threw doubt 
upon, nay even denied the principal dogmas of the 
Church, dogmatic theology has been compelled to lay 
stress upon demonstration from positive sources, 
especially from Holy Writ. A fusion of the positive 
with the Scholastic method of treatment was begun 
as early as the seventeenth century by theologians 
like Gotti and the Wirceburgenses, and their ex- 
ample has found many successful imitators in modern 
times (Franzelin, Scheeben, Chr. Pesch, Billot, and 
others). To the works of these authors must be added 
the commentaries on the writings of Aquinas by Car- 
dinal Satolli, L. Janssens, and Lépicier. For reasons 
into which it is not necessary to enter here, the series 
of dogmatic text-books of which this is. the first, while 
it will not entirely discard the speculative method of 
the Scholastics, which postulates rare proficiency in dia- 


15 Cfr. E. Commer, Die immerwihrende Philosophie, Wien 1899. 


I2 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 


lectics and a thorough mastery of Aristotelian meta- 
physics, as developed by the Schoolmen, will employ 
chiefly the positive method of the exact sciences.2® 


Mystic theology is not an adversary but a sis- 
ter of Scholastic theology. While the latter 
appeals exclusively to the intellect, mysticism ad- 
dresses itself mainly to the heart. Hence its ad- 
vantages, but also its perils, for when the in- 
tellect is relegated to the background, there is 
danger that unclear heads will drift into pan- 
theism, as the example of many of the exponents 
of later mysticism shows.'7 It must be remarked, 
however, in this connection that the greatest 
mystics, like St. Bonaventure, Richard and Hugh 
of St. Victor, and St. Bernard, were also thor- 
ough-going Scholastics. 

4. SUBDIVISION oF Sprctat DocMaATiIc THE- 
oLocy.—The principal subject of dogmatic the- 
ology as such is not Christ,!® nor the Church,” 
but. God. Now, God can be considered from a 


16 As helpful aids we can recom- 
mend: Signoriello, Lexicon peripa- 
teticum philosophico-theologicum, 
Neapoli 1872; L. Schitz, Thomas- 
Lexikon, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1895. 
On the subject of the “ philosophia 
berennis,” see especially O,. Will- 
mann, Geschichte des Idealismus, 3 
vols., 3rd _ed., Braunschweig 1908. 

17 Cfr. Proposit. Ekkardi a. 1329 
damn. a Ioanne XXII, apud Denzi- 
ger-Stahl, Enchird., ed, 9, n. 428 
sqq., Wirceburgi 1900. 


18 Cfr, J. Zahn, Einfiihrung in 
die christliche Mystik, Paderborn 
1908; A. B. Sharpe, Mysticism: 
Its True Nature and Value, London 
IQIO. 

19-Cfr. t Cor. III, 22 sq. “ Om- 
nia enim vestra sunt, ... vos 
autem Christi; Christus autem Dei 
—for all things are yours, . 
and you are Christ’s; and Christ is 
God’s.” 

20 Cfr. Kleutgen, J. c., pp. 24 sq. 


~ 


ee, ee 


ae ee 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION 13 


twofold point of view: either absolutely, in His 
essence, or relatively, in His outward activity 
(operatio ad extra). Dogmatic theology is ac- 
cordingly divided into two well-defined, though 
quantitatively unequal parts: (1) the doctrine 
of God per se, and (2) that of His operation ad 
extra. 

The first part may again be subdivided into 
two sections, one of which treats of God con- 
sidered in the unity of His Nature (De Deo Uno 
secundum naturam), the other of the Trinity of 
Persons (De Deo Trino secundum personas). 
His operation ad extra God manifests as Creator, 
Redeemer, Sanctifier, and Consummator. Dt1- 
vine Revelation, so far as it regards the created 
universe, includes the creation of nature, the es- 
tablishment of the supernatural order and the fall 
from that order of the rational creatures—4. e., 
menandangels. The treatise on the Redemption 
(De Verbo Incarnato) comprises, besides the re- 
vealed teaching on the Person of our Saviour 
(Christology), the doctrine of the atonement 
(Soteriology), and of the Blessed Mother of 
our Lord (Mariology). In his rdle of Sanc- 
tifier, God operates partly through. His invisible 
grace (De gratia Christi), partly by means of 
visible, grace-conferring signs or Sacraments 
(De Sacramentis, in genere et in specie). The 


14 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 


dogmatic teaching of the Church on God the 
Consummator, is developed in Eschatology (De 
Novissums). Into this framework the entire 
body of special dogma can be compressed. 


Reapincs:—S. J. Hunter, S. J., Outlines of Dogmatic The- 
ology, I, 1 sqq.— Wilhelm-Scannell, A Manual of Catholic The- 
ology, London, 1899, I, xvii sqq.— Schrader, S. J., De Theologia 
Generatim, Friburgi 1861.— Kihn, Enzyklopddie und Methodologie 
der Theologie, Freiburg 1892.—C. Krieg, Enzyklopddie der 
theol. Wissenschaften, nebst Methodenlehre, 2nd ed., Freiburg 
1910.— D. Coghlan in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, s. v. 
“ Dogma.”— J. H. Newman, The Idea of a University, Disc. 2 
sqq. New edition, London 1893.— Hettinger-Stepka, Timothy, 
or Letters to a Young Theologian, pp. 351 sqq., St. Louis 1902.— 
T. B. Scannell, The Priest's Studies, pp. 63 sqq., London 1908.— 
F. J. Hall (Anglican), Introduction to Dogmatic Theology, New 
York 1907.— J. Pohle, art. “ Theology” in the Catholic Encyclo- 
pedia, Vol. XIV, pp. 580-597.— J. B Hogan, S.S., Clerical Studies, 
and ed., Boston s. a., pp. 151-196. 


GOD 
HIS KNOWABILITY, ESSENCE, 
AND ATTRIBUTES 


PREFATORY REMARKS 


Here below man can know God only by anal- 
ogy; hence we are constrained to apply to Him 
the three scientific questions: An sit, Quid sit, 
and Qualis sit, that is to say: Does He exist? 
What is His Essence? and What are His quali- 
ties or attributes? Consequently in theology, as 
in philosophy, the existence, essence, and at- 
tributes of God must form the three chief heads 
of investigation. The theological treatment 
differs from the philosophical in that it con- 
siders the subject in the light of supernatural 
Revelation, which builds upon and at the same 
time confirms, supplements, and deepens the con- 
clusions of unaided human reason. Since the 
theological question regarding the existence of 
God resolves itself into the query: Can we 
know God?—the treatise De Deo Uno naturally 
falls into three parts: (1) The knowability of 
God; (2) His essence; and (3) His divine 


properties or attributes. 


15 


PART I 
THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD 


CHAPTERTT 


HUMAN REASON CAN KNOW GOD 


Human reason is able to know God by a con- 
templation of His creatures, and to deduce His 
existence from certain facts of the supernatural 
order. 

Our primary and proper medium of cognition 
is the created universe, 4. ¢., the material and 
the spiritual world. 

In defining both the created universe and the 
supernatural order as sources of our knowledge 
of God, the Church bars Traditionalism and at 
the same time Atheism, though the latter no 
doubt constitutes a ‘splendid refutation of the 
theory that the idea of God is innate. 


16 


SECTION 3 


MAN CAN GAIN A KNOWLEDGE OF GOD FROM 
THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE 


ARTICLE ‘5 


THE POSITIVE TEACHING OF REVELATION 


In entering upon this division of our treatise, 
we assume that the reader has a sufficient ac- 
quaintance with the philosophic proofs for the 
existence of God, as furnished by theodicy and 
apologetics." As against the attempt of atheists 
and traditionalists to deny the force and strin- 
gency of these proofs, Catholic theology staunch- 
ly upholds the ability of unaided human reason 
to know God. Witness this definition of the 
Vatican Council:? “Si quis dixerit, Deum 
unum et verum, creatorem et Dominum nostrum, 
per ea quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanae 
lumine certo cognosci non posse, anathema sit— 
If any one shall say that the one true God, our 
Creator and Lord, cannot be certainly known by 


1Cfr. Hontheim, S. J., Theodi- 1890; B. Boedder, S. J., Natural 
caea s. Theol. Naturalis, Friburgi Theology, 2nd ed., London 1899; 
1893; Fr. Aveling, The God of Phi- J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: 
losophy, London 1906; C. Gutber- God, New York 1904, 
let, Theodicee, 2nd ed., Minster 2 Sess. III, de Revel., can. 4. 


17 


18 THE TEACHING OF REVELATION 


the natural light of human reason through 
created things; let him be anathema.” Let us 
see how this dogma can be proved from Holy 
Scripture and Tradition. | 

1. THE ARGUMENT FROM SACRED SCRIPTURE. 
—a) Indirectly the possibility of knowing God by 
means of His creatures can be shown from Rom. 
II, 14 sqq.: “Cum enim gentes, quae legem non 
habent,? naturaliter ea quae legis sunt facwnt,* 
eiusmodi legem non habentes tpst sibt sunt lex: 
qui ostendunt opus legis,®> scriptum im cordibus 
suis, testimonium reddente illis conscientia tpso- 
rum et inter se invicem cogitationibus,® accusan- 
tibus aut etiam defendentibus, in die cum wudicabit 
Deus occulta hominum secundum Evangelium 
meum, per Iesum Christwm—For when the Gen- 
tiles, who have not the law, do by nature those 
things that are of the law; these having not the 
law are a law to themselves: who shew the work 
of the law written in their hearts, their con- 
science bearing witness to them, and their 
thoughts among themselves accusing, or also 
defending one another, in the day when God 
shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ, 
according to my gospel.’ 


The “law ” (lex, vones) of which St. Paul here speaks, 
is identical in content with the moral law of na- 


3@6vn Ta un vomov ExorTa, 5 pyov vémov- 
4 picet TA TOV vOpoVv Towa, 68 ray oyiouwr. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 19 


ture;‘the same which constituted the formal subject- 
matter of supernatural Revelation in the Decalogue. 
Hence, considering the mode of Revelation, there is a 
well-defined distinction, not to say opposition, between 
the moral law as perceived by unaided human reason, 
and the revealed Decalogue. Whence it follows, against 
the teaching of Estius, that “ gentes,’ in the above- 
quoted passage of St. Paul, must refer to the heathen, in 
the strict sense of the word, not to Christian converts 
from Paganism. For, one who has the material con- 
tent of the Decalogue “written in his heart,” so that, 
without having any knowledge of the positive Mosaic 
legislation, he is “a law unto himself,’ being able, con- 
sequently, to comply “naturally” with the demands of 
the Decalogue, and having to look forward on Judgment 
Day to a trial conducted merely on the basis of his own 
conscience,—such a one, I say, is outside the sphere of 
supernatural Revelation.® 


From this passage of St. Paul’s letter to the 
Romans we argue as follows: ‘There can be no 
knowledge of the natural moral law derived from 
unaided human reason, unless parallel with it, 
and derived from the same source, there runs a 
natural knowledge of God as the supreme law- 
giver revealing Himself in the conscience of 
man. Now, St. Paul expressly teaches that the 
Gentiles were able to observe the natural law 
“naturaliter’—“by nature’—1. e., without the 


7 Cfr. Rom. II, 21 sqq. egetical difficulties raised by St, 
8 Cfr. the commentaries of Bisp- Augustine and Estius, see Franzelin, 
ing and Aloys Schafer on St. Paul’s De Deo Uno, thes. 4. 
Epistle to the Romans. On the ex- 


20 THE TEACHING OF REVELATION 


aid of supernatural revelation. Since no one 
can observe a law unless he knows it, St. Paul’s 
supposition obviously is that the existence of 
God, qua author and avenger of the natural law, 
can likewise be known “naturaliter,’ that is to 
say, by unaided human reason. 

b) A direct and stringent proof for our thesis 
can be drawn from Wisdom XIII, 1 sqq., and 
Rom. I, 18 sqq. 

a) After denouncing the folly of those “in 
whom there is not the knowledge of God,” ® the 
Book of Wisdom continues (XIII, 5 sq.): “Ad 
magnitudine enim speciet et creaturae * cognos- 
cibiliter** poterit creator horum videri.'* . 
Iterum autem nec lis debet tgnosci; si enim 
tantum potuerunt scire, ut possent aestimare 
saeculum,’* quomodo huius Dominum non fa- 
cilius “* invenerunt?—For by the greatness of 
the beauty, and of the creature, the creator of 
them may be seen, so as to be known thereby. 
i But then again they are not to be par- 
doned; for if they were able to know so much 
as to make a judgment of the world, how did 
they not more easily find out the Lord thereof?” 
A careful analysis of this passage reveals the 
following line of thought: The existence of 


9“ In quibus non est scientia Dei.” 12 Pewpei rac, 
10 By hendyadys for “ beauty of 13 groxdoacba Toy aldva, i. e., 
the creature.” to explore the visible world. 


11 dvaddyws. 14 rdx tov, 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 21 


God is an object of the same cognitive faculty 
that explores the visible world,—. e., human 
reason. Hence the medium of our knowledge 
of God can be none other than that same ma- 
terial world, the magnitude and beauty of 
which leads us to infer that there must be a 
Creator who brought it forth. Such a knowl- 
edge of God is more easily acquired than a 
deeper knowledge of the creatural world; in 
fact, absence of it would argue unpardonable 
carelessness. As viewed by the Old Testament 
writer, therefore, nature without any extraneous 
aid on the part of Revelation or any special illum- 
ination by supernatural grace, furnishes sufficient 
data to enable the mind of man to attain to a 
knowledge of the existence of God. | 

B) We have a parallel passage in the New 
Testament,—Rom. I, 18 sqq., which reaches its 
climax in verse 20: “Jnvisibilia enim ipsius 
[sctl. Det] a creatura mundi per ea, quae facta 
sunt, mtellecta conspiciuntur *° sempiterna quo- 
que ews virtus et divinitas, ita ut sint inexcusa- 
biles *°—For the invisible things of him [God] 
from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, 
being understood by the things that are made; 
his eternal power also, and divinity: so that they 
are inexcusable.” In other words:—God, Who 


15 rois woinuact voovmera Kabeo- 16 dvarohoynrot. 
parat, 


22 THE TEACHING’ OF REVELATION 


is per se invisible, after some fashion becomes 
visible to human reason (voovpeva xafopara), But 
how? Not by positive revelation, nor yet by the 
interior grace of faith; but solely by means of 
a natural revelation imbedded in the created 
world (rots woujwaow), ‘To know God from nature 
appears to be such an easy and matter-of-fact 
process (even to man in his fallen state), that 
the heathen are called “inexcusable” in: their 
ignorance and are in punishment therefor “given 
up to the desires of their heart unto unclean- 
ness.74 


c) By way of supplementing this argument from Holy 
Scripture we will briefly advert to the important dis- 
tinction which the Bible makes, or at least intimates as 
existing, between popular and scientific knowledge of 
God. The former comes spontaneously and. without 
effort, while the latter demands earnest research and con- 
scientious study, and, where there is culpable ignorance, 
involves the risk of a man’s falling into the errors of 
polytheism, pantheism, etc. We find this same distinc- 
tion made by St. Paul in his sermons at Lystra and 
Athens, and we meet it again in the writings of the 
Fathers, coupled with the consideration that, to realize 
the existence of a Supreme Being men have but to advert 
to the fact that nations, like individuals, are plainly 
guided and directed by God’s Providence. In his 
sermon at Lystra, after noting that God had allowed 
the Gentiles “to walk in their own ways,” that is 
to say, to become the prey of false religions, the Apos- 


17 Rom. I, 18, 24 sqq. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 2% 


tle declares that He nevertheless ** “left not Himself 
without testimony, doing good from heaven, giving 
rains and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food 
and gladness.” 7° Before the Areopagus at Athens, the 
great Apostle of the Gentiles, pointing to the altar dedi- 
cated “ To the Unknown God,” said: “God, who made 
the world, . . . and hath made of one [Adam] all 
mankind, to dwell upon the whole face of the earth, 
determining appointed times and the limits of their habi- 
tation, that they should seek God, if happily they may 
feel after him or find him,?° although he be not far 
from every one of us: for in him we live, and move, 
and are.” 2! In the following verse (29) he calls at- 
tention to the unworthy notion that the Divinity 
is “like unto gold, or silver, or stone, the graving of 
art, and device of man.” Both sermons assume that 
there is a twofold knowledge of God: the one direct, 
the other reflex. The direct knowledge of God arises 
spontaneously in the mind of every thinking man who 
contemplates the visible universe and ponders the favors 
continually lavished by Providence. In the reflexive or 
metaphysical stage of his knowledge of God, on the 
other hand, man is exposed to the temptation wrongly 
to transfer the concept of God to objects not divine, 
and thus to fall into gross polytheism or idolatry.?? 
We have, therefore, Scriptural warrant for holding that 
the idea of God is entirely spontaneous in its origin, 
but may easily be perverted in the course of its scientific 
development.”? 


18 kairo rye = nihilominus. 21 Acts XVII, 24-28. 
19 Acts XIV, 16. 22 Cfr. Wisdom XIII, 6 sqaq. 
20“ Si forte attrectent eum aut 23 Hieron. In ep. ad Tit. I, 10. 


inveniant.” For a further elucidation of the 


24 THE TEACHING OF REVELATION 


2. The Patristic argument may be reduced to 
three main propositions. 

a) In the first place, the Fathers teach that 
God manifests Himself in His visible creation, 
and may be perceived there by man without the 
aid of supernatural revelation. 


Athenagoras calls the existing order of the material 
world, its magnitude and beauty, “pledges of divine 
worship ” ** and adds: “For the visible is the medium 
by which we perceive the invisible.”25 Clement of 
Alexandria, too, insists that we gain our knowledge of 
Divine Providence from the contemplation of God’s 
works in nature, so much so that it is unnecessary to 
resort to elaborate arguments to prove the existence of 
God. “All men,” he says, “Greeks and barbarians, 
discern God, the Father and Creator of all things, un- 
aided and without instruction.” 2° St. Basil 27 calls the 
visible creation “a school and institution of divine 
knowledge.” #8 St. Chrysostom, in his third homily on 
the Epistle to the Romans (n. 2), apostrophizes St. 
Paul thus: “ Did God call the Gentiles with his voice? 
Certainly not. But He has created something which is 
apt to draw their attention more forcibly than words. 
He has put in the midst of them the created world and 
thereby from the mere aspect of visible things, the 
learned and the unlearned, the Scythian and the bar- 
barian, can all ascend to God.” Similarly St. Gregory 
the Great teaches:?® “ Omnis homo eo ipso quod ra- 


subject, see J. Quirmbach, Die 25 Legat. pro Christ., n. 4 sq. 
Lehre des hl. Paulus von der 26 Strom., V, 14. 

natiirlichen Gotteserkenntnis und 27 In Hexaém., hom. 1, n. 6. 
dem natiirlichen Sittengesetz, Frei- 28 SidacKanreiov Kai GOeoyvwalas 
burg 1906. WawWeEevTnpLoy, 


24 évéxupa THs OeocePelas, 29 Moral. xxvii, 5. Cfr. Sprinzl, 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 25 


tionalis est conditus, debet ex ratione colligere, eum 
qui se condidit Deum esse — By the use of his reason 
every man must come to the conclusion that the very 
fact that he is a rational creature proves that his 
Creator is God.” 


b) The Fathers further teach: From even a 
superficial contemplation of finite things there 
must arise spontaneously, in every thinking man, 
at least a popular knowledge of God. 


To explain how natural it is to rise from a con- 
templation of the physical universe to the existence of 
God, some of the Fathers call the idea of God Pian 
innate conviction put by nature in the mind of 
man,” *° a knowledge which is “ not acciired..°t9 Dut 
“a dowry of reason,” *? and which, precisely because 
it is so easy of acquisition, is quite common among men. 
Tertullian calls upon “the soul of the Gentiles” to 
give testimony to God,—not the soul which “has 
learned in the school of wisdom,” but that which is 
“ simplex, rudis, impolita et idiotica.”—“ Magistra na- 
tura,”’ he says, “ anima discipula — Nature is the teacher, 
the soul a pupil.” ®* St. Augustine says that the con- 
sciousness we have of God blends with the very essence 
of human reason: “ Haec est vis verae divinitatis, ut 
creaturae rationali ratione iam utenti non omnino ac 
penitus possit abscondi,; exceptis enim paucis [sc. atheis] 
in quibus natura nimium depravata est, universum genus 
hominum Deum mundi huius fatetur auctorem — For 


Die Theologie der apostolischen 81 ypnua ov didaxrdv, adrouadés, 
Viter, pp. 110 sqq., Vienna 1880. 32 qdagt oUpmuTOS OYos, 
30 §déa éuguTos, éyvvoia EupuTos, 33 De Testim. An., c. 2 et 5. 


mpodrynyis Pvoiky, 
3 


26 .~THE TEACHING OF REVELATION 


such is the energy of true Godhead, that it cannot be 
altogether and utterly hidden from any rational creature. 
For with the exception of a few in whom nature has 
become outrageously depraved, the whole race of man 
acknowledges God as the maker of this world.” 334 
Seeking a deeper explanation, several Fathers CelGs, 
Justin Martyr and St. Basil) have raised the rational 
soul to the rank of an essential image of the Eternal 
Logos, calling it a déyos omepparixés, which irresistibly 
seeks out and finds God in the universe, 


c) The Fathers finally teach that human rea- 
son possesses, both in the visible world of ex- 
terior objects, and in its own depths, sufficient 
means to develop the popular notion of God into 
a philosophical concept. 


The Greek Fathers, who had to combat paganism and 


the heresy of the Eunomians, generally relied on two 
arguments as sufficient to enable any man to form a 
philosophical concept of God; viz., the cosmological and 
the teleological. Augustine’s profounder mind turned 
to the purely metaphysical order of the true, the good, 
and the beautiful, to deduce therefrom the existence 
of Substantial Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.** This 
trend of mind did not, however, prevent him from ac- 
knowledging the validity of the teleological and cos- 


mological argument. “Interroga mundum, ornatum 


coeh, fulgorem dispositionemque siderum, . . in- 
terroga omnia et vide, si non sensu suo Anca tibt 
respondent: Deus nos fecit. Haec et philosophi nobiles 


83a Tract. In Ioa., 106, n. 4. 
84Cfr. Confess., VIII, 17; DeLib. Arbit., II, 12. 


= 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD. 27 


quaesierunt et ex arte artificem cognoverunt. 
Quod curiositate invenerunt, superbia perdiderunt.” *° 


ARTICLE 2 


THE IDEA OF GOD NOT INBORN 


1. THE THEORY THAT OUR IDEA oF Gop Is IN- 
BORN.—Several of the Fathers insisted so 
strongly on the original and spontaneous char- 
acter of our knowledge of God, that a number of 
theologians ** were led to claim Patristic authority 
for the theory of innate ideas evolved by the 
famous Descartes. According to the teaching of 
these theologians, the Patristic concept of God is 
not based upon a conclusion of human reason 
(idea Dei acquisita), but is inborn (1dea Der 
innata). Our “consciousness of God,” says 
Kuhn, is but part and parcel of our “self-con- 
sciousness,” that is to say, it is “a knowledge 
of God founded upon His revelation to the hu- 
man mind.” ** It is a plausible enough theory. 
For as, ¢. g., Justin Martyr terms the idea of 
God “épdurov ry pica Tov avOporwv Sogav,—an opinion 
implanted in the nature of men,” *"* so also Ter- 


35 Serm. 141. Cfr. Schiffini, Dis- natiirliche  Gotteserkenntnis nach 


put. Metaphysicae Specials, II, 61 
sqq. Aug. Taurin. 1888. Copious 
references from the Greek Fathers 
will be found in Petavius, De Deo, 
I, -1 sq-—Cfr. also on the whole 
subject: Van Endert, Der Gottes- 
beweis in der patristischen Zeit, 
Freiburg 1861; K, Unterstein, Die 


der Lehre der kappadozischen Ktr- 
chenviter, Straubing 1903-4. 

36 Thomassin, Tournely, 
Drey, Kuhn. 

37‘ Ein Wissen. von Gott auf 
Grund seiner Offenbarung im 
Geiste.”’ 

37a Apol., II, n. 6. 


Klee, 


28 THE IDEA OF GOD NOT INBORN 


tullian teaches: “Animae enim a primordio con- 
scientia Det dos est, eadem nec alia et in A egyptus 
et in Syris et in Ponticis—From the beginning 
the knowledge of God is the dowry of the soul, 
one and the same amongst the Egyptians, and 
the Syrians, and the tribes of Pontus,” 28 

2. REFUTATION OF THIS THEORY.—The theory 
that the concept of God is inborn in the human 
mind, cannot stand the test of either philosophy 
or theology. Without entering into its philo- 
sophical weaknesses, we will only remark that 
aside from the danger of idealism which it in- 
curs, the very possibility of atheism renders 
this theory improbable. While not perhaps de- 
serving of formal theological censure, it cannot 
escape the note of “hazardousness,” inasmuch as 
it is apt to endanger the dogmatic truth that the 
existence of God is strictly demonstrable on ra- 
tional grounds.*® At any rate it can be shown 
beyond a peradventure that the Patristic teach- 
ing of the primordial character of human belief 
in God, is by no means identical with the theory 
of Descartes, and cannot be construed as an 
argument in favor of the proposition that the 
idea of God is inborn. 

a) In the first place, the assumption that it 

88 Adv. Marcion., I, 10. Cfr. Ot- 89 Cfr. Chr. Pesch, S. J., Prae- 
ten, Der Grundgedanke der Carte- lect. Dogm., t. II, 3rd_ed., Fri- 


Stanischen Philosophie, Freiburg _ burgi 1906, 
1896. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 29 


can be so construed does not harmonize with the 
epistemology of those very Fathers who speak 
of our knowledge of God as “innate.” Clement 
of Alexandria, Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen, 
Augustine and John of Damascus, uniformly 
teach that all our concepts, including those we 
have of God and divine things, in their last 
analysis are drawn from experience by means 
of a consideration of the material universe; hence 
they cannot possibly mean to say that our idea 
of God is inborn.*° 

b) A careful comparison of all the Patristic 
passages bearing on this subject shows that 
the Fathers nowhere assert that our idea of God 
is innate, though they frequently insist on the 
spontaneity with which, by virtue of an uncon- 
scious syllogism, this idea springs from any, 
even the most superficial, consideration of na- 
ture. What is inborn in our mind is not the 
idea of God as such, but rather the faculty readily 
to discover God in His creatures.*’ 


tullians, pp. 166 sqq., Paderborn 
1893. 
41 Gregory of Nazianzus, @é. g., 


“ Ratio a Deo data et om- 


40 Tertullian seems to offer an 
exception; but, like the rest, he 
concludes “‘ ex factitamentis ad fac- 
torem’’ and explains the phrase “a says: 


€ 


primordio,” which might give rise 
to a misunderstanding, as follows: 
“ Deus nunquam ignotus, ideo nec 
incertus, siquidem a_ primordio 
rerum conditor earum cum ipsis 
pariter compertus est, ipsis ad hoc 
prolatis [He created them for the 
purpose] «ut Deus cognosceretur.” 
Cfr. G. Esser, Die Seelenlehre Ter- 


nibus congenita et prima in nobis 
lex omnibusque conserta ad Deum 
nos deducit ex visibilibus’’? (Orat. 
28, n. 6), which is in perfect ac- 
cord with the teaching of St. 
Thomas Aquinas: “ Dei cognitio 
nobis dicitur innata esse, in quan- 
tum per principia nobis innata de 
facili percipere possumus Deum 


- 130 THE IDEA OF GOD NOT INBORN 


3. THE NEcEssity oF PrRovING THE Exist- 
ENCE OF Gop.—If the idea we have of God is not 
inborn, but owes its origin to a consideration of 
the cosmos, it necessarily follows that the exist- 
ence of God must be demonstrated syllogistically. 


a) The knowableness of God, as taught by Holy 
Seripture and the Church, ultimately resolves itself into 
His demonstrability. To question the validity of the 
ordinary proofs for the existence of God, and to say, 
as €. g. W. Rosenkranz says:*? “The so-called meta- 
physical proofs, which theology has hitherto employed, 
have one and all failed when put to a critical test,’— 
is to advocate scepticism and to miss the meaning in- 
tended by the Church. If no conclusive argument for 
the existence of God had yet been found, it would be 
safe to say that none such exists, and that the case is 
hopeless. Gregory XVI obliged Professor Bautain, of 
Strasbourg, to assent to the thesis: “ Ratiocinatio Dei 
existentianr cum. certitudine probare potest.” (Sept. 8, 
1840.) In 1855 the Congregation of the Index ordered 
Bonnetty to subscribe this proposition: ‘“ Ratiocinatio 
Det existentiam, animae spiritualitatem, hominis liberta- 
iem cum certitudine probare potest.’ *® The anti-Mod- 
ernist oath of Pius X expressly mentions the demonstra- 
bility of God. 

b) If we inquire into the nature of the middle term 
that is indispensable to a valid syllogistic argument for 
the existence of God, we find that Sacred Scripture and 
the Fathers agree that we must ascend to God a po- 


esse” (In Boéth. De Trin., prooem., 
qu... I, arts. 3, ad,’6)./ Cfr. Kleut- 
gen, Philosophie der Vorzeit, Ab- 
handl, 1 and 9; Franzelin, De Deo 
Uno, thes. 7; Heinrich, Dogmat. 


Theologie, Vol. III, § 140. 

42 Die Prinzipien der Theologie, 
p. 30, Miinchen 1875, 

48 Cir, St. Thomas, Contra. Gent., 
Ty 12; 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 31 


steriort, 1. e., from the material world that surrounds us. 
This fact alone would explain the distrust which the- 
ologians have ever shown towards the a priori or on- 
tological argument of St. Anselm.** Of the other 
proofs for the existence of God, it may be noted that 
two, namely, first, that which from the consideration 
of possible or contingent beings passes on to the conclu- 
sion that at least one necessary being exists; and, sec- 
ondly, that commonly called teleological, which draws 
this conclusion from order and beauty in the physical 
universe, are imposed on us both by Holy Writ. and 
the teaching of the Fathers. Nor, as the example of 
St. Paul shows,** can the moral and historical proofs 
(conscience, providence) be brushed aside as lacking 
cogency. Whence it appears that these arguments 
cannot easily be improved, except perhaps with regard 
to method, and by formulating them with greater 
precision. Since it is not the object of Revelation 
to furnish an exhaustive course of proofs for the ex- 
istence of God, such other arguments as that of St. 
Augustine based upon the metaphysical essences, and 
the one drawn from man’s desire for happiness, must 
also be accepted as valid, provided, of course, they do 
not move in a vicious circle. 

c) The a posteriori demonstrability of God is con- 
firmed by the great theological luminaries of the Middle 
Ages. Thus St. Thomas Aquinas, the Prince of Scho- 
lastic theologians, teaches: “Simpliciter dicendum est, 
quod Deus non est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur; 
sed magis per creaturas in Det cognitionem venimus, 
secundum illud Apostolt ad Romanos (I, 20): Invisi- 


44 Cfr. St. Thomas, De Verit., qu. ‘45 Rom. II, 14 sqq.; Acts XIV, 
10, art. 12. 16; XVII, 24 sqq. 


32 THE IDEA OF GOD NOT INBORN 


bilia Dei per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. 
Primum autem quod intelligitur a nobis secundum statum 
praesentis vitae, est quidditas ret materials.” ** That 
St. Anselm’s view, apart from his ontological argument, 
was in substantial agreement with that of St. Thomas, 
has been established by Van Weddingen.** 


Reapincs:—Cfr. the compendiums of Hurter, Wilhelm- 
Scannell, and Hunter.—*Franzelin, De Deo uno, ed. ga, 
Romae 1883.*—Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, Ratisbonae 1881.— 
Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. III, Mayence 1883.— 
*Scheeben, Katholische Dogmatik, Vol. I, Freiburg 1873.—*De 
San, De Deo uno, 2 vols., Lovanii 1894-97. *Stentrup, De Deo 
uno, Oeniponte 1878.—*L. Janssens, O. S. B., De Deo uno, 2 
tomi, Friburgi 1900——A. M. Lépicier, De Deo uno, 2 vols., 
Parisiis 1900.— Ronayne, S. J., God Knowable and Known, 2nd 
ed., New York 1902.— D. Coghlan, De Deo Uno et Trino, Dub- 
linii 1909.— P. H. Buonpensiere, O. P., Comment. in r P. (qu. 1- 
23) S. Thomae Aquinatis, Romae 1902— Chr. Pesch, S. J., 
Prael. Dogmat., Vol. II, ed. 3a, Friburgi 1906.—R. F. Clarke, 
S. J., The Existence of God, London 1892.— Delloue-Leahy, So- 
lution of the Great Problem, New York 1917, pp. 55 sqq.— Of the 
Scholastics, especially St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 1 saqq. 
and Summa contra Gentiles, 1. I, cap. 10 sqq. (Rickaby, Of God 
and His Creatures, London 1905, pp. 9 sqq.) ; also the treatises of 
Suarez, Petavius, and Thomassin, De Deo Uno, and Lessius, De 
Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis, ed. nova, Parisiis 1881.— The 
teaching of Franzelin and Palmieri is summarized in English 
by W. Humphrey, S. J., in “ His Divine Majesty,’ or the Living 
God, London 1897.— Other references in the text.48 


46S. Theol., 1a, qu. 84, art. 7. 
47 Essat critique sur la philosophie 


name indicates that his treatment of 
the question is especially clear and 


de S. Anselme, chap. 4, Bruxelles 
1875. See also Heinrich, Dogm. 
Theologie, Vol. III, § 137; A. 
Konig, Schépfung und  Gotteser- 
kenntnis, Freiburg 1885; and E. 
Rolfes, Die  Gottesbewetse bei 
Thomas von Aquin und Aristoteles, 
Koln 18098. 

48 The asterisk before an author’s 


thorough. As St. Thomas is invari- 
ably the best guide, the omission of 
the asterisk before his name never 
means that we consider his work in 
any way inferior to that of others. 
There are vast stretches of dogmatic 
theology which he scarcely ever 
touched. 


SECTION’ 2 


OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AS DERIVED FROM THE 
SUPERNATURAL ORDER 


In relation to our knowledge of God the facts 
of the supernatural order may be viewed from a 
twofold coign of vantage: either as premises for 
a syllogism demonstrating the existence of God 
from the standpoint of human reason; or as a 
preamble to supernatural faith in God (actus 
fidei in Deum), which, being a cognitio Dei per 
fidem, differs essentially from the cognitio Det 
per rationem. 


ARTICLE "x 


THE FACTS OF THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER CONSIDERED AS 
PREMISES FOR UNAIDED REASON 


I. STATE OF THE QuEsTion.—Both nature and 
the supernatural order,—the latter even more 
convincingly than the former,—prove that there 
is a God. The arguments which can be drawn 
from the supernatural order—the fulfilment of 
prophecies, miracles (in the Old and the New 
Testament), Christ and His mission,—are his- 

33 


S34 THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 


torical, and therefore appeal most forcibly to the 
student of history, though scarcely any eee 
mind can escape their force. 

We must call particular attention to the 
fact that the proofs for the existence of God 
drawn from the supernatural deeds of the Al- 
mighty Himself, are really and truly arguments 
based on reason, and hence do not differ essen- 
tially from others of the same class. They all 
depend for their validity upon the law of cau- 
sality. But the proofs here under consideration 
possess the twofold advantage of being (1) more 
petfect-and (2) more.eftective. They are (1) 
more perfect, because the supernatural effects 
wrought by God far surpass those of the purely 
natural order, inasmuch as greater effects point 


to a more perfect cause. They are (2) more 


effective, because they are based, not upon every- 
day phenomena constantly recurring in accord- 
ance with Nature’s laws, but upon rare and 
startling facts (such as prophecies and mira- 
cles) which cannot fail to impress even those 
who pay little heed to the glories of Nature. 

2. SKETCH OF THE ARGUMENT.—From the 
mass of available material we will select three 
prominent phenomena, which prove the existence 
of a Supreme Being. 


a) The first is the history of the Jews under the 
Old Covenant. As the Chosen People of God for two 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 35 


thousand years they led a religious, social, and political 
life radically different from that of the heathen nations 
around them. It was not due to a racial predisposition, 
such as é. g. a monotheistic instinct, that the Jewish 
people, encompassed by pagan nations, were able to pre- 
serve their peculiar belief, constitution, and discipline ; 
for was not the inclination to practice idolatry one of 
their chief faults? The true explanation is that all their 
peculiarities were traceable to supernatural causes,— 
a long, unbroken chain of prophecies and miracles, visi- 
ble apparitions of a hidden Power to individuals (Moses) 
and to the whole people (the laws given on Mount 
Sinai). The entire Old Testament is a most wonderful 
revelation of God and His attributes, and furnishes 
cogent proof for the existence of an almighty and gra- 
cious sovereign.? 

b) Secondly, there is the person of Jesus Christ. 
Cfr. Heb. I, 1, 2: “ Multifariam multisque modis olim 
Deus loquens patribus in prophetis, novissime diebus istis 
locutus est nobis in Filio, quem constituit haeredem um- 
versorum, per quem fecit et saecula— God, who at sun- 
dry times and in divers manners spoke, in times past 
to the fathers by the prophets, last of all, in these days 
hath spoken to us by his Son, whom he hath appointed 
heir of all things, by whom also he made the world.” 
The Old Testament was plainly a mere preparation for 
the New. In the person of the Messiah, God appeared 

1Cfr. F. H. Reinerding, Theolo- by a number of eminent As- 
gia Fundamentalis, pp. 112 sqq., syriologists. For information on 
Monasterii 1864.— Frederick De- this intricate subject, which has 
litzsch’s recent attempt (Babel und called forth a veritable flood of 
Bibel, Leipzig 1902), to trace the books and pamphlets, the reader 
genesis of Jewish monotheism and is referred to J. Nikel, Genesis 
the Mosaic revelation back to the und Keilschrififorschung, Freiburg 


civilization and culture of ancient 1903. 
Babylon was promptly frustrated 


36 THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 


bodily on earth. His wondrous conception, His miracles 
and prophecies, His superhuman teaching, His  insti- 
tuting the Church, His resurrection and ascension, tri- 
umphantly prove Christ to be what He claimed to be: 
the true Son of God. Hence God exists. Historians 
and philosophers are constrained to acknowledge in the 
words of the Evangelist (John I, 14): ‘And we saw 
His glory, the glory as it were of the only begotten of 
the Father, full of grace and truth.” Like the two 
hands of a clock, universal history, before and after 
Christ, gives testimony of Jesus: antiquity pointing for- 
ward as a “ paedagogus ad Christum,”’ while the Chris- 
tian era points backward to indicate fulfilment. The 
Incarnation represents the climax and culmination of 
God’s self-revelation to humankind. Thus Christ is in 
very truth the axis of the universe and of universal 
history, the living proof of Theism.? 

c) A third argument is derived from the wonderful 
religious and moral regeneration of the Mediterranean 
races wrought by the influence of Christianity in the 
first three centuries of its existence. Oppressed by 
the “shadow of death,’ the Gentiles before Christ 
walked in the ways of evil and darkness, or, as St. 
Paul puts it, God “in times past suffered all nations 
to walk in their own ways.” * The fourth century of 
the Christian era found these same nations radically 
changed — they had become “a new generation” walk- 
ing in “the way of the cross,” “burning what they 
had previously adored.” The bloody persecutions of 
the Czsars had proved so ineffective in stamping out 
the new religion, that Tertullian was able to exclaim: 


8 Cfr. Didon, Jesus Christ, Lon- of Christ, New York 1906. . 
don 1897; Bougaud, The Divinity 4 Acts XIV, 15. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 37 


“Sanguis martyrum semen Christianorum.’ Leaving 
aside all other considerations, from the purely histor- 
ical point of view alone such a radical transforma- 
tion of the family, and of economic and political life, 
the conversion of the masses, and their preservation 
in a state of moral purity such as the world had never 
known before, demand an adequate explanation. Where 
are we to seek for this explanation? Surely not in the 
circumstances, either extraneous or internal, of the re- 
generated masses themselves. For both in doctrine and 
morals Christianity was the antithesis of paganism, and 
therefore could not possibly have developed from it. 
All attempts to derive the Christian religion from rem- 
nants of Oriental beliefs or the philosophic theories of 
the Greeks (Stoicism, Neo-Platonism, Philo) have ut- 
terly failed. Far from aiding in the regeneration of the 
corrupt masses under the Roman Empire, philosophy 
made common cause against Christianity with a fanatical 
Jewry and a paganism already in the grip of death. Nor 
did the new religion owe its final triumph to force. The 
tulers of the mighty Empire, far from favoring Christi- 
anity and advancing its spread with the powerful means 
at their command, turned these engines against it as a 
deadly foe, and sought to drown the new faith in the 
life-blood of its adherents.’ It was not until the day of 
Constantine that a change set in. There is no satis- 
factory explanation for all this except that a super- 
human Being guides the destinies of men and lets the 
gentle sun of His providence shine. upon the weak 
and the strong alike. Filled with a conviction of this 
great truth, the unknown author of the Epistle to 
Diognetus * writes: “Ista non videntur hominis opera, 


5Cfr. P. Allard, Ten Lectures on the Martyrs, London 1907. 
6 Epist. ad Diogn., n. 7. 


38 THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 


haec virtus est Dei, haec adventus eius sunt demonstroa- 
tiones.” * 


ARTICLE 2 


THE SUPERNATURAL FACTS AS A PREAMBLE TO OUR BE- 
LIEF IN THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 


“1. STATE OF THE QuEsTION.—The supernat- 
ural facts described in the previous article are 
more than mere arguments of reason for the ex- 
istence of God. Inasmuch as they prove the 
Christian religion to be divine, they are also a 
praeambulum to the supernatural act of faith in 
the existence of God. To work out this argu- 
ment in detail is the business of apologetics.® 


There is another consideration that must be empha- 
sized. Although the Revelation made through Jesus 
Christ is demonstrable on rational grounds, yet it does 
not necessarily compel assent, but may leave the unbe- 
liever entirely unconvinced, whilst it leads the mind of him 
who receives it willingly to the act of faith. Since the 
praeambula fidei form an essential part of divine Revela- 
tion, they enter as a necessary ingredient into this actus 
fidei. From a mere outwork of (subjective) faith they 

7Cfr. B. Jungmann, De Vera the first edition of this work, while 


Religione, pp. 197 sqq., Brugis several times reprinted, has not 
1871; F. Bole, Flavius Josephus kept pace with the thoroughly over- 


tiber Christus und die Christen in 
den jiidischen Altertiimern, Brixen 
1896. 

8 Cfr. Schanz, Apologie des Chris- 
tentums, 3rd ed., Vol. II, Freiburg 
1905. The English translation of 


hauled second and third editions of 
the German original. Recently a 
fourth edition has begun to appear 
under the editorship of Prof. Koch 
of Tibingen, 


ee ee ee 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 39 


become a part of its essence; what was previously an 
historic and apologetic certainty, is transformed into the 
certainty of faith. Nature gives way to the supernatural 
in the heart of man. Objectively, purely rational dem- 
onstration cedes its place to the infallible authority of 
God’s word, while subjectively, a supernatural light in- 
stead of the natural light of reason becomes the source 
of faith.? Like the “ preamble”’ itself, the existence of 
God becomes a formal dogma, to be embraced and held 
with the supernatural certitude proper to faith. 


2. THE EXISTENCE OF GoD AS AN ARTICLE OF 
Faitu.—The knowableness of God being an ar- 
ticle of faith, a fortiori His existence must be 
a dogma. Although, as Heinrich says,** super- 
natural faith is an impossibility unless in the very 
act of faith itself we believe with supernatural 
certainty in the existence and veracity of God, in- 
asmuch as a revelation postulates the existence of 
a revealer ; nevertheless, the fact that there is one 
who reveals constitutes a separate and independ- 
ent article of the “depositum fidei.’ “Si quis 
unum verum Deum, visibilium et invisibilium 
creatorem et Dominum negaverit, anathema sit 
—If any one shall deny one true God, Creator 
and Lord of all things visible and invisible, let 
him be anathema.” *° 

a) In his Epistle to the Hebrews, Sty baa 


9 Cfr. Fr. Hettinger, Fundamental- 9a Dogm. Theol., II, 21. 
theologie, 2nd ed., pp. 853-892, 10 Conc. Vat., Sess. III de Deo, 
Freiburg 1888. can. I. 


40 THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 


declares belief in the existence of God to be an 
indispensable condition of salvation. NHebr. XI, 
6: “But without faith it is impossible to please 
God. For He that cometh to God, must believe 
that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek 
Him.” Here belief in the existence of God is 
coordinated, separately and independently, with 
belief in the truth that He rewards those that 
seek Him. Both these truths are based not only 
on philosophical arguments, but likewise on that 
supernatural faith which is the foundation of 
man’s justification. “De hac dispositione [ad 
justificationem] scriptum est: Credere oportet 
accedentem ad Deum, quia est et inquirentibus se 
remunerator sitt—Concerning this disposition it 
is written: ‘He that cometh to God, must be- 
lieve that He is, and is a rewarder to them that 
seek Him.’”** The examples of faith which 
St. Paul gives in Hebr. XI, 1 sqq., where he 
concludes with a reference to Christ as ‘“‘the au- 
thor and finisher of faith,” 12 admit of no other 
interpretation. 

b) The Fathers reécho this teaching of St. 
Paul, so much so that Suarez '* was able to state 
it as the conviction of the Schoolmen that “Fide 
catholica tenendum est, Deum esse.’ We have 
the most succinct proof for this proposition in 


11 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 6. 13 In 1. p. S. theol. I, 1. 
12 Heb. XI, 1 sqq.; XII, 2. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 4l 


the first article of the Apostles’ Creed: “Credo 
in Deum—moredo eis Ocov,” The paraphrase which 
the Vatican Council gives of this article ** shows 
clearly that “God” here means not the first per- 
son of the Most Holy Trinity (7. e., the Father), 
but God in His absolute essence and inasmuch 
as He is apt to be the object of a sure knowl- 
edge attainable by unaided reason. Thete can 
be no mistake about this; else how account 
for the fact that the canons attached to this 
proposition expressly condemn, not some anti- 
Trinitarian heresy, but atheism, materialism, and 
pantheism. If Atheism is a heresy, the existence 
of God must necessarily be a dogma,—the fun- 
damental dogma upon which all others rest. 
This explains why, as early as 1679, Pope In- 
nocent XI condemned the proposition: “Fides 
late dicta ex testimomo creaturarum simile mo- 
tivo ad justificationem sufficit—Faith in the 
wide sense, that is faith as based upon the testi- 
mony of creatures or some similar motive, suffices 
for justification.” * 


3. KNOWLEDGE vs. FarrH.— It may be objected that if 
the natural cognoscibility of God and the necessity of 
supernatural faith are both supernaturally revealed, these 
dogmas would seem to exclude each other, inasmuch as 
no man can know God for certain by his unaided rea- 
son, and at the same time firmly believe in Him on au- 


14 Conc. Vatican., Constit. de fide, 18 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiri- 
Grits \ dion, ni. 1173. 


4 


42 THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 


thority. At the root of this objection lies the assumption 
that we cannot know a thing and believe it at the same 
time, because, what we believe on the authority of an- 
other we do not know, and what we know we do not and 
cannot believe. It is true St. Thomas ** seems to have 
held that an evident knowledge of God is incompatible 
with belief in Him; but Estius confessed himself unable 
to reconcile this opinion with the teaching of St. Paul 
in Hebr. XI, 6; while St. Bonaventure,17 De Lugo,*8 
Suarez,*? and others, openly defended the contrary. 
Some theologians, like Cardinals De Lugo and d’ Aguirre, 
interpreted St. Thomas in favor of their own dissenting 
view. 

Whatever may have been the Angelic Doctor’s theory 
as to the subjective compatibility of knowledge with 
faith, it seems certain that we are not free to doubt the 
necessity, much less the possibility, of a co-existence of 
both modes of cognition in the same subject, especially 
since St. Paul and the Tridentine Council condition the 
justification of each and every man, whether he be 
learned or ignorant, upon a belief in the existence of 
God. The Vatican Council expressly defines both the 
knowableness of God from the consideration of the phys- 
ical universe, and the necessity of supernatural faith in 
God, as dogmatic truths. Hence we must conclude 
that both modes of cognition can co-exist in the same 
subject without conflicting. Such teaching involves no 
contradiction, for it does not oblige us to hold that we can 
know and believe the same truth under the same aspect or 
from the same point of view. Manifestly the material 
object of both acts (scientia — fides) is the same: ‘‘ God 

16S. Theol. 2a z2ae, qu. 1, art. 53 18 De Fide, disp. 2, sect. 2. 


De Veritate, qu. 14, art. 9. 19 De Fide, disp. 3, sect. 9. 
17 In 3 dist., 24, art. 2, qu. 3. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 43 


exists.’ But between the formal object of the one and 
the formal object of the other, there is this essential 
difference, that rational knowledge depends on the de- 
gree of evidence in the argument, while faith flows 
from the authority of God Himself testifying to His 
own existence2® There is this further difference, that 
to know God by purely natural means does not require 
supernatural grace, while faith, on the other hand, is 
conditioned by the supernatural assistance of the Holy 
Ghost (gratia actus fidei), without which no man can 
have that belief in God which is necessary for sal- 
vation.”* ! 


Reapincs: — Alb. a Bulsano, Instit. Theolog. Dogm. Specials, 
ed, Graun, t. I, pp. 16 sqq., Oeniponte 1893.—Heinrich, Dogmat. 
‘Theologie, Vol. II, § 149— Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 8 sq.— 
W. Humphrey, S. J., “ His Divine Majesty,” pp. 28 sqq., London 
1897, R. Kane, S. J., God or Chaos, London 1912. 


20 Cfr. W. Humphrey, S. J., The point we must refer the student to 
Sacred Scriptures, ch. XIII, Lon- the treatise on Grace, which forms 
don 1894. Volume VII of this English edition 

21 For a fuller treatment of this of Pohle’s dogmatic course. 


SECTION 3 


TRADITIONALISM AND ATHEISM 


ARTICLE: 1 


TRADITIONALISM A FALSE SYSTEM 


I. THE TRADITIONALIST TEACHING.—a) Re- 
duced to its simplest formula, the teaching of 
Traditionalism is this: Tradition and oral in- 
struction (language) are absolutely essential to 
the development of the human race, so much so, 
that without them man can attain to no knowl- 
edge whatever, especially in the domain of re- 
ligion and morality. Consequently, the knowl- 
edge of truth is propagated among men solely 
by oral tradition, and the source and fountain- 
head of all knowledge must be our first par- 
ents, or rather God Himself, who in what is 
called Primitive Revelation committed to Adam 
and Eve the treasure of truth to be kept and 
handed down to their descendants. Inspired by 
the best of intentions, 7. e., to destroy Rational- 
ism, the Traditionalists depreciate the power of 
human reason and exaggerate the function of 
faith. 

44 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 45 


b) In its crudest form?! Traditionalism asserts that 
a man can no more think without language than he 
can see without light— that without language reason 
would be dead and man a mere brute. Hence the 
Creator had to endow man with the gift of speech be- 
fore He could impress upon his mind the ideas of God, 
immortality, liberty, virtue, etc.; and it was only by 
means of language that Adam and Eve were able to 
transmit to their offspring the system of natural re- 
ligion and ethics based upon these ideas. Hence faith 
is the foundation not only of supernatural knowledge 
and life, but likewise of purely human science and rea- 
son. De Lamennais,? the inventor of the “sens com- 
mun’ as the supreme criterion of truth, insisted even 
more emphatically than De Bonald on the necessity of 
Primitive Revelation, from which alone, he says, all 
man’s religious and moral knowledge is derived. Tra- 
ditionalism reappears in a somewhat moderated form 
in the writings of Bonnetty (1798-1879) and P. Ven- 
tura (1792-1861).* Bonnetty admits that human reason 
is able, independently of language and instruction, to 
deal with the truths at least of the material order, but 
that for the fundamental doctrines of metaphysics and 
ethics we are dependent on Revelation. Ventura goes so 
far as to admit that unaided reason can form the basic 
notions of being, substance, causality, virtue, and so 
forth, but his Traditionalistic bent moves him to in- 
sist that these basic notions would needs remain unfruit- 
ful, so far as our natural knowledge of God is con- 
cerned, were it not for the aid of language and instruc- 


1Cfr. De Bonald, Recherches phi- 2 Essai sur VIndifférence en Ma- 
losophiques sur les premiérs objets tigre de Religion, Paris 1817. 


des connaissances morales, Paris 3La Tradition, Paris 1856. 
1817. 


46 TRADITIONALISM 


tion, that is to say, ultimately, Primitive Revelation. 
Traditionalism was still further attenuated by the Lou- 
vain school of Semi-Traditionalists, whose chief repre- 
sentative, Ubaghs,* expressly admits the revealed teach- 
ing that human reason can acquire a knowledge of God 
from the consideration of the physical universe, though 
he hastens to offset his own concession by explaining 
that the full use of reason (in a child) depends essen- 
tially on education and instruction in divine things, and 
that the concept of God which it is the business of edu- 
cation to convey, is derived from the Primitive Revelation 
given to our first parents in Paradise. This theory is 
calculated to raise anew the question as to the extent 
of the cognitive power of human reason, and traces the 
notion of God back to Tradition as its sole source. 
Were it not for its admission that reason can subse- 
quently, by its own powers, perceive the existence (and. 
essence) of God from nature, Traditionalism would 
openly contradict itself. 


2. WuHy TRADITIONALISM IS UNTENABLE.— 
The different systems of Traditionalism are phil- 
osophically and theologically untenable. 


a) Philosophically, the fundamental fallacy of Tra- 
ditionalism lies in the false assumption that language 
engenders ideas, while in matter of fact it is quite 
plain that, on the contrary, language necessarily pre- 
supposes thought and ideas already formed. Man 
must first have ideas before he can express them in 
words. “Verbis nist verba non discimus,” to quote St. 
Augustine, “imo sonum  strepitumque  verborum. 

4Cfr. his Institutiones Philosophi- The Revival of Scholastic Philoso- 


cae. Ubaghs was directly inspired by phy, New York 1909, p. 215. 
Malebranche. Cfr. J. L. Perrier, 5 De Magistro, c. 11. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 47 


. « . Nescio tamen verbum esse, donec quid significet 
sciam. Rebus igitur cognitis, verborum quoque cognitio 
perficitur.” It is quite true that language and instruc- 
tion play an important, nay, a necessary part in the 
formation of ideas, but only in so far as the spoken 
word of parent and teacher leads the child to think 
for himself and supports and aids him in such inde- 
pendent thinking. We may also concede that without 
the family and society no child can fully develop his 
mental faculties. : 

b) From the theological point of view Traditionalism 
is open to the following objections. Inasmuch as it 
denies that reason can attain to a knowledge of God 
from a consideration of nature, and asserts that all our 
knowledge of God is derived from language, human 
tradition, and Primitive Revelation, exaggerated Tradi- 
tionalism manifestly contradicts the teaching of the 
Vatican Council. The milder form usually called Semi- 
Traditionalism runs counter to dogma only in so far 
as it questions the certainty of the knowledge of God 
acquired by unaided reason. It can therefore be squared 
with the dogmatic definition of the Council on condi- 
tion that it be expressly understood that the knowl- 
edge of God handed down among men from generation 
to generation is derived not from Primitive Revelation 
in the strict sense of that term, but from an infused 
primitive knowledge.® 

Of the different Traditionalist schools only one, that 
of Louvain, has made an attempt to interpret Sacred 
Scripture and Tradition in accordance with its teaching. 
Its representatives endeavored to persuade themselves 
that the Bible and the Fathers refer to man as he grows 


@Cfr. Granderath, S. J., Constit. Vaticani ex ipsis eius Actis Ex- 
Dogmaticae SS. Oececum. Concilit plicatae, pp. 36 saqq., Friburgi 1892. 


48 TRADITIONALISM 


up among his fellowmen, and converses with them by 
human methods, and consequently, when they employ the 
phrase “natural knowledge of God,” they do not mean 
that concept of God which each individual human 
being forms anew under the influence of parents and 
instructors, but that concept which, derived from hu- 
man instruction and tradition, has its roots in Primitive 
Revelation and can at most be confirmed and deepened 
by individual consideration of nature. If this explana- 
tion were true, we should have to interpret Wisdom 
XIII, 1 sqq., and Rom. I, 20, thus: A man is inex- 
cusable if he does not know God, for the reason that 
all men derive a knowledge of God from Primitive 
Revelation and are, besides, able to perceive Him in 
nature. Is this the sense of Holy Scripture? We are 
at liberty to assume an elision only when there is rea- 
son to think that a writer has omitted something which, 
being self-evident, did not require express mention. Is 
the indispensableness of tradition, oral instruction, and 
Primitive Revelation self-evident in the passages under 
consideration? Certainly not: hence the sacred writers 
can not have meant to pass this point over per ellipsin. 
This becomes still plainer when we reflect that the 
Traditionalist interpretation is a modern innovation, ex- 
cogitated for the purposes of a philosophical system 
that was entirely unknown in the past, Nor can the 
teaching of the Fathers be quoted in favor of Tradi- 
tionalism, True, the Fathers admit the existence, in 
Paradise, of a Primitive Revelation upon which the 
human race is perpetually drawing; but they never 
regarded this Primitive Revelation as an absolutely 
necessary instrument of education: they merely advert 
to it as an accidental fact with which it is necessary 
to reckon. They insist that the original purity of 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 49 


Primitive Revelation was tarnished among the heathen 
nations, and that the genuine knowledge of God had to 
be constantly rejuvenated in the perennial purity of the 
springs of nature.” 


READINGS: —*Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, p. I, qu. I, art. 3— 
Chastel, S. J., De la Valeur de la Raison Humaine, Paris 1875.— 
Denzinger, Vier Biicher von der religidsen Erkenninis, Vol. I, 
Pp. 149 sqq., Wtirzburg 1856.— For a philosophical appreciation 
of Traditionalism, see Schiffini, S. J., Disput. Metaphys. Spe- 
cialis, Vol. I, n. 338 sqq.; B. Boedder, S. J., Natural Theology, 
pp. 149 sqq., New York 1891; Jos. Hontheim, S. J., Theodicaea, 
pp. 33 sqq., Friburgi 1893. 


ARTICLE 2 


THE POSSIBILITY OF ATHEISM 


1. DEFINITION OF ATHEISM.—Negative Athe- 
ism (Agnosticism, Criticism, Scepticism) holds 
_ that the existence of God is “unknowable,” be- 
cause there are no arguments to prove it. By 
positive Atheism we understand the flat denial of 
the existence of a supreme being apart and dis- 
tinct from the cosmos. Its chief forms are the 
different varieties of Materialism (Sensualism, 
Positivism, Mechanical Monism) and Panthe- 
ism, which constantly assumes new shapes, and 
has therefore been justly likened to Proteus of 
ancient classic mythology. Polytheism and 
Semi-Pantheism (e. g., the “Panentheism” of 


7Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib, VI sq.; Lactantius, Divin. 
Institut? II, 8. 


50 ATHEISM 


Krause) cannot, however, be branded as Athe- 
ism. For though both systems logically culmi- 
nate in the denial of God, their champions in 
some fashion or other hold to the existence of a 
supra-mundane and absolute being ® upon which 
all other beings depend. : 

2. THE PossIBILITY OF ATHEISM AND ITS 
Limits.—Seeing that Holy Scripture, Tradition, 
and the teaching of the Church emphatically in- 
sist on the easy cognoscibility of God, our first 
question, in coming to treat of Atheism, naturally 
is: Is Atheism possible, and how is it possible? 

a) We must, in the first place, carefully dis- 
tinguish between atheistic systems of doctrine 
and individual professors of Atheism. The his- 
tory of philosophy shows beyond a doubt that 
there exist philosophic systems which either ex- 
pressly deny,’ or in their ultimate principles. vir- 
tually exclude,** the existence of God. It must be 
noted, however, that by a happy inconsistency 
the atheistic tendency of these systems often re- 
mains more-or less latent, inasmuch as their ad- 
herents, in spite of atheistic (or pantheistic) 
premises, seek to uphold a belief in God.*° 

In considering the case of individuals who 
profess themselves atheists, the first question to 
suggest itself is not: Are there practical athe- 


8 The Homeric Zeus, Vedic heno- 9a Scepticism, Criticism. 
theism, etc. 10 Ontologism is an example in 
9 Materialism, Pantheism. point. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD SI 


ists? (that is to say, men who live as if there 
were no God), but rather: Can there be the- 
oretical atheists in the positive sense of the 
term? It is certain that no man can be firmly 
and honestly convinced of the non-existence of 
God. For, in the first place, no human being 
enjoying the full use of reason can find a 
really conclusive argument for the thesis that 
there is no God. In the second place, the con- 
sciousness that there is a God, is so deeply in- 
grained in the human heart, and has such a 
tremendous bearing upon life and death, that 
it is impossible for any man to rid himself of 
it for any considerable length of time. Not 
even Agnosticism can plead extenuating cir- 
cumstances. For every thinking man is con- 
strained by the law of causality, consciously or 
unconsciously to form the syllogism: Where 
there is order, some one must exist who pro- 
duced it; now, nature evinces a wonderful order; 
therefore there must exist a superhuman power 
that produced it, namely, God. The prem- 
ises of this simple syllogism must appeal to 
every thinking man, no matter whether he be 
learned or unlettered; and the conclusion flow- 
ing from these premisses forces itself with ab- 
solute cogency on the mind of every one who 
realizes that there can be no effect without a 
cause. Hence it is held as a sententia communis 


52 ATHEISM 


by theologians that no thinking man can be 
permanently convinced of the truth of Atheism. 
This does not, of course, imply that there may 
not exist here and there feeble-minded, idiotic, 
uncivilized human beings who know nothing of 
God. Their ignorance is due to the fact that 
they are unable to reason from effect to cause, 
which reasoning is a necessary condition of ac- 
quiring a knowledge of God from His creatures. 

b) As we have intimated above, even learned 
men may, from quasi-conviction, temporarily 
harbor a species of unbelief; though, of course, 
this always involves grave guilt. “Dixit in- 
sipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus—The fool 
hath said in his heart: There is no God.” *° 
Not scientific acumen nor a desire for truth, but 
folly is the source and fountain-head of Athe- 
ism. In most cases such folly is traceable to a 
corrupt heart, as St. Paul plainly intimates in his 
Epistle to the Romans, and as St. Augustine *°? 
repeats in his commentary on the Psalms: 
“Primo vide illos corruptos, ut possint dicere in 
corde suo: Non est Deus... . Dixerunt enim 
apud se non recte cogitantes. Coepit corruptio 
a mala fide, inde itur in turpes mores, inde in 
acerrimas indigmtates: gradus sunt isti.’ The 
psychological process of apostasy from the faith 


10a Ps, XIII, 1. 10b In Ps. LII, n. 3. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 53 


may be described as follows: First a man begins 
to doubt; then comes a period of practical un- 
belief, nourished sometimes by sensuality, some- 
times by pride, until finally he is deluded into 
theoretical Atheism. Not infrequently moral 
corruption precedes infidelity as a cause. Cfr. 
Eph. IV, 18: “Tenebris obscuratum habentes 
intellectum, alienati a vita Det per ignorantiam, 
quae est in illis propter caecitatem cordis tpsorum 
—Having their understanding darkened, being 
alienated from the life of God through the ig- 
norance that is in them, because of the blindness 
Ot their’ hearts,’’*? 


3. Wuy ATHEISM Is INTRINSICALLY PossIBLE.— Since 
the idea of God is spontaneous and forces itself almost 
irresistibly upon the human mind, purely moral causes 
do not suffice to explain Atheism; there must in each 
instance exist an intellectual factor also. This intel- 
lectual factor must be sought partly in the fallibility of 
human reason, which is controlled by the will, and 
partly in the circumstance that the proofs for the ex- 
istence of God do not produce immediate certainty. On 
the one hand man has it in his power to disregard the 
more or less cogent features of these arguments and 
by concentrating his thoughts on the manifold objec- 
tions raised against them, to delude himself into the 
notion that there is no God. On the other hand, these 
arguments, as we have said, carry no immediate, but 


11 On the psychology of unbelief, | Hettinger-Bowden, Natural Religion, 
see X. Moisant, Psychologie de pp. I sqq. 
VIncroyant, Paris 1908. Cfr. also 


54 - ATHEISM 


only a mediate certainty, inasmuch as the conviction 
which they engender depends upon a long chain of mid- 
dle terms. ! 

The number of real atheists is impossible to ascer- 
tain. It depends on conditions of time, of milieu, of 
degree and method of education, and on various other 
agencies. Our age boasts the sorry distinction of being 
immersed in a flood of Atheism which it may take a 
social revolution to abate.?? 


READINGS: — Segneri, S. J., L’Incredulo senga scusa, Venezia 
1690.— W. G. Ward, Essays on the Philosophy of Theism, 2 
vols., London 1884.—~Kaderavek, Der Atheismus, Wien 1884. 
—L. v. Hammerstein, Edgar, or From Atheism to the Full 
Truth, St. Louis 1903 W. M. Lacy, An Examination of the 
Philosophy of the Unknowable, Philadelphia 1883—A. W. 
Momerie, Agnosticism, London 1889.—Ip., Belief in God, Lon- 
don 1891.—G, J. Lucas, Agnosticism and Religion, Baltimore 
1895.— G. M. Schuler, Der Pantheismus, Wurzburg 1881.— Ib., 
Der Materialismus, Berlin 1890.—E. L. Fischer, Die modernen 
Ersatzversuche fiir das aufgegebene Christentum, Ratisbon 
1903.— H. Schell, Der Gottesglaube und die naturwissenschaft- 
liche Welterkenntnis, Bamberg 1904.—F. Aveling in the Cath- 
olic Encyclopedia, Vol. II, s. v. “ Atheism.”—F. Hettinger, 
Natural Religion, New York 1890—W. S. Lilly, The Great 
Enigma, 2nd ed., New York 1893.—L. A. Lambert, Notes on 
Ingersoll, Buffalo 1883.18—T, Finlay, S. J., “Atheism as a 
Mental Phenomenon” in the Month (1878), pp. 186 sqq. 


12 Cfr. C. Gutberlet, Theodicee, perfectly true that popular speakers 


ond ed., § 2, Miinster 1890; B. Boed- 
der, S. J., Natural Theology, pp. 


76 saqq.. New York 1891; J. T. 
Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: 
God, 2nd ed., pp. 15 sq., New York 
1904, 


13 Father Lambert’s Notes on In- 
gersoll has been published in nu- 
merous editions and shall be men- 
tioned here, though it is, of course, 


and writers of the type of Robert 
G. Ingersoll, while they ‘‘ may 
create a certain amount of un- 
learned disturbance, . . . are not 
treated seriously by thinking men, 
and it is extremely doubtful 
whether they deserve a place in 
any historical or philosophical ex- 
position of Atheism.’’ (Aveling in 
the Catholic Encyclopedia, II, 42.) 


CLAP CNR: EL 


THE QUALITY OF MAN’S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AC- 
CORDING TO DIVINE REVELATION 


The arguments for the existence of God not 
only prove His existence, but at the same time 
reveal each some one or other aspect of the 
Divine Essence.’ Whatever knowledge of the 
Divine Essence we may thus acquire from a 
consideration of finite things, is sure to be 
stamped with the birth mark of the creature. It 
may be ennobled and transfigured by Revelation 
and faith, but its substance is not changed thereby. 
Not until we are admitted to the beatific vision 
in Heaven, does the abstractive and analogous 
knowledge of God acquired here on earth give 
way to that intuitive and perfect knowledge which 
enables us to see the Blessed Trinity as It is. 
Such are the limitations of the created intellect 
that it cannot even enjoy the beatific vision ex- 
cept by means of a specially infused light, called 
“lumen gloriae.” 


1Cfr. S. Thomas, In Boeth. De nist quoquo modo de ea sciatur 
Priniiate, PQ 2, 0rd. 6, arty 13% ‘quid est’ vel cognitione perfecta 
“De nulla re potest scirt ‘an est,’ vel cognitione confusa.” 


55 


56 IMPERFECTION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE 


We shall treat of the two modes of knowing 
God, the earthly and the heavenly, in the next 
two sections, reserving a third section for the 
consideration of Eunomianism and Ontologism. 


SEGLION st 


OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AS IT IS HERE ON EARTH 


In this section we shall consider, (1) the 
imperfection of our knowledge of God here be- 
low; (2) the threefold manner by which man can 
know God, viz.: (a) affirmation or causation, 
inferring the nature of His attributes from the 
nature of His works; (b) negation or remotion, 
excluding the idea of finite limitation; (c) inten- 
sification or eminence, ascribing to God every per- 
fection which is consistent with His infinity, to 
the exclusion of all quantitative and temporal 
measures and comparisons;? and (3) certain 
theological conclusions flowing therefrom. 


ARTICER’ 3 


THE IMPERFECTION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IN THIS 
LIFE 


I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS.—The perfection 
or imperfection of any act of cognition depends 
upon the manner tn which concepts are ac- 
quired. These may be, on the one hand, either 


2Cfr. G. M. Sauvage in the Catholic Encyclopedia, art. “ Analogy,” 
Vol. I, pp. 449 sq. 


57 


58 IMPERFECTION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE 


abstractive or intuitive; or, on the other, either 
analogous or univocal. 


a) An intuitive concept is formed when consciousness 
and intellect put the mind into direct communication with 
objective truth (such is, e. g., the concept of a tree). A 
concept is abstractive—this term must not be con- 
founded with “ abstract ’— when its compound elements 
are derived from some other object or objects, and 
transferred to the object under consideration CAN 20 
the concept of a golden calf). Whence it follows, 
that every intuitive concept is an immediate one (con- 
ceptus immediatus), while an abstractive concept is al- 
ways mediate (conceptus mediatus), because it can 
be gained only by means of other concepts or of syl- 
logistic conclusions. It follows also that an abstractive 
concept can never represent its object adequately, while an 
intuitive concept may, though it does not necessarily do so. 

b) An analogous (conceptus analogus) differs from 
a univocal concept (conceptus univocus) in the same 
way that a metaphorical differs from a proper concept 
(conceptus improprius — proprius). A univocal or 
Proper concept is one which applies to every individual 
comprehended under it in the same sense, as for ex- 
ample the concept “man” applies to Peter, Paul, John, 
etc. An analogous concept, on the other hand, is predi- 
cated of a number of objects partly in the same and 
partly in a different sense, as e. g., “ healthy ” of the 
human body, the color of one’s face, the climate, etc. 

c) Here we shall have to borrow from philosophy 
two important truths. The first is, that all rational 
knowledge is grounded on sense perception, so that the 


8 For further details consult any good text-book of logic. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 59 


material objects of the senses must be said to be the 


primary, proportionate, and adequate object of our in- 


tellect. The second truth is based upon the first: Our 
earthly knowledge of God is not the fountain-head and 
source, but the consummation and climax of human 
cognition.* This gives us the status quaestionis of the 
problem we are studying. If it is true that in this life 
we can acquire a knowledge of God only from the con- 
templation of nature, it follows that our concept of 
Him is not intuitive (immediate, adequate) but abstrac- 
tive (mediate, inadequate). And if the concept we form 
of God does not represent Him as He is in Himself, 
but only analogically, it follows further that our knowl- 
edge of God cannot be univocal, but must, be analo- 
gous. Being abstractive and analogical, then, it must be 
very imperfect —and this imperfection not even super- 
natural belief in God (fides in Deum) can remove.* 


2. THE DoGMA IN SACRED SCRIPTURE AND 
TRADITION.—The imperfection of man’s knowl- 
edge of God here below may be said to be in- 
cluded in the dogma of God’s incomprehensibility 
or inscrutability (dxaradypia), “Deus... m- 
comprehensibilis’;° “Ecclesia credit... Deum 
verum et vivum... incomprehensibilem.” * 
How the term “incomprehensible” is to be under- 
‘stood, and in what the essence of incomprehen- 
sibility consists, the Church has never defined. 


4Cfr. Egger, Propaeg. Philoso- For we walk by faith and not by 
phico-theol., 6th ed., pp. 146 sqq., sight.” 
Brix. 1903. 6Cfr. Conc. Lat. IV, A. D. 1215, 
5 Cfr. 2 Cor. V, 7: “ Sta wiorews cap. “ Firmiter.” ¥ 
yap mepiratovper, o¥ dia evdovs — 7 Conc. Vat., Sess. III, cap. 1. 


60 IMPERFECTION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE 


a) The Scriptural argument, drawn from the 
Old and New Testaments, covers both our nat- 
ural and our supernatural knowledge of God 
(2. é., that based on faith and grace). In the 
Old Testament, besides the Book of Job,® it is 
especially the Sapiential Books which insist that 
we cannot comprehend God while we are way- 
farers on this earth; nay, that He remains in- 
comprehensible to our mind even in the here- 
after, when we enjoy the light of glory.® 

The principal text in proof of our thesis is 
drawn from the New Testament, viz., 1 Cor. XIII, 
12: “Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, 
tunc autem facie ad faciem; nunc cognosco ex 
parte, tunc autem [1. e. in coelo| cognoscam, 
sicut et cognitus sum—We see now through a 
glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. 
Now I.know in part; but then I shall know 
even as I am known.” St. Paul here makes a 
sharp distinction between two modes of knowing 
God, the one earthly, the other heavenly, which 
are opposed to each other (nunc—tunc, épr-— 
tore), Limiting ourselves to the former (the lat- 
ter will engage us later), we find human knowl- 
edge of God here below characterized by three 
essential marks. It is represented first as a “see- 
ing through a glass,” *° a mode of perception di- 


8 Job XI, 7 sqq. clus. XLII, 23 sqq.; Prov. XXV, 27. 
®Cfr, Wisdom IX, 13 sqq.; Ec- 10 Per speculum, 5¢ ésémtpov, 


~ tears. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 61 


rectly opposed to intuitive vision “face to face.” 
As in Rom. I, 20, so here St. Paul describes 
our earthly knowledge of God as an abstractive, 
mediate, inadequate knowledge, which remains a 
vision per speculum even if a man “should have 
all faith.” ** The second mark is “enigmatic,” 
which means that the human mind on earth 
can conceive God only by analogy drawn from 
His creatures; for a proper and univocal con- 
cept of God could not be designated as enig- 
matical or compared to seeing “in a dark man- 
' ner.” This characteristic is completed by the 
third mark, viz., partiality (ex parte, &« pépovs), 
_ which clearly designates our knowledge of God 
as being a knowledge “in part.’ All three of 
_ these notes prove the imperfection of our earthly 
_ knowledge of God as conclusively as they estab- 
_ lish God’s incomprehensibility by the human 
_ mind so long as man lingers in “this vale of 
99 13 

; b) The Fathers of the fourth and fifth cen- 
turies defended this dogma against the Euno- 
mians, who claimed that the human mind is able 
_ to comprehend God adequately here below. They 
defended it first as mere witnesses to the ancient 


_ Tradition, and secondly as philosophers discuss- 


4 ing the How and Why. 


111 Cor. RETA 25 farer’s Vision, pp. 1 sqq., London 
12In aenigmate, év alvlypart, 1909. 
13 Cfr. T. J. Gerrard, The Way- 


62 IMPERFECTION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE 


a) One of the first of these witnesses is St. Justin 
Martyr, who insists both on the incomprehensibility of 
God and the spontaneousness of our concept of Him. 
He says: “That same Being, which is beyond all es- 
sence,’* I say, is unutterable, and inexplicable, but alone 
beautiful and good, coming suddenly into souls well- 
dispositioned, on account of their affinity to and de- 
sire of seeing Him.”?® Gregory of Nyssa appeals to 
the Bible to give testimony against Eunomius: “ All 
those Scriptural expressions which have been invented 
to glorify God, designate something which belongs to 
God,** .. . whereby we are taught, either that He is 
almighty, or insusceptible of corruption, or immense. 
. . . His own essence, however, since it cannot be com- 
prehended by reason, nor expressed in language, He 
has not exposed to curious searching, inasmuch as He 
commanded [men] to venerate silently that which He 
withheld from their certain knowledge.” 17 “By the 
very act of confessing our ignorance,’ according to 
Cyril of Jerusalem, “we profess a deep knowledge of 
God.” 18 Of special importance in this connection are 
the five homilies of St. Chrysostom against the Euno- 
mians, entitled: ‘Of Him Who is Inscrutable.” We 
hear the same string faintly vibrating in the writings of 
the last of the Greek Fathers, for John of Damascus 
teaches: ‘“ The supreme, unutterable, impenetrable Being 
is alone in knowing Itself. True, it is manifest to all 
creatures that God exists; but they are utterly ignorant 
of what He is according to His substance and nature.” 
To quote at least one representative of the Latins, St. 


14 éréxewa mdons ovolas, 17 Contr. Eunom., 12. 
16 Contra Tryph., 4. 18 Catech.,’ Vi, n. 2. 
1674 wept Ocdy—attributes of 19 De Fide Orthod., I, 4. 


God. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 63 


Augustine says beautifully: “Verius enim cogitatur 
Deus quam dicitur, et verius est quam cogitatur — For 
God is more truly thought than He is uttered, and exists 
more truly than He is thought.” *° 

B) ‘In their capacity as metaphysicians, the Fathers 
seek to refute Eunomianism partly by a close analysis 
of the elements that enter into the human conception 
of God, partly by opposing to it a complete theory of 
knowledge. | 

In regard to the first point, the Fathers involved in 
the Eunomian controversy, especially the Cappadocians, 
prove the impossibility of man’s having an intuitive, ade- 
quate knowledge of God here below, by an analysis of 
the logical constituents of the various concepts he is 
able to form of God. Their argument may be summed 
up as follows: A careful classification of all these differ- 
ent concepts shows some of them to be affirmative, while 
others are negative in quality. The affirmative concepts 
connote some perfection, either concrete (é. g., God is 
wise), or abstract (e¢. g., God is wisdom). In the case 
of the former (affirmative), the human mind forms the 
concept of a being in which “ being wise” inheres after 
the manner of an accidental form; in the case of the 
latter (negative) notions, we conceive a form abstracted 
from its subject,—a form, therefore, which does not 
exist as such. Now, this mode of conception is proper 
to creatures, but not to God; for God, as Infinite Be- 
ing, is neither the subject of accidental forms of per- 
fection, nor Himself an abstract form of perfection. He 
is Substantial Wisdom, which is really identical with 
every other divine perfection, though it does not enter 
into any composition, either physical or metaphysical. On 


‘20 De Trinit., VII, 4, 7.— For further references, cfr. Petavius, De Deo; 
I, 5 sqq. 


64 IMPERFECTION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE 


the other hand, the negative concepts we form of God 
deny the existence in Him of any imperfection of the 
kind common to creatures (e. g., God is incorporeal), 
and hence do not express God’s essence such as it is 
in itself. But a concept which, in order to be a true 
concept, must first shed all imperfections, cannot pos- 
sibly claim to be adequate, intuitive, or univocal.?° 

The theory of knowledge elaborated by the Fathers, 
assumes that all our concepts are derived from sense 
perception, and concludes that a concept of God drawn 
from such a source must needs be imperfect. Thus, 
e. g., Gregory of Nyssa argues: “God’s epithets are 
based upon the things He works in us.... But His 
essence is anterior to its operations, and we derive our 
knowledge of these operations from the things we per- 
ceive by our senses,’ *4 The great Basil?? and John 
of Damascus 7° express themselves in like manner. Sev- 
eral of the Fathers go into the subject more deeply, 
anticipating as it were the Scholastic axiom: “ Cogmni- 
tum est in cognoscente non ad modum cogniti, sed ad 
modum cognoscentis,’ and emphasizing the truth that 
“the measure (70 pérpov) of our knowledge of God is 
immanent in man, who is a synthesis of spirit and mat- 
ter;” that is to say, the more perfect the power of 
cognition, the nobler is the resultant act or knowledge. 
Man, ranking midway between angels and brutes, ap- 
prehends the material things below him according to a 
higher, i. e., the notional, mode of being ; but his apprehen- 
sion of the things that are above him (the angels, God) 

20a For the necessary references, kenntnis nach der Lehre der kap- 


see St. Basil, Contra Eunom., lib. padozischen Kirchenvater, Straubing 
I, n. 13 sqq.; Gregory of Nazianzus, 1903-04. 


Orat. theolog., 2; Gregory of Nyssa, 21 Contr. Eunom., 1. XII. 
Contra Eunom., lib. XII. Cfr. K. 22 Ep., 234. 
Unterstein, Die natirliche Gotteser- 23 De Fide Orth., I, 4. 


fy KNOWABILITY OF GOD 65 


is cast in a more imperfect mould.** Consequently, our 
idea of God is necessarily imperfect. 

y) There are on record certain utterances of the 
Fathers which appear to contradict or at least to 
weaken the doctrine we have just propounded. But 
in reality they confirm it. The oft-repeated phrase, 
We know that God exists, but we do not know His 
essence,?> does not mean that we can have no knowledge 
whatever of God, but merely that our knowledge of His 
essence is imperfect. Nor can the Patristic dictum that 
we merely know what God is not, but do not know what 
He is, be cited in support of the Neo-Platonic teaching 
of a purely negative cognoscibility,?® or of Mr. Herbert 
Spencer’s Philosophy (bless the mark!) of the Unknow- 
able. St. Augustine, ¢. g., insists: “Si non potestis 
comprehendere, quid sit Deus, vel hoc comprehendite, 
quid non sit Deus; multum profecerttis, st non aliud 
quam est de Deo senseritis — If ye are not able to com- 
prehend what God is, comprehend at least what God is 
not: you will have made much progress, if you think of 
God as being not something other than He is.”*7 We 
have his own authority #® for explaining, that he merely 
intends to define the sublimity of the divine Essence as 
surpassing all categories of human thought; that is to 
say, he merely emphasizes the purely analogical and 
abstractive character of our knowledge of God. There- 
fore Gregory Nazianzen admonishes us: “It is not 
enough to state what [God] is mot; but he who would 
discover the nature of Him Who is (rod dvros), must 
also define what He is. For he who defines only what 


24 Cfr. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra confessio est, de Deo solum hoc 


Eunom., lib. I. nosse, quod est.” 
25 Cfr. Hilary, In Ps., 129:— 26 Oeds Buds &yvworos,- 
“ Humanae infirmitatis  religiosa 27 Tract. in Ioa., XXIII, n. 9g. 


238 De Trintt., V, 1. 


66 IMPERFECTION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE 


God is not, is like unto a man who would answer the 
question: How much is twice five? by saying: It is 
not one, nor two, etc., omitting to tell his questioner 
that it is ten.” ?° 


c) The dogma here under consideration is 
supported also by the authority of the great 
Scholastic theologians, notably St. Thomas 
Aquinas.*° 


Following in the footsteps of the Fathers, the School- 
men worked out a theory of knowledge which conforms 
not only to the psychology of the thinking mind, but 
likewise to the principles of revealed religion. As the 
foundation of their system they adopted the philoso- 
phy of Aristotle, for the reason that this system — at 
least in its fundamental lines — fitted in best with both 
the nature of the human intellect, and supernatural 
Revelation. Inasmuch as Sacred Scripture and the 
Fathers favor the basic principles of the Aristotelian 
theory of knowledge, this theory can claim our uncon- 
ditional assent, and we must admit that in its essential 
features, aside from incidental details, it cannot be false. 
In making this assertion, we do not, of course, wish to 
advocate a slavish restoration of the ancient psychology, 
nor to condemn every effort at originality in stating and 
developing its principles. Our sole object is to impress 
upon the reader that not every system of psychology 
can be fitted into the framework of revealed theology. 
Thus, e. g., the critical Idealism of Kant, based as it is 
upon radically false premises, cannot be harmonized 
with Revelation. It is a mistake to believe that, by 


29 Orat. Theol., 2.— See also Article 2, infra. 
80 S. Theol., 1a, qu. 12, art. 12, 


Le ee 


a a sg a ee 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 67 


clinging to Scholastic Aristotelianism, the Church puts 
a brake upon theologians who endeavor to clear up 
special questions. On the contrary, was not, for in- 
stance, the psychology of Albertus Magnus, a heteroclite 
amalgam of omnigenous philosophical elements, which 
it required the master mind of an Aquinas to sift and 
transfuse into a coherent system, by eliminating all ex- 
traneous ingredients ? *4 


ARTICLE 2 


THE THREEFOLD MODE OF KNOWING GOD HERE ON EARTH 


I, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—Our previ- 
ous article will receive confirmation from the de- 
tailed exposition, which we now undertake, of 
the manner in which man acquires such knowl- 
edge of God as is vouchsafed him here below. 
He attains to it in a threefold manner: wid 
aftirmationis seu causalitatis (os), wid nega- 
tioms (adbaipers), and wid superlationis seu emi- 
nentiae (*r«poxn). Every one of these methods 
is exceedingly imperfect. As we do not perceive 
God in His own form (in specie propria), but in 
that of some other being (in specie aliena), that 
is to say, by means of analogous concepts derived 


31 Cfr. J. Bach, Des Albertus  lastik, Mainz 1875; A. Otten, Allj- 


Magnus Verhdlinis zu der Erkennt- gemeine Erkenntnislehre des hl. 
nislehre der Griechen, Lateiner, Thomas, Paderborn 1882; De Wulf- 
Araber und Juden, Wien 1881.— Coffey, History of Medieval Phi- 


For a digest of ‘‘the traditional losophy, pp. 304 sq., London 1909; 
theory of knowledge,” see Heinrich, Id., Scholasticism Old and New, pp. 
Dogm. Theol., III, § 141. Cfr. also 124 sqq., Dublin 1907. 

M. Schneid, Aristoteles in der Scho- 


68 THREEFOLD MODE OF KNOWING GOD 


from His creatures, it is plain that our knowl- 
edge of Him must involve many imperfections, 
notably a certain inaccuracy in the notion of God, 
which calls for incessant correction if the judg- 
ments we formulate of God and divine things 
are not to be entirely wrong. When we affirm 
some divine perfection, such as, e. g., wisdom, 
we are immediately constrained to eliminate 
from this perfection, by an act of negation, every 
species of imperfection common to creatures 
(e. g., human wisdom), and furthermore to 
raise the perfection thus purged by a series of 
negations to its superlative degree and into the 
domain of the infinite (e. g., superhuman, abso- 
lute wisdom). This threefold process of affir- 
mation, negation, and intensification, is therefore 
merely a natural and necessary result of the ab- 
stractive and analogous character of our concep- 
tion of God.* 


It appears, then, that we may indeed claim to have 
a knowledge of the divine Essence, but only in a certain 
limited sense. As our earthly knowledge of God is 
neither intuitive nor univocal, we do not apprehend the 
divine Essence in the manner claimed by the Eunomians; 
though, on the other hand, as the Fathers insisted against 
the Gnostics and Neo-Platonists (who would admit the 
possibility of none but a purely negative knowledge of the 
divine Essence), it must be held that our cognition of 


82 Cfr. Sauvage, art. ‘‘ Analogy,” Humphrey, His Divine Majesty, pp. 
in the Catholic Encyclopedia; Ger- 42 sqq. 
rard, The Wayfarer’s Vision, ch. 13 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 69 


God comprises more than merely His abstract existence 
(Sr éorw), inasmuch as we are able, in a limited measure, 
by means of affirmative concepts of quality, to conceive 
the Divine Essence and to distinguish it from all other 
objects (rau wep) @edv). The doctrine that we know 
God by mode of affirmation is held by theologians to 
be “fidei proxima,’ because Holy Scripture applies 
positive as well as negative attributes to the God- 
head. 


2. THESE THREE Mopes oF COGNITION ARE 
INSEPARABLE.—TLhe three modes of knowing God 
which we have just explained, are like parts of 
a cripple’s crutch—the human mind cannot pro- 
ceed by means of any one of them alone, it must 
employ all three simultaneously. 


a) The positive predicates at. which we arrive by 
means of the wa affirmationis, express either a sim- 
ple or a mixed perfection.2* The difference between 
the two classes is, that the concept of a simple per- 
fection (é. g., sanctity), does not include any sort of 
imperfection, while a mixed perfection always connotes 
some defect (e. g., syllogistic reasoning). Now it is 
obvious that no perfection can be affirmed of God that 
has not previously been subjected to a process of logical 
purification. We may not even apply our notions of 
simple perfections unconditionally to God, but only with 
the express restriction that such and such a quality exists 
in God not after the manner of the creature (negation), 
but in an infinitely higher mode, in what is called the 
eminent sense. 


83 Perfectio simplex, perfectio mixta. 


70 THREEFOLD MODE OF KNOWING GOD 


b) With regard to the via negationis we must observe 
that this method is able to impart more than a purely 
negative knowledge of God; for inasmuch as it elimi- 
nates defects or limitations, it is essentially a negation 
of a negation, and thus attains to the dignity of an 
affirmation.** Thus the infinity of God, being essentially 
a denial that there are limitations in Him, postulates the 
plenitude of all being in God; which implies not only an 
affirmation, but also a modus eminentior, a more eminent 
mode of being. Hence there is no reason why, after the 
example of the Calvinist theologian, John Clericus, we 
should reject the via negationis as unfruitful and mean- 
ingless. 

c) Inasmuch as the superlative degree is merely the 
positive degree intensified, the via superlationis, or mode 
of eminence, naturally entails affirmations. But the 
process also implies a negation which serves the purpose 
of complement and correction. And for this reason, 
since even the purest perfections in God differ radically 
from those proper to creatures, in applying to God the 
notion of any created perfection, we must exclude every 
species of limitation. Language has three terms for 
three different forms of the superlative: First, abstract 
terms; e. g., God is goodness (ipsa bonitas — abraya6o- 
ms) ; second, terms compounded with the adverbs “ all” 
or “alone”; e. g., God is all-powerful or, “ God alone 
is powerful” (cfr. the “Tu solus altissimus” of the 
“ Gloria”) ; and third, terms compounded with the pre- 
fix “super” (e. g., God is super-temporal, i. ¢., above 
time, independent of it). 

The Scotist Frassen** appropriately compares these 

34 Cfr. S. Maxim., In Dionys. de 85 Scotus Academicus, ‘* De Deo,” 


Divin. Nomin., c. 4: “Sunt effi- disp. I, art. 2, qu. a. 
caces positiones.” 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 71 


three modes of cognition with the modus procedendt 
peculiar to the three arts of painting, sculpture, and 
poetry. The painter produces a portrait as it were 
“ affirmatively,” by brushing his colors upon the canvas ; 
the sculptor may be said to proceed “negatively” in 
carving a statue; while the poet treats his subject 
“ superlatively,’ by applying to it all sorts of tropes, 
metaphors, and hyperboles.** 


3. How Tu1s THREEFOLD MODE OF COGNITION 
AccorDSs WITH DivINE REVELATION.—The three 
modes by which the mind of man conceives God, 
as explained above, are clearly indicated in Holy 
Scripture and Tradition, and their existence and 
objective fitness must be admitted to be certain 
from a theological point of view. 


a) We have a plain Scriptural argument in Ecclus, 
XLIII, 29-32, a text which picturesquely describes 
the works of God, winding up as follows: “ Consum- 
matio autem sermonum |t. e., briefly stated]: Ipse 
[scil. Deus] est in omnibus [15 wav éorw adrds, 1, é., He 
contains all created perfections = via affirmations s, cau- 


salitatis]. Gloriantes ad quid valebimus? Ipse enim 

36‘ The three ways may be lik- limitations. And just as a _ poet 
ened to the methods of the fine makes his word-picture more by 
arts. Just as a painter produces metaphorical suggestion than by 


his picture by putting paint on his 
canvas, so I use the positive way 
of forming my shadows—I take 
qualities from creatures and I trans- 
fer them to God. Just as a sculp- 
tor produces his statue by chipping 
off pieces from a block of marble, 
so I ‘use the negative way of form- 
ing my shadows —I think of quali- 
ties in creatures and I remove the 


exact description, so I use the more 
eminent way in forming my shadows 
—I take the qualities of creatures 
and knowing that they are all real- 
ized in infinite degree in God, I 
conclude that any mutual exclusive- 
ness which they have in creatures 
must be transcended in the simplic- 
ity of God.” (Gerrard, The Way- 
farer’s Vision, pp. 5 sq.) 


72 THREEFOLD MODE OF KNOWING GOD 


ommpotens super omnia opera sua [the Septuagint 
has: avrds yap 6 péyas mapa mdvra. ta epya adrov, i. €., 
He is nothing of the things He has made — via 
negations]. . . . Glorificantes Dominum, quantumcun- 
que potueritis, supervalebit enim adhuc [tmepééer yap xat 
ér., 1. €., He is high above every thing = via eminentiae].” 
St. Thomas Aquinas finds the three modes or stages in- 
dicated also in Rom. I, 20: “‘ Invisibilia Dei’ cognos- 
cuntur per viam negationis ; ‘ sempiterna virtus’ per viam 
causalitatis; ‘ divinitas’ per viam excellentiae.” * 

b) The most famous and the best known formula that 
has come down to us from Patristic times, is that of 
the Pseudo-Dionysius: @eds . .. advrwv Oéors Kal mdvtov 
ddaipecis % Urép macav Oéow Kat ddaipeow airia.*® The 
same early writer, whoever he may have been, sailing 
in the wake of the Neo-Platonists, cultivated with a 
certain predilection the via superlationis: “ Nihil eorum, 
quae sunt... explicat arcanum illud omnem rationem 
et intellectum superans superdettatis superessentialiter 
supra omnia superexistentis (ras trép mdvra vrepovotas 
brepovons vmepfedryros).” *° He is equally familiar with 
the via negations, though in employing this mode he 
does not adopt the one-sided view of the Neo-Platon- 
ists. “ God”—he says—‘is not substance, not life, 
not light, not sense, not spirit, not wisdom, not good- 
ness, not divinity, but something that is far higher and 
nobler than all these.” *° Summing up the teaching of 
the Greek Fathers, St. John of Damascus says: “It is 
more becoming to speak of God negatively, denying all 
things about Him. Not as if He were nothing Him- 
self, but inasmuch as He is above everything which 


37 In Ep. ad Rom., c. I, lect. 5. 89 De Div. Nom., 13. 
88 Myst. Theol, c 2 — 40 Myst. Theol., c& 3 


a ee ee ee ge ent ee es 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 73 


exists, nay, above being itself.” 4 For many other con- 
firmatory passages, see Thomassin, De Deo, IV, 7-12. 
As every negative conception of God essentially in- 
volves affirmations and intensifications, the negative 
mode of apprehending God is not quite so striking as 
one might conclude from the manner in which it was 
urged by the Fathers. Far from employing it for the 
purpose of proving the (Gnostic) “ incognoscibility ” of 
God or the (Neo-Platonic) “purely negative cognosci- 
bility’ of God, the Fathers rather strive by means of 
it to throw light both on the super-substantiality 
(iepovoia) of God, and on our (relative) ignorance 
of things divine. For as Pseudo-Athanasius  cor- 
rectly remarks, @cds yap xataAapBavopevos odk ort deds. 
This explains why ever since the days of the Pseudo- 
Areopagite, the mystics have defended the principle that 
“The highest knowledge we can have of God is that 
we do not know Him.” * Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa 
devoted an entire book to the development of this 
thought. “In rebus divinis scire est scire, nos ignorare,” 
he writes.4? In speaking, as they often do, of a “ mystic 
night,” in which God’s obscurity reveals itself to us 
most clearly, the medieval mystics merely vary the dic- 
tum of the Apostle of the Gentiles: [Deus] “lucem 
_.. imhabitat inaccessibilem, quem nullus hominum 
vidit, sed nec videre potest —[God] inhabiteth light in- 
accessible, whom no man hath seen, nor can see,’ 44 


41 De Fide Orth., I, 4. ypwoke vmep vouy YywwoKev,” 
42 Cfr. Pseudo-Dionysius, Myst. 43 De Docta Ignorantia, I, 26. 
Theol., cap. I, § 3: “‘r@ under ye- 441 Tim. VI, 16. 


74 GOD’S INEFFABILITY 


ARTICLE 3 


THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS 


1. Gop’s INEFFABILITY.—a) Language is 
merely the expression of thought, and therefore, 
if God is incomprehensible, it follows that He 
must also be ineffable or unutterable. “Deus 

. meftfabilis,’ says the Fourth Lateran Coun- 
cil. And St. Augustine beautifully observes: 
“Quid quaeris, ut ascendat in linguam, quod in 
cor hominis non ascendit?”’*® As God alone 
comprehends Himself, so He alone can utter 
Himself adequately. It is in this sense that the 
Fathers designate God as the ‘“‘ineffable”’ or 
“nameless” one (4verepos) , 

b) Nevertheless man is able to conceive God, 
though inadequately, by a series of concepts repre- 
senting His different attributes; and consequently 
can utter Him in a variety of names. Hence 
the Patristic term 7eAvovupos, “He of many names,” 
and the still larger term employed by some of 
the Fathers, wavevpos, ¢, @., “all-names,” ‘He 
to Whom all names apply.” In his sublime 
“Hymn to God,” Gregory Nazianzen beautifully 
sums up these conceptions: ‘20 mdvrey rédos éoot 
kat eis, Kal mdyta, Kal ovdev: ody ty éwv, ov mdvra, Tla- 
vaovupe, tl GE Tarésow, Tov povoy dxAniaror,’? 483 St. 


45 Caput “ Firmiter.” 46a Thou art at once One, All, 
46 In Ps. 85, n. 12. and None, and yet Thou art not 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 76 


Augustine expresses himself in a similar man- 
ner: “Omnia possunt de Deo dici et mhil digne 
dicitur de Deo. Nihil latius hac inopia. Quae- 
ris congruum nomen? Non invents. Quaeris 
quoquo modo dicere? Omma_ invenis—All 
things can be said of God, and nothing 1s 
worthily said of God. Nothing is wider than 
this poverty of expression. Thou seekest a fit- 
ting name for Him; thou canst not findit. Thou 
seekest to speak of Him in any way soever; thou 
findest that He is all.” * 

c) A comparison of the logical elements of 
the various names applied to God, shows that 
all taken together yet fall far short of. ex- 
pressing the fulness of his infinite and super- 
notional Being; hence the Patristic term t7«pévupos, 
We need not call attention to the fact that this 
threefold mode of appellation (woAvorvpos, ravaevupos, 
tmepovopos) corresponds exactly to the threefold 
mode of our apprehension of God, as explained 
above.** 

2. THE COMPOSITE CHARACTER OF OUR CON- 
CEPTION OF Gop IN RELATION To His SIMPLic- 
1ry.—The three modes by which we apprehend 
God produce in the human mind a great variety 
of concepts expressing attribution; hence the in- 


all or one. All-name! by what St) \ Thomas, (Sos Theol.;° 145; qu. rz, 

name can I call Thee, nameless arte is 

One, alone of all. 48 Cfr. Gerrard, The Wayfarer’s 
4% Tract. in Ioa., 13, n. 5. Cfr. Vision, p. 7. 


76 OUR CONCEPTION OF HIM COMPOSITE 


evitably composite character of our conception of 
God. We have a typical example of such com- 
position in the “Dogmatic Constitution on the 
Catholic Faith” adopted by the Vatican Council: 
“Ecclesia credit et confitetur, unum esse Deum 
verum et vivum, Creatorem ac Dominum coeli 
et terrae, omnipotentem, aeternum, wmmensum, 
incomprehensibilem, intellectu ac voluntate om- 
nique perfectione infinitum, etc.—The Holy 
Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and 
confesses that there is one true and living God, 
Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, almighty, 
eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in 
intelligence, in will, and in all perfection.” * 
There naturally arises the question: How can 
a composite conception of God be harmonized 
with the absolute simplicity of the Divine Es- 
sence? 


Already the Eunomians raised the objection that the 
doctrine of the abstractive and analogous character of 
our knowledge of God must necessarily lead to an (im- 
possible) piecing together of the Divine Essence, though 
it is quite evident that the supremely simple Being can 
be conceived only by the agency of an equally simple 
concept, and that consequently the various names ap- 
plied to God are mere synonyms. The Fathers, in par- 
ticular Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, solved this cunning 
objection by pointing out that though our knowledge 


49 Conc. Vatic., Const. De Fide, c, 1. Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, 
n, 1782. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD a7 


of God is very imperfect, the Divine Essence com- 
prises all perfections and consequently cannot be com- 
pressed into a finite concept. While our abstractive 
analogical mode of cognition compels the intellect to 
conceive God by a series of partial concepts, the in- 
finite fulness of the Divine Being renders it impossible 
for us to exhaust that Being by means of conceptions 
formed in our finite mind.” 


3. OuR CONCEPTION OF GoD, DESPITE ITs IM- 
PERFECTIONS, IS A TRUE CoNCEPTION.—Our in- 
ability to form an adequate conception of God is 
apt to make us suspect that the conception we do 
arrive at is false. Eunomius expressly declared it 
to be so, insisting that, in order not to be misled 
into forming wrong notions of God, it must nec- 
essarily be in man’s power to construct an ade- 
quate notion of Him. Proceeding from the 
axiom that no conception can be true that repre- 
sents a thing otherwise than it is, this heretic 
insisted that man must have the ability to form 
an adequate concept of God; because otherwise 
he would be doomed to form inadequate notions, 
and consequently to be deceived. 


a) In undertaking to refute this specious objection, - 
we must stress the fact that the truth and correctness 
of the concept which man forms of God by the agencies 
of reason and revelation, is a dogma coinciding with 


50 For a more detailed explana- Cfr. also St. Thomas, De Pot., qu. 
tion of this difficulty, see Part II. atts Fe 


78 OUR CONCEPTION OF HIM TRUE 


that of the cognoscibility of God.5 Among the di- 
vine predicates that human reason gathers from the 
consideration of nature, St. Paul °? expressly mentions 
two: % didis adtod divams, i, e., the eternal power mani- 
fested in the creation of the universe, and Oadrys, 1. €., 
a Divine Essence differing from all created things. 
As a third predicate the Book of Wisdom ** adds the 
attribute of divine “beauty.” Elsewhere the Bible re- 
fers to God as “ He who is,” i. e., Who has the pleni- 
tude of being; the Eternal, the Allwise, the Immense, 
etc.,— all predicates which, if they were incorrect or un- 
true, would belie the Word of God. 

b) The Eunomian contention, that unless we assume 
the possibility of man’s forming an adequate idea of 
God, we are placed before the alternative of forming 
either a false conception of Him or no conception at 
all,— is met by the Fathers with the retort that it rests 
upon a confusion of the separate and distinct notes 
of “imperfect” and “incorrect” on the one hand, 
and their contradictories, “perfect” and “ correct,” on 
the other. ‘The Fathers insist that there is such a thing 
as a true though imperfect concept of God; that our 
knowledge of God, in spite of its inevitable defects, is 
true and remains true for the very simple reason, 
among others, that we are fully aware, and do so 
judge, that the perfections we ascribe to God exist in 
Him in a quite different way than they exist in His 
creatures and in the concepts of the human mind; that, 
whatever wrong elements may enter into our conception 
of God, are eliminated by an express judgment; while 
on the other hand the Eunomians themselves are open 
to the charge of counterfeiting the notion of God when 


61 Supra, Ch. 1. 52 Rom. I, 20. 58 Wisd. XIII, 5. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 79 


they pretend to be able to conceive God and to com- 
prehend Him as He is, though in matter of fact they 
derive their conceptions of Him from analogy.** 


READINGS: — Suarez, De Divina Substantia eiusque Attributis, 
lib, I, cap. 8-12— Thomassin, De Deo, lib. IV, cap. 6-12.— 
Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 10-13— Chr. Pesch, S. J., Der 
Gottesbegrif, Freiburg 1886—M. Glossner, Der spekulative 
Gottesbegriff in der neuen und neuesten Philosophie, Pader- 
born 1894.—Simar, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, 4th ed., Vol. I, 
pp. 113 sqq.— W. Humphrey, S. J., “ His Divine Majesty,” pp. 16 
sqq., London 1897.—M. Ronayne, S. J., God Knowable and 
Known, 2nd ed., New York 1902—T. J. Gerrard, The Way- 
farer’s Vision, London 1909. 


64 Cfr. Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 13. 


SECTION 2 


MAN’S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AS IT WILL BE IN 
HEAVEN 


When we arrive in the abode of the Blessed, 
our knowledge of God will change. It will be 
different from, and far more perfect than the 
knowledge we have here below. Our mediate 
abstractive knowledge of God will give way to 
immediate intuition, analogical to univocal 
knowledge, because we shall see God as He 
is. 

In this section we therefore propose to treat 
three important questions, viz.: (1) the reality 
and the supernatural character of the intuitive 
vision; (2) the necessity of the light of glory 
to the intellect of the Blessed; and (3) the re- 
lation between the intuitive vision of God and 
His incomprehensibility. 


ARTICLE 1 
THE REALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL CHARACTER OF 
THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD 


I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS.—The expression 


“intuitive vision of God” is based on a metaphor 
80 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD SI 


which likens the human intellect to the eye. 
Bodily vision has two peculiarities: first, the eye 
sees a material object immediately, and, second, 
it perceives it clearly and distinctly. Analo- 
gously we may say that the intuitive vision of 
God means, first, that we know Him immediately, 
without depending on the created universe as a 
medium or mirror; and secondly, that our knowl- 
edge of Him is clear and distinct—an apprehen- 
sion in the proper sense of the word. The 
quality corresponding in God to our intuitive 
vision of Him, is His visibility (visibilitas Dei), 
which some dogmaticians treat as a separate di- 
vine attribute. 


If we take the term “vision” in its more extended 
sense, we shall be able to distinguish in abstracto a 
threefold visibility, corresponding to the four differ- 
ent kinds of intuitive vision. There is (a) bodily 
vision (visio oculis corporeis), which, being metaphys- 
ically impossible when applied to God, can never take 
place, not even in Heaven; (b) that mode of spiritual 
vision by which we see God through the cosmos, or by 
an act of faith (visio abstractiva) ; this constitutes the 
sole mode of seeing God natural to all rational crea- 
tures, angels and men; (c) that mode of spiritual vision 
by which we envisage God immediately in His essence 
(visio tntuitiva s. beatificia) ; it is in this the beatitude 
of angels and men consists; (d) the comprehensive or 
exhaustive vision of God (visio comprehensiva s. ex- 
haustiva), which is denied even to the Blessed in 
Heaven, being reserved to the Almighty Himself. 

1 Vide infra, Article 3. 


82 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD 


Corresponding to this threefold manner of seeing God, 
we may distinguish a threefold invisibility. (To the 
bodily eye, both in its natural and in its glorified state, 
God is absolutely invisible). Since the created mind 
has no means of knowing God other than the ab- 
stractive-analogical apprehension proper to its limited 
faculties, God’s essence and substance must ever remain 
invisible to the created intellect, except supernaturally, 
by means of the “lumen gloriae.’ But even in the 
light of glory God cannot be adequately conceived by His 
creatures, and therefore under this aspect, too, must ever 
remain invisible, 7 ¢., incomprehensible, even to the 
holy Angels and the Elect in Heaven. God alone “ sees” 
Himself fully and adequately to the limit of His essence 
and cognoscibility. 


2. Dogmatic THEsEs.—The subject-matter 
propounded in the above preliminary remarks 
may be reduced to three problems, which we 
shall endeavor to solve in as many theses; vig.: 
(1) the absolute impossibility of a bodily vision 
of God; (2) the natural impossibility of an in- 
tuitive vision of God; and (3) the supernatural 
reality, and consequent possibility, of the intui- 
tive (beatific) vision of God in Heaven. 


First Thesis. To the bodily eye, even in its glori- 
fied state, God is absolutely invisible. 


This thesis is partly of faith, and partly repre- 
sents a theological conclusion. 

Proofs. To enable us to see God bodily, either 
God would have to appear in a material vesture, 


aS a NR a i Sk 


ee 


Sa le ee ee 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 83 


or our own corporeal organ of sight would have 
to be capable of attaining by supernatural means 
to a bodily vision of purely spiritual substances. 
Both these suppositions are inadmissible. 

a) God, being a pure spirit, has no material 
body, and therefore cannot be visible to the 
human eye. This sort of invisibility, conceived 
as incorporeity, is a dogma clearly taught in 
Holy Scripture, partly in those passages. which 
teach that God is a pure spirit,’ partly in those 
texts that insist on His invisibility in terms 
which exclude every possibility of bodily vision. 
Cfr. 1 Tim. VI, 16: ‘'‘O povos éxwv abavaciav, dds 
oixay dmpoottov, ov cidev ovdeis dvOpwrwv, ode idely d¥vaTar— 
Who only hath immortality, and inhabiteth light 
inaccessible, whom no man hath seen, nor can 
see.” Cfr. John I, 18: “Deum nemo vidit un- 
quam—No man hath seen God at any time.” 
Asserting as they do the spiritual invisibility of 
the Divine Essence, these texts must a fortiori 
be understood as denying the corporeal visibility 
of God. In the light of these Scriptural texts 
it is not to be wondered at that the Fathers and 
the infallible magisterium of the Church have 
always considered the invisibility of God, as just 
explained, to be a revealed dogma and have de- 
fended it expressly and vigorously against the 
Audians and the Anthropomorphites, who at- 


2Cfr. John IV, 20 sqq. 


84 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD 


tributed to God a material body and human 
limbs.? 


b) Another question here presents itself: Would it 
be possible for the human eye, by means of some super- 
natural light sut generis, to attain to a bodily vision 
of God’s spiritual substance? Leo Allatius‘ held that 
while the Elect in Heaven will not see the Divine Es- 
sence (he means the Divinity itself, not the human na- 
ture of Christ) until after the resurrection of the body, 
Mary, the Mother of God, with glorified eyes sees 
it even now. When, many centuries before Allatius, 
St. Augustine® undertook to denounce this view as 
“msipientia et dementia,’ his Catholic contemporaries 
were so scandalized by his harsh strictures that the 
great Bishop of Hippo in his little treatise De Videndo 
Deo,® found himself constrained to admit that it would 
require a more careful investigation than any one had 
yet made of the question whether, in virtue of the 
metamorphosis of man from an “ earthly ” into a “ heav- 
enly”’ being, his spiritualized eye after the resurrection 
will be enabled to envisage the Divine Substance. 
While his offended opponents appealed to Job XIX, 26: 
“In carne mea videbo Deum meum—In my flesh I 
shall see my God,” it seems St. Augustine personally 
never changed his belief that such a spiritualization of 
the flesh was impossible. 

In spite of the passage quoted from Job, the impos- 
sibility of the bodily eye being so highly spiritualized 
as to be able immediately to see God, while not an arti- 


3 Cfr. Epiphanius, Haeres., 70. 4 De Consensu Eccles. Orient., II, 
See also Part III of this work, on 17. 
the Incorporeity of God. 5 Ep. 22 ad Italicam. 


6 Ep. 147 ad Paulinam. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 8s 


cle of faith, is to-day generally received as a well es- 
tablished theological conclusion. St. Augustine himself 
trenchantly refuted the construction which his adver- 
saries put upon Job XIX, 26, and other similar texts. 
With regard to the effatum of Job, he says: “Non 
dixit Job: per carnem meam, quod quidem si dixisset, 
posset Deus Christus intelligi, qui per carnem im carne 
videbitur. Nunc vero potest et sic acctpt: in carne mea 
videbo Deum, ac si dixisset: In carne mea ero, cum 
videbo Deum — Job does not say ‘by the flesh.’ And, 
indeed, if he had said this, it would still be possible 
that by ‘God’ Christ was meant; for Christ shall be 
seen by the flesh. But even understanding it of God, 
it is only equivalent to saying, ‘I shall be in the flesh 
when I see God.’”* The spiritualization of the risen 
body, of which St. Paul speaks in 1 Cor. XV, 44 (odpa 
mvevpatikov), by no means consists in the transmission 
to the material body of spiritual powers and qualities 
—for this would mean an evolution of matter into 
spirit, which is impossible —, but in a clarification or 
transfiguration of the flesh enabling it to foster and 
support the activity of the soul, instead of pulling it 
down to the level of the senses, “ Evit spiritui subdita 
caro spiritualis,’ St. Augustine says, “sed tamen caro, 
non spiritus; sicut carnt subditus fuit spiritus ipse 
carnalis, sed tamen spiritus, non caro — The flesh shall 
then be spiritual, and subject to the spirit, but. still 
flesh, not spirit.”* At bottom the whole question ap- 
pertains to philosophy rather than theology. Philosophy, 
needless to remark, cannot admit the possibility of an 
intuitive vision of God’s spiritual substance by a ma- 
terial organ, for such a concession would imply that 


t De Civit. Dei, XXII, 29. 
&De Civit. Dei, XXII, 21. Cfr. Petavius, De Deo, VII, 2. 


86 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD 


flesh could be changed into spirit without ceasing to 
be material flesh. The argument is strengthened by 
another theological conclusion, viz.: It is metaphysically 
certain that the bodily eye can see none but corporeal 
substances; on the other hand, it is de fide that the 
glorified bodies of the Elect after the resurrection will 
be and remain bodies of real flesh; hence it is the- 
ologically certain that the bodily eye, even in its trans- 
figured state, can perceive only what is corporeal — 
consequently, that it cannot see God, Who is a pure 
spirit. 

Second Thesis. No created spirit (angel or man), 


can by his purely natural faculties attain to the im- 
mediate vision of God. 


So far as it applies to existing spirits, this 
proposition is an article of faith. 

Proof. The supernatural character of the 
visto beatifica on the part of such rational creat- 
ures as exist under the present economy, was 
defined as early as A.D. 1311, by the Council 
of Vienne.? But we have not the certitude of 
faith as to the question whether God might not 
create a spirit—say, an angel of the highest pos- 
sible order—which would have a right to the 
vision of God in virtue of the perfection of its 
nature, this point having never been defined by 
the Church. A few of the Schoolmen (Duran- 
dus, Becanus, Ripalda) believed themselves free 


9Cfr. also Propos. Baji damn., 3-5, 9, apud Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 
1003 sqq. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 87 


to hold the view that in some other universe than 
ours God could create a spirit which, in virtue 
of its very nature, might claim beatific vision 
asaright. Ripalda*® in speaking of such a hy- 
pothetical spirit, calls it “substantia intrinsece 
supernaturalis.’” However, since Sacred Scrip- 
ture and Tradition trace the natwral invisibility 
of God to His innermost essence, the hypothesis 
of the possibility of a “supernatural substance’’ 
must be rejected as false and involving a con- 
tradiction.1t Hence our present thesis must be 
made to embrace all possible spiritual beings; 
and in that sense it is certainly true, because the 
proofs drawn from Revelation are applicable to 
all created or creatable intellects. 

a) Apropos of the Scriptural argument for 
our thesis, it must be noted: 

a) The natural inaccessibility of the Divine 
Essence is expressly taught in 1 Tim. VI, 15- 
16: “Beatus et solus potens rex, regum et 
Dominus dominantium, qui solus habet immortals 
tatem et lucem inhabitat tnaccessibilem, quem 
nullus hominum vidit, sed nec videre potest— 
The Blessed and only Mighty, the King of 
kings, and Lord of lords, who only hath im- 
mortality, and inhabiteth light inaccessible, 
whom no man hath seen, nor can see.” It ap- 


10De Ente Supernaturali, t. I, mieri, S. J., De Deo Creante et 
disp. 23; t. II, disp. ult., sec. 40. Elevante, thes. 39, Romae 1878. 
11 For further details, see Pal- 


88 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD 


pears from this enumeration of such attributes 
as “‘blessedness,” “omnipotence,” and “immor- 
tality,” (attributes every one of which is quite 
invisible to the bodily eye), that the Apostle 
had in view not so much the bodily as the in- 
tellectual invisibility of God. Such expressions 
as “whom no man hath seen nor can see,” and 
“inhabiteth light inaccessible,’ must therefore 
be taken as referring mainly to the under- 
standing. Now if this light is inhabited by God 
alone, it follows that all who are outside of it 
—and all rational creatures both existing and 
possible are outside of it, because it is “‘inac- 
cessible’’ to all except God—neither “see” nor 
“can see” the Godhead. Nor is this conclusion 
in the least affected by the circumstance that 
invisibility is here predicated of God only in 
relation to man (“nullus hominum’”); for the 
decretory. principle—viz., inaccessibility—is so 
positive and universal that it comprises not 
only the angels but all spirits in general (even 
those which have no existence). That, on the 
other hand, St. Paul did not consider it impos- 
sible for finite rational beings to be admitted 
into the divine “light” by the favor of grace, 
is quite plain from his teaching in regard to 
the reality of the supernatural vision of God in 
Heaven.” 


12 Cfr. 1 Cor. XIII, 8-12. 


wr 


a 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 89 


Rom. I, 20, Ta ddpara adrod . . . Trois rovjpace voovpeva 
xaSopara.— For the invisible things of him... are 
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are 
made ”’— can be quoted in support of the same truth. 
For “the invisible things of Him” (7. e., of God) 
are here contrasted with His visibility, that is to say, 
His knowableness in the light and by means of the 
created universe. That the contrast is intentional ap- 
pears from the use of the words ddpara— xafopara, 
which are calculated to convey the idea that without the 
medium of created things, the Godhead is in itself “ in- 
visible,” 7. e., cannot be envisaged in its essence. This 
invisibility is defined not as a bodily but as an “in- 
tellectual ” attribute (intellecta — voovjpeva). Though St. 
Paul in the passage under consideration means to refer 
primarily to the human understanding, as the context 
shows, it is quite plain that he looks upon “ invisibility ” 
as such a characteristic attribute of the Godhead per se 
(ra ddpata), and that we are not at liberty to make an 
exception in favor of any rational being, either actually 
existing or merely “ creatable.” 7° 


8) There are a number of Scriptural texts in 
which the intuition of the Divine Essence is de- 
scribed as the exclusive privilege of the Godhead, 
or of the three Persons in the Most Holy Trinity, 
implying that God’s intuition of Himself can be 
communicated to creatures, even those endowed 
with reason, only by way of supernatural 
grace. Cfr. Matth. XI, 27: “Nemo novit F1- 
lium nisi Pater, neque Patrem quis novit (ém- 


13 Cfr, the commentators on Rom.I, 20. 


go THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD 


ywoown) nisi Filius, et cui voluerit Filius revelare 
(drroxadtya:)—No one knoweth the Son, but the 
Father: neither doth any one know the Father, 
but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the 
Son to reveal him.” Similarly in John VI, 46: 
“Non quia Patrem vidit quisquam (épaxé ms) 
mst is, qui est a Deo [scil. Filius]: hic vidit 
Patrem—Not that any man hath seen the 
Father; but he who is of God, he hath seen the 
Father.” The same thought is still more sharply 
brought out in John I, 18: “Deum nemo vidit 
Unquam (ovels Edpaxe momore) ; ynigenitus Filius, qui 
est m sinu Patris, ipse enarravit (é€yyhoaro)— 
No man hath seen God at any time: the only be- 
gotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, 
he hath declared him.” Besides the Father and 
the Son, there is only the Holy Ghost Who 
intues “* the inner essence of the Divinity. Cfr. 
1 Cor. Il, 11: “Quae Dei sunt, nemo cognovit 
(éyvoxer) nisi Spiritus Dei—The things that are 
of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God.” 
Whence it follows that no created intellect can, 
by virtue of its own power, penetrate into the 
Divine Essence. If the revelation to believing 
men of the mystery of the Blessed Trinity is a 
supernatural favor, the intuitive “face-to-face” 
vision of the same must a fortiori be a grace, 


14“ We will . . . use the word tion’ and the adjective ‘ intuitive,’ ” 
‘intue ' as corresponding in every (W. G. Ward, Nature and Grace, 
respect with the substantive ‘ intui- I, 40, London 1860.) 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD QI 


and a much greater one. From all of which we 
may validly conclude that, according to the teach- 
ing of the Bible, the Divine Essence is absolutely 
invisible to any created being except through the 
operation of supernatural grace. 

b) The Fathers formulated their teaching 
along the lines of the Biblical texts just quoted. 


a) Those of the Fathers in particular, who did not 
content themselves with merely restating the dagma and 
showing it to be founded in Holy Writ, tried to bot- 
tom the natural invisibility of God on the metaphysical 
axiom that “the Uncreated cannot become visible to a 
created being.”*® They regarded solely the natural 
mode of cognition, as is evidenced by the fact that they 
did not hesitate to ascribe to the Elect in Heaven a 
supernatural intuition of God. Gregory of Nazianzus 
insists that an intuitive vision of the Divine Essence is 
possible only “in virtue of a special indwelling of God 
in the intellect and of the latter’s being penetrated 
through and through with a divine light,” ** — a divine act 
which St. Chrysostom designates more succinctly as 
ovyxatéBaois, 7. €., a condescension on the part of the 
Almighty. 

B) The teaching of St. Irenaeus is deserving of special 
mention because of its unmistakable clearness. He as- 
sumes that we can attain to a knowledge of God nat- 
urally, by contemplating the created universe, and then 
proceeds to distinguish three stages in the supernatural 
knowledge which man can have of God: (1) the “ sym- 


15 Cfr. Chrysost. Hom. 5 de In- 16 Or. 34: Ad rd mAnolor elvat 
comprehens.: Ovcla yap ovciav Ocod kai bw 7@ pwrl kaTaddpure- 
irepéxovoay ovK ay duvadeln Ka- Oat, 


A@s eldévac, 


g2 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD 


bolical ” vision implied in the Old Testament theophanies; 
(2) the “adoptive” vision exemplified in the Incar- 
nation of the Logos; and (3) the “paternal” vision of 
the Elect in Heaven, which alone deserves the name 
of intuition. The principal passage is Adv. Haeres. IV, 
20, 5, where St. Irenaeus says: “Homo etenim a se 
[ber naturalia sua] non videt Deum, ille autem volens 
videtur [ab] hominibus, quibus vult et quando vult et 
quemadmodum vult; potens est enim in omnibus Deus. 
Visus quidem tune [i. e., in V. T.] per spiritum pro- 
phetiae, visus autem et per Filium adoptive, videbitur 
autem et in regno coelorum paternaliter — For man does 
not see God by his own powers; but when He pleases 
He is seen by men, by whom He wills, and when He 
wills, and as He wills. For God is powerful in all 
things, having been seen at that time [in the Old Testa- 
ment] indeed, prophetically through the Spirit, and seen, 
too, adoptively through the Son, and He shall also be 
seen paternally in the kingdom of Heaven.”27 He 
sharply differentiates between the natural invisibility 
and the supernatural visibility of God, when he says: 
“Quit vident Deum, intra Deum sunt, percipientes eius 
claritatem. ... Et propter hoc incapabilis (6 édxépy- 
tos) et invisibilis (ddparos) visibilem se et comprehensi- 
bilem et capabilem hominibus praestat (épmpevov éavroy 
kat katadapBavopevoy Kat xXwpovpevoy) — And for this rea- 
son, He [although] beyond comprehension, and invisi- 
ble, renders Himself visible and comprehensible to 
men, 71% 


Third Thesis. The Blessed in Heaven, through 
grace, see God face to face, as He is in Himself, and 
are thereby rendered eternally happy. 


17 Iren., Adv, Haer., IV, 20. 
18 Iren., J. c. Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 12, art. 4. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 93 


This thesis embodies an article of faith. 

Proof. “Ab esse ad posse valet illatio.’” The 
very fact that Sacred Scripture describes the 
beatific vision as the supernatural recompense 
with which God rewards virtue in angels and 
men, proves the possibility of such vision, al- 
though, despite the existence of Revelation, hu- 
man reason cannot demonstrate either the in- 
trinsic possibility or the reality of the beatific 
vision, which is consequently reckoned by nearly 
all theologians among the absolute theological 
mysteries.” The fact itself has been defined 
as an article of faith in the Constitution “Bene- 
dictus Deus’ of Pope Benedict XII (A.D. 
1336), which says: “Defnimus quod [animae 
sanctorum]| post Domint Nostri Jesu Christi 
passtonem et mortem viderunt et vident divinam 
essentiam visione intuitiva et etiam faciali, nulla 
mediante creatura in ratione objecti visi se ha- 
bente, sed divina essentia immediate se nude, 
clare et aperte eis ostendente, quodque sic vi- 
dentes eadem divina essentia perfruuntur, necnon 
quod ex tal visione et fruitione eorum animae, 
qui tam decesserunt, sunt vere beatae et habent 
vitam et requiem aeternam.’?®? This definition 
clearly sets off both the reality and the super- 
natural character of the beatific vision. The 
fact itself is established in part (negatively) by 


19 Cfr. Chr. Pesch, Pralect. Dogm., 20 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiri- 
II, 43 sqq., Friburgi 1899. dion, N. 520. 


94 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD 


the exclusion of every other medium of cogni- 
tion, and in part (positively) by insistence on 
the immediateness of the act of vision. Its super- 
natural character appears from the fact that 
its beginning is traced back to the death of 
Christ and that it is described as the consum- 
mation of the theological virtues of faith and 
hope.** All possible doubt as to whether or not 
the vision of the Blessed Trinity is included in 
the beatific vision, has been removed by the 
Florence decree of 1439, which says: “Definimus 
. .. [dlorum animas] .. . in coelum mox recipi 
et intuert clare ipsum Deum trinum et unum, 
Sicuit) est. 2? 

a) Holy Scripture promises to the just in the 
hereafter boundless bliss, which it calls “eternal 
life,” “the kingdom of Heaven,” “the marriage 
feast of the Lamb,” etc.,?2 and describes as a 
state in which tears stop flowing, pain ceases, 


pure joy and happiness reign supreme.?4 Now, 
in what does this heavenly bliss consist? 
a) In 1 Cor. XIII, 8 sqq., we read: “Sive 


prophetiae evacuabuntur sive linguae cessabunt 
sive scientia destruetur; ex parte enim cognos- 
cimus et ex parte prophetamus. Cum autem 


21“ Ac quod visio et fruitio actus Kabos éorw,” Cfr. Denzinger- 


fidet et spei in eis evacuant, prout 
fides et spes propriae theologicae 
sunt virtutes.”’ Const. “ Benedictus 
Deus,’ 4. c. 

22“ Kal Kkadapw@s Oewpeiy adroy 
tov éva Kal rpiovrdataroy Oeép, 


Bannwart, n. 693. 

23 For further information on 
this point we must refer the reader 
to Eschatology. 

24Cfr. Apoc, VII, 16; “S¥I, 4, 
etc. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 95 


venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex 
parte est... . Videmus nunc per speculum m 
aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem; nunc 
cognosco ex parte, tunc autem cognoscam, sicut 
et cogmitus sum—Whether prophecies shall be 
made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge 
shall be destroyed; for we know in part, and we 
prophesy in part. But when that which is per- 
fect is come,?** that which is in part shall be done 
away.**> We see now through a glass in a dark 
manner, but then face to face.2*° Now I know 
in part; 744 but then I shall know even as I am 
known.” 74°. As we have already observed on a 
previous page, the Apostle here contrasts the 
piecemeal, enigmatic, and per speculum vision of 
God that is vouchsafed us here below, with the 
radically different one which we shall enjoy 
hereafter, and which possesses the two distinc- 
tive marks of immediateness * and perfect clear- 
ness."° Man’s knowledge of God in Heaven is 
a vision “face to face,” or “person to person,” ** 
which is opposed to the vision “through a 
glass’ ** that we have on earth. Again, the 
“herfectum” (76 rédeov) is contrasted with the 


24a rb Tédevov, 4. @., the beatific 24e rére 6&8 emvyvdcouat, Kalas 
vision. Kal éreyvaadny, 

24b karapynOnoerat Td éK meé- 25 Sine speculo, non in aenigmate. 
povs, i. e., abstractive knowledge 26 Non ex parte. 
shall cease. 27 Cfr. Exodus XXXIII, 11: 


24c mpdowmoy mpds mpdowmoy= pO_-ON DIR, 
visto factalis. oF Oe 77 
24d éx juépous ; 28 Cognitio per speculum = ab- 

: stractiva e+ analogica. 


96 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD 


cognuitio ex parte (76 & pépovs), and the perfect 
clearness of the beatific vision is illustrated in 
this wise: “As God sees me, even so shall 
I see Him;” that is to say, immediately, intui- 
tively, clearly, without veil or medium, no longer 
by means of analogy derived from the created 
universe.” 

8B) The teaching of St. John accords perfectly 
with thatiof St. Pauki City) john IDf;.23 .We- 
rissum, nunc flu Dei sumus et nondum apparuit, 
quid erimus. Scimus, quoniam, cum apparuerit 
(av pavepwO}), sumiles et erimus, quonmiam videbi- 
mus eum sicutt est—Dearly beloved, we are now 
the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared 
what we shall be. We know, that, when he 
shall appear, we shall be like to him, because we 
shall see him [12. e., Christ in His Divinity] as 
he is.” As in rt Cor. XIII, so here our knowl- 
edge of God on earth is contrasted with our 
knowledge of Him in Heaven. Here below, until 
it will “appear what we shall be,” we are “chil- 
dren of God” in an imperfect way only; but in 
Heaven “‘we shall be like to God,* because we 
shall see Him as He is.” **—In the light of these 


explanations we are able to understand the 


29 Cfr. Al. Schafer, Erklarung ing on the present-day error of 


der beiden Briefe an die Korinther, 
pp. 268 sqq., Minster 1903. On 
man’s dark and enigmatical vision 
of God here on earth, its purpose, 
and the bearing of St. Paul’s teach- 


“‘ Pragmatism,’”? cfr T. J. Gerrard, 
The Wayfarer’s Vision, London 
1909. 

30 Suolot AUTO, 

31 6Wdmeba avrov Kaus éorwy, 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 97 


deeper meaning of the Saviour’s dictum: “Beats 
mundo corde, quoniam ipst Deum videbunt— 
Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see 
God./"?), The angels, too;) enjay, the beatific 
vision of God the Father, and consequently of 
the whole Divine Trinity. “Angeli eorum |sc. 
mfantium] in coelis semper vident faciem Patris 
met,** gui in coelis est—Their [the children’s] 
angels in heaven always see the face of my 
Father who is in heaven.’ ** 

b) The Patristic argument for our thesis 
offers some difficulties, though these difficulties 
appear to be hermeneutical rather than dogmatic. 
Vasquez contends that such eminent authorities 
among the Fathers as Chrysostom, Basil, Greg- 
ory of Nazianzus, Cyril of Alexandria and Cyril 
of Jerusalem, Ambrose and others, deny that the 
denizens of Heaven enjoy the beatific vision of 
God. But even if this somewhat strange con- 
tention could be proved, it would not destroy the 
argument based upon the unanimous consensus 
of the majority of the Fathers. For, be it re- 
membered, this dogma was not defined until 
much later, and its history shows a turning- 
point in the fourth century, when the Eunomian 
heresy began to influence considerably the tactics 
of the Fathers. 


32 Matth. V, 8. 
33 Brérovet 7d mpdowrov Tov waTpés pov, 
84 Matth. XVIII, 1o. 


98 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD 


a) The pre-Eunomian Fathers simply teach, 
in full accord with the Bible, that the angels and 
saints in Heaven are vouchsafed a real “face 
to face” vision of God. We have already ad- 
verted to the admirably lucid teaching of St. 
Irenaeus. Corroborative passages can be cited 
from the writings of Clement of Alexandria, 
Origen, Cyprian, and others.* 

8) The rise of the Eunomian heresy led to a 
change of tactics, though the doctrine remained 
unchanged. Whenever the Fathers of Euno- 
mius’s time were not engaged in controversy, 
they employed the traditional phraseology with 
which the Christians of that era were so familiar. 


It is important to exonerate especially St. John Chryso- 
stom from the charge of material heresy made against 
him by Vasquez.** Treating of the Transfiguration of 
Christ on Mount Tabor, Chrysostom says:%* “If the 
bliss produced by a dark vision of the future was suffi- 
cient to induce St. Peter to cast away everything, what 
will man say when once the reality bursts upon him; 
when the doors of the royal chamber are thrown open, 
and he is permitted to look upon the King Himself — 
no longer enigmatically as in a mirror, but face to face; 
no longer in the faith,** but in reality.” ®® Again he 
says:*° “The just, however, dwell there with their 
King, . 4.4 not.ias in. a :vestibule,**. not. in) the faith, 


35 Cfr. Petavius, De Deo, VII, 7. 39 da eldous, 


36 Comment. in S. Th., 1 p., disp. 40 Hom. in Phul., 3, n. 3. 
27.) Cap. 23s 41 61a eloddov is probably a more 
37 Ad Theod. Laps., n. 11. correct reading than d.d eldovs, 


38 64a wicrews, 


| 
: 
1 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 99 


but face to face.” 4? It is only when he combats Euno- 
mianism, or at least when he has this heresy in view, 
that St. Chrysostom uses expressions which might strike 
the careless reader as a denial of the beatific vision in 
Heaven, or a limitation of it to the Blessed Trinity. 
Vasquez points especially to Hom. de Incompreh., 3, n. 3: 
“Nullt creatae virtuti Deum esse comprehensibilem,* 
et a nulla plene** viderit posse.’ To understand this 
and similar passages correctly, we must consider in the 
first place,*® that in St. Chrysostom’s time the distinction 
between such terms as knowing (yvaois), seeing (Gewpia), 
and comprehending (xardAnfis) was not yet clearly de- 
fined, and that the Saint was not minded to deny the sim- 
ple visio intuitiva, but merely combated the comprehensio 
adaequata asserted by Eunomius. Hence such guarded 
phrases as these: “‘yvadows dxpiBys, axpiBys KaTaAnyis THs 
ovcias, axpiBas ywookev,” etc. An adequate comprehen- 
sion of God, such as that taught by Eunomius, is plainly 
not granted to either angels or men, but, as St. Chrysos- 
tom himself elsewhere explains, is proper only to the 
three Divine Persons.*®° By putting a different construc- 
tion on St. Chrysostom’s teaching, we should not only 
muddle the sense and violate the context of his writings, 
but make him contradict himself.*? 

y) Vasquez’s accusations against certain other Fathers 
must be appraised in the light of this typical example. 
If St. Basil asserts that “the angels do not see the 


42.a\\a mpdowmroy mpds mpdaw- 
Tov, 

43 KaTaAnT TOY, 

44 wera axpiBelas, 

45 Cfr, Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, p. 
238. 

46 Hom. in. Ioa., 18 mM. 2% 
“wvacw yap evravda CInaois) 
Ty axpiBn Aéyer Oewplay re Kal 


karadnyw, kat Tocairyny, bonv 6 
marnp exec wept Tov .madds — 
For by knowledge He here means 
an exact idea and comprehension, 
such as the Father hath of the 
Son.” 

47 Cfr. Wirceburgenses, De Deo 
Uno, nn. 99 sqq. 


S 


100 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD 


Godhead as It sees Itself,” he expresses no doubt as to 
the beatific vision, but merely wishes to emphasize the 
dogma of God’s absolute incomprehensibility, which 
makes Him inscrutable even to the Elect in Heaven. 
“The face to face vision and the perfect cognition 
of the incomprehensible majesty of God,’ 48 he says, 
“is promised to all who are worthy of it as a reward 
in the hereafter.” *® Such was also the teaching of 
St. Cyril of Jerusalem, who, after declaring that “ the 
angels do not see God as He is,” ®® immediately adds: 
“ They see Him according to the measure of their ability, 
... the Thrones and Powers [see Him] more per- 
fectly than the [mere] angels, yet short of His ex- 
cellency;*°* only the one Holy Ghost, besides the Son, 
can see Him in a becoming manner.” ®? 

5) We can spare ourselves the trouble of defending 
the other Fathers who have been attacked by Vasquez, 
because it is quite plain to any one who reads their 
writings carefully and without bias, that they teach just 
the contrary of what Vasquez imputes to them. If the 
one or other of them does here and there appear to 
deviate from the orthodox view (as, e. g., Gregory of 
Nyssa), he must be interpreted in the same way as St. 
Chrysostom. There is no solid reason for charging a 
single one of these Fathers with heterodoxy. St. Augus- 
tine already showed ** how certain utterances of St. 
Ambrose and St. Jerome can be construed in a per- 
fectly orthodox sense.**. The only false note in the 


4870 wev yap mpdowmory mpds 53 Ep, 148, alit. 111; Migne, P. 
apdcwmov kal ) rerela émiyywos, L., XXXIII, 622. 

49 Basil, Serm. de Imp. et Potest. 54 For St. Augustine’s own teach- 

50 00 Kadws é€oriv 6 Oeds, ing the reader is referred to De 

51 €\arroy 6é THs atlas, Civ. Dei, XI, 29, XXII, 29, and 


52ms xpn, Cyril of Jerusalem, De Trinit., XIV, 16. 
Catech., 6, n. 6. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD IOI 


harmonious concert is an expression of Theodoretus, 
who says that the Angels “do not see the Divine Es- 
sence, but only a certain lustre,®> which is adapted 
to their nature.” It is likely that this passage is 
the source of the heresy of the fourteenth century 
Palamites,®* who alleged that the divine attributes can 
be contemplated separately from the divine Substance 
in the form of a “ garb of light’? enveloping the God- 
head."” 


ARTICLE 2 


THE LIGHT OF GLORY A NECESSARY MEDIUM FOR THE 
INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD 


1. WHAT THE LIGHT oF GLORY 1s.—The term 
“light” (lumen), like ‘“‘vision” (visio), has been 
transferred from the material world to the realm 
of intellectual cognition. As material light is 
the condition and the cause of bodily vision, 
so intellectual light is necessary for intellectual 
vision, t. e., cognition. As there are three states: 
that of nature, that of grace, and that of glory; 
so there are three specific modes of cognition, 
with as many different “lights” adapted and pro- 


55 Sétap ruva. 

56 On the heresy of the Palamites 
(from Gregory Palamas), cfr. Her- 
genrither’s Handbuch der Allge- 
meinen Kirchengeschichte, ath ed. 
by J. P. Kirsch, vol. II, pp. 804 
sqq.; Blunt, Dictionary of Sects, 
etc., pp. I91 Sq. 

57 Possibly Gregory the Great al- 
luded to Theodoretus when he 
wrote (Moral, XVIII, nn. 90 sq): 


* Fuere nonnulli, qui Deum dice- 
rent etiam in tlla regione beatitudt- 
nis in claritate quidem sua conspict, 
sed in natura minime vidert. Quos 
nimirum minor inquisitionis subtili- 
tas fefellit; neque enim ill sim- 
plict essentiae aliud est claritas et 
aliud natura, sed tpsa et natura sua 
claritas, tpsa claritas natura est.” 
On the whole subject, see Franzelin, 
De Deo Uno, thes. 19, Romae 1883. 


102 THE LIGHT OR GLORY 


portioned to each; wz.: the “light of reason” 
(lumen rations), which comes from the Creator ; 
the “light of grace” (lumen gratiae, fidet), which 
comes from the Sanctifier, and the “light of 
glory’ (lumen gloriae), which comes from the 
Divine Remunerator. 

Here we have to deal with the light of glory. 
What is the light of glory? Like the light 
of reason and the light of grace, the light of 
glory must be immanent in the human intellect, 
and hence cannot be objectively identical with 
the majesty or splendor of God (lumen quod 
videtur). Nor can it be the actus videndt of 
the Elect, inasmuch as this act, though im- 
manent in the human intellect, is impossible 
without the light of glory, just as cognition de- 
pends of necessity on the light of reason, and 
faith on the light of grace. The theologians 
accordingly define the light of glory as a super- 
natural force or power imparted to the intellect 
of the Blessed in Heaven, like a new eye (or 
principle of vision), enabling them to see God as 
He is:** 

2. THE Docma.—The Council of Vienne 
(A. D. 1311) defined the necessity (and hence 
implicitly the existence) of the lumen glonae, 
when, through the mouth of Clement V, it con- 
demned the heresy of the Beguines and Beg- 


58 Cfr. W. Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,” pp. 48 sqq. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 103 


hards,® that “Anima non indiget lumine gloriae 
ipsam elevante ad Deum videndum et eo beate 
fruendum.” °° 

a) The necessity of the light of glory flows as 
a corollary from what we have said above. If 
the order of grace and salvation instituted for 
all rational creatures is a strictly supernatural 
state, absolutely unattainable by purely natural 
means; if, in particular, the natural power of 
the created intellect is not sufficient to enable it 
to attain to an intuitive vision of God’s essence 
because He “dwells in light inaccessible;’’—then 
manifestly the cognitive faculty of rational crea- 
tures must, in virtue of the potentia obedientials 
latent therein, be elevated to the supernatural 
sphere and endowed with the supernatural power 
necessary for it to see God. Whoever denies 
this conclusion must perforce accept the heretical 
antecedent that the created intellect is able by 
its own natural powers to arrive at an intuitive 
vision of God.°*? 

b) The necessity of the light of glory can be 
proved even more cogently from its relation to 
the habitus of theological faith. For while the 
supernatural habitus of love (habitus caritatis) 
will continue in the beyond,*’ faith, on the other 


59 On the Beguines and the Beg- 60 Clement., 1. V, tit. 3, cap. 3. 
hards, see E. Gilliat-Smith in the 61 Cfr, Supra, Article 1, No. 2. 
Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. II, pp. 62 Cfr. 1 Cor, XIII, 8: 4 dydrn 


389 sq. : ovdéroTe éxminTet, 


104 THE LIGHT OF GLORY 


hand, will cease, being changed into vision,.** 
Now, if the supernatural life of faith here on 
earth is supported by a special habitus, viz., 
theological faith, it is plain that the light of 
glory, too, which takes the place of faith in 
Heaven, requires a habitus for its foundation; 
the more so because the beatific vision is far 
superior to the knowledge of faith, representing, 
as it does, the summit which grace makes it 
possible for any created intellect to attain. 
Cir. Apoc. XXII, 4 sqq.: “Et videbunt faciem 
ems;** . . . et nox ultra non erit; et non ege- 
bunt lumine lucernae, neque lumine solis, quo- 
niam Dominus Deus illuminabit tllos, et reg- 
nabunt in saecula saeculorum—And they shall 
see his face;.-... and night shall, be no mote: 
and they shall not need the light of the lamp, 
nor the light of the sun, because the Lord God 
shall enlighten them, and they shall reign for 
ever and ever.” | 

3. SCHOLASTIC CONTROVERSIES REGARDING THE 
NATURE OF THE LIGHT oF GLORY.—While no 
Catholic is allowed to doubt the existence and the 
necessity of the light of glory—in the sense of 
“supernatural assistance’—we are free to discuss 
the question, in what the essence of this light 
consists, and what are its qualities; provided, of 


63 Cfr. 1 Cor, XIII, 10: Bray 64 dforvrat 7d rpdowmoy adrod, 
dé €On 7d rédewor, 7d x ppous 856 eds gwriet ex’ avrois, 
Karapynoncerac, 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 105 


course, that the dogma itself is duly safe- 
guarded. 


a) Three Scholastic theories on the matter must be 
rejected as partly erroneous and partly inadequate. 

a) We must reject as incorrect in the first place the 
opinion of that school which holds that a mere ex- 
trinsic elevation (elevatio extrinseca) is sufficient % for 
the supernatural equipment of the human intellect, or 
that it is at least possible.*? The essence of this ele- 
vatio extrinseca is held by its champions to consist not 
in any intrinsic strengthening of the cognitive faculty, 
but in the exercise by God Himself of an immediate 
influence on the natural intellect, enabling it to at- 
tain to supernatural vision. Some theologians, as 
Cardinals Cajetan and Franzelin, regard this opinion 
as theologically unsound, and as involving a_ philo- 
sophic contradiction, on the ground that no vital potency 
can produce a supernatural act without undergoing an 
intrinsic alteration.°* Whatever view one may take of 
the possibility or impossibility of the elevatio extrinseca, 
this much appears to be certain: the theory does not 
accord with the spirit of the Clementine decision, be- 
cause the term “lumen gloriae elevans animam ad Deum 
videndum” implies just as much of an intrinsic (qualita- 
tive) change in the principle of cognition as does the 
phrase, “lwmen fidet elevans animam ad credendum.” 

B) There is a second theory, which accords some- 
what better with the sense of the dogma. It postu- 
lates an intrinsic strengthening of the soul by the agency 


66 Durandus, Comment. in Qua- Toletus, Comment. in S. Theol., 1, 
tuor Libros Sent., IV, dist. 49, qu. qu; 312, art. 5, conel.-3. 


Sg: 68 Cfr., however, G. B, Tepe, 
67 Cfr. Suarez, De Deo, II, 13;  S. J., Instit. Theol., II, pp. 137 saq., 
; Paris 1895, 


8 


106 THE LIGHT OF GLORY 


of an unbroken chain of actual graces (gratiae actuales). 
If it is true that in Heaven faith gives way to vision, 
while charity remains, and both are of the same species, 
i. é., habitual virtues, then should we not expect a cor- 
responding habitus visionis to replace the former habitus 
fidei? But this habitus visionis would be identical with 
the /umen gloriae. Hence, if the latter is at all to be 
compared to supernatural grace, it must be compared not 
to actual grace (gratia actualis), but to sanctifying grace 
(gratia habitualis), which inheres in the soul of the jus- 
tified as a permanent quality, a habitus infusus. 

y) Thomassin and several other theologians °® held 
that the beatific vision of God consists in a direct par- 
ticipation by the Elect in the Divine Vision itself, 7. e., 
in an actual transfer of the divine act of intuition to 
the intellect of the Just. Thomassin says:7 “ Videtur 
Deus a beatis non alia specie intelligibili quam Verbo 
ipso mentem imformante.’ Nay, he does not shrink 
from identifying the light of glory with the Holy Ghost, 
falsely drawing from Ps. XXXV, 10: “Jn lumine tuo 
videbimus lumen,’ the conclusion: “JIdeoque lumen 
gloriae, quo videtur Deus, est Spiritus sanctus.’ Sucha 
confusion of the beatific vision with the uncreated Logos, 
and of the light of glory with the Person of the Holy 
Ghost, deserves to be called adventurous. While it is 
quite certain that God cannot transfer His own vital 
act of self-contemplation to any extraneous being, it is 
equally certain that the Blessed in Heaven behold Him 
in virtue of a vital act of vision proper to, and immanent 
in, their own intellects. Can I see with the eyes of 
another? True, the Holy Ghost elevates and strengthens 
the intellect per appropriationem; but He is not the sub- 


69 Mentioned by Lessius, De Summo Bono, Il, 2, 
70 De Deo, VI, 16. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 107 


jective principle of energy from which the supernatural 
act of vision vitally emanates. Pursued to its logical 
conclusion this theory leads directly to Pantheism. 


b) From what we have said in refutation of 
these false theories the reader can easily for- 
mulate the true view. According to the senten- 
tia communis, the light of glory consists in a 
“supernatural power which inheres in the intel- 
lect of the Blessed as a permanent habitus, en- 
abling them to see the Divine Countenance.” 
This definition possesses the twofold advantage 
of being in full accord with the Clementine de- 
cree, and of satisfying the scientific dogmati- 
cfan,"? 


ARTICLE 3 


THE BEATIFIC VISION IN ITS RELATION TO THE DIVINE 
INCOMPREHENSIBILITY 


1. STATE OF THE QUESTION.—The incompre- 
hensibility of the Divine Essence must not be con- 
ceived as merely relative. God is incomprehen- 
sible to us not only in the natural condition of 
our intellect here below, but likewise in the super- 
natural state of glory in Heaven. Holy Scrip- 
ture’? and Tradition both define incomprehen- 


71 On some of the deeper prob- ject. more briefly in his Praelect. 
lems concerning the species im- Dogmat., vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 41 
pressa and expressa, cfr. G. B. Tepe, sqq. Friburgi 1906. : 
Instit. Theol., pp. 145 sqq. Chr. 72 Cir. Job XI, 7; Ps. CXLIV; 3. 


Pesch, S. J., treats the same sub- 


108 THE BEATIFIC VISION 


sibility as an absolute attribute, by which the 
Divine Essence is, and ever remains, impene- 
trable to every created and creatable intellect, 
even in the state of transfiguration and. elevation 
produced by the light of glory. The Fourth 
Lateran Council enumerates “incomprehensi- 
bilis’”” among God’s absolute and incommunicable 
attributes.7* Now there arises a difficult prob- 
lem. It has been defined by Benedict XII (1336) 
and by the Florentine Council (1439), that the 
beatific vision of the Blessed in Heaven is di- 
rected to the infinite substance of God, nay, to 
the Blessed Trinity itself, which the Elect intue 
immediate, nude, clare et aperte. If this is true, 
how can the Divine Essence remain incompre- 
hensible to those who enjoy the beatific vision? 
In other words: How can the dogma of the 
absolute incomprehensibility of God be reconciled 
with the dogmatic teaching of the Church that 
the Just in Heaven are happy in the intuitive 
vision of the Divine Essence? 

2. UNsuCcESSFUL ATTEMPTS AT HARMONIZ- 
ING THE Two Docmas.—It is plain that no at- 
tempt to harmonize these two dogmas by at- 
tenuating either the one or the other can prove 
successful or acceptable. The incomprehensi- 
bility of God and the reality of the beatific vision 
must both be accepted in their true meaning and 


78 Cfr, Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchirid., n. 428. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 109 


to the full extent of their logical bearing. Be- 
cause they fail in this the theories enumerated 
below are all defective. 


a) By excepting from the beatific vision several divine 
attributes, and positing the essence of God’s incompre- 
hensibility precisely in the concealment of certain un- 
seen divine perfections, Thomassin and Toletus mani- 
festly minimize the dogma of the visio intuitiva. Tole- 
tus insists that “Decem attributa distincte percipere, 
maioris est virtutis quam octo; ergo infinita percipere 
infinitae est virtutis. Divinae perfectiones sunt infimtae: 
ergo impossibile est, omnes ab intellectu creato percipt.” ™ 
But to distinguish between seen and unseen attributes 
is contrary to the absolute simplicity of the Divine Es- 
sence. That some of God’s attributes remain hidden to 
the Elect, in contradistinction to others which they do 
see, is a theory which can be entertained only on the 
assumption that the Divine Essence is split up into an 
infinite multiplicity of objectively distinct perfections, of 
which one might become visible while the others re- 
mained hidden. But the essence of the Godhead is 
physically and metaphysically indivisible. Hence, who- 
ever enjoys an intuitive vision of this most sim- 
ple Being, must envisage either all its perfections or 
none. To the objection of Toletus that in that case 
“ sequeretur quod omnia Det iudicia, omnes voluntates 
occultae essent beatis manifesta, quia omnia talia sunt 
formaliter in Deo,” we retort that God’s occult decrees 
and counsels involve an extrinsic relation, i. e., a rela- 
tion to something which is not God. As little as the 
intuition of the Divine Essence eo ipso entails a knowl- 


74 Comment. in S. Theol., I, qu. 12, art. 7. 


110 THE BEATIFIC VISION 


edge of all real and possible creatures — for these do 
not form a part of the Divine Essence as such — just 
so little does a vision of the Divine Essence in its en- 
tirety necessarily imply knowledge of God’s free de- 
crees, which have their terminus outside of the God- 
head, and, therefore, remain hidden even to the Elect 
in Heaven, unless God sees fit to disclose them by a 
special revelation. 

b) The second theory under consideration detracts 
from the dogma of God’s incomprehensibility. Its cham- 
pions (notably Ockham and Gabriel Biel) assert that no 
concept formed of any object is complete, unless to the 
comprehensio tntrinseca (1. e., an exhaustive notion of 
its objective cognoscibility), there is joined a compre- 
hensio extrinseca, which implies that the subjective mode 
of cognition is the most perfect possible. This view 
does not necessarily deny the incomprehensibility of 
God, because after all it is only God’s contemplation 
of Himself which is entitatively and noétically infinite, 
inasmuch as only the infinite Being Himself is capable 
of performing an infinitely perfect vital act. But the 
underlying shallow conception of God’s incomprehensi- 
bility involves certain insoluble antinomies. It im- 
plies, on the one hand, that the Blessed in Heaven 
might enjoy a true and full comprehension of the Di- 
vine Essence without infringing on the “ dxatadyyia,” 
inasmuch as, subjectively and from the noétic stand- 
point, there would still remain an unbridgeable chasm 
between God’s divine apprehension of Himself and the 
vision which He vouchsafes to His creatures in Heaven. 
It implies, on the other hand, that the attribute of in- 
comprehensibility cannot be limited to the Divine Es- 
sence, but must be extended to all things without ex- 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD III 


ception, even the smallest and most easily knowable. 
Not only God, but every truth (e. g., the Pythagorean 
theorem), nay, every material object (e. g., a blade of 
grass) would then be incomprehensible even to the 
highest angelic intellect, for the simple reason that an 
infinitely perfect mode of knowledge is possible only to 
an infinite being.’® 


3. THE TRUE THEoRY.—St. Thomas Aquinas 
strikes at the root of the problem by reducing the 
incomprehensibility of God to His infinity. 


“Ens et verum convertuntur.’. Therefore God’s 
knowableness, like His Essence, must be infinite. In- 
finite cognoscibility, however, can be exhausted only by 
an infinite power of cognition, and this no creature pos- 
sesses. Hence it is in the infinite, absolute Being only 
that cognoscibility and cognition, being and thought, can 
be really identical. ‘‘ Everything that is comprehended 
by any knowing mind, is known by it as perfectly as it 
is knowable. ... But the Divine Substance is infinite 
in comparison with every created intellect, since every 
created intellect is bounded within the limits of a cer- 
tain species. It is impossible, therefore, that the vision 
of any created intellect can see the Divine Substance 
as perfectly as it is visible.’’* In the light of this 
explanation we can understand why the Elect in Heaven, 
though they envisage the entire Substance of God (in- 
cluding all His attributes and the Divine Persons), 
nevertheless do not and cannot comprehend this Sub- 
stance either intensively, to the limits of its content, 

75 On the unsatisfactory theory 76S. Thom., Contr. Gent., III, 
of Vasquez (De Deo, disp. 53, cap. ss, (Rickaby, Of God and His 


2), see Franzelin, De Deo Uno, Creatures, p. 227. London 1905.) 
thes. 18, Romae 1883. 


112 THE BEATIFIC VISION 


nor yet extensively, in its totality. They intue the 
whole Godhead (totum), but they do not intue it fully 
(fotaliter) ; they envisage the Infinite Being Himself 
(infinitum), but they do not envisage Him in an in- 
finite manner (infinite). As a keen eye, says Richard 
of Middletown,” perceives the same color more dis- 
tinctly than a weak eye, so the saints’ supernatural 
power of vision is proportioned to the measure of their 
merits, that is to say, to the different degrees of the 
light of glory vouchsafed to each, although they all be- 
hold the same object.7® 


ReEApincs:— Lessius, S. J., De Summo Bono et Aeterna 
Beatitudine Hominis, Antwerpiae 1616.— Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, 
pp. 222 sq., Ratisbonae 1881.— Bautz, Der Himmel, spekulativ 
dargestellt, Mainz 1881.—*Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 14-19. 
— Th. Conefry, The Beatific Vision, Longford 1907,— W. Hum- 
phrey, S. J., “ His Divine Majesty,’ pp. 46 sqq., London 1897.— 
IneM, The One Mediator, pp. 296 sqq., London 1890.—Schniitgen, 
Die Visio Beatifica, Wirzburg 1867——*G. B. Tepe, S. J., Jn- 
stitut. Theol., Vol. Il, pp. 103 sqq., Parisiis 1895.— Scheeben, 
Die Mysterien des Christentums, 2nd ed., pp. 583 sqq., Frei- 
burg 18908— St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 12, and the commen- 
tators. 


77 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., III, dist. 14, qu. 14. 
78 Cfr. St. Thom., Comp. Theol., cap. 216. 


SECTION 3 


EUNOMIANISM AND ONTOLOGISM 


The dogmas expounded in the two foregoing 
Sections have been attacked by two classes of 
opponents: (1) by those who deny the incom- 
prehensibility of God, either here on earth or in 
Heaven; and (2) by those who allege that the 
intuitive vision of God is proper to man even 
here on earth. To the first-mentioned class be- 
long the Eunomians, who pretended to an ade- 
quate comprehension of God here below (a for- 
tiort, of course, in Heaven). Prominent among 
the second class are the Ontologists, who claim 
that man has an immediate, intuitive knowledge 
of God even in this world. 


Fad oe RAEN 8B 


THE HERESY OF THE EUNOMIANS 


I. THE TEACHING oF EuNomius.—Eunomius, 

a pupil of Aétius, about A. D. 360, espoused the 

cause of strict Arianism and became the leader 

of the so-called Anomoeans, who, in order to 

emphasize their belief that the Logos was a crea- 
Loe 


114 EUNOMIANISM 


ture, substituted for the ‘“‘épowvcov’’ of the semi- 
Arians the harsher term ‘‘évépov” (unlike). In 
the interest of Arianism, whose premises he car- 
ried to their legitimate conclusions, Eunomius 
soon added to his Trimtarian heresy a theological 
one by asserting that there is nothing in the God- 
head which can elude the grasp of human rea- 
son." The Eunomian heresy may be condensed 
into the following propositions: 

a) Human reason conceives God as ade- 
quately as He comprehends Himself. Accord- 
ing to St. Chrysostom,? Eunomius declared: 
“Deum sic novi, ut ipse Deus seipsum,’ which 
is merely a more pregnant formulation of the 
teaching of his master Aétius: “Tam Deum 
nOv1, sicut meipsum, imo non tantum novi meip- 
sum, quantum Deum.” * | | 

b) We acquire an adequate knowledge of the 
Divine Essence by forming the notion of “éye- 
vjoia’’ (uncreatedness), which perfectly expresses 
that Essence. By sophistically interchanging 
the terms “‘dyévyros” (uncreated, derived from 
“yiyvopa”) and “dyévvytos’”? (not generated, derived 
from “yevdo”) Eunomius infected the unsuspect- 
ing masses with two heretical errors. On the 
one hand, he discredited the Logos, Who, (he 


1 Cfr. Alzog, Manual of Universal 8 Quoted by Epiphanius, Haer., 
Church History, English ed., vol. I, 76. Cfr. also Socrates, Hist. Eccl., 
p. 540, Cincinnati 1899. EV. 


2 Hom. 2 De Incompr. 


Se a 


a nt wot haa 


SS SOT Oe et Oy Ba 
a en ie a 


Ae 


— ee 
<S= 


5 a ook iin ge oe 


bn ea a a Oe ay 
OFS esp aa 


ee ae 
; 


Ped 


A 
a i 
i. 
a 
Tee 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD I15 


said), being “yévr0s,” 7. e., generated, is a mere 
creature of the Father; on the other hand, he 
employed the handy equivocation as a means to 
confuse the “dyewnoia” (innascibilitas) of the 
Father with the fundamental attribute of God, 
aseity (‘“dyerncia”), thus poisoning the minds of 
his hearers with Arianism. 

c) Besides ‘“éyerqota’’ (innascibility), he said, 
there is no other divine attribute. All the other 
so-called attributes are mere synonyms comprised 
in the one notion of ‘“éyeoia,”” A composite 
concept of God would necessarily imply compo- 
sition in the Divine Essence, and therefore could 
not possibly be true. There is but one simple 
conception of God that corresponds to the sim- 
plicity of the Divine Essence, and that is 
“avevynota,”’ 34 

2, REFUTATION OF EuNnom1AniIsmM.—Though 
the Church never formally condemned Eunomius, 
his teaching as to the absolute intelligibility of 
the Divine Essence has always been held to be 
quite as heretical as his decidedly Arian view 
of the Logos. In refuting him the Fathers of 
his time insisted chiefly on the dogma of the 
divine incomprehensibility, though they did not 
neglect to combat this heretic, who was well 
versed in the writings of Aristotle, with the 


8a On the history and use of the Vol. II, pp. 347-9, 9th ed., Lon- 
term dyévyntov, see Newman, Se- don 1903. 
lect Treatises of St. Athanasius, 


116 ONTOLOGISM 


sharp weapons of philosophy also. It was, as we 
have already shown on a previous page, espe- 
cially Basil,* Gregory of Nazianzus,° Gregory 
of Nyssa® and Chrysostom’ who refuted this 
heresy. After what we have said on the subject 
in an earlier chapter, we need not enter into a 
detailed argument here. 


Reapincs:— Klose, Geschichte und Lehre des Eunomius, Kiel 
1883.— Hefele, Conciliengeschichte, 2nd ed., Vol. I, pp. 644 sqq., 
Freiburg 1873 Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, 2nd ed., Vol. II, 
pp. 19 sqq., Freiburg 1895.—*Fr. Diekamp, Gotteslehre des hl. 
Gregor von Nyssa, Minster 1896—E. Myers in the Catholic 
Encyclopedia, Vol. V, pp. 605 sq. art. “ Eunomianism.”— Bar- 
denhewer-Shahan, Patrology, pp. 239 sq., Freiburg 1908.— New- 
man, Arians of the Fourth Century, pp. 335 saq.. New Impres- 
sion, London 1901.— Blunt, Dictionary of Sects, pp. 151 sq., New 
ed., London 1903. 


ARTICLE (2 


‘WHY ONTOLOGISM IS UNTENABLE 


1. EXPOSITION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL SYSTEM. 
—The system of Ontologism consists of two main 
propositions: (a) the human intellect enjoys 
an immediate intuition of the Divine Essence 
here on earth; (b) this intuition, which is the 
source and principle of all other human knowl- 
edge, is natural to the human understanding, be- 
cause the Absolute is not only the highest object 


4 Contra Eunom. On St. Basil’s 5 Or. Theol., 1-4. 
attitude towards Eunomianism, cfr. 6 Contra Eunom. 
Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, pp. 7 Hom. contra Anomoeos, espe: 


282 sq. cially 1-5, wept rov dkaTadnTTov, 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 117 


of our cognition (veritas prima ontologica), but 
also the first thing that we actually perceive 
(veritas prima logica). The human intellect 
can conceive nothing whatever until it has con- 
ceived God, because it can apprehend created 
things only in God, who is their archetype. 
Sense-perception serves merely to make us re- 
flexively conscious of the ideas which we perceive 
directly though unconsciously in Him who is 
Truth itself. The name Ontologism was in- 
vented by Vincenzo Gioberti,* for the purpose 
of indicating, first, that all rational cognition 
takes place not by the agency of concepts, but 
of real entities (76 6v), and, secondly, that as 
God is first in the order of being (prumum on- 
tologicum, 7 évtws év, 6 év), so He is also first in 
the order of knowledge (primum logicum). 


2, History or OnToLocisM.— The germ of Ontologism 
may be traced back to the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, 
who himself at first favored the theory, in his Com- 
mentary on the Liber Sententiarum of Peter Lombard, 
but combated it vigorously in his later writings.®* In 
the fifteenth century Ontologism had an exponent in 
Marsilio Ficino, an ardent neo-Platonist, who went so 
far as to demand that Plato should be read in the 

8 + 1852, Fora sketch of his life Ch. II, § 1, no. 3: ‘“‘Innatism of 
and a brief account of his philoso- Aquinas,” pp. 109 sqq., Notre 
phy, see U. Benigni’s article, ‘“‘Gio- Dame, Ind. 1905. See also Msgr. 
berti,” in vol. VI of the Catholic Ferré, St. Thomas of Aquin and 
Encyclopedia. Ideology, English transl. by a Father 


8a On this point, cfr. M. Schu- of Charity, 3rd ed., London 1881. 
macher, The Knowableness of God, 


118 ONTOLOGISM 


churches, and who kept a light burning before the great 
philosopher’s bust in his room at Florence.® 

a) Nicolas Malebranche first developed the theory 
into a philosophical system and may therefore be 
justly called the Father of Ontologism. He tells us in 
his famous Recherche de la Vérité (published in 1675): 
God is as it were the Sun in the center of a world 
of thinking spirits. He is ever present to our minds, 
into which He pours the light of His eternal ideas. 
It is only by peering into this intellectual Sun, 1 @., 
by an immediate intuition of God, that we perceive all 
things and truths. “Nous voyons toutes choses en 
Dieu.’ 1° Malebranche’s theory was adopted and de- 
fended by Cardinal Gerdil in his Défense du Sentiment 
du P. Malebranche sur la Nature et l Origine des Idées; 
but it is said the learned Cardinal renounced Ontologism 
in his later years. In the nineteenth century, Vincenzo 
Gioberti!t endeavored to strengthen Ontologism by 
drawing his famous distinction between direct and re- 
flex perception. Direct perception, according to him, 
consists in: the immediate intuition of God, though not 
of God per se, but in His creative influence on the 
world. Hence the celebrated principle: “ L’ente crea 
le esistenze — Being creates existences.” In virtue of 
reflexive perception we realize, though indistinctly and 
in a limited way, what we see clearly and definitely, 
though unconsciously, in the intuitus Dei. ‘The essence 
of Gioberti’s system lies in the assumption that direct 
10 For a succinct account of 


Malebranche’s system, see W. 
Turner, History of Philosophy, pp. 


9 Cfr. M. Schumacher, C.S.C., in 
the Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. VI, 
5s. wv. “Ficino”’? Among Ficino’s 


several works, the Theologia Platon- 
ica de Animarum Immortalitate de- 
serves mention. Cfr. also De Wulf- 
Coffey, History of Medieval Philoso- 
phy, pp. 468 sq., London 1909. 


464 sq., Boston 1903, 

11 Introdusione allo Studio della 
Filosofia. On Gioberti, cfr. Benigni 
in Vol. VI of the Catholic Ency- 
clopedia, pp. 562 sq 


ey, 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 119 


intuition of God, though only as “ creating existences ”’ 
—.Ens creans existentias, i. e., in so far as He exer- 
cises an influence upon the cosmos,— is the starting-point 
of all human knowledge. 

b) The Ontological system of Antonio Rosmini (died 
1855) created quite a stir, especially in his native Italy. 
The controversy reached its climax in the condemna- 
tion, on December 14, 1887, of forty propositions taken 
from Rosmini’s writings.12 The condemnation was pro- 
nounced by the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition 
by command of Pope Leo XIII. Rosmini, who began 
his philosophical career as a defender of the theory of 
“ inborn ideas,” 12 later entered the camp of the Ontolo- 
gists, and finally ascribed to the idea entis certain quali- 
ties which belong only to the Absolute, 7. e. God. 
By hopelessly confusing the notion of indefinite, gen- 
eral, abstract being (7 év) with that of the infinite, con- 
crete, divine Being (6 év), he gave the Ontological 
system a decidedly Pantheistic turn.” 

Among the theistic champions of Ontologism Profes- 
sor Ubaghs of Louvain (died 1854), whom we have 
already met with as a defender of Traditionalism, was 
perhaps the most prominent. “ Ubaghs thinks that we 
are born with the idea of the infinite God, and that 
this idea is in the beginning unformed, but becomes 
formed by reflection, to which we are led by our edu- 


cation in human society.” *° 


12 For a list of the condemned 
doctrines, consult Rosminitanarum 
Propositionum Trutina Theologica, 
Romae, Typis Vaticanis, 1892. A 
Life of Rosmini was written in 
English by Fr. Lockhart (London 
igor). Cfr. Turner, History of 
Philosophy, pp. 631 sa. 


Ontological errors were 


13 Nuovo Saggio sull’ Origine 
delle Idee (1830). 

14]] Rinnovamento della Filoso- 
fia (1836); Teosofia (1859). 

15 Cfr. Propos. Rosmint 
1-5. 

16 Boedder, Nat. Theology, p. 143 
Cath. Encycl., xv, 114. 


damn., 


120 ONTOLOGISM 


also propagated by Pére Gratry,17 Abbé Branchereau,?8 
Bishop Hugonin of Bayeux,!® Abbé Fabre,?° by an un- 
known author under the pseudonym “ Sans-Fiel,” 2* and 
by a number of other writers in F rance, Belgium, and 
Italy. There is also, or was until recently, a small school 
of Ontologists in the United States.22. German writers, 
with the sole exception of P. Rothenflue, S. J.,2* never 
grew enthusiastic over Ontologism; but such among 
them as were tainted with it (notably Krause and 
Baader) drifted straightway into Pantheism, which is 
after all only a logical — if covert — sequel of Ontolo- 
gism, 

c) How could so many learned and pious men deceive 
themselves so egregiously? For a psychological ex- 
planation let us turn to the leading arguments of the 
Ontologists. Some of these arguments are very specious. 
Thus, one of them, based upon the doctrine of universal 
ideas, concludes: A universal concept must have a real 
object (universale in re). Now there can be no univer- 
sale in re either in the contingent things of this world, 
which are in a constant flux, nor in the activity of 
the human mind. Not in the contingent things of this 
material world, because the universals are as necessary, 


as eternal, and as unchangeable as Truth itself. Not 

17 De la Connaissance de Dieu, 2 (Cfr. W. Turner, History of Phi- 
vois. Paris 1853. On Gratry and losophy, pp. 636 sq., Boston 1903). 
his teachings, see G. M. Sauvage’s Driscoll (Christian Philosophy: God, 
article s. v. in the Catholic Ency-  p. 56) Says that ‘To-day Onto- 


clopedia, vol. VI, 

18 Instit. Philos. 

19 Etudes Philosophiques; Onto- 
logisme. 

20 Défense de lV’Ontologisme. 

21 Discussion Amicale sur l’On- 
tologisme. 

22Its most distinguished repre- 
sentative was Orestes A. Brownson, 


logism counts no defenders among 


Catholic writers,’ but is “ most 


strenuously advocated by many non- 
Catholic writers” (e. g., Harris, 
Knight, Luthardt, C. M. Tyler, T. 
H. Green, E. Caird). “This re- 
cent form of Ontologism is due to 
the influence of Hegel.” 

23 Instit. Philos. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD I2r 


in the human mind, because the mind does not, by 
thinking, create truth, but presupposes it and bows be- 
fore its majesty. Now, necessity, eternity, unchange- 
ableness, etc., can be predicated of God alone; hence 
in perceiving truth we see the Godhead. Again, it is 
only on the basis of Ontologism that we can account 
for the notion of infinity, inasmuch as “the finite is a 
limitation of the infinite,’ and consequently must in 
thought come after it. The idea of infinity cannot be 
gained by abstraction, because the finite contains nothing 
infinite which could be abstracted. Consequently, the 
concept of the infinite is derived from an immediate 
intuition of the Infinite Being itself. 

Gioberti bottoms one of his favorite arguments on the 
postulate of a parallelism supposed to exist between the 
(ontological) order of being and the (logical) order of 
thought. The order of cognition, he argues, must cor- 
respond to the order of being. Therefore we perceive 
all things in the rank and sequence in which they are. 
Now, God is the very first thing in the order of being 
(ens primum) ; consequently He must also be the first 
which we apprehend (primum cognitum). The tradi- 
tional practice of placing the material objects of the 
senses first, and God last, among the objects of human 
cognition, he says, destroys the harmony between being 
and thought (between the ontological and the logical 
order), and fails to take due account of the unique 
dignity of God. 

With a contemptuous sneer at “ German philosophy,” 
some of the leaders of Ontologism attempted to raise 
their system into the exalted place of “the only ac- 
cepted Catholic philosophy.” In endeavoring to explain 
the origin of our ideas, they argued, we must choose 

9 


122 ONTOLOGISM 


between Cartesian Psychologism and Ontologism. In 
other words: We must draw our ideas either from 
the mind that conceives them, or from the object of 
perception (év = being). If we derive them from the 
mind, we shall depreciate their objective content, deify 
reason as the sole source of truth, throw open the door 
to Pantheism, and drift into the shoals of Kant, Fichte, 
Schelling, and Hegel. Ontologism is the only alterna- 
tive.”4 


3. PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF THE ONTOLO- 
GIST SySTEM.—To refute Ontologism thoroughly, 
we shall have to demonstrate, first, the falsity of 
its principle of knowledge, and, secondly, the per- 
nicious consequences to which it logically tends. 


a) A close examination of the nature of our universal 
concepts (ideae universales) shows convincingly that 
God cannot be the principal nor (in point of time) the 
first object of human knowledge here on earth. We 
first apprehend the visible world, and thence ascend to 
a knowledge of God as its Creator. Our knowledge 
of God is the arch or keystone of science. Further- 
more, Our conception of the infinite is vitiated by an 
incurable negation,— which could not be were we en- 
dowed with an immediate intuition of that Being which is 
in reality the Infinite. If Ontologism were right, how 
should we explain the notorious fact that man can know 
of the existence of God by no other than the syllogistic 
method? How comes it that we are forced to define 
the Essence of God by means of concepts that express 
quality, and to employ the methods of negation and 


24For a refutation of all these fallacies, see the text-books on. phi- 
losophy; cfr. also No, 3, infra, 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 123 


eminence? How is it that theodicy is built up on cos- 
mology and psychology (the sciences of the world and 
of the soul)? Why do all our apprehensions and judg- 
ments contain an admixture of phantasms?** Why, if 
we have an immediate intuition of God, are we not 
conscious of it? All these questions Ontologism finds 
itself unable to answer. 

The fact last referred to, viz., that we are not con- 
scious of possessing an intuitive knowledge of God, 
is alone sufficient to disprove Ontologism. If our con- 
sciousness (sensus intimus) faithfully reports all the in- 
terior facts both of sense perception and of spiritual 
life-— which it must if we are to accept it as a reli- 
able source of true and certain knowledge,— then it 1s 
simply impossible that it should tell us nothing what- 
ever of what, if it existed, would manifestly be the 
most fundamental of all the facts of our conscious- 
ness, namely, the intuitive knowledge of God. Yet our 
consciousness is silent on this point, and therefore those 
who affirm that the human mind enjoys such an intuitive 
knowledge of its Maker, must evidently be deceiving 
themselves. 

b) The falsity of Ontologism further appears from 
the circumstance that it entails wrong conclusions. 
Logic tells us that where there is a false consequent, 
there must be a false antecedent. The worst feature 
of the Ontologist system is its immanent Pantheistic 
bias. We do not, of course, mean to charge all On- 
tologists, most of whom were well-meaning, learned, 
and honorable men, with consciously advocating Pan- 
theism, though several of them, like Gioberti and Ros- 
mini, seem to have quite frankly drawn the last con- 


25 Cfr, Aristotle, De Memor. Rem. 1: “ Noety ovKk tori dvev dav- 
TaouLaros,” 


124 ONTOLOGISM 


clusions from their premises. What we mean to say is, 
that the system as such, in its logical deductions, in- 
evitably runs into the marshes of Pantheism. This is 
most plainly apparent in those forms of Ontologism 
which identify abstract being (esse universale) with 
Divine Being (esse infinitum), and confuse knowledge 
of the one with an intuition of the other. For if 
abstract being is really identical with Divine Being, 
then everything that can be subsumed under the uni- 
versal notion of being is God; in other words: Every- 
thing is God. But even the more moderate defenders 
of the Ontologist system, who put the purely negative 
necessity, eternity, and unchangeableness of our univer- 
sal ideas on the same plane with the corresponding 
positive attributes of God, are guilty of a deification 
of finite essences and tumble hopelessly into the pit of 
Pantheism, 


4. THEOLOGICAL EstrMaTE oF ONTOLOGISM.— 
So much for the philosophical aspects of Ontolo- 
gism. To ascertain its status before the bar of 
dogmatic theology, we will first examine the 
judgments pronounced upon it by the Church. 


a) The first in the series of these judgments is a 
decree of the Holy Office, dated September 18, 1861, 
in which seven Ontologist propositions are indirectly 
censured by the remark: “Tuto tradi non possunt,” 
Chief among them are: “Immediata Dei cognitio, 
habitualis saltem, intellectut humano essentialis est, ita 
ut sine ea nihil cognoscere possit, siquidem est ipsum 
lumen intellectuale ” (prop. 1). “Esse illud, quod in 
omnibus [est] et sine quo nihil cognoscimus, est esse 
divinum” (prop. 2). “ Universalia a parte ret consi- 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 125 
derata a Deo realiter non distinguuntur” (prop. 3). The 
‘Ontologists tried to make it appear that this decree was 
aimed directly at Pantheism; but when Abbé Branch- 
ereau in 1862 submitted his theistic Ontologism to 
the judgment of the Roman authorities, he was advised 
that the fifteen theses into which he had cast it fell 
under the decree of the Holy Office.2® The Vatican 
Council did not enter into a discussion of this aber- 
ration, but one of its dogmatic definitions?’ plainly 
strikes at Ontologism, in so far as Ontologism leads 
logically to a Pantheistic identification of God with the 
universe.”® 

Even more telling and important is the condemna- 
tion, in A.D. 1887, by the Congregation of the Holy 
Office, of forty propositions of Antonio Rosmini, “in 
proprio sensu auctoris,’—a decision which Pope Leo 
XIII expressly ordered to be observed throughout the 
universal Church. Several of these forty propositions 
embody a frank statement of the principles of Ontolo- 
gism. Thus, e.g.: “Esse indeterminatum, quod procul 
dubio notum est omnibus intelligenttis, est divinum illud, 
quod homini in natura manifestatur” (prop. 4). “ Esse, 
quod homo intuetur, necesse est ut sit aliquid entis ne- 
cessarti et aeternt, causae creantis ... atque hoc est 
Deus” (prop. 5).?° 

b) In appraising the theological value of these official 
decisions the first question that suggests itself is: If 
Ontologism contradicts two dogmas, that of the mediate 


mat. SS. Conc. Vaticani ex ipsis 
eius Actis Explicatae, p. 75, Fri- 


26 See Kleutgen, Verurtheilung 
des Ontologismus, Munster 1868. 


27 “ Praedicandus est [Deus] re 
et essentia a mundo distinctus.’— 
Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1782. 

28 Cir. Granderath, Constit. Dog- 


burgi 1892. 

29 The full text of the decree is 
given by Schiffini, Disput. Metaph. 
Spec., Vol. I, pp. 432 sqq. 


126 ONTOLOGISM 


character of our knowledge of God here below,®° and 
that of the /umen gloriae,** why was it not condemned as 
a heresy ? 

a) There is a vast difference between the Ontologists 
and those earlier writers who denied the dogmas just 
mentioned. The latter were outright heretics, while the 
Ontologists, on the contrary, disavow the heretical im- 
plications of their doctrine and profess loyal adherence 
to the faith. They deny in particular that the intuition 
of God which they teach implies the “ visio beatifica,”’ 
admitting that the latter can only take place in Heaven 
and by virtue of the “lumen gloriae.” In explaining 
this distinction they have recourse to various subter- 
fuges, which, while elucidating nothing, at least prove 
that those who seek shelter under them are not and do 
not desire to be regarded as heretics, 

B) But the laws of logic are inexorable, and Ontolo- 
gism cannot escape the heretical conclusions that flow 
from its principles. It is for this reason that the 
Church dealt the whole system a mortal blow. An 
immediate intuition of God,—no matter whether we 
- consider Him as the Absolute Spirit or as the Creator, 
— necessarily implies an intuitive knowledge of the Most 
Holy Trinity, and also beatific bliss. He who excludes 
the visible world as an indispensable medium of cog- 
nition, must needs admit that man, if he sees God, Who 
is simplicity itself, must see Him as He is. Now if, 
as Ontologism alleges, an intuitive knowledge of the Di- 
vine Essence is “ natural,” nay “essential ” to the human 
intellect, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that an 
intuitive knowledge of the Most Holy Trinity, and conse- 


80 V. supra, Chapter II, § 1. 
31 V. supra, Chapter II, § 2, Art. 2, 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 127 


quently the beatific vision, are likewise natural and essen- 
tial to the mind of man.*? 

y) For a positive doctrinal justification of the Roman 
decrees against Ontologism it suffices to revert to 
the two dogmas which we have set forth above. For, 
the fact that our knowledge of God is necessarily 
inferential and imperfect, of itself excludes the possi- 
bility of an immediate intuitive vision of the Divine 
Essence. This teaching being so clearly contained in 
the sources of Divine Revelation, it is plain that the 
Ontologists cannot base their claims on the Bible. 
They adduce Ps. IV, 7: “Stgnatum est super nos 
lumen vultus tui, Domine — The light of thy counte- 
nance, O Lord, is signed upon us,” in favor of their 
contention, that we see God directly here below; but 
the context makes it plain that the Psalmist merely 
meant to praise the benevolence of God Who watches 
oven thins And) 2) St.John i( I) om speaks of the 
true light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh 
into this world,” he cléarly means supernatural enlight- 
enment by faith and grace through the Divine Logos. 
Nor has Ontologism been successful in its attempts to 
found its teaching upon the Fathers. Its opponents 
were able to show that not a single one of the Fathers 
ever taught that man enjoys an intuitive vision of God 
here on earth; no, not even St. Augustine, on whom the 
Ontologists chiefly rely. 


5. oT. AUGUSTINE NO ONTOLOGIST.—More em- 
phatically than any other Patristic writer has 
St. Augustine insisted on the difficulty of ac- 


32 Cfr. Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, 33 Cfr. Ps. XXX, 7; Numbers 
pp. 76 sqq. IMAL, 252 


128 ) ONTOLOGISM 


quiring a metaphysically correct conception of 
God here on earth. 


a) Cfr. De Genes. ad Lit., lib, IV: “Mens itaque 
humana prius haec, quae facta sunt, per sensus corporis 
cernit eorumque notitiam pro infirmitatis humanae mo- 
dulo capit; et deinde quaerit eorum causas, st quomodo 
possit ad eas pervenire principaliter et incommutabiliter 
permanentes in Verbo Det, ac si invisibilia eins per ea, 
quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. Quod quanta 
tarditate ac diffiicultate agat et quanta temporis mora 
- +. quis id ignoret?” It is to be noted, however, 
that St. Augustine applies to every species of cognition 
the term “vision,” of which he distinguishes three 
kinds: “visio corporalis” (by means of the bodily eyes), 
“visio spiritualis” (by means of the imagination), and 
“visto intellectualis” (by means of the intellect). The 
“visio intellectualis” he subdivides into natural and 
supernatural, according to the power which performs 
it (mature or grace). Grace enables us to see God 
either through faith (“ per fidem”’) or by revealing to 
us the Divine Essence (“ per speciem).” Cfr. Enarr. 
im Ps. 149, n. 4: “Est quaedam visio huius temporis, 
erit altera visio futuri temporis. Visio, quae modo est, 
per fidem est; visio, quae futura erit, per speciem erit. 
St credimus, videmus; si amamus, videmus — There is 
a kind of sight belonging to this present time; there 
will be another belonging to the time hereafter ; the 
sight which now is, is by faith: the sight which is to 
be, will be by the [Divine] Essence. If we believe, we 
see; if we love, we see.” But the only real and true 
vision of God is that enjoyed by the angels and the just in 
Heaven. Cir. De Trin. I, 13: “I psa visio est facie ad 
faciem, quae summum praemium promittitur iustis — 


ig 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 129 


That sight is face to face that is promised as the highest 
reward to the just.” 

b) It is in conformity with this fundamental teach- 
ing of St. Augustine that we must interpret those pas- 
sages of his writings in which he speaks of God as the 
“ intelligibilis lux” of things, and even describes him as 
the “lumen mentium.? Solil., cap. 1, n. 3: “ Deus m- 
telligibilis lux, in quo et a quo et per quem intelligibiliter 
lucent omnia —God is the intelligible light, in which 
and from which and through which all things are in- 
telligible.” De Civit. Dei, VIII, 7: “[Deus est] lumen 
mentium ad discenda omnia —[God is] the light of our 
understanding, by which all things are learned by us.” 
In the first of these passages his purpose is to raise 
created things to the rank of copies of the divine orig- 
inal, “ incorporated thoughts of God” as it were; while 
in the second passage he evidently means that the light 
of reason in man is a reflection as well as an effect 
of the Divine’ Light: Cir. De Trin. XIV, nu. 15: 
“ Mens humana non. sua luce, sed summae illius lucts 
participatione sapiens erit.... Sic enim dicitur ista 
hominis sapientia, ut etiam Dei sit... verum non ita 
Dei, qua sapiens est Deus, ... quemadmodum dicitur’ 
etiam iustitia Dei non solum illa, qua ipse wstus est, 
sed quam dat homini, cum iustificat impium — The hu- 
man mind then will be wise, not by its own light, but 


by participation of that supreme Light... . For this 


wisdom of man is so called, that it is also of God 
... yet not so of God, as is that wherewith God is 
wise ... as we call it the righteousness of God, not 
only when we speak of that by which He Himself is 
righteous, but also of that which He gives to man 
when He justifies the ungodly.” This teaching has 
nothing in common with the Ontologism condemned by 


130 ONTOLOGISM 


the Church; else the Schoolmen would surely not have 
incorporated it into their treatises on God.*4 

c) The genius of Augustine ascended to heights into 
which only the profoundest mystic can follow. It is 
his mystic utterances that the Ontologists adduce in 
favor of their theory, especially his teaching that we 
envisage the truths of the metaphysical order “in ra- 
tiombus aeternis,” nay, “in ipsa, quae supra mentes 
nostras est, incommutabili veritate.” 25 Vercellone and 
others, from the fact that St. Augustine was favorably 
inclined towards Platonism, inferred that he postulated 
an intuitive vision of the archetypal ideas in God Him- 
self. This would stamp him an Ontologist. But the 
assumption is altogether unfounded. Despite his predi- 
lection for Plato,—he himself towards the end of his 
life retracted the exaggerated encomiums he had heaped 
upon the ancient Greek philosopher,— St. Augustine 
never shared the errors of Platonism. St. Thomas 
assures us ** that “ Augustinus, qui doctrinis Platoni- 
corum imbutus fuerat, st qua invenit fidet accommodata 
im eorum dictis, assumpsit; quae vero invenit fidei nos- 
trae adversa, in melius commutavit.” Besides, the On- 
tologist claim cannot be harmonized with Augustine’s 
well-known theory of knowledge. For he not only in- 
sists that the conception of God which men have here 
below, is a cognition “per speculum” and “in aenig- 
mate,” derived from the consideration of the material 
universe; but he also teaches that we can not argue 
a priort from ideal truth to real truth, or to the Divine 
Archetype.*’ Interpreting the above quoted passages by 
their context, therefore, and in the light of Augustine’s 

84/Cfr.'S. 'Thom,;"S; )Theol.,’ 12, 35 Confess., XII, 25. 


qu. 84, art. 5; De Verit., qu. 10, 86'S. Theol., 1. c. 
art. 11, ad 12, 87 Cfr. supra, Chapter I, Art. x. 


KNOWABILITY OF GOD 13t 


ordinary teaching, their meaning must be that the Author 
of all things, in creating them, stamped them with the 
seal of ontological truth, at the same time imprinting 
upon the human intellect the eternal and necessary laws 
that govern thought, 7. ¢., logical truth. That man has 
an immediate intellectual intuition of all truths in God, 
is a teaching quite foreign to the mind of St. Augus- 
tine, as interpreted by St. Thomas Aquinas and the 
Schoolmen generally; and the Ontologist construction, 
which was unknown before the seventeenth century, has 
no claim to truth or probability.** 


We have shown that Ontologism has no basis 
either in Sacred Scripture or Tradition. Its 
principle runs counter to the teaching of Reve- 
lation, in spite of all attempts that have been 
made to deny or to veil this opposition. In its 
consequences it leads partly to Pantheism, partly 
to other heretical doctrines. Hence the Church 
was fully justified in condemning it. 


Reapincs:—*A. Lepidi, Examen Philosophico-Theologicum 
de Ontologismo, Lovanii 1874.— Schiffini, S. J. Disput. Meta- 
physicae Spec., Vol. I, pp. 476 saq., Taurini 1888.— *Kleutgen, 
S. J., Verurteilung des Ontologismus durch den hl. Stuhl (Beila- 
gen zur Theol. und Philos. der Vorzeit), Munster 1868.— 
-*Zigliara, Della Luce Intellettuale e dell’ Ontologismo, Romae 
1874.— Karl Werner, Antonio Rosmini und seine Schule, Wien 
1884.—Ipem, Der Ontologismus als Philosophie des nationalen 
Gedankens, Wien 1885—JIpem, Die kritische Zersetzung und 
speculative Umbildung des Ontologismus, Wien 1885.— Boedder, 
S. J., Natural Theology, 2nd ed. pp. 12 sqq., London 1899.— 
M. Schumacher, The Knowableness of God, pp. 136 sqq., Notre 
Dame, Ind. 1905.—J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, 


88 Cir. Schiitz, Divum Augustinum non esse Ontologum, Monasterii 1867, 


132 ONTOLOGISM 


pp. 56 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 1904.— W. Turner, History of 
Philosophy, pp. 228, 367, 632 sqq., Boston 1903.— G. M. Sauvage, 
art. “Ontologism,” in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, pp. 257 
sq.— Mercier (tr. by Parker), 4 Manual of Modern Scholastic 
Philosophy, London 1916 sq., Vol. I, pp. 253 sq., 368; Vol. II, 
PP. 24 sqq.— Rosmini’s Short Sketch of Modern Philosophies and 
of His Own System, trans. by Lockhart, London 1882— For the 
ecclesiastical decisions in the matter, see the Resolutiones C ongr. 
S. Offictt et Indicis de Traditionalismo, Ontologismo, etc. 


PART II 
THE DIVINE ESSENCE 


Having demonstrated the knowableness of God, we 
proceed to inquire into His Essence. 

Our knowledge of the Divine Essence is gained from 
attributive notions. A more perfect mode of apprehen- 
sion is impossible on account of the defectiveness of 
our cognitive faculties, which enable us to perceive God 
only in an abstractive and analogical manner. But His 
infinite perfection offers us a supereminent equivalent 
for an infinite number of separate perfections, which 
the human mind can grasp. While in the creature, ex- 
istence, essence, and attributes are separate and distinct 
entities, in God they are all identical (Existence = 
Essence = Attributes). To define the Divine Essence 
scientifically, therefore, we must try to discover among 
God’s many attributes one which is the root and 
principle of all the rest. This particular attribute is 
Aseity or Self-existence. As the names applied to God 
in Holy Scripture afford us valuable indications for de- 
termining the Divine Essence, we shall begin by studying 
the substantive names of God in the Bible. 


133 


CHAPTER 1 


THE BIBLICAL NAMES OF GOD 


SECTION 1 


THE “SEVEN HOLY NAMES OF GOD” IN THE OLD 
TESTAMENT 


I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—We scarcely 
need to premise that in speaking of names, or 
nouns, a distinction lies between proper and 
common nouns (nomen proprium—nomen com- 
mune Ss. appellativum). Since God does not be- 
long to any species, and since there are no other 
individuals like Him, He cannot strictly speak- 
ing be designated either by a proper or a com- 
mon noun (hence the predicate dvémpos, afyros, 
meffabilis). Consequently the names attributed 
to God in Holy Scripture are not to be taken 
as adequately expressing His essence or nature; 
they are merely imperfect, inadequate, analogical 
appellations. 


Scheeben * has ingeniously divided the so-called “ seven 
holy names” of God in the Old Testament into three 


1 Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 66 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, pp. 170 sqq.) 
if4 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 135 


classes, of which the first (containing three names) 
elucidates the relation of God ad extra, 1. e., to man; 
while the third (comprising also three names) sets off 
the “three aspects of His intrinsic perfection.” In the 
center of both groups stands Yahweh, which is es- 
sentially a proper name, because it expresses the Divine 
Essence, and which is related to the other six names as a 
cause to its effects. 


2, THE THREE CLASSES OF DivINE NAMES.— 
As we have already explained, the proper name of 
God, describing His Essence, is ™ (Yahweh). 
The three aspects of His intrinsic perfection are 
denoted by “¥ (Schadai), the Strong, Mighty; 
WY (Elion), the High, Sublime, the Most High; 
and ¥inP (Kadosch), the Holy. God’s relation 
ad extra is characterized by 5x (El), the Strong, 
pion (He who is worthy of veneration), and ‘2'8 
(Adonat), Commander, Lord. 


a) God Himself revealed to Moses the Tetragram- 
maton imeffabile (nin) as the proper name signifying 
His Divine Essence.2 Owing to a misunderstanding 
of Lev. XXIV, 16: “Quit pronuntiaverit [= blas- 
phemaverit] nomen Domini, morte moriatur — He that 
blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him 
die,’ the Jews did not dare to pronounce the “ Four 
Letters ” (rerpaypdpparoy), and in consequence it long 
remained uncertain whether the Tetragrammaton was 
to be pronounced “ Jehovah” (a word still in use), or 
“Vihve,” or “ Yehave,’ or “ Yahweh.’ In the Jewish 
synagogues mn’ was always pronounced Adonai, ac- 


2 Ex, JIT, 13\saq.3° Vi, 3. 


136 THE SEVEN HOLY NAMES 


cording to the Rabbinical precept: “Dixit Deus: non 
legor, sed scribor. Scribor et legor Adonai.” * This 
uncertainty as to the proper pronunciation of myn ex- 
plains the interesting fact that the Tetragrammaton 
found its way even into Greek Bible codices, where it 
was changed by ignorant copyists into IIIT (= mm). 
To indicate that mm was always to be pronounced IN 


(Adonai), it was written with the vowel signs of the 
latter word, thus: nin’ = (chateph-patach being altered 


into shwa mobile). This gave rise — probably no earlier 
than the sixteenth century —to the wrong pronuncia- 
tion “Jehova.” To-day it seems pretty certain that the 
word must be written mm and pronounced Vahweh.4 


More important than the question of its grammatical 
form, is the meaning of the Tetragrammaton. Its root 
is undoubtedly mia, an older form of pn, i. é., to be. 


Hence mm means: He Whols. God Himself attached 


this meaning to the word when he replied to Moses who 
had asked Him for His name: “I am who ain. Pobule 
is therefore. God’s proper name, denoting His very es- 
sence, and can never, even catachrestically, be applied to 
other beings besides Himself, e, g., to false gods.® 
Exegetes have often discussed the question, whether 
the Tetragrammaton was known to the antediluvian 
Patriarchs and to Abraham, or whether it was first re- 
vealed to Moses. In attempting to solve this problem, 
we must distinguish carefully between the word as a 
3Cfr. Raym. Martini, Pugio 6 Cfr. Is. XLII, 8: “Ego Jahve, 
Fidei, p. 649, Lips. 1687, hoc est nomen meum; gloriam 
4Cfr. Broglie, “ Elohim et Jah- meam altert non dabo —I the Lord, 
weh ” (Annales de Phil, Chrétienne, this is my name: I will not give 
Pp. 537 sSqq., 1891). my glory to another.” (Cfr. also 
5 Ex. III, 14. Vulg., “Sum qui Deut. VI, 4; 2 Kings VII, 22.) 
sum”; Septuagint, éyd elue 6 dp: 
Hebrew, MON TWN NN, 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 137 


vocal sound, and its meaning. The pre-Mosaic origin 
of the word is probable: (1) from the archaic verbal 
root M7, to be, from which was formed Mn (the root 
is not m7, to be, which was in use in Moses’ time) ; 
(2) from the use of the Divine Name among the 
Patriarchs;7 (3) from the pre-Mosaic verbal com- 
pounds with mn (abbreviated iY), like Abja, Achja, 
Jochabed, Morja, etc. The assumption of a prolepsis 
does not appear to be justified in view of the fact that 
the name occurs 150 times in Genesis and that Moses 
introduces himself to the Israelites as one sent by 
Yahweh.’ It is quite certain that the Tetragrammaton 
in its deeper meaning and full sense (as a nomen 
proprium) was first revealed to Moses. Cfr. Ex. VI, 
3: “Ego mm et apparui Abraham et Isaac et Iacob 
ut “IW Sx, sed (quoad) nomen meum YM non notus 
fui illis.’ This fact is well established and cannot be 
affected by Delitzsch’s theory® that the name of God 
was familiar to the ancient Babylonians. 

b) Among the names of the third class, which, as 
we have said, express the intrinsic (transcendental) 
perfection of God, 8 (Schadat), usually enforced by 
the article “Wn or "YW Sx, is the most frequent and 
also the most ancient.*° Derived from the etymon 77¥, 
i. €., to be violent, employ force, it designates the in- 
trinsic might or power of God, thus: the Allpowerful; 
Sept., mavroxpdrop; Vulg., omnipotens (i. e., fortis).— 
The majesty and sublimity of God find expression in 
the name iipy (from ney = ascendit): the Most High; 


7 Cir. Gen. i LV 25/263 Ve 2938 9 Bibel und Babel, Leipzig 1902, 
passim, 10 Cfr, Ex, ‘VI, 3. 

8 Cfr., however, Himpel, Kirchen- 
lexikon, 2nd ed., V1, 1281 sq. 


10 


138 THE SEVEN HOLY NAMES 


Sept., 6 tyros; Vulg., altissimus.——The word viND, 
found chiefly in the Prophets, and among these espe- 
cially in Isaias, means the Holy One, and denotes the 
sanctity and purity of the Divine Essence. These three 
words, although originally adjectives, have been devel- 
oped into substantive appellations of the Deity and en- 
joy the prerogative of being applied exclusively to the 
one true God. 

c) The same cannot be said of the first two names 
of the remaining group, which describe God in His re- 
lation to man. The first and most ancient of these, 
current among all Semitic nations, 5x (from 53x, to 
be strong), 7. ¢., the Strong, the Mighty (Sept., 6 icyupés, 
mavroxpdtwp), is sometimes per abusum applied also to 
pagan gods.‘* When applied to the one true God, it 
is emphasized thus: ONT (6 @éos), or 7 by (Deus 
vivus), or DYOwA 5x (Deus coelorum), or DION by 
(Deus deorum).* The plural form Dio (the singu- 
lar, mide , is chiefly poetical), occurs no less than 
2,500 times, and is probably related to 5x. Its primary 
root is supposed to be Six, to be strong, its derived 
root nde, to swear, to venerate, to fear. The funda- 
mental meaning of the word, therefore, is power, in- 
asmuch as it strikes fear, or challenges adoration. 
Elohim is a majestic plural, or a veiled indication of 
the Most Holy Trinity, and by no means represents a 
rudiment of polytheism. For not only is the word 
almost invariably construed with the verbal singular, 
but we must remember that God Himself took special 

11 Dan. XI, 37 sqq. 13 Cfr. the Arabian Allah, Syrian 

12 Cfr. Zschokke, Theologie der Aloho, Babylonian Ji, Jiu. 


Propheten, pp. 12 sqq., Freiburg 
1877. 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 139 


care to preserve Monotheism pure among the Jews. 
Elohim is quite frequently applied to the false gods of 
the Gentiles, and likewise to angels and kings, that is 
to say, to rational beings that reflect the power and 
adorableness of God.?* In all such cases, however, pio’ 
is always a true plural.*® To describe the true God, it 
is often combined with appositions such as NiN3¥ DTiON 
(Elohim Sabaoth = dominus exercituum), or Elohim 
Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, etc. Unlike mim, Elohim is 
consequently not a proper name of God, but rather 
a nomen appositivum, which sometimes even takes the 
place of a predicate, e. g., “ Yahweh is the Elohim.” 
A further difference lies in this that Elohim is used 


preferably to designate the God of nature, while Yahwe 


more often describes God in His relation to the super- 
natural order of salvation— The most significant and 
most important name of this group is the third, ‘278 
(Adonai), from yn, to judge; hence: Judge, Lord 
(Dominus, 6 xipws). In spite of its plural form (omy 
lords;” cfr. monsieur, monsignore) Adonai is always 
singular in meaning and is applied only to the one true 
God. It is closely related to 1‘, not only because it 
loans its vowels to that word, but also for the reason 
that it is to be considered as a quasi-proper name of 
God.*® 


94 Chr. Ps) SLX XR XE, 62). * Ego 15 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, 
dixi, dit estis—I have said: You qwiy13; art0: 


are gods.” 16 Cfr, Gesenius, Thesaur., I, 328 
sq. @ 


SECTION: 2 


THE NAMES APPLIED TO GOD IN THE NEW TESTA- 
MENT AND IN PROFANE LITERATURE— 
THE SYMBOLIC APPELLATIONS 


I. The New Testament adopted the nomen- 
clature of the Old by translating the Hebrew 
names of God as literally as possible into Greek. 
It did not, however, succeed in adequately ren- 
dering the profundity of the Hebrew appella- 
tions with their wealth of meaning. We also 
note that New Testament usage in this regard 
is characterized by an almost slavish dependence 
on the Greek Septuagint. 


On the whole @cés (Vulg. Deus), corresponds to the 
Hebrew El and Elohim, while Vahwe (and also Adonai 
and S'‘chadai) is generally translated by xvpws (Vulg. 
Dominus). Hence it is not too much to say that from 
the point of view of the comparative science of lan- 
guages the fact that Christ is constantly called 6 KUp.os 
(Lord) is presumptive evidence in favor of His Divin- 
ity. On the other hand there comes to the foreground 
in the New Testament a new name of God, viz.: marhp, 
pater (Father), which is characteristic of the spirit of 
love and mercy exemplified in the Incarnation. Since, 
however, this name also occurs repeatedly in the Old 

140 


Se 
ee 


Ses 
x 


Se a 


Se pe oe 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 141 


Testament, there is no objective reason for accepting the 
Gnostic theory of a clean-cut opposition between the 
God of the Old Testament and the God of the New. 


2. If we abstract from the old Hellenic Té« 
(same as ™, an abbreviation for MM), the Indo- 
Germanic languages have coined altogether dif- 
ferent names for the Deity than the Semitic. 


The derivation of @eés from Oéew (run) or aifew 
(burn) or 6céc6a (behold), which the Fathers of the 
Church adopted from Plato,? and which was approved 
by the Schoolmen,? is no longer considered probable, since 
there has been found in the Sanskrit root dyu (div), to 
shine, shed luster (applied to the firmament), a common 
verbal stem for all the divine names current among the 
Aryan nations. Max Miller refers to the discovery 
of the etymological equation (Sanskrit) Diaus-Piiar = 
(Greek) Zebs-rarhp = (Latin) Jupiter =(old Nordic) 
T%r, as “ the most important discovery of the nineteenth 
century,” inasmuch as it proves not only that our own 
ancestors and the ancestors of Homer and Cicero spoke 
the same tongue as the nations of India, but also that 


1 Deut. XXXII, 6; Is. LXIII, 16; Zevs, but it also occurs in Lithu- 
Mal. II, 10. anian as devas and in the ancient 

2Cratyl., c. 16, p. 397 D. Nordic Edda as T)-r (genit. T¥-s, 

3 Cfr. John Damascene, De Fide  accus. T$), whom the ancient Teu- 
Orth. I, 9: “@eds Aéyerar ék tons venerated as their supreme god. 
Tov Oéew Kat mepiéme Ta oUumay- In Old High German this god was 
ra°  éx Tov aidew, 8 éore cate? called Zio, in Anglo-Saxon, Tiw; 
H dmd Tov OedoOat Ta mwavTa,” hence our English Tuesday, the 
Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, que same as ‘© Ziestag’’ in the Aleman- 
TZ, arts.8: nic dialect. The highest deity of 

4Cfr. Max Miiller, Essays, IV, the Romans, Jupiter (Dispiter) is 
444.. The Sanskrit word Dyaus identical with the ancient Greek. 
(Persian devs), formed from this Zeds-rarhp, Cir. J. T. Driscoll, 
root, appears not only in the Latin Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 42 
language as Deus (cfr. dies, sub  8qQs end ed., New York 1904. 
divo) and in Greek as Qedés and 


142 THE NEW TESTAMENT NAMES 
they all at one time had the same faith and for a while 
adored the same deity under exactly the same name — 
“Father of Heaven,’ 5 : 

The origin of the Germanic Gott (English God) is 
far more uncertain, in fact, it has not been cleared up. 
Some have derived the word from the Sanskrit jut — 
dyut (shining); others from ghu, to hail; others from 
the Greek dya0ds ( good), while again others have traced 
it to the Persian khoda (old Persian godata = “ens a 
1 WEEN € 

The Slavic tongues have the name bogu, Polish bog, 
derived from the Sanskrit root bhag = to apportion, 
order, venerate.’ 


3. The symbolic names applied to God in Holy 
Scripture (light, lion, fire, etc.), must be under- 
stood metaphorically. To interpret them literally 
would be heretical. 


Adapting itself to man’s way of thinking and speaking, 
the Bible applies to God many appellations known as 
anthropomorphic or anthropopathic, which describe Him 
as if he were a man, attributing to Him eyes, ears, 
arms, a heart, feet, etc., and purely human emotions 
such as passions, either concupiscible (as joy, desire, 
etc.) or irascible (e. g., anger, revenge, hate). That 
these are metaphors appears clearly from the Scriptural 
teaching that God is an absolutely invisible spirit, and in 


5 Max Miller, Anthropological Re- 


ligion, p. 82. London 1892, 

6 Cfr. Kluge, Etymol. Worter- 
buch der deutschen Sprache s. vy, 
“ Gott; ”? Dr. Murray’s New English 
Dictionary, Vol. IV, p. 267, Oxford 
1901. 


7 Cfr. on the subject of this sec- 
tion, Max Miiller, Lectures on the 
Science of Language, Vol.. I, pp. 
421 sqq., London 1880; also O, 
Schrader, Sprachvergleichung und 
Urgeschichte, Chapter VIII, Jena 
1883. 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 143 


particular from the fact that some of the symbols used 
to describe Him are derived from irrational, lifeless 
creatures. Thus God is called a “lion,” a “fire,”* a 
“sun,”® a “ light,” ?° and so forth. St. Thomas Aquinas 
tells us the purpose of these symbolic appellations: 
“ Nomen leonis dictum de Deo nihil aliud significat, quam 
quod Deus similiter se habet, ut fortiter operetur in SUIS 
operibus, sicut leo in suis.”*+ The Church has always 
declared it to be heretical to apply these words literally 
to God, as did, e. g., the Anthropomorphites of the fifth 
century. 


Reapincs:— Scholz, Handbuch der Theologie des Alten. 
Bundes, Vol. I, § 25.— Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 66 (Wil- 
helm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 169 sqq.).— S. J. Hunter, S. J., 
Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. Il, pp. 40 sqq.— Franzelin, 
De Deo Uno, thes. 22— Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vokvl) 
3rd_ed., pp. 53 sqq. Friburgi 1903. Reinke, Beitrage sur 
Erklirung des Alten Testaments, Minster 1855.— De Lagarde, 
Bildung der Nomina, Gottingen 1889.— F. Vigouroux, Diction- 
naire de la Bible, Paris 1891 sqq.—J. T. Driscoll, Christian 
Philosophy: God, pp. 42 sqq. 2nd ed., New York 1904.— 
Hastings, Dictionary of the Bible, s, v. “God (in O. T.)."— 
F. J. Hall, The Being and Attributes of God, pp. 227 saqq., New 
York 1909.— A. J. Maas, S. J., art. “ Jehovah” in the Catholic 
Encyclopedia, Vol. VIII, pp. 329 saq. 


8 Cfr. Heb. XII, 29. 

9 Mal. IV, 2. 

10 John I, 9; 1 John I, 5. 

49°S; Theol.) 1a, qu.’ 13) art. ‘6. 
St. Thomas’s teaching on the ap- 
plication of terms of human 
thought to the Deity is that of all 
Catholic theologians and _philoso- 
phers. For a defence of it against 


Herbert Spencer, see Boedder, Nat- 
ural Theology, pp. 106 sqq. Cfr. 
also Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: 
God, pp. 335 sq. (against J. Fiske) ; 
oS Fox,, art. Anthropomor- 
phism”? in the Catholic Encyclope- 
dia, Vol. I; and M. Schumacher, 
The Knowableness of God, pp. 161 
sqq., Notre Dame, Ind. 1905. 


CHAPTER II 


THE ESSENCE OF GOD IN ITS RELATION TO HIS AT- 
TRIBUTES 


SHC RIO Nr 
FALSE THEORIES 


When we speak of the essence of a thing, we com- 
monly mean not its physical but its metaphysical entity, 
as expressed in its definition (76 ri jv eva), giving the 
proximate genus and the specific difference; ¢. g., 
“homo est animal rationale.’ With the essence thus 
constituted we contrast the essential properties or at- 
tributes of the thing, which emanate from the essence as 
their ontological principle. As we begin to enquire into 
the relation that God’s Essence bears to His divine at- 
tributes,— leaving aside for the nonce the question in 
what His metaphysical essence consists,— we find that 
such relation must needs depend on the distinction be- 
tween them. Ontology teaches us that there are two dis- 
tinct categories of difference, real and logical. The latter 
can be subdivided into two kinds: virtual (distinctio ra- 
tiomis ratiocinatae s. cum fundamento in re), and purely 
logical (distinctio rationis ratiocinantis s. pure mentalis). 
The attempt of the Scotists to construe another distinc- 
tion, called formalis, intermediary between the real and 
the virtual, must be looked upon as futile. It is the busi- 
ness of dogmatic theology to ascertain precisely how the 
Essence of God differs from His attributes. 


144 


THE! DIVINE .ESSENCE 145 


ARTICLE 1 


THE HERESY OF GILBERT DE LA PORREE AND THE 
PALAMITES 


1. HERETICAL REALISM AND THE CHURCH.— 
That well-known champion of extreme Realism, 
Gilbert de la Porrée,* taught that there is and 
needs must be a real distinction between God 
and Divinity, and between essence and person 1n 
God. Opinions differ as to whether Gilbert ap- 
plied his Realism also to the Essence and the 
attributes of God. Some writers exonerate 
him from this charge, while St. Bernard’ de- 
clares him guilty. It is certain, at any rate, that 
the Synod of Rheims, A. D. 1148, in the pres- 
ence of Pope Eugene III, condemned as heretical 
the error of the extreme Realists when it de- 
creed: “Credimus et confitemur, simplicem na- 
turam divinitatis esse Deum nec aliquo sensu 
catholico posse negari quin divinitas sit Deus et 
Deus divinitas. Si vero dicitur, Deum sapientia 
saprentem ... aeternitate aeternum... esse, 
credimus nonnisi ea sapientia, quae est ipse Deus, 
sapientem esse... 1. @., Seipso saplentem, mag- 
num, aeternum, unum Deum.’ ? Gilbert readily 


1 Bishop of Poitiers from about De Wulf-Coffey, History of Medie- 
1142 to his death in 1154. His val Philosophy, pp. 194 sqq. 
principal work is the Liber Sex 2Serm. 80 in Cant. 
Principiorum. For a concise state- 8 Hardouin, Coll. Conc., t. VI, 
ment of his philosophical views, see op. 2, col. 1299. 


146 HERETICAL REALISM 


submitted to this decision, and also his friend, 
Otto von Freising. 

Two centuries later there arose among the 
schismatic Greeks the heresy of the Palamites 
—so called from its author, Gregory Palamos. 
This heresy two Constantinopolitan synods 
(A. D. 1341 and 1347) did not blush to pro- 
claim as a schismatic dogma. The quintes- 
sence of the Palamite error may be stated as 
follows: Between the essence (otcta) and the 
activity (épyea) of God there is a real 
distinction, inasmuch as the latter radiates 
from the former as something inferior, though 
still, in a sense, divine (4érys), God’s different 
attributes are merely radiations of the Divine 
Essence, and they solidify as it were by taking 
on the shape of an uncreated but visible light, 
which the Blessed in Heaven perceive by means 
of bodily vision. It is the same light that the 
disciples beheld on Mount Tabor. Here on 
earth this heavenly bliss is possible per anticipa- 
tionem only, as the fruit of severe mortifica- 
tion, in the jovx!, that is, the repose of con- 
templative prayer. Hence the name Hesychasts; 
hence also the contemptuous nickname épdaddsyryot 
or Umbilicans, given to these heretics by Bar- 
laam, the learned Abbot of St. Saviour’s at Con- 
stantinople.* 


4Cfr. Alzog, Manual of Universal Church History, II, 812 sq., Cin- 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 147 


2, HERETICAL REALISM REFUTED.—Except be- 
tween the Divine Hypostases, no real distinc- 
tion can be admitted to exist in the Godhead, 
because if there were in it any sort of real dis- 
tinction, the Divine Essence would consist of 
distinct parts, which is repugnant. St. Bernard 
of Clairvaux® justly traces this erroneous view 
to Polytheism: “Mulia dicuntur esse in Deo et 
quidem sane catholiceque, sed multa unum; alo- 
quin si diversa putemus, non quaternitatem habe- 
mus, sed centeneitatem: habebimus multiplicem 
Deum.” 

The dogma that God’s Essence is absolutely 
identical with His attributes, is taught, at least 
by implication, in all those passages of Holy 
Writ in which the divine attributes are con- 
ceived ‘substantively rather than adjectively. 
Cfr. 1 John IV, 8:° “Deus caritas est—God 1s 
charity.” John XIV, 6: “Ego sum via et vert- 
tas et vita—I am the way, and the truth, and 
the life.’® The Fathers never took these pas- 
sages for rhetorical figures of speech, but inter- 


cinnati 1899; von Stein, Studien 
iiber die Hesychasten, Wien 1874; 
Hergenrother, Kirchengeschichte, 
4th ed., Vol. II, pp. 804 sqq., Frei- 
burg 1904. The doctrine of the 
sight of the divine light has been 
retained in the theology of the 
schismatic Greeks and gained new 
power with the revival in that 
body in the nineteenth century. A 
work on the “spiritual prayer” 


which leads to the vision of light, 
was published at Athens as lately 
as 1854, under the title of ‘ Spir- 
itual Synopsis,” by Sophronios, an 
archimandrite of Mt. Athos. Cfr. 
Ph. Meyer in the New Schaff-Her- 
zog Encyclopedia of Religious 
Knowledge, Vol. V, pp. 256 SQQey 
New York 1909. 7 

5 De Consid., V, 7. 

8% adnan Kal h Swh, 


148 NOMINALISM 


preted them literally. Augustine condensed the 
entire dogmatic teaching of the Church on this 
subject into one pregnant axiom, viz.: “Deus 
quod habet, hoc est—God is what He has”? 
When the Fathers distinguish between és. and 
7a mept cov, they simply mean to emphasize that 
there is room for a virtual distinction between 
the Divine Essence and attributes. 


ARTICLE 2 


THE HERESY OF EUNOMIUS AND THE NOMINALISTS 


I. NoMINALISM AND THE CHURCH.—The Eu- 
nomian heresy,—that man can form an adequate 
conception of God here below by means of the 
dyewmaia,” paved the way for another error, wig.: 
that all the names and attributes of God are 
Synonymous ; in other words, that the distinction 
between God’s essence and His attributes is 
purely logical (distinctio pure mentalis s. rationis 
ratvocinantis). The medieval Nominalists (Ock- 
ham, Gregory of Rimini, Gabriel Biel) revamped 
this same error, with this difference that they 
held that the only ground we have on which to 
base distinctions between the attributes of God 
(which are per se synonymous), is the difference 
in the modes by which God manifests His power 
ad extra (distinctio cum connotatione effectuum). 


7 De Civit. Dei, XI, ro. 9 Supra, p. 114. 
8 Cfr. S. Anselm., Monol., cap. 16, 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 149 


Both the Eunomians and the later Nominalists 
insisted that the absolute unity and simplicity of 
the Divine Essence allowed of no distinctions, 
not even a virtual one.*° 

That the various names and attributes of God 
correspond to as many objective aspects of the Di- 
vine Substance, and are consequently not synony- 
mous, is “vix non de fide.’** It was because 
he had exaggerated the concept of unity that 
Master Eckhart had to submit to the condemna- 
tion, by Pope John XXII, of the following prop- 
ositions extracted from his writings: “Deus 
unus est omnibus modis et secundum omnem ra- 
tionem, ita ut in 1pso non sit invenire aliquam 
multitudinem in intellectu vel extra intellectum” 
(prop. 23). “Omnis distinctio est a Deo aliena, 
neque in natura neque in personis; probatur: 
quia natura ipsa est una et hoc unum, et quae- 
libet persona est una et id 1tpsum unum, quod 
natura’ (prop. 24). 

2. REFUTATION OF NOMINALISM.—a) Gre- 
gory of Nyssa’ called attention to the many 
attributes ascribed to God in various parts of 
the Bible. If the Eunomian hypothesis were 
correct, he insisted, these attributes would be 


10 Cfr. Gotti, De Deo, tract. 2, 
qu. 4, § 5. 

11-Kleutgen, 

12 Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 
523 sq. The Bull of John XXII 
(*‘ Dolentes referimus’”’) is dated 
March 27, 1329. On Eckhart’s life 


and writings, cfr. A. L. McMahon 
in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 
V, art. “ Eckhart; ”’? also De Wulf- 
Coffey, History of Medieval Phi- 
losophy, pp. 453 saqq. 

12a Or. 12 contr. Eunom, 


150 NOMINALISM 


meaningless and the Sacred Writers guilty of 
insufferable pleonasms. Basil ridicules the pat- 
ent absurdities implied in the Eunomian theory 
as “manifeste insania, ridiculum.” The intrin- 
SIC unity and simplicity of God does not justify } 
us in timidly denying all virtual distinctions in 
the Godhead. Far from infringing on the sim- 
plicity of God, the distinctions drawn by the 
human intellect “rather have their roots in, and 
grow out of, the unity of the Divine Essence.” }* 
“Loc ipsum ad perfectam Dei unitatem pertinet,” 
says St. Thomas, “quod ea quae sunt multipli- 
citer et divisim in aliis, in ipso sunt simpliciter 
et umte.” " The simplicity of God not only 
consists in the absence of all composition, like 
the simplicity of a mathematical point, but also 
in an infinite wealth of unnumbered perfections. 
But since.our finite intellect is unable to exhaust 
this wealth of perfection in one concept, we 
are compelled to form successively a number of 
varying attributive notions, which correspond to 
as many different momenta (not elements) in 
the Divine Being. It is only by this method 
that our limited understanding can take account 
. of the plenitude of Divine Perfection. 

b) The connotata tentatively suggested by the 
Nominalists do not make their theory acceptable. 
For God is called good and wise, not only be- 


13 Scheeben. 
14S. Theol., 1a, qu. 13, ‘art. 4; ad 3. 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 151 


cause He communicates His goodness and wis- 
dom to His creatures, but likewise because He 
is in Himself really good ib wise, treat diese 
of His imitabilitas ad extra." 

c) The pernicious conclusions which follow 
from the teachings of Eunomianism and Nominal- 
ism become most glaringly apparent in their 
treatment of the Most Holy Trinity. For if we 
hold that there is only a logical distinction (dis- 
tinctio pure mentalis) between God’s Essence 
and His attributes, how can there be a virtual 
distinction between the essential and the notional 
acts of the intellect and will, such as is postulated 
in the dogmatic principle: “The Father gen- 
erates, but the divine Essence does not generate 
—Pater generat, essentia divina non generat’? 
Thus we see how the error of Eunomius and the 
Nominalists logically involves a Sabellian Mod- 
alism. 


ARTICLE 3 


THE FORMALISM OF THE SCOTISTS 


1. THE Scotist THEORY.—“Formalism’’ plays 
a very important réle in the philosophy and the- 
ology of the Scotist school, quite as important 
as the concept of “praemotio” in the Thomist 
system. By “Formalism” we understand that 


15 Cfr, S. Thom., Comment. in hoc, quod [Deus] bona facit, bonus 
Quatuor Libros Sent., I, dist. 2, est; sed quia bonus est, bona 
qu. 1, art. 3: “‘Neque enim ex facit.” 


152 FORMALISM 


peculiar theory which posits distinctions that are 
neither real nor virtual, but are said to lie mid- 
way between these two as “formalitates ex na- 
tura rev.’ Formal distinctions are not real, be- 
cause they are related to one another not as 
object is related to object, but only as “formal- 
ity” is related to “formality.” At the same time, 
however, they are more than virtual distinctions, 
because the various “formalitates” are rooted in 
the things themselves, independently of the 
human intellect; that isto say, they are ante- 
cedently present in things not merely fundamen- 
taliter, but actu, as e. g. animalitas and rationali- 
tas are present in man before the mind ever draws 
a distinction between them. Only in this way, 
say the Scotists, are we able to explain why the 
various “formalities” postulate each an essen- 
tially different note, so that it is necessary to 
deny their mutual identity (e. ¢., animalitas non 
est rationalitas). By applying their Formalism 
to the Godhead, the Scotists—Scotus himself 
must perhaps *° be excepted from this indictment 
—arrived at the notion that the distinction be- 
tween the Essence and the attributes of God, and 
also that between the various divine attributes, 
while not real, is more than virtual, namely, 
formal. For inasmuch as the Divine Intellect 
must be defined differently from the Divine Will, 


16 Cfr. Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., I, dist. 8, qu. 4. 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 153 


it is possible to deny the one of the other, ¢. g.! 


; ©The intellect is not the will; “Justice spares 


not, mercy spares,” etc." 


>. CRITICAL EstIMATE OF ForMALISM.—AI- 
though the Church has never officially pronounced 
against it, the formal distinction invented by the 
Scotists must be rejected as hair-splitting, un- 
justified, and dangerous. 

a) It is unjustified because it is an incon- 
ceivable hybrid which eludes every attempt of the 
mind to grasp it. The dichotomy of real and 
logical distinction has its roots deep down in 
the very principle of contradiction, for every 
true distinction must be conceived either as real 
or as not-real (i. e., existing only in the think- 
ing subject); and therefore it is as impossible to 
find room for a third member between the two, 
as it would be to establish an intermediary link 
between Yes and No. | 

b) But even if the logical possibility of a 
formal distinction were, for argument’s sake, 
conceded, what would theology gain thereby? 
Would not Formalism lead,—though not per- 
haps so straightway nor so evidently as Realism, 
_-to the same end, viz.: the destruction of God’s 
simplicity? For if, independently of and ante- 
cedently to the action of the mind, the jus- 


17 Cfr. Kleutgen, Philos. d. Vor- alters, Vol. II, Mainz 1865; J. 
zeit, Vol. I, Abh. 25. Stéckl, Ge- Rickaby, General Metaphysics, pp» 
schichte der Philosophie des Mittel- 107 sqq. (Stonyhurst Series). 

11 


154 FORMALISM 


tice of God is not His mercy, this proposition, 
carried to its ultimate logical consequences, can 
only mean that the attribute of mercy is founded 
upon a different “reality” in God than the at- 
tribute of justice. What the Scotists call a 
“formalitas” thus ex subjecta materia becomes a 
reality. Different formalities, therefore, sup- 
pose as many varying realities. We will not 
here inquire into the applicability of Formalism 
to such creatures as are physically and meta- 
physically compound; in theology it plainly has 
no place, because the unique simplicity of the 
Divine Essence forbids all attempts to dissolve it. 

c) Finally, the arguments of the Scotist 
school, in so far at least as they apply to the 
dogmatic treatise on the nature and attributes 
of God, are absolutely unconvincing, For the 
logical necessity of defining mercy otherwise 
than justice, or necessity otherwise than liberty, 
and so forth, only proves that there co-exist in 
God perfections which, in spite of their concen- 
tration in one indivisible monad, offer to the 
thinking mind a basis for distinguishing sepa- 
rate, nay, even opposite excellencies (= distinctio 
virtualis). For the same reason the divine at- 
tributes cannot be negatived absolutely of one 
another, or of the Divine Essence, but must be 
predicated of each other in the same identical 
sense. St. Augustine exemplifies this truth as 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE Iss 


follows: “Una ergo eademque res dicitur, sive 
dicatur aeternus Deus, sive immortalis, sive 
incorruptibilis, sive tmmutabilis... . Bomtas 
etiam atque iustitia, numquid inter se in natura 
Dei, sicut in eius operibus distant, tamquam 
duae diversae sint qualitates Det, wna bonitas, 
alia iustitia? Non utique; sed quae iustitia, ipsa 
bonitas; et quae bonitas, ipsa beatitudo—lt iS 
one and the same thing, therefore, to call God 
eternal, or immortal, or incorruptible, or un- 
changeable... . Or do goodness, again, and 
righteousness, differ from each other in the 
nature of God, as they differ in His works, as 
though they were two diverse qualities of God 
—goodness one, and righteousness another? 
Certainly not; but that which is righteousness 
is also itself goodness; and that which is good- 
ness is also itself blessedness.” ** The younger 
Scotist school has diluted its Formalism so much 
that it now approaches the virtual distinction 
theory of the Thomists. It is not worth while 
to enter into a more detailed discussion of these 
subtleties. 


18S, Aug., De Trinit., XV, 5, n. mat., Vol. I, 3rd ed., pp. 79 sqq- 
7; Haddan’s translation, On the For a sharp critique of Formalism, 
Trinity, pp. 384, 385, Edinburgh vy. Gerson, Contra Vanam Curiosita- 
1873.— Cfr. Pesch, Praelect. Dog- tem, lect. 1. 


SECTION 2 


THE VIRTUAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOD’S ES- 
SENCE AND HIS ATTRIBUTES 


1, Having rejected the Realistic, the Nomi- 
nalistic, and the Scotistic theories with regard 
to the distinction of God’s Essence from His at- 
tributes, as well as of these attributes among 
themselves, there remains but one other, vig.: that 
which asserts the distinctio virtualis. This is the 
theory of St. Thomas Aquinas, which has be- 
come sententia communis. Inasmuch as the ex- 
tremes, Realism and Nominalism, both lead to 
heresy, or at least come dangerously near it, 
Catholic theology must plainly seek a via media. 
We have seen that Scotistic Formalism cannot 
claim to be the golden mean. Hence we must 
adopt the Thomist view, which postulates a 
virtual distinction between God’s Essence and 
Flis attributes. What this means will be tea- 
sonably clear to the student who has read the first 
section of this chapter carefully. The subjoined 
quotation from St. Thomas? will elucidate the 
point even better: “Quod Deus excedat intel- 
lectum nostrum, est ex parte ipsius Dei propter 


1 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., I, dist. 2, que 1, art. 3e 


156 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 157 


plenitudinem perfectionis eius, et ex parte intel- 
lectus nostri, qui deficienter se habet ad eam 
comprehendendam. Unde patet, quod pluralitas 
istarum rationum non tantum est ex parte mtel- 
lectus nostri, sed etiam ex parte tpsius Det, in- 
quantum sua perfectio superat unamquamque 
conceptionem nostri intellectus. Et ideo plural- 
tati istarum rationum respondet aliquid in re, 
quae Deus est; non quidem pluralitas ret, sed 
plena perfectio, ex qua contingit, ut omnes tstae 
conceptiones et aptentur.” 

2. In order to gain a deeper understand- 
ing of the Thomistic distinctio virtualis, let us 
remember that it can be conceived in a twofold 
manner. Either the objective concept of one per- 
fection, which is (really) identical with its ob- 
ject, excludes that of another, which 1s also 
identical with the same object (as e. g. “sensu- 
ality” and “rationality” in man), and then we 
have a distinctio virtuals perfecta s. cum prae- 
cisione objectiva. Or the objective concept of 
one perfection includes the objective concept of 
the other, either formaliter or radicaliter (as 
e. g. “sensitive being’? and “substance,” the lat- 
ter being contained formally in the former; or 
“rational soul’ and “intellect,” of which the 
latter is contained radically in the former), and 
then the two are related to each other as an “im- 
cludens”’ to an “inclusum,’ and we have a dts- 


158 THE VIRTUAL DISTINCTION 


tinctio virtualis imperfecta s. cum praecisione 
formal. The distinctio virtualis perfecta, inas- 
much as it implies real composition in its object 
(the notional indifference of the one perfection 
towards the other being an infallible index of 
their potentiality), cannot possibly be applied to 
God, Who is purest actuality (actus purissimus). 
Hence there must be posited between His Es- 
sence and His attributes a distinctio virtualis im- 
perfecta; which means that each separate at- 
tribute of God includes within itself formally 
His Essence, that His Essence includes within 
itself each separate divine attribute, and, finally, 
that each separate attribute notionally includes 
every other attribute.? 


REapIncs: —*S, Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 13, art. 4-5, 12.— 
IpeM, Contra Gent., I, 31-36 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, 
pp. 24 sqq., London 1905).— Suarez, De Div. Sub. eiusque Attrib., 
I, 10-14.— Petavius, De Deo I, 7-13.— *Gillius, De Essentia Det, 
tr. 6, cap. 6 sqq.— *Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit, 1. T., 2. Abh., 
3." Hpst— W. Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 57 saq., 
London 1897.— Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Theology, 
Vol. I, pp. 164 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899. 


2 Suarez tried to demonstrate this 
mutual inclusion from God’s infin- 
ity. ‘Nam sapientia, v. gr., vel 
includitur in essentiali conceptu Dei 
vel non,” he says (De Deo, I, 11, 
5). “ Si includitur, ergo praedica- 
tur essentialiter de illo, eademque 
ratio est de quolibet alio attributo 
vel perfectione absoluta, quae in 
Deo formaliter existat. St vero 


non includitur, ergo illud ens quod 
essentialiter est Deus, ex vi suae 
essentiae non est summe perfectum 


neque infinitum ens, quia non in- 


cludit in suo esse essentiali omnem 
perfectionem possibilem.” For a 
more detailed treatment of this 
point, see Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. 
II, pp. 69 sqq., Paris 1895. 


CHAPTER AT 


THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD 


In order to come at the metaphysical essence 
of God, we must try to find among His many 
attributes one which fulfils four distinct require- 
ments: 1. It must be the first to be perceived 
(primum in cognitione). 2. It must signify 
God’s very being, not merely the status or 
mode of His being. 3. It must present a clean- 
cut distinction, after the analogy of an ultimate 
or specific difference, between God and every- 
thing that is not God. 4. It must be the taproot 
or a priori source of all the other divine at- 
tributes. As the Church has never defined in 
what the metaphysical essence of God consists, 
differences of opinion are permissible,—a right 
of which philosophers and theologians have lib- 
erally availed themselves. 


159 


SECTION 1 


UNTENABLE THEORIES 


I. SURVEY OF THE F IELD.—Leaving aside for 
the moment aseity or self-existence, we find that 
three theories have been elaborated to solve the 
problem of defining the Divine Essence. 

a) The Nominalists held that the Essence of 
God was simply “the sum of His perfections” 
(cumulus omnium perfectionum), that is, the sum 
of all His attributes and perfections, whether 
known or unknown, quiescent or active, trans- 
cendental or predicamental, whether qualities of 
the intellect or of the will. They excluded only 
the divine Relations and Hypostases and ar- 
gued that, inasmuch as there are in God no 
accidents (ov8eByxdra) His attributes being 
strictly identical with His Essence,:—whatever 
is divine must eo ipso be part of the Divine Es- 
sence. | 

b) The Scotists pitched upon God’s infinity 
as that one among His attributes from which all 
others flow. They argued that since no attribute 
can be a truly divine perfection unless it is 


1 V. supra, Chapter II. 
160 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 161 


stamped as it were with the seal of infinity, in- 
finity must be the one attribute in which all 
others are contained. By positing a radical in- 
stead of a formal infinity, several writers of this 
school managed to bring their theory into sub- 
stantial accord with that which makes self-exist- 
ence (aseitas) the fundamental attribute of God.* 

c) A considerable number of theologians of 
the Thomist school assigned intellectuality as 
the metaphysical Essence of God, some conceiv- 
ing this attribute as “absolute spirituality” (esse 
spiritum), others as formal intellectual activity 
(intellectio subsistens). It must be said in 
favor of this view that we can hardly imagine 
a more serviceable principle of distinction than 
absolute reason, inasmuch as this attribute neatly 
marks off the Divine Essence from matter and 
from created reason, and is at the same time the 
root from which all other vital attributes log- 
ically grow. 

2. CRITICISM OF THESE THEORIES.—Neverthe- 
less these theories must all be rejected, either be- 
cause they do not meet the question squarely, 
or because they assume as God’s fundamental 
attribute some property which is not really the 
basic principle of His Divine Essence, but points 
to another still more fundamental. 


2By “infinitas radicalis” they must necessarily enjoy all other 
understood that fundamental at- perfections, real and possible. 
tribute, in virtue of which God 


162 UNTENABLE THEORIES 


a) The Nominalist solution does not solve 
the problem at all. The “sum of all divine per- 
fections” merely constitutes God’s real  es- 
sence. ‘The question to be solved is, Which of 
the many qualities that make up God’s physical 
essence is the foundation or root of all the rest? 
Those writers of the Thomist school who take 
God’s metaphysical essence to be absolute spir- 
ituality, likewise evade the question, because 
absolute spirituality (including cognition and 
volition) formally constitute God’s Nature 
rather than His Essence. The essence of any 
thing is prior to its nature, nature being merely 
another name for essence viewed as the principle 
of operation. 

b) The remaining theories fail to comply with 
one or other of the four conditions laid down 
in the introductory paragraph of this Chapter. 

a) The Scotistic theory, which regards in- 
finity as God’s fundamental attribute, conforms 
to several of these conditions, but not to all. 
For infinity is neither the fundamental attrib- 
ute of God, nor is it the one which our mind 
perceives first (primum in cognitione). It is 
not the fundamental attribute, because aseity 
builds the logical bridge to infinity; and it is 
not the primum in cognitione, because infinity 
has its source elsewhere, namely, in the notion 
of aseity, atrovoia, actus purus. True, aseity can 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 163 


be logically deduced from infinity, but only by 
an a posteriori argument, concluding from the 
consequent to the antecedent, rather than vice 
versa. Now, it is plain that any attribute which 
must be conceived as the sequela rather than the 
source of other divine attributes, cannot claim to 
by the root principle of all others. 

B) There remains the theory of those 
Thomists * who define the metaphysical Essence 
of God as the activity or operation of the Di- 
vine Intellect (intellectio subsistens). It cannot 
be denied that God differs radically from all 
created beings by His absolute act of cognition. 
But He differs from them just as radically by 
several other absolute attributes, e. g., His eter- 
nity, immutability, immensity. Yet none of these 
can be said to constitute His metaphysical Es- 
sence. Hence underlying all these attributes 
there must manifestly be still another, from 
which the whole series derive their incommuni- 
cability. Besides it is an error to look upon 
intellectio subsistens as the basic attribute of 
God from which all others spring. For while 
it may be possible to derive from it @ priors a 
whole group of new properties, such as omni- 
science, wisdom, etc.; yet there are other neces- 
sary attributes of the divine Essence that can- 
not be derived from intellectio subsistens, and 


-3Gonet, Billuart, Salmanticenses. 


164 


UNTENABLE THEORIES 


which in turn must therefore be conceived as 
the fruit of a most comprehensive perfection of 
being, (viz.: the actus purus), rather than as the 


fount and origin of all other attributes. 


The in- 


telugere subsistens necessarily presupposes the 
esse subsistens as its ontological and logical prin- 


ciple.* 


4Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, 
qu. 4, art. 2: “Deus est ipsum 
esse per se subsistens, ex quo opor- 
tet quod totam perfectionem essendi 


in se contineat.” For more detailed 
information, consult Kleutgen, De 
Ipso Deo, pp. 125 sqq., Ratisbonae 
1881. 


SECTION 2 


ASEITY THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTE OF GOD 


1. THE Notion or AseEItTy.—Aseity (aseitas, 
from ens a se) is that divine attribute in virtue of 
which God exists by Himself, in Himself, and 
through Himself. In English it is generally 
called “self-existence.” + Opposed to the ens a 
se as its contrary is the ens ab alio, 1. é., a be- 
ing whose existence and essence are derived from 
an extraneous being. The created universe, as 
a whole and in all its parts, is thus conditioned. 
Hence we might, if we were allowed to coin a 
new word, designate as its fundamental quality 
“abaliety,’—that notion of created being which is 
most directly contrary to the metaphysical Es- 
sence of God the Creator.’ 

a) In its purely etymological sense, aseity 
denominates not the divine Essence, but its mode 
or status, vizg.: that it has no cause (ens a se = 
ens non ab alio). But we need only to analyze 
the concept of aseity or self-existence to find that 


1Cfr. Hunter, Outlines of Dog- Author of Nature and the Super- 
matic Theology, 11, pp. 54-55, Lon- satural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916. 
don 1894. 

2Cfr, Pohle-Preuss, God _ the 


165 


166 THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTE 


besides this negative it also contains a positive 
note, in virtue of which aseity expands and de- 
velops into the notion of being pure and simple 
(esse simpliciter, esse subsistens, ipsum esse) or 
pure actuality (actus purissimus),—all synony- 
mous terms, denoting the absoluteness of the 
divine being. Thus aseity becomes atrovota pure 
and simple, 7. ¢., identity of existence and es- 
sence. For in Him who does not derive His be- 
ing from another but possesses it of Himself, ex- 
istence and essence must coincide.® 


Here the enormous difference between Divine Being 
and created being again becomes manifest. God is 
being, the creature has being,— either this or that, such 
or another. God is pure transcendent being; the crea- 
ture is limited to the one or other category of being. 
If we hold them together, they are not only not com- 
mensurable, but, strictly speaking, cannot even be com- 
pared, inasmuch as the notion of being is predicated of 
God in an entirely different sense than of His creatures. 
The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) defines: “ Inter 
creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo no- 
tart, quin inter eos maior dissimilitudo sit notanda.” 4 
Hence being does not represent a common genus in 
which God and creatures coincide. The concept of 
being in its proper sense (proprie et princtpaliter) ap- 
plies to God alone; to the creatures only improperly 
and analogically (improprie et analogice)—a relation 
which finds its most pregnant expression in the Biblical 

3Cfr. S. Thom., S$. Theol., 1a, 4 Conc. Lateran. IV, cap. “ Dam- 


qu. 18, art. 3, ad 2: “Deus est  namus.” 
ipsum suum esse? 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 167 


designation of the creature as “ something which is not ‘i 
or “ non-being ” (pa év).? 


b) In order to gain a deeper understanding 
of aseity, it is necessary to avoid two serious 
misconceptions into which even a trained thinker 
is liable to fall, viz.: confounding self-existence 
with self-realization on the one hand; and, on 
the other, absolute being with abstract being. 


a) It is a mistake to take aseity or atrovota to mean 
self-realization.2 This misconception was probably occa- 
sioned by the Scholastic use of the phrase “ causa sm,” 
as synonymous with “ens a se.” The phrase was ill 
chosen. The Schoolmen do not mean that God causes 
Himself (causa sui efficiens), but, on the contrary, they 
use the term causa sui precisely for the purpose of de- 
nying that the first cause is in need, or capable, of being 
caused by some other, ulterior cause, extrinsic or intrinsic 
(causa sui formalis). St. Jerome says: “ Deus ipse sus 
origo est suaeque causa substantiae,’* but he speaks 
metaphorically, as does St. Anselm when he declares: 
“ Quomodo ergo tandem esse intelligenda est per se et 
ex se [divina substantia], si nec ipsa se fecit nec tpsa 
sibi materia extitit nec ipsa se quolibet modo, ut quod 
non erat esset, adiuvit, nisi forte eo modo intelligendum 
videtur, quo dicitur, quia lux lucet per seipsam et ex 
seipsa?” ® The theory here under consideration runs 
counter to both the law of causality and the principle 
of contradiction. The law of causality, far from de- 
manding that it be applied to God, halts before the 


& Cfr. Wisdom XI, 23; Is. XL, 7In Eph., Ill, 14. 


15 8 St. Anselm, Monol., cap. 6. 


6 Ginther, Kuhn, Schell. 


168 THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTE 


causa prima incausata. He Who carries the reason for 
(not the cause of) His existence within Himself, neither 
requires an extrinsic cause, nor does he produce Him- 
self; for either the one or the other would presuppose 
a potentiality towards a reality not yet (logically) ex- 
isting, which would contradict the notion of aseity.® 
The notion that God causes Himself is likewise repugnant 
to the principle of contradiction. For, in order to cause 
itself a being would have to be conceived as being 
in order to be able to posit itself ; that is to say, it 
would exist before it had caused itself ; in other words, 
it would exist before it came into existence, which is 
absurd.° 

B) A second error, far worse than the first, is to 
confuse absolute being (ens a sé). with abstract being 
(ens universale), to which the philosophers sometimes 
apply the name of “ pure being.” According to Hegel 
“pure being” is that which, as yet absolutely vacuous 
and undetermined, awaits its realization ; it is only when 
the dialectical process reaches its apex that nothing 
develops into the plenitude of being. Now, the pure 
being of God must not be confounded either with 
Hegel’s “ pure being” or with the abstract being which 
forms the subject-matter of ontology. A comparison 


Ratisbon 1874. Also Gill, De Es- 
sentia atque Unitate Dei, lib. i We 
tract. 1, c. 3: “Deus non est a 


9Cfr. Henry of Gent, Summa, 
Ila, art. 21, qu. 5: “Cum argui- 
tur, quod Deus non habet esse a 


se, quia [secus] esset causa sui 
tpsius, dicendum quod verum est, 
st haberet esse a se principiative 
[= efficienter]; hoc enim est impos: 
sibile, quia nihil est principiativum 
sui ipsius; formaliter tamen bene 
est possibile aliquid habere esse a 
se, ut dictum est. [Habet ‘enim 
esse ex hoc, quod est forma et 
actus purus.]”’ 

10 Cir. Glossner, Dogmatik I, 64; 


sé causaliter ullo genere causalita- 
tis; nam nihil potest esse sibi causa 
essendi: omnis quippe causa est 
prior causato, at idem se ipso prius 
et posterius esse repugnat.’ For 
further details, consult Chr. Pesch, 
lc, pp. 64 sqq.3 Ipem, Theolo: 
gische Zeitfragen, Freiburg 1900}; 
L. Janssens, O. S. B., De Deo Uno, 
t. I, pp. 229 sqq. Friburgi 1900. 


eS 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 169 


will bring out the difference between them. Pure being 
in God, and abstract being as a metaphysical conception, 
are logically distinct both in comprehension and exten- 
sion. Absolute Being, though the smallest in extension,. 
has the widest and fullest comprehension. Abstract 
being has no comprehension at all outside of the nude 
note of abstract being (esse), and for this reason the 
term is exceedingly wide in extension, as it can be 
predicated of every sort of possible and real being. 
The two notions differ also with regard to the man- 
ner of their origin. While the concept of abstract be- 
ing is formed by simple abstraction, that of Divine 
Being is the result of a syllogistic process. They 
differ thirdly in their mode of existence. Divine Be- 
ing is real, individual, personal; while abstract be- 
ing has no formal existence except in the abstracting 
mind; in the things themselves it exists only funda- 
mentally, and hence it is no real being at all, still less 
a personality. They differ finally in their properties. 
True, “simplicity ” and “ transcendence” are predicated 
of both, but in an essentially different sense. Abstract 
being, like a mathematical point, is simple only by virtue 
of its vacuity and logical incompositeness ; while Abso- 
lute Being is called simple, because, though possessed 
of an infinite plenitude of being, it is ontologically in- 
divisible. Again, abstract being is merely a transcen- 
dental concept, while God is a transcendental being, 1. é., 
a substance existing far above all genera, species, and 
individuals. 

_c) To prepare the ground for a scientific division of 
the divine attributes, to be made later, it will be useful 
to turn our attention to the twofold aspect presented 
by aseity in its full signification of atrovota or actus 


‘ 11 Cfr. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, De Fide, can. 4 
2 


170 ASEITY A TRUE ATTRIBUTE 


purus. We distinguish in it a static and a dynamic 
side, each of which can be taken as the source of a 
number of divine attributes, As ens a se, God is not 
only pure being, but also pure activity; not only pro- 
found repose, but also sheer motion. Both these mo- 
menta mysteriously coincide in the concept of actus 
purissimus, and our mind is led up to them spon- 
taneously by the same logical process by which it as- 
cends to a knowledge of the existence of God from the 
contemplation of nature. The argument from the con- 
tingency of the cosmos and that called argumentum 
ex gradibus point mainly to the absolute being, while 
the argument from motion, that from causality, and 
that called teleological, accentuate rather the absolute 
life of the First Cause. It is in these two aspects of 
aseity that we have the underlying foundation for two 
classes of divine attributes, viz.: attributes of being and 
attributes of life. 


2. ASEITY A TRUE ATTRIBUTE OF Gop.—Both 
Holy Scripture and Tradition teach that aseity 
is an attribute proper to God, and to God alone.” 

a) The argument from Sacred Scripture is 
based upon the revealed name of God, Yahweh. 
Ex. III, 14 sqq.: “Ego sum qui sum. . 
Sic dices filus Israel: Qui est (6 4v), misit me 
ad vos.... Dominus "2, Deus patrum ves- 
trorum ... misit me ad vos: hoc nomen mihi 
est in aeternum—I am who am.... Thus 
shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He 
who is, hath sent me to you.... The Lord 


12 Cfr. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, De Fide, cap. z. 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 171 


God of your fathers . . . hath sent me to you: 
This is my name for ever.” ** Modern exe- 
getes take M2 as merely expressing God’s fi- © 
delity in keeping His promises. But this view 
is contradicted by Jehovah’s own interpretation 
of His name, and runs counter to the whole 
Jewish and Christian Tradition. Of course, fi- 
delity necessarily follows from  self-existence. 
But God is not called ™?% because He is faith- 
ful; He is faithful because He is ens a se.'* Nu- 
merous paraphrases of aseity are found in the 
Apocalypse. Cfr., e. g., XXII, 13: “Ego sum 
a et », primus et novissimus, principum et finis 
(6 mpdros kot & goxatos, 4 adpxy Kat 76 rédos )— am 
Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the be- 
ginning and the end.” *° 

b) Tradition elucidates and confirms the 
above-quoted texts from Holy Scripture. Greg- 
ory of Nazianzus explains the appellation 6 
dv as follows: “Quia totum esse (Srov 7d vat) 
in ipso collocandum est, a quo cetera habent, ut 
sint—The totality of Being must be embodied in 
Him from Whom everything else derives its 
being.’”’ Gregory’s famous description of aseity 
‘as “an immense ocean of being’ ’* was taken 


13 Cfr, Is. XLII, 8: “ Ego yn’ I the Lord, I am the first and the 
3c) 


hoc est nomen meum.” last.” Detailed Scriptural proof 
14 Cfr, Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, PD. apud Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 
120. 22. i 
18 Cfr, Is, XLT, 4: “Ego MM, 6 Or., 45: “oléy re wédaryos 


primus et novissimus ego sum—  obalas &meipov Kal ddpioror.” 


172 SELF-EXISTENCE 


over literally by St. John of Damascus into his 
treatise De Fide Orthodoxa."* Hilary gives us 
a beautiful paraphrase of airovola, when he says: 
“Ipse est, qui quod est non aliunde est, im sese 
est, secum est, ad se est, suus sibi est.” 18 

3. ASEITY THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTE OF 
Gopv.—The more general and more ancient opin- 
ion among theologians favors the view that 
aseity constitutes the metaphysical essence of 
God. Hence we shall act prudently in adopting 
this theory, especially since it is well founded in 
Holy Scripture and Tradition, and can be de- 
fended with solid philosophical arguments, 

a) Sacred Scripture defines MM as 6 ov, and 
it would seem, therefore, that this definition is en- 
titled to universal acceptance. Now, God Him- 
self (Ex. III, 14) interprets His proper name Nn 
as “Sum qui sum—éys ey 6 dv,” that is, 1 am He 
who is, 7. e., I am Being itself, Consequently 
being, atroveia, self-existence, is the signature of 
the Divine Essence. This interpretation, based 
as it is upon the literal meaning of mm , ex- 
plains not only the ineffability of the Tetragram- 
maton,” but likewise its absolute incommunica- 
bility to creatures, inasmuch as the essential 
proper name of a person is of its very nature 


17 De Fide Orth., I, 9. 19 Cfr. Ex, III, 13 sqq. 
18 Tract. in Ps., 2, n. 13. Addi, 20V. supra, pp. 135 sq. 
tional texts quoted by Heinrich, 
Dogmat. Theologie, I, §160. 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 173 


incommunicable. Hence aseity denotes the very 
essence of the Godhead and differentiates it 
sharply from every thing that is not divine." 
The Old Testament definition of "7 also proves 
the statement, made a little further up in our 
text, that the aseity of God must not be con- 
ceived as inert or dead being, but as living, per- 
sonal activity. For God does not say: "Bye 
cu 7d dv, but 6 dv == “He Who is, not “het 
which is.” The Hebrew text brings out the 
idea still more clearly. After explaining His 
Essence and His name by declaring: “Fgo 
sum qui sum? (AAR WR TN), He commands 
Moses to tell the children of Israel, not: eae 
who is (Sept., 6 6v; Vulg., qua est) has sent me 
to you,” but far more trenchantly: ‘“The ‘I am’ 
(the ™8) has sent me to you.” 2. This araé 
Aeysuevov has led not a few Scholastics to enter- 
tain the false notion that the verbal form used 
here as a substantive is another divine name quite 
distinct from ™™. “It is perfectly proper and 
quite correct,’ observes Oswald,” ‘‘to designate 
God’s essence as 79 8v or 79 évrws 6v; but it is more 
appropriate to call Him é 4v, because by this term 
He is described as a personal and intellectual be- 
ing; besides, 6 4 (MIS) gives the best and most 


21-Cfr, Deut. XXXII, 39 sqq5 23 Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. I, p. 
Is. XLIV, 6. 76. 3 
22 Ex. III, 14. 


174 SELF-EXISTENCE 


complete answer to the question: What js 
God ?” 


b) The Fathers, too, treated aseity, or self-existence, 
as a real and fundamental attribute of the Divine 
Essence. Contemplating the profundity of the name 
Yahweh, Hilary exclaims: “ Admiratus sum plane tam 
absolutam de Deo significationem. ... Non enim aliud 
proprium magis Deo quam esse intelligitur.” #* Gregory 
of Nyssa, arguing against Eunomius, insists upon aérov- 
gia as a divinely revealed note of God’s essence (in 
contradistinction to dyewnota): “If Moses has incor- 
porated in the Law an essential note of true Divinity, 
it is to know of God that He is Being; as is proved 
by the effatum: I am who am.” 244. St. Jerome suc- 
cinctly declares: “Deus solus essentiae vere nomen 
tenet... ego sum qui sum.” ® Profoundly as is his 
wont St. Augustine observes: “Non est ibi nisi est. 
--. Ego sum qui sum. Tu diceres: Ego sum, quis? 
Caius. Alius, Lucius. ... Ego [Deus] sum. Quis? 
qui sum. Hoc est nomen tuum, hoc est totum quod 
vocaris.” ®® No one has described the fundamental at- 
tribute of God more graphically than St, Bernard: 
“Quid est Deus? Non sane occurrit melius quam qui 
est. Hoc ipse de se voluit respondere: qui est, misit me 
ad vos. Merito quidem... . Si bonum, si magnum, st 
beatum, si sapientem vel quidquid tale de Deo dixeris, 
in hoc verbo imstauratur, quod est Est.’ 27 


c) Philosophy supports the Scriptural and 
Traditional argument by demonstrating that 


24'De Trin, 1.1,)D. ss." 27 De Consid., V, 6. Cfr. also 
24a Contr. Eunom., I, 8. S. Anselm., Monol., c. Spun) Bess 
25 Ep. 15 ad Damasum, n. 4. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 165 1a0ts 


26 In Ps., 1ro1, serm. 2. II. 


THE DIVINE ESSENCE 178 


aseity alone among all of God’s attributes com- 
plies with the four conditions enumerated above.”* 


To begin with, aseity or self-existence, as theodicy 
shows, is the first of the divine attributes to be perceived 
by the thinking mind. Secondly, taken in its full com- 
prehension as adrovoia, aseity reveals to us not only the 
mode or state of God’s Essence, but that Essence itself. 
“Ouum esse Dei sit ipsa etus essentia,’ observes 
Aquinas,?° “ manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc 
[scil.: qui est] maxime proprie nominat Deum.” In the 
third place, unlike the so-called communicable attributes, 
aseity differentiates God primarily and essentially from 
every thing that is not-God, while the other incommunica- 
ble attributes are incommunicable to creatures precisely 
because they are rooted in aseity. Finally, aseity is the 
fount and origin of all the other divine attributes. fay 
Thomas deduces all divine perfections from the con- 
cept of the actus purus.*° 


4. ATTRIBUTES DERIVED IMMEDIATELY FROM 
Gov’s AsEITy are all those divine perfections 
which refer to God’s mode of existence and His 
knowability. 


a) God’s inoriginateness, independence, and necessity, 
are merely different names for His aseity or self-ex- 
istence. The first-mentioned perfection (not to be con- 
founded with the innascibilitas of the Father as the 
first Person of the Blessed Trinity) results from the 
fact that God, in virtue of His self-existence, has no 
efficient cause outside Himself (ens non ab alio). In 

28 Supra, p. 159- caea, pp. 283 sdq., Friburgi 18933 


29 S. Theol., 1a, qu. 13, art. 11. Stentrup, Synopsis de Deo Uno, pp. 
30 Cfr, Hontheim, S. J., Theodi- 51 saqq., Oeniponte 1895. 


176 SELF-EXISTENCE 


this same fact are also rooted His independence (in- 
dependentia) from all extrinsic factors, and His neces- 
sity (necessitas), which flows from aseity in so far as 
a Being that exists by virtue of its own essence, exists 
necessarily (non potest non esse). 

b) The three attributes of invisibility (invisibilitas), 
incomprehensibility (incomprehensibilitas), and ineffa- 
bility (ineffabilitas), which have reference to the know- 
ableness of God, are likewise founded upon his aseity 
Or avrovoia. Scheeben says: “Precisely because the 
notion of essential being penetrates to the very depth of 
the Godhead, its mode of expression is the most imper- 
fect, and its content, more than that of any other human 
concept, remains dffyros, ineffabilis, unutterable. Hence 
the holy dread which surrounded the name Jehova 
among the Jews and kept them from employing it or 
giving it utterance.” ** For the same reason the Fathers 
referred to God ‘not only ‘as’ the aérovcws ahd the mrep- 
ovows, but likewise as the dvdvows or essence-less one. 


Reapincs:—S. Thom., S. Theol., Ia, qu. 13, art. 11—IpEM, 
Contra Gentiles, I, 21-24 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, 
pp. 16 sqq. London 1905).— Thomassin, De Deo, J. IIT, cap,’ 21— 
24.— Petavius, De Deo, 1. III, cap. 6— D’Aguirre, Theologia S. 
Anselmi, disp. 24.— Kleutgen, Philosophie der Vorzeit, Bad. i 
Abh. 5, Bd. II, Abh. 9.— Ine, Theologie der Vorzeit, T. 1, Abh. 
2, Hpst. 6—*Gillius, De Essentig atque Unitate Dei, Lugdun. 
1610.— D. Coghlan, De Deo Uno et Trino, pp. 106 sqq., Dublinii 
1909.— W. Humphrey, S. J., “ His Divine Majesty,” pp. 59 saq., 
London 1897. 


81 Dogmatik, I, 502. 


PART III 


THE DIVINE PROPERTIES OR 
ATTRIBUTES 


In our imperfect human way of thinking we are led 
to conceive the divine properties or attributes as forms 
enveloping the already constituted essence after the man- 
ner of qualities. But our judgment proceeds to correct 
this inadequate conception by insisting on the absolute 
identity of God’s attributes with His Essence.* The 
Fathers speak of the divine attributes as proprietates 
(iSépara) or ea circa Dewm (ra mept @cdv), as dignitates 
(détar, d€uspara), or rationes (vonpara, ériAoyiopol), OF as 
virtutes (dperat) or mores (émirnSedpara). 

More important than this nomenclature is the ques- 
tion how these attributes are to be divided. The most 
common classifications are: First, negative attributes 
(attributa negativa, apaiperixd, aropatixa), and affirmative 
attributes (atiributa affirmativa, s. positiva, KaTapatiKd ) . 
This division is based on the different modes in which 
we acquire a knowledge of these attributes, some being 
conceived by the negative method,? others by the positive 
method or that of supereminence.? This classification 
has its roots deep down in our creatural knowledge of 
God, and must therefore be considered. fundamental. 
There is a second classification, viz.; into incommunicable 
(attributa incommunicabilia) and communicable attributes 
(attributa communicabilia). This coincides materially 


1 V. supra, Part II, Ch. II, § 2. 3 V. supra, p. 69 saq. 
2V. supra, p. 70. 
177 


178 HOW DIVIDED 


with the first, inasmuch as the negative qualities of God, 
expressing as they do a fundamental contrast between 
Him and His creatures, cannot be communicated to any 
being outside of God; while in His affirmative perfec- 
tions (both in the order of nature and of grace), crea- 
tures may be allowed to share. Since, however, it is 
more difficult to draw a hard and fast line between com- 
municability and incommunicability, than between affir- 
mation and negation (even certain negative attributes, 
as, €. g., unchangeableness, are communicable, in a 
degree, by grace; the only really and absolutely in- 
communicable attribute is aseity), we do not consider 
it advisable to classify the divine attributes according 
to this principle of division. 


A favorite division is that into quiescent (at- 
tributa quiescentia, avevepyyré) and operative at- 
tributes (attributa operativa, évepyyt«é), accord- 
ing as we conceive God in His being or in His 
operation (nature). In making this distinction, 
however, we must never forget that God’s Es- 
sence is pure actuality and His actuality is pure 
being.’ As this classification brings out the 
two aspects of aseity already referred to, vig.: 
the static and the dynamic, we consider it better 
adapted than any other to facilitate a scientific 
study of the divine attributes. We therefore 
divide the divine attributes into attributes of be- 
ing and attributes of operation. 

All being may be reduced partly to the five 


4V. supra, p. 170. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 179 


a "transcendental categories, viz.. ens, unum, 
 verum, bonum, pulchrum; partly to the ten pre- 
- dicables: substance, quality, quantity, relation, 
_ place, time, posture, habiliment, action and pas- 
-sion.® Accordingly we shall divide the divine 
Petiributes of being into transcendental, and cate- 
ae or predicamental. 


8 Cfr. P. Coffey, Ontology, London 1914, pp. 114 Sqaq., 207 sqq. 


CHAPTER I 


GOD’S TRANSCENDENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF BEING 


SECTION 1 
ABSOLUTE PERFECTION AND INFINITY 


The term being (ens) includes in its signification 
both existence (existere) and essence (esse, essentia). 
We have treated of the existence of God in the first part 
of this volume. Here we are considering the Divine 
Ens in its essence. God’s proper essence (essentia 
metaphysica), as we have seen, consists in aseity (abrov- 
gia) or self-existence. Therefore there remain to be 
considered only perfection and infinity, as special at- 
tributes flowing from the divine ens. 


ARTICGUE a 


GOD’S PERFECTION 


I, PRELIMINARY OssERVATIONS.—‘“‘Perfect” 
etymologically means that which is finished, to 
which nothing can be added (réAewv, from réAos 
==an end accomplished). In this sense perfec- 
tion connotes fieri, development. More specif- 
ically, perfection signifies the accomplished end 
or state itself (7eAeérys), as the possession and 

180 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 181 


enjoyment of goods obtained. It is in this nar- 
rower sense that we apply the term to God." 


But even within these circumscribed limits the con- 
cept of perfection admits of degrees. In the first place 
all being, considered as being, is necessarily perfect. 
The degree of a thing’s being is also the measure 
‘of its perfection, while, conversely, not-being furnishes 
the measure of imperfection? In a higher sense, how- 
ever, perfection denotes the sum total of all those ex- 
cellences which a being ought to have in considera- 
tion of its nature and end. The absence of even one 
of these (essential or integral) excellences constitutes a 
privation (privatio,. orépnos), a concept which coincides 
with that of evil (e. g., blindness, eternal damnation). 
In its highest sense, lastly, perfection means the pos- 
session and fruition of all the aforementioned excel- 
lences, not only in a large, but in an extraordinary 
measure. Thus supernatural or eternal bliss means, 
for man, the state of highest consummation or achieve- 
ment, and Mary, the Mother of God, is the beau idéal 
of a human being, surpassed only by Christ Himself 
(in His human nature). 

It goes without saying that between divine and crea- 
ted perfection—even taking the latter in its highest 
sense — there yawns a chasm as immense as that which 
separates the ens a se from the ens ab alio. For, while 
the creature acquires all its perfections through cre- 
ation and development, God possesses His own of, from, 
and through Himself. He is adroreAns, essentially and 
originally perfect. Again, while creaturely perfection 

4Cfr. S., Thom., Contra Gent., qu. 5, art. 1: “In tantum est per- 


I, 28. fectum unumquodque, inquantum 
2Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, est actu.” 


182 PERFECTION. 


is limited to certain well-defined categories, God, on 
the other hand— as zavredfs, all-perfect — unites within 
Himself every existing and every conceivable perfection. 
Finally, while the measure and end of creaturely per- 
fection is outside of and above the creature, God car- 
ries the measure and end of His perfections within His 
own Essence, as a centre from which He communicates 
excellencies to His creatures; in other words, He is 
vmepteAns, more-than-per fect. 


2. THE Docmatic Proor.—That God is orig- 
inally perfect, all-perfect, and more-than-perfect, 
is an article of faith. “Deum... intellectu ac 
voluntate omnique perfectione infinitum—lInfinite 
in intelligence, in will, and in all perfection.” ? » 

a) We find all three of the characteristic modes 
of perfection attributed to the Deity in Sacred 
Scripture. That God is original or archetypal 
perfection, follows not only from the name 7? 
which He Himself has revealed as signifying His 
essence,’ but is expressly taught in the Gospel of 
St. Matthew: “ “Ecco otv ipeis réde101, dorep 6 maTyp 
vpov 6 ovpdrvos Tédewds eoTw-—Be ye therefore perfect, 
as also your heavenly Father is perfect,” which 
the Fourth Lateran Council interprets as fol- 
lows: “Estote perfecti perfectione gratiae, sicut 
Pater vester coelestis perfectus est perfectione 


naturae.”° Note also those passages of Holy 
3 Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, De Fide, 5 Conc. Lateran. IV, cap. “ Dam- 

cap. 1. namus.”’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, En- 
4 Cfr. our remarks on His aseity, chiridion, n. 432.) 


supra. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 183 


Writ which emphasize the divine self-sufficiency, 
ase. ¢3 Rom. XI, 35: “Quis prior dedit wh et 
retribuetur ei?—Who hath first given to him, 
and recompense shall be made him?” °—Being 
all-perfect, God is the exemplar and the catise 
of all created perfections, which He comprises 
within Himself in their highest purity. 4 Ke- 
este) X LITE aol) ite ner conyy airds—The sum 
of our words is: He is all.” Rom. A260: 
Or, @& adrod Kal dv avrov nah es abdtov Ta mavtra—Hor 
of him, and by him, and in him, are all things.” 

Out of His inexhaustible fund of being, there- 
fore, God draws the concepts of created things 
and bestows upon them all the perfections of 
their being. Ps. XCIII, 9: “Oui plantavit 
aurem non audiet, aut qui finxit oculum non 
considerat?—He that planted the ear, shall he 
not hear? or he that formed the eye, doth he 
not consider?”7° The superabundance of di- 
vine perfection, finally, so elowingly described 
ty eclic. s&s LIL. 20. sag, is apt. to inspire 
rational creatures with fear: “Terribilis Do- 
minus et magnus vehementer et mirabilis potentia 
ipsius — The Lord is terrible, and exceeding 
ereat, and his power is admirable.” Here no 
univocal comparison between the Creator and 
the creature is possible, becatise we have no 


e Chr Us! Xba tas Pe AV, 23 Acts’ XVII, 253°." 
7Cfr. Is. LXVI, ~9. 


184 PERFECTION 


common standard by which to measure their 
respective perfections. Cfr. Is. XL, LAL 
nations are before him as if they had no being 
at all, and are counted to him as nothing and 
vanity.” 

b) The Fathers resolved divine perfection 
into its various momenta, and found that it con- 
tains all creatural perfections in their most highly 
sublimated form. 


Hence the golden rule formulated by St. Ambrose: & 
“Quidquid religiosius sentiri potest, qguidquid praestan- 
tius ad decorem, quidquid sublimius ad potestatem, hoc 
intelligas Deo convenire.’ St. Bernard has the follow- 
ing beautiful passage:® “Non quod longe ab unoquo- 
que sit, qut esse omnium est, sine quo omnia nihil. 
Sane esse omnium dixerim, non quia illa sunt quod tlle, 
sed quia ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia.” 
The philosophical proof for God’s perfection rests 
partly on aseity as the taproot of all divine perfections, 
and partly on the arguments for God’s existence. 
Among these the profound argumentum ex gradibus per- 
fectionum, unfortunately too much neglected now-a- 
days,*° shows God to be the ens perfectissimum. St. 
Thomas ™ proves this as follows: “Deus est ipsum. esse 
per se subsistens, ex quo oportet quod totam perfectionem 
essendi im se contineat.... Secundum hoc enim ali- 
qua perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent, unde 
sequitur quod nullius rei perfectio Deo desit.” 

8 De Fide, I, 16. 11S, Theol., 1a, qu. 3, art. 2. 

9 Serm. In Cant., 4. 12 Cfr. S. Schiffini, S. J., Disput. 


10S. Theol., 1a, qu. -3,. art. 3: Metaphys. Spec. Vol. I, disp. 2, 
“Quarta via; ”’ Contra Gent. II, 15. sect. 1, August. Taur. 1888. 


sh 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 185 


3, How THE CREATED PERFECTIONS ARE Con- 
TAINED IN Gop.—All creaturely perfections must 
be somehow contained in God, because He is the 
all-perfect and more-than-perfect Being. But 
how are they contained in the Divine Essence? 
It is quite plain that finite perfections cannot 
be attributed to God until they have been put 
through a refining process. 


Since the time of St. Anselm,}* theologians have been 
wont to distinguish two classes of divine perfections — 
viz.: pure or simple, and mixed perfections (perfectiones 
simplices — perfectiones mixtae s. secundum quid). The 
former in their form and concept exclude all imperfec- 
tion, so that they contain nothing but “ pure” perfection 
(as e. g., spirituality, wisdom) ; while the latter are per- 
fections with an admixture of imperfection (as, ¢. 9., 
matter, the faculty of drawing conclusions). St. Anselm 
appropriately defines a pure perfection as “ melius ipsum 
quam non ipsum,” a mixed perfection as “ melius non 
ipsum quam ipsum.” Thus, measured by the absolute 
standard, spirit is better than non-spirit or body ; while, 
conversely, corporeity is “ not-better * than, 7. e., inferior 
to, spirituality. 


a) These considerations furnish the key to 
the question how both kinds of perfection are 
contained in the Divine Essence. The pure 
perfections, inasmuch as they can be notionally 
intensified to an infinite degree, are contained 


in God formally; the mixed perfections, on the 


13 Cfr. Monol., c. 143, Proslog., C. 5- 
13 


186 PERFECTION 


other hand, are in Him virtually and eminently 
only." 


It is easy to see the reason for this, For, as the 
formal attribution of the pure perfections is founded 
in the fact that they signify nothing but perfec- 
tion, so the concept of a mixed perfection postulates 
that it be first put through a process of logical re- 
finement (which takes place by means of negation) be- 
fore it can be applied to God. E. g., 1f there were 
such a thing as infinite contrition, we should not be 
justified in predicating it formaliter of God, because the 
very concept of contrition implies sin, which is an im- 
perfection. 


b) It remains to be determined how one thing 
may be virtually and eminently contained in an- 
other. 


God contains all mixed perfections virtually or equiva- 
lently (virtus — valor), inasmuch as He is their ideal or 
exemplar (causa exemplaris). But He also contains the 
mixed perfections after the manner of a cause contain- 
ing its effects, inasmuch as He creates them, or is able 
to create them, out of nothing (virtus = potentia ac- 
tiva). ‘Thus material light is contained in God virtually, 
because He is both its exemplary and its creative cause. 
Eminent containment involves three elements: first, the 
necessity of previous purification by means of negation ; 
second, elevation to a different and higher mode of 
being; and third, absolute identification of one perfec- 
tion with all the others. A mixed perfection cannot 


14 Hence the theological axiom: formaliter, mixtae autem tantum 
“ Perfectiones simplices sunt in Deo virtualiter et eminenter.” 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 187 


be formally predicated of God, unless it has been properly 

‘refined by negation (¢. g., God is incorporeal). But 
even after it has been so purified, a form cannot exist 
‘n God in its creatural mode (¢. g., as filling space) ; 
but must be elevated to a higher mode of existence (@. 9., 
omnipresence). Since, however, this divine attribute is 
not to be conceived as an accident, but as a substance, it 
‘must in the last analysis be identical not only with 
God’s essence, but with all His other perfections, the 
pure as well as the mixed:— It is’ easy to, see that 
there is an intrinsic connexion between the two modes 
of presence, the virtual and the eminent. They partly 
complement and partly condition each other. Eminent 
presence is no doubt the more comprehensive of the 
two, wherefor some theologians © confine themselves to 
the thesis; ‘‘ The mixed perfections are contained in 
God eminenter.” It is in this sense that we must in- 
terpret the following curious proposition taught by Car- 
dinal Nicholas of Cusa: “ Deus est complicatio om- 
nium” (namely, non formaliter, sed eminenter). 


c) The proposition that the mixed perfections 
are in God virtualiter et emimenter only, must 
not, however, be taken to mean that the pure 
perfections are 101 So contained in Him. In mat- 
ter of fact the pure perfections no less than the 
mixed, are virtually and eminently in Him, the 
only difference being that the former are form- 
ally attributable, while the latter are not. 


But even this is not true without some limitation. 
For inasmuch as the perfectio simplex, too, is invariably 


15 Among them Lessius and Kleutgen. 


+ Fe 


188 7 PERFECTION 


an abstractive and analogical conception derived from 
created things, it is congenitally affected by a creatural 
mode involving imperfection, This can be removed only 
by way of negation or intensification.1* On the other 
hand, it would be a Serious mistake were we to rely 
for our knowledge of God solely upon an analysis 
of the simple or pure perfections, neglecting the per- 
fectiones mixtae. The mixed perfections are equally 
helpful to a true knowledge of God, first, because they 
are ektypa or likenesses, and secondly, because they are 
effects (effectus) of God. As ektypa or likenesses 
they suggest a corresponding archetype (causa exem- 
plaris), while as effects they point to an efficient cause. sy 
It is in intimate connexion with these truths that the a 
Schoolmen teach, that all creatures bear the stamp of 
God’s likeness; though not, of course, in the same man- 
_ mer or to the same extent. The irrational creatures are 
as it were God’s footprints (vestigia), while those en- 
dowed with reason are true images of Him," 


4. A PanrTHetstic OBJECTION.—Against the 
doctrine set forth above Pantheists object that 
“God plus the universe” must obviously be more 
perfect than “God minus the universe,” 

If this objection means that God and the uni- 
verse are two separate and distinct beings 
(plura entia), Pantheism simply reverses itself. 
If, contrariwise, it means that from an addition 
of creaturely perfections and divine perfections 


16.V, supra, pp. 70. *‘The Vestiges of God in Creation,” 

tn Otr, S. Theol., ta, qu. 93; and see M. Ronayne, S., J., God Know- 
Janssens’ commentary, De Deo Uno, able and Known, Chap. IV, 2nd 
tom. I, p. 250, Friburgi, 1900, On ed., New York 1902. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 189 


there restilts a higher degree of being (plus 
entis), the Pantheists forget that God and the 
universe cannot be added together, because divine 
Being belongs to an altogether different order 
than creatural being. It is only homogeneous 
things, objects of the same kind, that admit of 
addition. Now, the concept of being applies to 
God in its proper sense, to creatures only analo- 
gously. Therefore, “God plus the universe” is 
a sum that can not be added. Besides, all crea- 
tural perfections, both pure and mixed, are in 
matter of fact already present in God, either for- 
maliter or virtualiter et eminenter, in a plenitude 
which is infinite, and with a reality concentrated 
in the highest degree. Were we to attempt, ¢. £., 
to blend the corporeal perfections of the material 
world with the immanent perfections of God, in 
order to obtain a third being superior to God 
Himself, the attempt would not result in a higher 
form of perfection, just as little as if we should 
try to “improve” human reason by amalgamating 
it, by some intrinsic process, with what 1s 
wrongly called animal intelligence. In either 
case we should simply deteriorate the grade of 
perfection. As little as “Dante plus the Divina 
Commedia,” or “Michelangelo plus The Last 
Judgment,” constitute a higher perfection than 
either Dante or Michelangelo alone—a work of 
art obviously derives all its merits from the artist 


190 INFINITY 


—just so little, and even less, can “God plus the 
universe” be said to constitute a higher degree 
of being than God alone minus the world of 
creatures,’® 


RbADINGS : — *Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 71 (summarized 
in Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, pp. 177-179).— Heinrich, Dog- 
mat. Theologie, Vol. I, § 163.— *Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 163 
sqq— S. Thom., S$. Theol., 1a, qu. 4.— IbeM, Contra Gentiles, I, 
28, 29 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 22 sq.).— Pe- 
tavius, De Deo, VI, 7.— W. Humphrey, “ His Divine Ma jesty,” pp. 
74 sqq., London 1897.— F. Aveling, The God of Philosophy, pp. 
IOI sqq., London 1906, 


ARTICLE 2 


GOD'S INFINITY 


1. THE Notion oF Inrinity.—Finite’ we 
call that which has limits or an end (finis, Spos) ; 
“infinite” (infinitum, 4zepov) is that which is un- 
limited or endless. 


a) A being can be infinite in one of two ways; either 
potentially (infinitum potentiale) or actually (infinitum 
actuale). The latter is called infinitum categorematicum, 
the former, infinitum syncategorematicum, Infinity of 
the last-mentioned kind is merely the susceptibility of be- 
ing multiplied or increased indefinitely (indefinitum). 
What is indefinite, is not therefore infinite, but merely, 
in the phrase of the Schoolmen, “sine fine finitum.” 
That which is actually infinite (infinitum categoremati- 
cum), on the other hand, is absolutely limitless; it is 


18 Cfr. Suarez, Metaphys. Disput.,  sénlichkeit Gottes und thre modernen 
28, sect. 3; J. Uhlmann, Die Per- Gegner, pp. 56 saqq., Freiburg 1906, 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 191 
really infinite in the proper sense of the term. Leaving 
aside the vagaries of Hegel,*? we must say that, al- 
though the actually infinite (infinitum categorematicum) 
is the only real infinite, the potentially infinite (infimtum 
syncategorematicum Ss, indefinitum ) is not a mere figment, 
but a real, objective concept. Aristotle and the School- 
men attributed a true (though potential) infinity to pri- 
mordial matter (materia prima, vAy mpotn), because its 
determinability is unlimited.2® Similarly they conceived 
the created intellect as potentially infinite, because of 
its unlimited capacity for knowledge.* At the same 
time, however, they held that no created intellect can. 
actually know all things knowable. And even the few 
things that the human mind does know, it knows not like 
God, of and in itself, but either by means of infused 
forms (as the angels), or (as man) by a process of 
abstraction from material things. 


b) We must furthermore draw a sharp line 
between quantitative infinity (imfnitum quanti- 
tate) and infinity of being (infimtum perfectione 
s. essentid). Quantitative infinity belongs to 
mathematics; infinity of being or perfection, to 
theology. 


The mathematician reckons with “infinitely large” 
and “infinitely small” quantities, leaving it to phi- 
losophy to determine whether these magnitudes are 
actually infinite or only potentially so.22, Even if the 


Unendlichen,” in the Katholik, 
Mainz, 1880; Idem, “ Das unend- 


19 Cfr. Enzyklopidie, pp. 90 Sd. 
20“ Materia prima est potentia 


omnia.” 

21‘ Intellectus fit 
omnia.” 

22 Cfr, Pohle, ‘‘Das Problem des 


quodammodo 


lich Kleine,” in the Philosoph. Jahr- 
buch der Gorresgesellschaft, 1888, 


1893. 


192 INFINITY 


quantities with which mathematics deals were actually 
infinite, they would yet retain their character of ac- 
cidents, and could not, therefore, form a connecting 
link with God, Who is infinitely perfect. In the domain 
of the finite we should have at most an actu infinitum 
secundum quid, never an actu infinitum simpliciter. 

The term infinite in the strict sense always denotes 
infinity of being and substance, and therefore must be 
objectively identical with the absolutely perfect, though 
formally there may be drawn between them a three- 
fold distinction: first, because absolute perfection is an 
affirmative, while infinity is a negative attribute of God; 
secondly, because absolute perfection is related to in- 
finity in the same manner in which the universal is re- 
lated to the particular, or the whole to any one of its 
parts; and thirdly, because absolute perfection empha- 
sizes God’s intrinsic plenitude of being, while infinity 
rather accentuates the extrinsic magnitude of His being 
and attributes, 


2. THE Docma.—The Church has repeatedly 
defined infinity to be an attribute of God. The 
first definition of this dogma was uttered by the 
Second Council of Nicaea CA.'D. 787): 78. the 
last by the Vatican Council,4 


a) In proceeding to prove the dogma from Sacred 
Scripture, we will not tepeat the texts already quoted 
in establishing the attribute of divine perfection,?> but 
confine ourselves to such passages as bear directly on 
the infinity of the Divine Substance. Ps, CXLIV 32 

23 Oeds dveriypados. 


24“ Omnique perfectione infinitum.” 
25 Supra, pp. 182 sq. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 193 


“ Magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis et magnitudinis 
eius non est finis — Great is the Lord, and greatly to be 
praised: and of his greatness there is no end.” In- 
asmuch as there can be no accidents in God (quan- 
tity is an accident), “ magnitude” in the foregoing pas- 
sage must refer to the Divine Substance. Nor can the 
infinity which the Psalmist ascribes to God’s magni- 
tude, be an infinitum potentiale, because potentiality in 
an ens a@ se would involve contradiction, Manifestly 
the meaning of the passage is that God is actually in- 
finite. There are other texts which ascribe infinity 
to the one or other of God’s attributes. For instance, 
Ps. CXLVI, 5: “Magnus Dominus noster et magna 
virtus eius, et sapientiae eius non est numerus — Great 
is our Lord, and great is his power, and of his wisdom 
there is no number.” All such passages prove the 
infinity of the divine Essence, which is identical with 
each divine attribute. The infinity of the divine Es- 
sence is furthermore taken for granted in all those 
Scriptural texts which contrast God as the absolute Be- 
ing (6 dv, MN?) with His creatures, which are often 
described as mere shadows or zeroes (}8). Also when- 


ever the Bible distinguishes God in an especial manner 
by superlative predicates.” 

b) It is hardly necessary to develop the argument 
from Tradition. The Fathers of the Church invariably 
postulate God’s infinity whenever they discuss His in- 
comprehensibility. Gregory of Nyssa expressly excludes 
from God potential infinity when he says: “ He be- 
comes neither larger nor smaller by addition or sub- 
traction, because in the Infinite there can be no such 
addition as takes place in creatures, when they grow 


26 Cir. Is, XL, 173; Ecclus, XLITI, 32. 


194 INFINITY 
larger.” *7 St. Hilary gives a beautiful description of 
God’s infinity in his commentary on the 144th Psalm: 
“Haec Dei prima et praecipua laudatio est, quod nihil 
in se mediocre, nihil circumscriptum, nihil emensum et 
magnitudins suae habeat et laudis.... Finem magni- 
ficentia eius nescit.” 28 

c) Scholastic theology deduces God’s infinity directly 
from the concept of His self-existence. It is in this 
sense that St. Bonaventure writes: “Ipsum esse puris- 
simum non occurrit nisi in plena fuga ros non esse.” 2 
St. Thomas Aquinas argues trenchantly in this fashion: 
“Secundum modum, quo res habet esse, est suus modus 
im nobilitate. . . . Igitur si aliquid est, cui competit tota 
virtus essendi, ei nulla nobilitas deesse potest, quae alicui 
rei conveniat. Deus autem sicut habet esse totaliter, ita 
ab eo totaliter absistit 73 non esse.” *° By the a pos- 
teriort method the infinite perfection of the divine Es- 
sence can be deduced from the concept of God as the 
cause of all being.*+ 


Reapincs:—S. Thom, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 7—Contra Gent., 
I, 43 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 30 sqq.).— 
Suarez, De Deo, II, 1.— Aguirre, Theol. S. Anselm., disp. 32.— 
*Gutberlet, Das Unendliche, pp. 130 sqq., Mainz 1878.— Lépicier, 
De Deo Uno, t. I, pp. 263 sqq., Parisiis 1902—~ Boedder, S. J., 
Natural Theology, pp. 100 sqq.— Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of 
Catholic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 185. 


27 Contr. Eunom., 1. 12. Toletus, Comment. in S. Th., I, qu. 
28 Tract. in Ps. 144, n. 66. For VE 


other Patristic testimonies, cfr. 82 Chr,’ S.. Theol.) ta, qu. a, art 
Aguirre, Theol. S. Anselmi, disp. 
32. 

29 Itin. Mentis, c 5. 


80 Contr. Gent., I, 28. Cfr. also 


2. The philosophical arguments are 
developed systematically by Gutber- 
let, Das Unendliche, Mainz 1878 


SEGTION 2 


GOD’S UNITY, SIMPLICITY, AND UNICITY (OR 
UNIQUENESS ) 


The essence of oneness (unum, 7 &) lies in 
this that it is intrinsically undivided. Hence the 
Scholastic definition of unum as “td quod est 
indivisum in se.” A being which is not merely 
undivided, but indivisible, possesses simplicity 
(unitas indivisibilitatis s. simplicitas). Unicity 
(or uniqueness) differs from both unity and 
simplicity in that it superadds to the concept one 
(unum) the further note of “exclusion of all 
other beings from the possession of some at- 
tribute or quality.” Hence uniqueness is no 
more a transcendental attribute of being than 
mathematical unity, which is the principle of 
numbers or quantity. 

As a pure perfection, metaphysical or trans- 
cendental unity, raised to infinite power, must 
be predicable of God both as indivisio and indi- 
divisibilitas. Thus understood, the uniqueness 
of God is plainly a postulate of reason. While 
created units exist as individuals, the uncreated 
Being must of necessity be sole and unique. 

195 


196 INTRINSIC UNITY 


Hence from the concept of unum there are de- 
ducible three additional attributes of God, viz.: 
Flis intrinsic unity (unitas Dei); His simplicity 
(simplicitas) ; and His uniqueness (unicitas). 


ARTICLE 1 


GOD’S INTRINSIC UNITY 


I, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—The concept 
of metaphysical (transcendental) unity adds the 
note of indivision to the general notion of being. 
Whatever is undivided in itself is one. Con- 
sequently, the essence of unity consists in the 
negation of division. Nevertheless, unity is a 
positive predicate of being; first, because ens re- 
mains the fundamental concept; and secondly, 
because to deny that there is division is at bot- 
tom only a negation of a negation, and therefore 
an affirmation or position. 


a) There is a distinction to be made between things 
that are undivided. Some are incapable of being divided 
(indivisible), and therefore simple, while others are 
composite. Hence, besides unitas indivisionis, we must 
distinguish two other kinds of unity, viz.: unity of in- 
divisibility (simplicity) and unity of composition (unitas 
compositions). The latter may be unitas per se (e. 
g. a man) or unitas per accidens (e. g., a house). 
It follows that unity must be co-extensive with being: 
“Ens et unum convertuntur.’ For every being is 
either simple or composite. If simple, it is indivisible 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 197 


and therefore surely indivisum in se; if composite, it 
has no being so long as its parts are not united into 
one, receiving its indivision, 7. e., its unity, at the mo- 
ment when composition sets in.’ 

b) Over against this metaphysical unity we have to 
distinguish sharply between two cognate concepts that 
do not represent transcendental determinations of be- 
ing, viz.: mathematical unity and unicity. Mathematical 
unity (one), as the “principle of numbers,’ has its 
place in the category of (discreet) quantity, and there- 
fore is not a general determination of being as such. 
Unicity, on its part, connoting as it does “ the exclusion 
of others from the possession of some perfection,” also 
belongs to the class of determined beings, although, of 
course, in their quality of beings, both mathematical 
unity and unicity embody the notion of metaphysical 
or transcendental unity. 

c) The opposite of one (unwm) is many (multa). 
Over against simple unity as mere indivisio, we have 
multiplicity as division into parts, unities, or monads. 
But the contrary of indivisibility or simplicity is not 
multiplicity (multipler)— God, though absolutely one, 
is threefold in person — but composition (compositum). 
Inasmuch as both division and composition involve im- 
perfection (orépyows), they are contrasted with unity in a 
privative manner (as “ seeing,” and “ blind”). Mathe- 
matical unity is related to multiplicity as a part is re- 
lated ta its whole, inasmuch as “one” is both the 
first in the series of numbers, and likewise one of that 
series; and this opposition must be conceived as a rela- 
tive one (¢. g., “ father” and “son”). And as, finally, 
the notion of unicity (unicum) directly excludes every 
species of multiplicity within the same genus, the two 


1Cfr. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 11, art. I. 


198 INTRINSIC UNITY 


catia are hie to each other as contradictories (as 

“yes? -and * , 

From Cod the species of multiplicity, as opposed 
to unity, must be rigorously excluded, so far as His 
divine nature, substance, or essence is concerned ; though 
in respect of personality, there is a real Tinity, The 
Divine Essence more particularly excludes every kind 
of intrinsic division, every species of composition, all 
multiplicity of like beings. On the other hand, it nec- 
essarily includes intrinsic unity, absolute simplicity, and 
unicity. We shall devote separate chapters to the two 
last-mentioned attributes. Here we have to consider 
God’s intrinsic unity,— an attribute which, it is hardly 
necessary to remark, is virtually implied in His sim- 


plicity. 


2. THE Docma oF Gop’s Intrinsic Unity.— 
In view of the fact that the subjoined proposi- 
tions merely paraphrase dogmatic definitions of 
the Church (aseity, simplicity, etc.) they must be 
received as substantially de fide. 


a) If we consider God’s unity in connection with 
His self-existence, it is plain that He is wnus a se. 
Hence He must be conceived as the primarily One,? 
or, in the language of the Fathers, as unity itself (ipsa 
unitas, 4 povds, évds). Of course, this unity is not, like 
abstract being, a vacuous unity devoid of content. It 
is rather “the smallest kernel of being that can pos- 
sibly be conceived, and smaller than which nothing 
can be conceived”; and, on the other hand, because of 
its plenitude of being it is also “the largest being that 


2We adapt this English term from Wilhelm-Scannell (Manual, Vol. 
I, ‘p. 203). 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 199 


can possibly be conceived, and larger than which noth- 
ing can be conceived.” ® The description which St. 
Bernard gives of the divine primordial monas, may be 
cited here as a gem of both theological and rhetorical 
exposition: “Est qui est, non quae est.... Purus, 
simplex, integer, perfectus,... non habens quod ad 
numerum dividat, non quae colligat ad unum, .Unum 
quippe est, sed non unitum: non paritbus constat ut 
corpus, non affectibus distat ut anima... . Tam sim- 
plex est Deus quam unus est. Est autem unus et quo- 
modo aliud nihil, si dict possit, unissimus est... . Quid 
plus? Unus est etiam sibi: idem est semper et uno 
modo. Non sic unus est sol, non sic una luna: clamat 
uterque —ille motibus, illa et defectibus suis. Deus 
autem non modo unus sibi, et in se unus est; nihil in se 
nisi se habet: non ex tempore alterationem habet, non m 
substantia alteritatem.... Compara huic uni omne 
quod unum dici potest, et unum non ent." 

b) Inasmuch as God is one in an infinitely higher 
sense than all created entities, He may be said to be 
Super-Unity, with which created unities are absolutely 
incomparable. Concentrated in the very smallest focus, 
as the minutest possible unity, the super-fulness of His 
infinitely great and various perfections coalesces into a 
“ super-one monas, which in its simplicity is the most 
narrowly contracted and therefore the richest and also 
the purest being.”® From this concept of super-unity, 
St. Thomas Aquinas*® deduces the proposition that God 
is not only unum, but maxime unum. That is maxime 
unum, he says, which has the greatest fulness of be- 
ing and the largest measure of undividedness. Now, 

3 J. v. Gérres, Preface to Sepp’s 5 Gorres, 1. c. 3 


Leben Jesu, Ratisbon 7853. 6S. Theol., 1a, qu. 11, art. 4. 
4De Consid., V, 7. 


200 ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY 


God as the actus purus is very being, and as the ab- 
solutely simple He is that being which is most undivided 
in itself; hence He is maxrime unum, 1. é@, one in a 
supreme and unique sense.? 


READINGS : — Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 177 sqq.— Scheeben, 
Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 82.— Picus a Mirandola, De Ente et Uno.— 
Thomassin, De Deo, II, 1 sq.— Jos. Gorres in Sepp’s Leben 
Jesu, Vol. I (Preface, pp. 18 sqq.), 2nd ed., Ratisbon 1853.— 
Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 85 sqq.—J. T. Driscoll, Chris- 
tian Philosaphy: God, pp. 209 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 1904. 


ARTICLE 2 


GOD’S ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY 


I. STATE OF THE QuEsTIon.—In treating of 
the relation of God’s Essence to His attributes,® 
we drew a virtual distinction between them, 
based on the simplicity of the Divine Nature. 
This we shall now endeavor to explain more 
fully. Since a contrary opposition lies not 
between the simple and the multiplex, but be- 
tween the simple and the composite,® we can de- 
fine simplicity as “the absence of composition.” 1° 

a) Now, composition is twofold, physical and 
metaphysical, according as a being contains 
within itself parts that are really distinct, or 
parts that are merely notionally or metaphysi- 


7¥For Scriptural proofs, consult of the Trinity (De Deo Ipso, p. 
Gregor, de Valentia, Comment. in 1 185). 


P., qu. 11, art. 4. Kleutgen shows 8 Supra, pp. 144 sqq. 
that the unutterable super-unity of 9 V. supra, Art. 1, No. x 
God is not affected by the dogma 10 “ Simplicitas est carentia com- 


positionis.’? 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 201 


cally distinct. Physically composite beings are 
those in which there is substantial composition 
(e. g., of matter and form, body and soul), 
and also those in which there is a composi- 
tion of accidents (e. g., substance and accident). 
Metaphysical compounds are those whose parts 
(e. g., genus and specific difference), though 
really identical, are nevertheless represented by 
objectively distinct concepts. Every compound 
consists of parts. “Part” signifies “an incom- 
plete being, requiring to be complemented by an- 
other.” It follows from what we have so far 
explained, that the parts which enter into any 
compound mutually complement and perfect one 
another, giving completeness to the compound 
and in their turn receiving completion from the 
whole. 


b) While this conclusion is evidently true of physical 
compounds, the complementary function of metaphys- 
ical parts is not quite so clear, for the reason that in 
God virtually distinct perfections can easily be mistaken 
for metaphysical parts. Yet the dogma of the absolute 
simplicity of God forbids the assumption that there is 
in the divine Essence any sort of composition, even 
though it be a mere composition of logically distinct 
parts. The essential difference between metaphysical 
and virtual composition lies in this, that the latter is 
founded on a distinction purely subjective, while the 
former is based upon truly objective differences. The 
metaphysical parts of any creature, even though it be 

14 


202 ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY 


the most indivisible of all creatures, an angel, bear the 
same objective relation to each other which potentiality 
(potentia) bears to actuality (actus). Hence, when 
there is objective composition in a being, this is certain 
proof that such a being is contingent. Moreover, in the 
creature the determinable element (@. g., animal) ap- 
pears to stand in need of being determined by another 
(e. g., rationale); while at the same time both these 
elements are mutually indifferent to such a degree that 
either can be realized without the other ( e. g., brute, 
angel). In God, on the other hand, there is neither 
a determinable nor a determining element. He is pure 
actuality, and His perfections are anything but mutually 
indifferent. None of them can exist apart from the 
others. 


2. THE DocMa oF Gon’s ABsoLuTE SIMPLIC- 
try.—The Fourth Lateran Council (A. D. 121 5) 
defined the Blessed Trinity as “One absolutely 
simple essence, substance, or nature—una essen- 
tia, substantia, seu natura simplex omnino,’ © 
The Vatican Council as “one... absolutely 
simple and immutable spiritual substance—sim- 
plex omnino et incommutabilis substantia spir- 
itualis.”’ 1? 

a) The Bible teaches God’s absolute sim- 
plicity (a simplicity which does not even admit 
of metaphysical composition) in all those pas- 
sages where it speaks of God’s attributes sub- 
stantively, that is to say, where it identifies them 


11 Conc. Lateran. IV, cap. “ Fir- 12 Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, De 
miter.” Fide, cap. 1. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 203 


really with the Divine Essence. Thus God not 
only “hath life in himself” ™ but He “is life it- 
self,” 14 and, therefore, is the only one who hath 
immortality.® As God possesses within Him- 
self “all the treasures of wisdom and knowl- 
edge,’ 1° so He is wisdom itself," .andythere- 
fore, “alone wise.” ** He is a God of charity, 
because He has charity; but it is still more cor- 
rect to say that He “ts charity itself,” #® and, in 
so far, “alone good.” He is “full of truth,” a 
but He is more properly “the truth.”** In a 
word, according to the teaching of Sacred Scrip- 
ture, God is purest actuality without any qualifi- 
cation. His attributes are identical with His 
substance. This is merely another way of saying 
that God is pure actuality without any admixture 
of potentiality, and that there is in Him no 
manner of composition, not even metaphys- 
eal? 

b) We proceed to formulate the argument 
from Tradition. 


a) That the simplicity of the Divine Essence is real, 
can easily be shown to have been the belief of the 


13 John, V, 26. 21 John I, 14. 

14 John I, 4; XIV, 6; 1 John I, 22 ddndea, John XIV, 6; 1 
Py John V, 6. 

151 Tim. VI, 16. 23 Cfr. 1 John I, 5: “ Quoniam 

16 Col. II, 3. Deus lux [= actus] est, et tene- 

17 Prov. I, 20; Wisdom VII, 21; brae [= potentia] in eo non sunt 
TrCOr sh, 24. ullae—God is light [actuality], 

18 Rom. XVI, 7. and in Him there is no darkness 

19 1 John IV, 8. {potentiality].”’ 


20 Math, XIX, 17; Luke XVIII, 19. 


204 ,. ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY 


Christian Church through all the centuries of her ex- 
istence. Origen mentions it among the earliest dogmas.”4 
Irenzus asserts against the Gnostics who taught emana- 
tion that “ Deus simplex et non compositus, totus tvwouw 
et totus vous et totus ddyos.” ** Cyril of Alexandria says 
this truth is attested by the whole human race.?¢ 
The opposing error is branded by the Fathers in terms 
so harsh that they must plainly have meant to strike 
at a heresy: “absurdum et nefarium” (Maximus), 
“summa tmpietas” (John of Damascus), “ blasphemia” 
(Athanasius). The Fathers repeatedly employed this 
dogma as a weapon against the Arians, who, whatever 
errors they may have taught with regard to the relation 
existing between God the Father and the Son, never de- 
nied the divine simplicity.27 

B) The simplicity of God as taught by the Fathers 
is to be taken not only as a real, but also as a 
necessary quality, because of the absolute identity be- 
tween God’s Essence and existence, His attributes and 
Essence, and between His separate attributes. ‘“ Not 
only as seeing partially, and partially as not seeing, but 
in His whole substance He is all eye and all hearing 
and all spirit (dos vois),”’ says St. Cyril of Jerusalem. 
Hence the Augustinian axiom: 78* “ Deus quod habet, 
hoc est,’ and its Patristic conversion: “ Creatura non 
est, sed habet sapientiam, etc.” In the words of St. 
Gregory the Great: “Sapientia Dei est et sapit, nec 
habet aliud esse, aliud sapere. Servi autem sapientiae 
[t. e., homines], quum habent vitam, aliud sunt et aliud 


24De Princ., I, 1,6. ovalas marpés) esse dixistis: aah 
25 Adv, Haer., Il, 13. yap éorw ovcla, év 3 ovK éors 
26 Thesaur., 31. Two.orns,”” 
27 Cfr, Athanasius, De Synod. 34: 28 Catech., VI. 

“ Dixistis ex Deo esse filium, ergo . 28a De Civit. Dei, XI, 10. 


tam ex substantia Patris (ék ras 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 205 


habent, quippe quibus non est hoc ipsum esse quod 
vivere.’ 28 The technical phrase of the Schoolmen, which 
is so familiar to us, viz.: that God is pure actuality with- 
out any potentiality, dates back to the time of St. Maxi- 
mus the Confessor, who wrote: “God exists actually, 
not potentially (évepyeig éorw, ov Suvdper), as if He were 
originally not wisdom (d&poovvy) and then in reality 
became reason; therefore He is only pure reason (vots 
povoy Kkabapds), possessing cognition not as something 
additional, but He thinks only through Himself (arap’ 
gavtod voc). ®° Petavius has collected a large number 
of additional passages from Patristic literature bearing 
on this subject.*+ 

c) The philosophical explanation of the dogma must 
proceed on the assumption that God’s perfect sim- 
plicity does not consist merely in His indivisibility 
(i. @., the absence of parts)— for else the “monads i 
of Leibnitz, the “ Realen” of Herbart, the “atoms” of 
the chemists, and the “points” of the mathematicians 
would eo ipso be endowed with supreme perfection — 
but primarily in the simultaneous plenitude of God’s 
positive perfections of being. From this point of view 
the argument by which we prove God's simplicity from 
His aseity or self-existence is a most cogent one. Sti 
Thomas *? luminously formulates it as follows: “Jn 
omni composito oportet esse potentiam et actum, quod 
in Deo non est, quia vel una partium est actus respeciu 
alterius, vel saltem omnes partes sunt sicut in potentia 
respectu totius.” An equally stringent argument is that 
based upon the absolute causality of God:** .“ Omne 
compositum causam habet; quae enim secundum se di- 
versa sunt, non conveniunt in aliquod unum, nist per 


29 Gregor. M., Moral., II, 27. 81 Petav., De Deo, II, sq.; cfr. 
30 Comment. in Dionys. De Div. also Thomassin, De Deo, IV, 4. 
Nom., c 5. 82S, Theol., 1a, qu. 3, art. 7. 


33S. Thom., }. c. 


206 ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY 


aliquam causam adunantem ipsa. Deus autem non habet 
causam, cum sit prima causa efficiens.” 34 


3. Docmatic ConcLusions.—In virtue of His 
simplicity (which we have proved) there must 
be excluded from God all manner of composi- 
tion, and all parts, both physical and metaphys- 
ical. We begin with the cruder forms of com- 
position, gradually ascending to the higher ones. 


Thesis I: God is not composed of matter and 
form (ex materia et forma). 

Proof. Matter (#Ay zpér) is mere potentiality 
(S%vams) 5 but God is pure actuality (&épyaa, évre- 
Aexea), without a trace of potentiality. In the 
words of St. Thomas: “Deus est actus purus, 
non habens aliquid de potentialitate. Unde im- 
possibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex ma- 
teria et forma.” °° Therefore St. Bernard says: 
“Ipse sibi forma, ipse sibi essentia est. Non est 
formatus Deus, forma est. Non est compositus 
Deus, merum simplex est. Tam simplex Deus, 
quam unus est.” *° Materialism alone believes 
in a material God. 

Thesis II: God is not composed of substance and 
accidents (ex substantia et accidentibus). 

Proof. It is the function of an accident to 
perfect the substance in which it inheres, by 


84 Other philosophical arguments 85 S. Theol., 1a, qu. 3, art. 2. 
in St. Anselm’s Monol., c. 16, 17. 36 De Consid., V, 7. 
Cfr. also Schiffini, Metaph. Special., 
Vol. II, disp. 2, sect. 2. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 207 


giving it something which it does not possess 
of itself. Substance and accident are conse- 
quently related to each other in the same man- 
ner as the potential is related to its actuation. 
God as 6 4v is incapable of being perfected. In 
other words, whereas the created substance pos- 
sesses and supports its properties, which in turn 
are possessed and supported by their substance 
(ratio habentis et habiti), God 1s what He has. 
Hence there can be no accidents in Him.*' 


Thesis III: There is in God no composition of fac- 
ulty and act (ex facultate et actu). 

Proof. If God were not immutable actuality 
from everlasting, there would have taken place, 
or there would still be taking place within His 
Essence a transition from potentiality to actuality 
(a potentia ad actum), and the resulting act 
would inhere in the Divine Substance after the 
manner of an accident. This is repugnant to 
God’s pure actuality and the absence of accidents 
in His Essence. Consequently, in the words of 
St. Thomas, “Deus est sua operatio et actio.” ** 


Thesis IV: There is in God no composition of 
really distinct activities (ex actu et actu). 

Proof. If knowing and willing and transient 
operation in God were really distinct activities, 


37 Cfr. St. August., De Trinit.,  tristic testimonies, see Petayius, De 
AY Deo, V, 10-11. 
38 Contr. Gent., II, 10. For Pa- 


208 ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY 


there would exist in the Divine Essence three 
acts, none of which would be identical with 
either of the others. In other words, the God- 
head would consist of a real trinity of acts, cul- 
minating in some sort of “organic unity,” as 
Gunther taught. To hold this would be to 
deny the identity of God’s Essence with His 
attributes, and also His aseity, His absolute per- 
fection, and His infinity. It follows that the di- 
vine Nature must exercise its activity in one sim- 
ple act. There can be no reasonable objection to 
this thesis so far as it applies to God’s necessary 
operation ad intra (cognition, volition). It is 
only when it is applied to God’s free operation 
ad extra (@. g., creation, sanctification) that 
difficulties arise. Yet, when we consider the 
question carefully, we find that creation and sanc- 
tification: do not add to the perfection of God, 
but merely to that of the creature. It is not 
the divine operation as such that undergoes an 
intrinsic change, but solely the product of this 
operation. Hence God’s free operation ad extra 
furnishes no objective reason why His operation 
and nature should be split up and His simplicity 
endangered.*° 


39 For a more detailed treatment disp. go, sect. 9; cfr. also supra, 
of this thesis, see Suarez, Metaph., Chapter II, § 4. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 209 


Thesis V: There is in God no composition of sub- 
ject and essence, or of nature and person (ex subjecto 
et essentia; ex natura et hypostasi). 

Proof. According to the teaching of Aris- 
totle,*? it is only in material things that indi- 
vidual determination lies outside of specific de- 
termination, so that the production of an indi- 
vidual requires a principle of individuation—the 
tn mporn or materia signata. Of the “pure 
forms” (angels) St. Thomas asserts ** that their 
specific coincides with their individual determi- 
nation, so that every individual eo ipso consti- 
tutes a separate species. Regardless of what one 
may think of this theory (which is not entirely 
unobjectionable from the view-point of philoso- 
phy) it is certain that in God individuality 
(in the sense of singularitas) must coincide 
absolutely with essence. ‘To assume composition 
in the Deity, even if it were a merely metaphysical 
composition of subject and essence, would be to 
attribute to the Divine Essence potentiality, and 
consequently to deny its aseity. Therefore Eu- 
gene III, at Rheims, in 1148, laid down against 
Gilbert de la Porrée’s heretical proposition, 
“Divinitate Deus est, sed divinitas non est 
Deus,” * the dogmatic declaration: “Ne aliqua 
ratio in theologia inter naturam et personam 
divideret, neve Deus divina essentia diceretur, 


40 De Anima, IIl, 4. 42See St. Bernard, Serm. im 
41,5. Theol., 1a, qu. 4, art. 3. Cant., 80, n. 6. 


210 ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY 


ex sensu ablativi tantum, sed etiam nominativi.’ 
Whence it is plain that the Divine Essence ab- 
solutely excludes a composition of nature and 
hypostasis. We are therefore bound to profess, 
not only “Pater est Deus,’ but likewise, “Pater 
est divinitas,’ and conversely. 

But how does the mystery of the Blessed 
Trinity affect the absolute simplicity of the Di- 
vine Essence? Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, 
though really distinct as Persons, do not subsist 
in three different natures (Tritheism), but in 
one and the same divine nature. “Quaelibet 
trium personarum est alla [summa] res, vid. 
substantia, essentia s. natura divina.”’ ** We 
conceive this threefold subsistence of the one 
“summa res’ by drawing a virtual distinction 
between nature and person,—a distinction which 
does not imply objective composition.*® Hence 
the theological axiom: “Jn divinis omma sunt 
unum, ubt non obviat relations oppositio.” *° 


Thesis VI: There is in God no composition of 
genus and specific difference (ex genere et differen- 
tia). 

Proof. <A genus (e. g., animal) is something 
abstract, capable of being determined, and there- 


43 Cfr. Conc. Lateran. IV, cap. bitis. For a fuller explanation we 


* Damnanus.” must refer the reader to the dog- 
44 Conc. Lateran. IV, l. c. matic treatise on the Blessed Trin- 
45 V. supra, pp. 156 sqq. ity. 


46 Decretum Eugensi IV pro Jaco- 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 211 


fore potential. The specific difference (e. g., ra- 
tionale) lies outside the genus and determines 
it more nearly, though it does not posit it ex vt 
notionis. Now, in God there can be neither a 
determinatum nor a determinans, because He 1s 
actus purus; and therefore each separate divine 
perfection logically postulates every other divine 
perfection, because all His perfections are iden- 
tical among themselves and with His essence and 
existence. “Ex genere enim habetur quid est res, 
non autem rem esse; nam per differentias spect- 
ficas constituitur res in proprio esse. Sed hoc, 
quod Deus est, est ipsum esse. Impossibile est 
ergo, quod sit genus.’ *" As a thing is defined 
by giving the class (or proximate genus) to 
which it belongs, and the characteristic (or 
specific) quality which differentiates it from the 
other members of the same genus,** it is evident 
that, strictly speaking, God cannot be defined. 
Hence the proposition “Deus est ens a sé,” 
while absolutely correct so far as it goes, 1s no 
true definition, but merely an analogous substi- 
tute for a definition. The undefinable Divine 
Being has its place above and beyond all genera 
and categories, because it cannot be univocally 
subsumed under any common genus with created 
beings. 


47 Cfr. S. Thom., Comp. Theol., 48 Cfr. Clarke, Logic, p. 205. 
Captas : 


212 UNICITY 


Thesis VII: There is in God no composition of 
essence and existence (ex essentia et existentia). 

Proof. The Divine Essence, which exists 
with metaphysical necessity, cannot be conceived 
as non-existing. The notion of a merely pos- 
sible God, or of a God real indeed but objec- 
tively composed of essence and existence, involves 
a contradiction.*® For the same reason the 
Godhead does not even admit of a virtual distinc- 
tion between essence and existence. The dis- 
tinction between them is purely logical (dis- 
tinctio rationis ratiocinantis seu sine fundamento 
mre). 

READINGS: — Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 72 (summarized 
in Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 182 sqq.).— Hurter, 
Compendium Theol. Dogmat., t. II, thes. 82—Franzelin, De 
Deo Uno, thes. 26 sq.— Petavius, De Deo, II, 1-7—*St. Thom., 


Contra Gent., I, 16-27 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, 
pp. 14 sqq.).— Lépicier, De Deo Uno, t. I, pp. 149 sqq., Parisiis 


1902.— Boedder, Natural pbeeiog ,» PP. 92 sqq—See also the. 


Readings on p. 158. 


ARTICLE 3 


MONOTHEISM AND ITS ANTITHESES: 
; DUALISM 


POLYTHEISM AND 


1. Monorneism as A DocMA.—Standing as it 
does at the head of all our creeds,” the dog- 


49 Cfr. S. Thom,’ S.. Theol., ‘1a, 
qu. 3, art. 4. “‘Sicut illud quod 


est sua essentia. Si igitur non sit 
suum esse [= extstere], erit ens 


habet ignem et non est ignis, est 
ignitum per  participationem, ita 
illud quod habet esse et non est 
esse, est ens per participationem et 
non per essentiam. Deus autem 


ber participationem et non per es- 
sentiam. Non ergo erit primum 
ens.” 

50 Cfr. Nicaen.: “ Credo in unum 
Deum — mioretw els éva Ocedr,” 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 213 


ma of God’s unicity (Hovepxia) forms one of the 
fundamental verities of the Christian faith. In 
matter of fact Monotheism is the only possible 
form of Theism. While the Fourth Council of 
the Lateran professes, in accord with all Chris- 
tendom, “that there is but one true God,” ®* the 
Vatican Council formally condemns Atheism, 
Polytheism, and Dualism, when it defines, “S% 
quis unum verum Deum, visibilium et invisibilium 
creatorem et Dominum negaverit, anathema sit 
—If any one shall deny the one true God, Creator 
and Lord of things visible and invisible; let him 
be anathema.” °? We are bound to believe not 
only that there is but one God, but also that 
there can be no more than one God. 

a) Monotheism was the principal, nay, strict- 
ly speaking, the only express dogma of the 
Jewish people under the Old Law, and it had 
the same fundamental importance for them that 
the baptismal formula has for us Christians. 
Organically connected with this fundamental 
dogma was the basic law of the love of God. 
The Israelites were to build their world-view 
theoretically on belief in, and practically on the 
love of, the one God. Both precepts appear to 
be dogmatically defined in the famous 28: 
“Audi Israel, Dominus Deus noster Dominus 


51Conc. Lateran. IV (A.D. 52 Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, De 
1215), cap. “ Firmiter”: “ Quod Fide, can. I. 
unus solus est verus Deus.” 


214 MONOTHEISM 


unus est; diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto 
corde tuo.” °* The connection between these two 
commandments is a causal one: “Because God 
is one, therefore shalt thou love Him with all thy 
heart.” Monotheism runs like a golden strand 
through all the pages of the Old Testament and 
constitutes its specific mark of distinction, so 
much so that the Rationalist hypothesis that 
is the national God of the Jews, might appear de- 
batable, did not Holy Scripture itself emphasize 
the fact that God’s numerical unity must be con- 
ceived as absolute unicity (Hovepxia), subject to 
no limitations, either national or theocratic. Is. 
XLIV, 6: “Ego primus et ego novissimus et 
| propterea| absque me non est Deus—I am the 
first and I am the last, and [therefore] there is 
no God besides me.’ °* 

The distinctive fundamental dogma of Chris- 
tianity in the New Testament is the Trinity, 
while the basic law of love endures in a higher 
and transfigured form. But so far from being 
obscured or impaired by the dogma of the 
Trinity, Monotheism is confirmed and deep- 
ened thereby. The Athanasian Creed insists 
that the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity is im- 
possible except on a Monotheistic basis. The 
Mosaic 3#8¥ is not abrogated by Christianity ; 


63 Deut. VI, 4. Freiburg 1857; Zschokke, Theologie 
541s. XLIV, 6. Cfr. J. Konig, der Propheten, § 36, Freiburg 1877. 
Theologie der Psalmen, pp. 280 sqq., 


¥ 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 215 


on the contrary, it has become the foundation 
stone of the Christian dispensation. Mark XII, 
29: “lesus autem respondit et [scribae], quia 
primum omnium mandatum (mdr mavrev évron? ) 
est: Audi Israel, Dominus Deus tuus Deus 
unus est. Diliges etc-——And Jesus answered 
him [one of the scribes]: The first command- 
ment of all is, Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God 
is one God,” etc. The real distinction between 
the three divine Persons does not destroy but 
postulates the unity of the divine Nature. Cir, 
John XVII, 3: “Haec est autem vita aeterna, ut 
cognoscant te solum verum Deum (a& Tov pdvov 
édyfurv Ov) et quem misistt Iesum C hristum— 
Now this is eternal life: that they may know thee, 
the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou 
Hast: sent.’’ 

Among the Apostles St. Paul is pre-eminently 
the protagonist of strict Monotheism. The 
Lystrians in Lycaonia, who offered to sacrifice 
bulls to him and to his companion Barnabas, he 
instructs impressively concerning the one true 
God.®®= In Athens he preaches the “one un- 
known God” before the assembled Areopagus.*® 
He proclaims Monotheism as a universal re- 
ligion which transcends all national and _ local 
bounds. Rom. III, 23: “Is he the God of the 
Jews only? Is he not also of the Gentiles 


55 Acts XIV, 14. 56 Acts XVII, 23. 


216 - * .MONOTHEISM 


(<Ovav) ? Yes, of the Gentiles also.” He for- 
bids, finally, the eating of meat that had been 
sacrificed to idols, saying: ‘We know that an 
idol is nothing in the world, and that there is 
no God but one.” * 

b) In constructing the argument from Tra- 
dition, we note in the first place the apodictic 
form in which the Fathers teach Monotheism. 
Following the lead of Scripture, they deduce 
the intrinsic contradiction involved in Poly- 
theism, and the absolute necessity of there be- 
ing but one God, from various middle terms, 
especially that of aseity, and also that of in- 
finite perfection. 


Thus St. Irenzus** argues: “Si extra illum est 
aliquid, iam non omnium est mdhpopa neque continet 
omnia; deerit enim mdnpopart hoc, quod extra eum [esse] 
dicent — But if there is anything beyond Him, He is 
not then the Pleroma of all, nor does He contain all. 
For that which they declare to be beyond Him will be 
wanting to the Pleroma.” Tertullian®® appeals to the 
soul which is by nature Christian (“anima naturaliter 
christiana’’), to witness the truth of Monotheism, and 
he proves its intrinsic necessity from God’s absolute 
perfection: “Duo ergo summa magna quomodo con- 
sistent, cum hoc sit summum magnum par non habere? 
— How, therefore, can two great Supremes co-exist, 
when this is the attribute of the Supreme Being, to have 
no equal?’’®° Justly, therefore, do the Fathers, having 

57 Kal dru obdels Oeds el uty els, 59 Contr. Marcion., I, 3. 


Buon Vildde as 60 Tertull., J. c. 
58 Adv. Haer., II, 2. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 217 


in mind St. Paul’s dictum: “Kal deo ev ro KOT LO — 
You were... without God in this world,” ®t con- 
clude that “ Polytheism is at bottom sheer Atheism.” °? 
And Tertullian summarily declares: “Deus, si non 
unus est, non est — God is not if He is not one.” ® 

In regard to the teaching of the Scholastics, it will 
suffice to note that St. Thomas Aquinas in his philosoph- 
ical Summa * marshals no less than seventeen arguments 
to prove the necessity of Monotheism. The three chief 
ones among them, viz.: those based on the simplicity 
and perfection of God, and on the harmony existing 
in the created universe, he repeats in his Summa The- 
ologica.*® Another author worth reading on the subject 
is St. Anselm.°° 


2. THE Heresy oF PorytHetsm.—By Poly- 
theism we understand the belief in two or more 
gods. Its wellspring is partly the weakness of 
the human intellect since the Fall, partly and prin- 
cipally the sinful bias of the human will. Some 
forms of Polytheism reduce the Absolute to the 
level of the finite, while others raise the finite 
to the rank of the divine. All of them flagrantly 
contradict both reason and Revelation. 


a) If it be permissible to draw a distinction between 
the “ pure” and the “ applied ” concept of God, we may 
say that the fundamental error of Polytheism consists 


61 Eph. II, 12. Dé Deo Uno, I, 3-4; Thomassin, 


62 Cfr. Athanasius (C. Gent., 40, De Deo, Il, 1-6. 
24): ‘* Thy wodvdedTnTa abedrnTa 64 Contr. Gent., I, 42 (Rickaby, 
elvac Aéyouev +--+ Kal mohvapxia Of God and His Creatures, pp. 29 
dvapx la,” sq.). 

63 For further quotations from 65S. Theol., 1a, qu. 11, art. 3+ 
Patristic literature, see Petavius, 66 Monol., c. 4. 


15 


218 POLYTHEISM 


in applying the concept of God to improper subjects, 
t. €., to beings which are not and cannot be divine. 
Cir. Wisdom XIV, 21: “Incommunicabile nomen [2. 
é., NN] lapidibus et lignis imposuerunt —Men . 
gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood.” 
It would be an exaggeration to say that Polytheisra is 
identical with Atheism; for the atheist denies that there 
is a God, while the polytheist merely transfers the con- 
cept of Deity to some creature. But Polytheism involves 
an intrinsic contradiction and, pushed to its logical con- 
clusions, necessarily leads to Atheism. Polytheism is a 
specific characteristic of Paganism, and hence the direct 
antithesis between it and all non-pagan, #. ¢., monotheistic, 
forms of religion (Christianity, Judaism, Mohammedan- 
ism). | 

b) The rapid spread of Polytheism, especially during 
the period stretching from Abraham to Christ, calls for 
an explanation. Since reason is able to produce the 
strongest arguments against the intrinsic possibility of 
Polytheism, the enormous propagation of this error can 
not be sufficiently explained by attributing it to the 
weakness of the human intellect after the Fall, or to 
forgetfulness, or to a disinclination to reasoning, or to an 
enslavement of the intellect by the material things of 
this world. Its chief source is doubtless the false bias 
which bends the will of man towards sin. Without the 
co-operation of sin it is hard to imagine how so many 
nations could have fallen into gross idolatry. St. Paul 
in his first Epistle to the Romans,*? gives a graphic 
description of the powerful influence of sin, and the Book 
of Wisdom explains ° how idolatry, once it finds lodg- 
ment in the human mind, can grow to enormous 
proportions and eventually plunge the race into mis- 


67 Rom. I, 18-32. 68 Wisd. XIII-XV. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 219 


fortune and misery. “Infandorum enim idolorum cul- 
tura omnis mali causa est, et initium et finis — For the 
worship of abominable idols is the cause, and the be- 
ginning and end of all evil.” ® 

St. Thomas Aquinas 7° traces Polytheism and idolatry 
to two principal causes: first, sinful aberrations of 
the mind, such as image worship, the idolizing of crea- 
tures, etc.; and, secondly, the influence of evil spirits 
(e. g., in the pagan oracles). This last-mentioned agency 
must not be underestimated, because the Devil and his 
imps doubtless do everything in their power to spread 
idolatry and to fasten it upon the minds of men. How 
often does not Holy Scripture designate idolatry as 
devil worship? Idolatry must indeed exercise a dia- 
bolic charm upon men who have become entangled in 
the snares of sin; else how could the Chosen People, 
in spite of continual castigations, indulge their terrible 
penchant for Polytheism and surrender themselves unre- 
servedly to such an irrational cult, for instance, as that 
of the golden calf? “It was only in the fiery furnace 
of the Babylonian captivity that this impious tendency 
was extirpated root and branch; after that time we 
never again hear of the Jews practicing idolatry.” ” 

c) The forms which Polytheism has assumed are 
manifold. It belongs to the science of comparative re- 
ligion, and to the philosophy of religion, to distribute 
them into scientific categories. We will only ob- 
serve, in a general way, that the classification depends 
chiefly on whether the Absolute is leveled down to 
the finite, or whether the finite is deified. The first- 
69 Cfr. Wisdom XIV, 27. sacrifice to devils, and not to God.” 
70S. Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 94, art. Cfr...s. Cor: X, 20. ’ 

72 Oswald, Dogmat. Theol., Vol. 


v2 Ctr. Bar, LV, 72 |) Immolantes Ai Dee 70s 
daemoniis et non Deo — Offering 


4 


220 POLYTHEISM 


mentioned method was practiced in the East, where the 
Gnostic and Hindoo systems of religion, with their 
“emanations,” “eons,” and “ incarnations,” flourished, 
although the original unity of God was‘in a manner 
still retained as the center of emanation. The second 
method is distinctively Western in origin and character, 
and exemplified mainly in the Polytheism of the Graeco- 
Roman world. Since the deification of the creature can 
give rise to as many divinities as there are classes of 
created things, Polytheism has had a wide and fertile field 
for its vagaries. On the lowest plane we find Fetish- 
ism,’* which looks for help or punishment to inanimate 
objects, such as, e. g., a stick of wood. Related to 
Fetishism is Idolatry (in the strict sense of the term), 
which actually worships inanimate objects (é. g., images 
of stone, wood, or metal) as symbols of the Deity. 
Of somewhat higher rank is Sabaism, so-called, which 
adores the elements, especially the stars. From Sabaism 
it is but one step to Nature Worship, which pays divine 
honors to the powers of nature or the animal world 
(e. g., Animism,”* Totemism). The Deification of Man 
probably had its origin in ancestral and hero worship 
and developed into the formal apotheosis not only of 
particular men, but of general attributes of mankind, 
including vices, which were individualized, e. g., Apollo 
== god of wisdom; Aphrodite = goddess of love, etc. 
Of this latter kind was the gay and motley Polytheism 
of the Greeks and Romans. The most horrid form of 
Polytheism, and the one most directly opposed to Chris- 
tian Monotheism, is Devil Worship or the cult of evil 
spirits (Satanism) .75 

738 See the article ‘ Fetishism,” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 
by J. T. Driscoll in the Catholic I, pp. 526 sqq.; and the same au- 


fincyclopedia, Vol. VI. thor’s The Soul, New York, 1900. 
¢# On Animism, see J. T. Driscoll 75 Cfr. W. H. Kent, art. ‘* Devil 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 221 


d) Monotheism and Polytheism are logical contraries ; 
hence Polytheism in whatever guise is not only a 
grave aberration of human reason, because the nat- 
ural knowableness of God clearly postulates Monothe- 
ism; but also repugnant to Divine Revelation. If Mono- 
theism is a dogma, Polytheism must eo ipso be a heresy. 
The Bible expressly tells us that it is a heresy. The 
Book of Wisdom devotes several chapters "® to the ref- 
utation and condemnation of Polytheism and Idolatry. 
In fact, Holy Scripture never tires of denouncing Idol- 
atry as foolish and impious, and the pagan deities as 
“not gods,” 7 “lies and vanity,” 7° “ wind and vanity,” 7° 
airy nothings.*° 


3. THE Heresy or Duatism.—Dualism is 
the theory that there are two absolute and eter- 
nal principles. It is traceable to a different psy- 
chological source than Polytheism. It orig- 
inated in a mistaken conception of the problem 
of evil and is opposed to both reason and Reve- 
lation. 


a) The Dualism of the Gnostics and Manichzans, 
which teaches that there are two divinities, one good and 
the other evil, is of very ancient origin. As early as 
the sixteenth century B.C., Zoroaster, the founder of 
the Perso-Iranian national religion, imagined two divine 


Worshippers ” in the Catholic En- 76 Wisd. XIII-XV. 

cyclopedia, Vol. IV. For a list of 774 Kings XIX, 18; Jer. I, 21. 
reference works on these subjects, 78 Jer. XVI, 1 

consult M. Heimbucher, Die Bi- x Jo te 
bliothek des Priesters, pp. 114 sqq. 79 Is. XLI, 24; Dan. V, 23. 
Ratisbon 1904, and the bibliograph- 80 Ps. XCV, 5; not prqyby, but 
ical notes appended to the respec- ooby, i. e., nihila. Ps 
tive articles in the Catholic Ency- MF aes 

clopedia. 


222 DUALISM 


principles, Ormuzd, the god of light, and Ahriman, the 
god of darkness — the one the author of all good, the 
other the principle of all evil, physical and moral. In 
their never-ending struggle for supremacy now one is 
victorious, now the other. When in the third century 
after Christ, Manes (or Mani)** introduced the Persian 
gnosis into the countries of the Western world, which 
was just then opening its doors to Christianity, even 
so brilliant a genius as St. Augustine was temporarily 
seduced by its “eclectic jumble of wild fancies, among 
which the soberest and strongest dogmas of the Chris- 
tian creed were sometimes seen to be imbedded.” 8? 
Later on, however, he became one of the most powerful 
Opponents of Manichzism.%% 

b) That Dualism is repugnant to sound reason appears 
from an analysis of the notion of “evil.” A principle 
of evil, taking it—-not in the sense of Satanism or 
Anti-Christianism — but as an absolute being, is a con- 
tradiction in terms. “Evil” (malum) merely means 
privation of being (privatio, orépynos) i. ¢., non-being 
(vm 8v), which, carried to its ultimate limits, must issue 
in pure nothingness (nihilum, otk dv). Now nothing- 
ness is no being, least of all absolute being. The 
case against Dualism may also be argued thus: The 
good God and His evil anti-god are either equal or 
they are unequal in power. If they possess equal 
power, they are mutually destructive, because each is 
sufficiently potent to paralyze the other, and, therefore, 
to reduce him to inactivity. If their power is un- 
equal, then the stronger of the two is sure to vanquish 

81 Cfr, T. Gilmartin, Manual of 83 Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Pa- 
Church History, Vol. I, pp. 126 trology, pp. 474, 482, Freiburg and 
sqq., 3rd ed., Dublin 1909, St. Louis 1908. 


82 Cyclop. Americana, s. v. Ma- 
nichaeism. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 223 


and paralyze the weaker. St. Athanasius says beauti- 
fully: “To speak of several equally powerful gods, is 
like speaking of several equally powerless gods.” *4 

c) Dualism is opposed to the Catholic faith because 
it runs counter to the dogma of Monotheism, But it 
can also be expressly disproved from Scripture. So far 
as physical evil (death, pain, suffering) is concerned, 
we have it on God’s own authority that He is its funda- 
mental principle, just as He is the fount of whatever 
is good in this world. In the farewell canticle chanted 
by Moses in the hearing of the whole assembly of 
Israel, we read: “See ye that I alone am, and there 
is no other God besides me; I will kill and I will make 
to live: I will strike and I will heal, and there is 
none that can deliver out of my hand.”*® As if to 
refute Dualism in advance, God declared by the mouth 
of the prophet Isaias: “I am the Lord, and there 
is none else: I form the light and create darkness; I 
make peace and create evil: I the Lord that do all 
these things.” ** With regard to moral evil (sin), 
we must, of course, hold that God, on account of His 
absolute sanctity, cannot be considered the author of 
sin; that, on the contrary, sin has its proximate cause 
in an abuse of man’s liberty. It is interesting in this 
connection to note how God assumes the responsibility, 
é. g., for the hard-heartedness of Pharaoh *? in a man- 
ner which positively excludes the co-existence with Him 
of an absolutely evil principle. Of the Fathers of the 
Church Irenzus, Tertullian, Augustine, and John of 
Damascus have written special treatises against Dualism 
(Manichzism ) 8° 

84 Or. contr. Gent. 87 Ex, TV, 21. 


85 Deut. XXXII, 39. 88 On the mystery of evil, of 
86 Is. XLV, 6, 7. - which F. J. Hall (The Being and 


224 DUALISM 


Reapines:— Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. I, §§ 151- 
154.— Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 25.—Oswald, Dogmat. 
Theologie, Vol. I, Appendix, pp. 264 sqqg.—*C. Krieg, Der 
Monotheismus der Offenbarung und das Heidenthum, Mainz 
1880.— Chr. Pesch, S, J., Gott und Gétter, Freiburg 1890.—J. 
Nikel, Der Monotheismus Israels in der’ vorexilischen Zeit, 
Paderborn 1893—H. Formby, Monotheism, London, s. a— 
Driscoll, God, pp. 30 sqq.— E. R. Hull, S. J., Studies in Idolatry, 
Bombay 1906— W. McDonald, “Studies in Idolatry,” in the 
Irish Theological Quarterly, Vol. I (1906), No. 4—F. X. Kort- 
leitner, De Polytheismi Origine quae sit Doctrina Sacrarwm Lit- 
terarum Patrumque Ecclesiae, Innsbruck 1911; IpEm, De Hebrae- 
orum ante Exilium Babylonicum Monotheismo, I9gt0. 


Attributes of God, p. 66, New York 
1909), rightly observes, that it 
“sums up apparently all that can 
ever be urged as constituting anti- 


pedia, Vol. V¥ J. ‘Rickaby, S. J., 
Moral Philosophy, ch. VI-VIII, new 
ed., London 1908; R. F. Clarke, 
S. J., The Existence of God, pp. 


theistic evidence in the proper 
sense of that term,” see A. B. rard, The Wayfarer’s Vision, pp. 
Sharpe, Evil: Its Nature and 244 sqq., London 1909; B. Boedder, 
Cause, London, 1907; IDEM, art. S. J., Natural Theology, pp. 393 
“Evil” in the Catholic Encyclo- — sqq., and ed., London 1899. 


56 sqq., London 1867; T. J. Ger- 


SECTIONS 


GOD THE ABSOLUTE TRUTH 


Truth being a “pure perfection,” its formal 
concept must be applicable to God. Now, 
“truth” is threefold: ontological, logical, and 
moral. Consequently God is called “Absolute 
Truth’ in a threefold sense: First, absolute 
ontological truth,” second, absolute logical truth,° 
and third, absolute moral truth,* or veracity 
(truthfulness). 


ARTICLE )s 


GOD AS ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH 


I. PREFATORY OBSERVATIONS.—Truth is not 
only in the understanding, it is also in objects 
(e. g., true gold); and as such is called on- 
tological truth. Ontological truth is the con- 
formity of a being to its concept.” 


99 66 


Instead of “true,” we often say “ genuine, right,” 
“correct.” Thus a true, genuine friend is one who has 
all the perfections which the concept of “friend” in- 


1Veriias in essendo, veritas in 4 Veritas absoluta in dicendo. 
cognoscendo, veritas in dicendo. 58 Veritas ontologica est adae- 
2 Veritas absoluta in essendo. quatio ret cum idea eius.” 


8 Veritas absoluta in cognoscendo. 


225 


226 ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH: 


cludes. Whence it follows that ontological truth is the 
thing itself in so far as it is knowable (in¢telligibile). 
Since, however, this intrinsic relation to (a real or 
possible) knowledge adds no new reality to the ens, 
the difference between ens and verum must be purely 
logical. Hence the philosophical axiom: “Ens et verum 
convertuntur.” If we compare the intelligibility of a 
thing with its being, we find that they are co-extensive, 
each being the measure of the other; the measure of 
intelligibility is being, and vice versa. St. Augustine ad- 
verts to this transcendental character of ontological truth 
when he says:* “Verum esse videtur id quod est — 
That which is, seems to be true.” 

If all being, as such, is knowable, and consequently 
true, an object of cognition can be called false or untrue 
only in an analogous sense, namely inasmuch as some 
feature of it is apt to produce logical falsity in the 
mind; as when, for instance, we mistake a “ gold brick ” 
for real gold. Even the things we call false possess 
ontological truth, because they are what they are; thus, 
for example, false hair is a true wig, false butter may 
be genuine margarine, a spurious Hector may be a 
true tragedian, etc.’ 


2. THE Docma.—Whenever the sources of 
Divine Revelation and the infallible teaching 
office of the Church employ the term “one true 
God” (verus Deus), they refer not to His log- 
ical, but to His ontological truth. While the 
“false gods’ of the Gentiles are true and gen- 
uine idols, Yahweh alone is the true God, 7. e., 


6: Sohtl., Ilys. 8 Cfr. Conc. Lateran. IV, cap. 
7 Cfr. S. Thom., De Verit., qu. 1, * Firmiter’’; Conc. Vatican., Sess. 
art. 10. III, De Fide, can. 1% 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 227 


He corresponds ih every respect to the genuine 
concept of Deity.° 


a) If we would resolve God’s ontological truth into 
its constituent momenta, we must first conceive it, as it 
were, steeped in aseity; and consequently as essential, 
primeval, primordial truth (veritas a se). God is Pure 
Truth in virtue of His own essence, not by any agency 
extraneous to Himself. Since ontological truth, or cog- 
noscibility, increases in the same ratio with being, it 
follows that He who Is MM, or 6 oy, par excellence, 


must likewise be the “ first and sovereign truth ” (veritas 
suprema, % abradnbea). As St. Augustine puts it, “ Ubo 
magnitudo ipsa veritas est, quidquid plus habet magni- 
tudinis, necesse est ut plus habeat veritatis — Where 
greatness itself is truth, whatsoever has more of great- 
ness, must needs have more of truth.’ ° 

b) But God is also the All-Truth (4 wavaAnGea), 1. €., 
the creative cause of all truths derived from Him, and 
subject to Him, and their ideal (type, exemplary cause). 
In these two propositions all philosophy is contained 
as in a nutshell, and we shall have to discuss them a 
little more fully. 

a) As the efficient cause, or Creator, of the universe, 
God endows all creatures with whatever they have both 
of being and of truth (intelligibility). All beings out- 
side the Divine Essence owe their origin to that Essence, 
and are nothing but “embodiments of divine ideas.” 
The world in us and around us is merely a reflex of the 
world of divine ideas. The things that exist are true 
(i. e., knowable) only in so far as there is perfect cor- 
respondence between them and their archetypes in the 


9 Cfr. Jer. X, 10; John XVII, 3. VIII, 1. (Haddan’s translation, p. 
ga Cir. St. Augustin., De Trinit., 202.) 


228 ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH 


Mind of God, Who planned and created them. The 
“conformity of things to the divine idea,” therefore, 
‘constitutes their ontological truth. We know for cer- 
tain that the world around us, which we perceive as 
real, is not a surd, unintelligible ddoyov, but derived from 
an Intellect, and therefore intelligible. This certitude 
lays the foundation for all metaphysics and epistemology. 
It is only when viewed in the light of this overshadow- 
ing truth, that the universe appears to us as a rational 
whole, apt to be conceived and appraised by our finite 
understanding. Truly, therefore, does the Pseudo- 
Dionysius *° call the ideas existing in the Divine Mind 
“the creative Jogot of things,” ** and “the exemplars 
according to which God, the tepovcws, designed and 
created all existing substances.” 1? Aquinas with his 
customary acuteness develops this thought as follows: 
“Res naturales mensurant intellectum nostrum, sed 
sunt mensuratae ab intellectu divino, in quo sunt omnia 
creata, sicut omnia artificata [sunt] in intellectu artificis: 
sic ergo tntellectus divinus est mensurans, non mensu- 
ratus, res autem mensurans et mensurata; sed intellectus 
noster est mensuratus, non mensurans quidem res na- 
turales, sed artificiales tantum.” 8 

8B) God can communicate ontological truth to created 
objects only in accordance with the “ eternal world- 
ideas” existing within Himself; and here we have a 
second reason why He is “the All-Truth”: He is the 
exemplary cause of all things, and therefore the ideal 
of all derived truth. Nothing exists—sin alone ex- 
cepted — which cannot be traced to the eternal ideas of 
God, But what about the domain of the merely pos- 

10 De Divin. Nom., c. 5, § 8. 12 7a SvTa wavTa mpowpice Kar 


11 9 rev bvTwy ovaidro.ot Adyot, mapryaryer, 
18 De Verit., qu. 1, art. 2. 


= 


rs 


i 


eS 


ll 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 229 


sible, the supra-sensual sphere of “the purely intelli- 
gible,” the ideal world of “ metaphysical essences,” in 
which the genius of Augustine delighted to soar? This, 
too, receives all its truth, 7 e., its intelligibility, from 
God as its exemplary (though not as its creative) cause. 
The archetype, basis, and measure of all (abstract) 
truths in logic, metaphysics, ethics, zesthetics, music, 
mathematics, etc., must be sought in God, the wavad7Oea, 
Who drew forth from His own immutable Essence, 
where they had existed from all eternity, the unchange- 
able norms of these sciences, and imposed them as in- 
violable laws on the minds of His creatures. Even the 
sciences that deal with contingent and accidental things 
(such as history) are but reflexes of the divine All- 
Truth, exponents of its imitability and its ability to pro- 
ject itself outward. As for the truth or untruth of moral 
actions, Scripture teaches that all morality is grounded 
in an eternal and unchangeable idea, the Jer aeterna, 
with which our actions must conform in order to be eth- 
ically true, 7. e., morally good. Sin alone does not cor- 
respond to any exemplary idea or creative thought in 
the Divine Essence; sin, therefore, is “ untruth,” sin is 
a “lie.” It is in this sense that we must understand 
Ps. CXVIII: ‘“ All His [God’s] ways are truth (nDs)” ; 


and the prayer pronounced by Jesus as the High Priest 
Ghi humanity“, oanetily them” mi itrith 8. alla hor 
them do I sanctify myself, that they also may be sancti- 
fied in truth.”+* According to the Apocalypse no one 
“that maketh a lie” can enter into the heavenly Jeru- 
salem.*® | 

c) As He is the Primordial Truth, and the All- 
Truth, so God is also the Super-Truth (4 trepadrnGea). 
For, if (ontological) truth consists in conformity of 


14 John XVII, 17 sqq. ‘ 15 Apoc, XXI, 27. 


230 LOGICAL :. TRUTH 


being to knowledge, it is quite plain that the concept 
to which the Divine Essence conforms, must have its 
root in this very Essence. In other words, the type of 
true Divinity is that infinite idea which God has of Him- 
self from all eternity, and which He does not derive 
from anything outside Himself, but carries within His 
own Substance. To this infinite idea the divine being 
conforms to such a degree that there is substantial iden- 
tity between God’s being and knowledge.t® While the 
Divine All-Truth determines all derived truths, as their 
canon and norm, it does not itself receive its measure and 
purpose from anything extraneous or superior to itself, 
but as “Super-Truth” finds these in its own essence, 
which infinitely surpasses everything that can be con- 
ceived in the domain of created truth. 


READINGS : — Alex. Halens., Summa, ta, qu. 15.—S. Thom., 
S. Theol., 1a, qu. 16 (Bonjoannes-Lescher, Compendium, pp. 46 
sqq.).— Ipem, S. Contr. Gent., I, 42 (Rickaby, Of God and His 
Creatures, pp. 44 sq.).— Ruiz, De Scientia Dei, disp. 88 sqq.— 
Lessius, De Perfect. Divin., VI, 4. 


ARTICLE 2 


GOD AS LOGICAL TRUTH OR ABSOLUTE REASON 


I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—By “logical 
truth” (veritas in cognoscendo), or truth in its 
formal sense, we understand conformity of the 
mind to its object.” Knowledge is true in so 
far as it conforms to its object; that is to say, 
in so far as the object is conceived as it is. 


16 Cir) S.Pheol., 1a, u,)-26,). ante etiam est ipsum suum intelligere.” 
5: “Esse autem Dei non solum 17 “ Veritas logica est adaeguatio 
est conforme suo intellectui, sed  intellectus cum re.” 


ey 


Pe ae it Oey 


THE: DIVINE, ATTRIBUTES 231 

As ontological truth belongs to metaphysics, so logical 
truth appertains to logic and epistemology. The op- 
posite of logical truth is falsity or error, which must 
therefore be defined as a want of conformity between 
cognition and its object. It is the business of logic to 
show that error originates in judgments and ratiocina- 
tions. Since logical truth relates to cognition, its place 
is properly among the attributes of divine life or opera- 
tion. We treat it here because it is inseparable from 
ontological truth, reserving a fuller discussion for a later 
article on the knowledge of God. 


2. THE Docma.—By “absolute reason” we 
mean, not spirituality, or a mere faculty of cog- 
nition, but pure intelligence (ipsum intelligere, 
intellectio subsistens). In this sense the dogma 
that God is absclute reason is formally included 
in the dogma of His simplicity.°° A deeper 
analysis leads to the following conclusions: 


a) The first truth that impresses itself upon us is 
that the Divine Knowledge is not a mere conformity or 
equation, but “identity” of being and thought. While 
in the case of creatures every act of cognition proceeds as 
a (vital) accident from its faculty, and is supported by 
that faculty, God’s knowledge is a substantial act, ab- 
solutely identical with the Divine Essence, life, and at- 
tributes. Therefore God is above all things the Sub- 
stantial Truth.2° It is but a step from this proposition 


18 St. Thomas, Contr. Gent., I, 19 Supra, pp. 200 sqq. 


61: “The intellect does not err 
over first principles, but over rea- 
soned conclusions from first prin- 
ciples.” (Rickaby, Of God and His 
Creatures, p. 44). 


20 Cfr. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 14, art. 
1: “Scientia non est qualitas in 
Deo vel habitus, sed substantia eé 
actus purus.” 


232 LOGICAL TRUTH 


to that other one, that “God is His own infinite com- 
prehension.” ** The perfection of logical truth, be it 
remembered, depends on three factors: (I) a cog- 
nizable object; (2) a cognitive power, and (3) the 
union of both in the act of cognition. The richer, the 
clearer, the more intelligible an object is, the more 
powerful and penetrating is the faculty of cognition, 
the more intimate is the comprehension of the object 
by the faculty in the act of cognition, the higher and 
more perfect is the truth of the resulting knowledge. 
Now God, as the Primal Truth, the All-Truth, and 
the Super-Truth, is the most intelligible of all beings. 
His cognitive power is commensurate with His infinity ; 
and the union of both is the most intimate that can 
possibly be conceived, because it results in an absolute 
equation (identity) between being and cognition. Con- 
sequently God’s knowledge of Himself must culminate 
in an infinite comprehension of His own Essence, in 
and by virtue of which He adequately and exhaustively 
understands Himself and all things external to Himself. 
Since this absolute divine self-comprehension is a vital 
operation, God must be the essentially subsisting, per- 
sonal, living Truth (intellectio subsistens, vitalis). In 
all three of these respects God is “ Absolute Reason.” 
Sacred Scripture accordingly loves to personify the Di- 
vine Wisdom and Truth, and often speaks of it as a 
Personal Being (in the sense of absolute subsistence). 
This is the case especially in-the Sapiential Books of 
the Old Testament. The Fathers imitate this practice. 
Jesus, in saying: “Ego sum via et veritas (4 é\bea) 
et vita —I am the way, the truth, and the life,” 2? clearly 
means logical truth, because He is speaking of His mis- 
sion as the “ Teacher” of mankind. 


21°‘ Deus est comprehensio sui.” 22 John XIV, 6. 


aes ta SS ees he 


Es 
Se 


THE ‘DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 233 


b) In the foregoing paragraph we have treated of 
God as Absolute Reason per se. We now proceed to 
consider Him as the Absolute Truth in relation to 
His rational creatures. The fate of Ontologism and 
Theosophy warns us that we are treading on danger- 
ous ground. St. Augustine ?* teaches that we may call 
God “the light of intelligent spirits” (lumen men- 
tiwm). He means to say that the Divine All-Truth is 
not only in itself purest light, depending for its bril- 
liancy on none other, but that this light somehow 
illuminates the created intellect, moving it intrinsically 
to perform the act of cognition. It is here we reach that 
half-obscure boundary line where truth easily becomes 
distorted, and incautious theologians are likely to go 
astray. Nowhere, therefore, is it more necessary than 
here to mark off the domain of natural cognition from 
the realm of supernatural truth. 

a) In the natural order Absolute Reason is the 
Creator and Author of all intelligence—the surging 
and overflowing ocean of light from which all truth 
descends into created intellects. The Divine Truth rules 
all created intelligences by means of the (metaphysical ) 
laws of being and the (logical) laws of thought, and 
bends them unconditionally under the iron law of evi- 
dence, which is the criterion of all truth. And in so 
far as the created intellect is an “image and like- 
ness” of the Infinite Spirit —- Who is the Prototype of 
all intelligences — it is subject to the sway of the divine 
light of truth, which renders all being intelligible, and 
endows every mind with intelligence. Consequently, 
every single act of truth-perception on the part of a 
finite intellect, and the created mind itself are but a 
weak reflex of the Divine Spirit and the Divine 


23 Supra, Pe 129 
16 i 


234 LOGICAL TRUTH 


Knowledge. God thinks because He is thought itself: 
the creature merely re-thinks in its finite fashion the 
thoughts already spun out by the Divine Intellect. 
In this sense, and in this sense alone,24 are we to un- 
derstand the Scholastic formula of the participation of 
the finite intellect in Divine Knowledge, which St. 
Thomas Aquinas explains as follows: “ Sicut animae 
et res aliae verae quidem dicuntur in suis naturis, 
secundum quod similitudinem illius summae naturae 
habent, quae est ipsa veritas; ita id quod per animam 
cogmitum est, verum est, inquantum illius divinae verita- 
tis, quam Deus cognoscit, similitudo quaedam existit in 
psa. Unde et Glossa (in Ps. XI, 2) dicit, quod sicut 
ab una facie resultant multae facies in speculo, ita ab 
una prima veritate resultant multae veritates in menti- 
bus hominum — As the soul and other beings are called 
‘true’ in their natures, as bearing some likeness to the 
supreme nature of God,— which is truth itself, as be- 
ing its own fulness of actual understanding,— so what 
is known by the soul is true for the reason that 
there exists in the soul a likeness of that divine truth 
which God knows. Hence on the text CPS Oy ae 
‘Truths are diminished from the sons of men,’ the 
Gloss *® says: ‘The truth is one, whereby holy souls 
are illumined: but since there are many souls, there 
may be said to be in them many truths, as from one 
face many images may appear in many mirrors.” 26 
This excludes all Pantheistic and semi-Pantheistic in- 
terpretations. 

8) It is in the supernatural order that the participa- 
tion of the created intellect in the truth-life of the God- 

24 Not in the Theosophic mean- 26 Contr. Gent., III, 47 (Rickaby, 
ing given to it by Baader. Of God and His Creatures, p. 127). 


25 Cir, St. August., Enarrationes 
in hl. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 235 


head becomes most complete, most intimate, and most 
real; though here, again, we must guard against The- 
osophic and Pantheistic perversions. The supernatural 
light of truth, by which the germs of “conformity with 
God” 2? are implanted in the soul, first asserts itself in 
the act of faith. For, “the life was the light of men” 
. and He [the Logos] “was the true light, which 
enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world.” ** 
In Heaven the dim light which faith imparts here 
below, becomes perfect vision, which, in virtue of the 
light of glory, immerses the intellects of the Just into 
the Divine Essence and elevates them to an immediate 
participation in the Trinitarian life of the Godhead.”® 
Lessius ®® gives a graphic description of the manner 
in which truth flows forth from its heavenly Source 
and inundates the created universe. Gushing from its 
divine fount, it first flows through the channel of crea- 
tion into the forms of created things, imparting to them 
their ontological truth (cognoscibility). Thence it forces 
its way into the intellect of those creatures who are en- 
dowed with reason (= logical truth), seeps through into 
the passions and moral actions of men, until finally, 
having lost much of its original impetus, it terminates 
in the truths that men speak and write. It finds a 
second channel in Supernatural Revelation, which orig- 
/inates in the infusion of faith and reaches its climax 
in the beatific vision of God. A third channel, the one 
we have pointed out above *! in treating of God as the 
causa exemplaris of created things, Lessius leaves un- 
mentioned. 


27 Cfr. 2 Pet. I, 4: “ divinae con- 29 Cfr. supra, Part I, Chapter 2, 
sortes naturae.” Section 2. ; 


28 John I, 4 sqq.; cfr. 1 Pet. II, 80 De Divin. Perfect., VI, 4. 


9. 81 Article 1, No. 2. 


236 MORAL TRUTH 


READINGS : — Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 95.— Franzelin, De 
Deo Uno, thes. 28, 36.— Lessius, De Divin. Perfect., V1, 4—*S, 
Thom., De Verit., qu. 11—W. Humphrey, S. J. “His Divine 
Majesty,” pp. 89 sqq., London 1897. | 


ARTICLE 3 


GOD AS MORAL TRUTH, OR HIS VERACITY AND 
FAITHFULNESS ; 


I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—The attri- 
bute of “moral truth” comprises two elements: ve- 
racity (veracitas = veritas in dicendo) and faith- 
fulness (fidelitas = veritas in agendo),. 

a) Veracity means the firm purpose of tell- 
ing the truth always and everywhere. It is ¥ 
opposed to mendaciousness, which disturbs the 4 
harmony between thought and language in — 
order to deceive others, and thereby destroys 
confidence. Mendaciousness is habitual un- 
truthfulness, and is a proper attribute of the 
Devil, whom Sacred Scripture calls “the father 
of lies.” Though veracity in so far as it is a 
virtue, and mendaciousness in so far as it is a 
vice, appertain formally to the will, they also 
bear an essential relation to the intellect, because 
veracity must always be conceived as an equa- 
tion between the intellect and speech (adaequatio 
intellectus cum sermone) while mendaciousness 
is a difformity between the two (difformitas in- 
tellectus et sermonis). 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 237 


b) Akin to veracity, although not identical 
with it, is fidelity or faithfulness, which may be 
defined as “the firm purpose of keeping one’s 
promises or carrying out one’s threats.” Like 
veracity, faithfulness as a virtue appertains im- 
mediately to the will, though it too bears an 
obvious relation to the intellect, inasmuch as to 
keep one’s promises, and to carry out one’s 
threats, postulates veracity. He who breaks his 
promise is a liar. To bring out these momenta 
clearly, we may say that faithfulness is an 
equation between speech and conduct (adae- 
guatio sermonis cum actione).*? Opposed to 
faithfulness as its contradictory is infidelity; its 
contrary is deceit. Both are vices, and as such 
inhere in the will. Yet, involving as they do a 
lack of harmony between speech and conduct, 
they can never deny their relationship with 
falsehood, lying, and error. 

c) From all this it appears that veracity 
and faithfulness, considered as divine virtues, 
are not properly attributes of being, but rather 
qualities of the will, But inasmuch as both 
have truth for their taproot, it is meet that 
they be treated in connection with the ontological 
and logical truth of God. Theologically God’s 
veracity and faithfulness are very important at- 


82 Cfr. St. Thomas, In Epist. 1  delitas) nihil aliud est quam par- 
Tim., c 2, lect. 2: “Fides (=fi-  ticipatio sive adhaesio veritati.” 


238 | VERACITY 


tributes, because they constitute the foundation 
of two of the so-called theological virtues, ve- 
racity being the formal motive of faith, while 
faithfulness is the formal motive of hope. 

2. THE DoGMa or Gop’s Vrracitry.—It is an F 
article of faith that in the present Economy 
God neither lies nor can lie. But is lying ab- 
solutely repugnant to the Divine Essence? Can 
no other order of the universe be imagined in 


which it might be possible for God to lie? Some 
theologians, recalling the example of Jacob and _ 


Judith in the Old Testament, and the teaching 
of Gabriel Biel,** Pierre d’Ailly, and others, 
see no more than a theological conclusion in the 
proposition that lying is absolutely repugnant to 
the Divine Essence. We prefer to hold, with 
Suarez, that it is a dogma clearly contained in 
Divine Revelation. , | , 

,a) The Bible again and again asserts the ve- q 
racity of God, by declaring that in virtue of Hts 
very Essence it is impossible for Him to lie. 


“Qui me misit, verax (44%) est—He that sent _ q 
me is true,’* or “dye8}s—God, who lieth 


not.” > “Impossibile (4dvarev) est mentiri Deum 
——It is impossible for God to lie.” 2* The mean- 
ing of the well-known antithesis in St. Paul’s 
letter, to, the).Romans:.*°*, Est isquiem.Deme 


33 Comment. in Quatuor Libros 85 Tit. I, 2, 
Sent., III, dist. 38, qu. x. 36 Heb. VI, 18. 
84 John VIII, 26. 36a Rom. III, 4. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 239 


verax, omnis autem homo mendax—God is true, 
but every man a liar,” is evidently this: Man 
is capable of lying, God is not.** 

b) While some of the Fathers (like Chrysos- 
tom and Jerome) appear to base the immorality 
of lying on its positive prohibition by God, rather 
than upon its intrinsic wrongfulness, the ma- 
jority, under the leadership of St. Augustine, 
teach that mendaciousness is something so essen- 
_ tially immoral in itself that it would be sinful 
even if there were no specific divine command- 
ment forbidding it. What is intrinsically and 


essentially sinful, God’s sanctity can never per- 


mit, either in the present or in any other con- 
ceivable Economy. Even St. Chrysostom, no- 
toriously so mild in condoning the little “white 
lies” of daily life, expressly declares that “there 
are certain things impossible to God, wiz.: to be 
deceived, to deceive, and to lie.” *° 

3. THE DocMa oF Gop’s FIDELITY. Ll eard 
ing to the consentient teaching of all theologians, 
it is de fide that infidelity or deceit is absolutely 
contrary to the Essence of God. 

a) The Scriptural proof for this dogma is 
bottomed first upon those texts which teach 
God’s faithfulness,*® and secondly upon the re- 
peatedly asserted impossibility of God’s breaking 


$7 Ronis’ LIT, 4. \.-Cfr, Numb. 39 Cfr, Ps. CXLIV, 13: “ Fidelis 
TET 79, Deus in omnibus verbis. suis.” 
38 Hom. in Symb., 1. 


240 FIDELITY 


4 


the faith, because if He broke the faith He 
would contradict Himself.t? Jesus Christ de- 
scribes divine fidelity in these subtime terms: * 
“Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my 
words shall not pass away.” * 

b) From the writings of the Fathers we 
shall content ourselves with citing this one pas- 
sage of St. Augustine: ** “Spes nostra tam 
certa est, quast 1am res perfecta sit. Neque 
etiam timemus promittente veritate. Veritas 
nec falli potest nec fallere—Our hope is as cer- 
tain as if the promise were already fulfilled. 
Nor do we fear, seeing we have the promise of 
truth. Truth can neither be deceived nor de- 
ceive.’ The theological argument rests upon 
God’s veracity. He would not be veracious if 

He failed to keep His promises or to carry out 
His just threats. All those circumstances and 
motives which at various times induce men to 
become faithless or to deceive others (such as 
forgetfulness, change of mind, impotence, malice, 
etc.) are formally excluded from God’s Essence 
by the divine attributes of omniscience, immuta- 
bility, omnipotence, sanctity, etc. 

READINGS : —*Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 397 sqq.— Alb. a 


Busano, ed. Graun, Theol. Dogmat. Special., I, pp. 99 sqq., 
Oeniponte 1893. 


40 Cfr. 2 Tim. II, 13: “ S# non continueth faithful, he cannot deny 
credimus, ille  fidelis (aworéds) Himself.” 
permanet [quia] negare seipsum non 41 Math. XXIV, 35. 
potest (adpyjnoacbar yap éavrdy ov 42 Cir. Deut. XXXII, 4; VII, 9; 
dvvara:)—If we believe not, he 1 Thess. V, 24; 2 Thess. III, 3; etc. 
43 Praef, in Ps., 123. 


SECTION 4 


GOD AS ABSOLUTE GOODNESS 


Goodness, too, is a pure perfection and there- 
fore formally predicable of God. Like truth, 
goodness may be either ontological, ethical, or 
moral (bonitas in essendo, in agendo, im com- 
municando). From the notion of bonum, there- 
fore, we can develop three other divine attributes 
which correspond to the attributes of truth, 
vig.: ontological goodness, ethical goodness 
(sanctity), and moral goodness (benevolence). 


ARTICLE 1 


GOD AS ONTOLOGICAL GOODNESS 


1. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.— Aristotle defines on- 
tological goodness thus: “ Bonum est, quod omma ap- 
petunt — The good is that which all desire.’* On- 
tological truth denotes objects inasmuch as they are in- 
telligible; ontological goodness (bonitas) describes them 
as appetable, or desirable. | 

But this definition is incomplete, because it describes 
goodness merely in its effects, not in its essence. An 
object is good when it is appetable. But why is it ap- 

1 Ethics, 1. 1. This is not to be men, but in the sense that whatso- 


understood, says St. Thomas, as if ever is desired has in it the idea 
every good were desired by all of good. 


= SAT 


242 ABSOLUTE GOODNESS 


petable? It is not good because it is appetable, but it 
is appetable because it is good. In order to arrive at an 
essential definition of goodness, it is first of all necessary 
to distinguish between absolute goodness (bonum in se 
s. bonum quod), and relative goodness (bonum alteri s. 
bonum cui). Both of these combined will give us the 
adequate definition we are in search of. 

a) Now, what is absolute goodness? A thing is 
called absolutely good (bonum quod) when it is exactly 
what its nature requires it to be, 7. e., when it has all 
the perfections due to, and demanded by, its essence. 
The notion of bonum quod, therefore, materially coin- 
cides with that of perfectum, with this sole difference 
that the former connotes a relation to some (conscious 
or unconscious) appetency, which the notion of “ per- 
fect’? lacks. Hence we may say that what is perfect 
in its species is (absolutely) good. If a being lacks 
some perfection which it ought to possess (as, é. g., 
a deaf person lacks the sense of hearing), we have the 
concept of “ evil,’ which may consequently be defined 
as the privation or absence of some perfection required 
by the nature of a thing.? If an object lacks even one 
of those perfections which its nature postulates, it is 
‘bag OR \Gwil., ie 

b) Relative goodness (bonum cui) consists in the 
communicability of that which is good (perfect) to some 
other being or beings. As (ontological) truth tends to 
reveal itself to the intellect, so (ontological) goodness 
tends to communicate itself to other beings, and thereby 
to produce more good.’ This communicability formally 
consists in the adaptability of one object to another, so 

2° Malum est privatio perfec- integra causa, malum ex quocunque 
tionis debitae.”” defectu.”’ 


8 Hence the axiom: “ Bonum ex 4“ Bonum est diffusivum sui.” 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 243 


that the other has a motive for desiring or striving after 
the bonum with an “ appetite” (appetitus), and this may 
be either conscious or unconscious. It is easy to see how 
relative goodness, in virtue of its adaptability (con- 
venientia), at once becomes bonitas finis, and how the 
latter spontaneously overflows, coloring with its own 
goodness all the means that lead to the end, and com- 
municating to them the characteristic note of usefulness 
or utility (bonum utile). The opposite of relative good- 
ness, which we obtain by a process of contrary conver- 
sion, is “inadaptability (harmfulness) of one thing to 
another,” irrespective of whether the harm is caused 
through the instrumentality of some positive perfection 
(e. g., capital and labor), or by its absence (¢. g., drunk- 
enness in parents and spoilt children). 

c) By welding the essential marks of absolute and 
relative goodness into one concept, we obtain the fol- 
lowing definition of goodness in general: “That is 
good which is perfect in itself and adapted to another.”’ 
Under either aspect goodness is evidently a trans- 
cendental attribute of being.» For a thing is more or 
less good according to the measure of being which it 
contains, e. g., “good” bread, a “good” poem. Even 
bad things are good under at least one aspect, vtz.: 
in as much as they are. Whence the dictum of St. 
Augustine: “In quantum sumus, boni sumus.” Rela- 
tively speaking every being as such is good, 7. e., adapted 
to every other being, because all things are related to 
one another either as substance to accident, or as a part 
to the whole, or as an effect to its cause; or vice versa. 
Hence all beings are constantly perfecting themselves and 
each other. To a superficial observer it might seem as 


5“ Ens et bonum convertuntur.” 
6 Cfr. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 5, art. 1-3. 


244 ABSOLUTE GOODNESS 


if ontological goodness had a wider scope than the con- 
cept of being, inasmuch as it can be predicated, e. g., 
of phantoms, “ air-castles,’ etc. But this is a delusion. 
In matter of fact the goodness of a thing is always and 
everywhere commensurate with the measure of its being, 
even if it were only an ens rationis.7 


2. THE DocmMa.—God is ontologically good, 
both in the absolute and in the relative sense of 
the term. The dogma of His absolute goodness 
is clearly contained in that of His divine per- 
fection.* His relative goodness is implied partly 
in the condemnation of Dualism,® partly in the 
goodness of the created universe.’ 

a) Considering God’s absolute ontological 
goodness we find that 

a) It is, in the first place, closely bound up 
with aseity and primal goodness (bonitas a se). 


While creatures have all their goodness (perfection), 
as they have their being, by participation (bonum ab 
alio s. per participationem), God, and He alone, is orig- 
inally good in Himself; or, to express it substantively, He 
is goodness itself (ipsa bonitas, 4 abrayabdrns). This can 
be proved from Holy Scripture. St. Paul teaches: 1 
“Omnis creatura Dei bona est—Every creature of 
God is good.” Christ, on the other hand,!? says that 


7Cfr. A. H. Tombach, Unter- dico, cum voco Deum bonum, ac si 
suchungen iiber das Wesen des album vocarem nigrum.” 
Guten. Bonn 1900, 9 Supra, pp. 221 sqq. 

8 Cfr. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, 10 Cfr. Conc. Vatican., |. c.; Cone. 
“ De Fide,” cap. 1; cfr. Propos. 28 Trident., Sess. VI, can. 6. 
Ekkardi damn. a Ioanne XXII a. Tgp hams! LV a 
1329: “ Deus non est bonus neque 12 Luke XVIII, 19. 


melior neque optimus; ita male 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 248 


“nemo bonus nisi solus Deus — None is good but God 
alone.” These two statements can be harmonized only 
by attributing essential, aseitarian goodness to God alone, 
and conceiving the goodness predicated of His creatures 
as derived or participated goodness, which is as nothing 
in comparison to God’s. It is in this sense that we 
must interpret Tertullian’s dictum: “Bonus natura 
Deus solus; qui enim quod est sine initio habet, non 
institutione [ab alio] habet, sed natura [a se] —God 
alone is good by nature; for He, who has that which He 
is without beginning, has it not by creation, but by na- 
ture.” 23 Clement of Alexandria testifies to the belief 
of the Greeks on this head when he writes: “The 
essential good is not said to be good on account of its 
being possessed of virtue, . . . but on account of its be- 
ing in itself and by itself good.” ** 


B) Since all goodness found in creatures is 
virtually and eminently contained in the Divine 
Essence, God is the universal good (bonum uni- 
versale) or, more correctly, universal goodness 
(4) mavayaborns ) , 


While created goodness by its very nature can never 
be more than partial and particular, and is limited to 
certain definite stages of perfection, God’s goodness com- 
prehends within itself and is infinitely superior to all 
particular goodness found elsewhere. Cfr. Ex. XXXIII, 
19: “Ostendam omne bonum tibi —I will shew thee 
all good,” (i. e., Him who contains within Himself 
everything that is good). St. Ambrose tersely declares: 


13 Contr, Marcion., II, 6. kal 8’ adrnv dayabhny elvar.— 
14’A\AA Te adThy Kas’ a’tny Paedag., I, 8. 


246 ABSOLUTE GOODNESS 


“Deus universitate bonus, homo ex parte.”’?** St. Au- 
gustine develops the notion of God’s universal goodness 
trenchantly as follows: “ Bonum hoc et bonum illud, 
... bolle ‘hoc’ et ‘illud’ et vide ipsum bonum, si 
potes. lia Deum videbis non alio bono bonum, sed 
bonum omnis boni.... Quid hoc nisi Deus? Non 
bonus animus aut bonus angelus aut bonum coeli, sed 
bonum Bonum— This thing is good and that good, but 
take away this and that, and regard good itself if thou 
canst; so wilt thou see God, not good by a good that 
is other than Himself, but the good of all good . : 
and what can this be except God? Not a good mind, 
or a good angel, or a good of heaven, but goodness 
itself.” *° It is impossible for the mind of man to con- 
ceive the universal good more profoundly than St. 
Augustine does in this luminous passage. 


y) Lastly, inasmuch as all created goodness 
has its measure and goal in God alone, while 
the Divine-Good, on the other hand, has its 
measure and end not above but within itself, 
the concept of God’s universal goodness nat- 
urally expands into 4 trepayabdrys, 7. e., His good- 
ness transcends all other goodness. It is in 
this sense that the Church, without regard to 
the possible existence of rational creatures, re- 
fers to God as “the highest, the most beautiful, 
the best good” (summum bonum in se). Be- 
cause God knows and loves Himself as the Su- 


15In Luc., I, 8. 
16 De Trinit., VIII, 3, 4 (Haddan’s translation, p. 205). 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 247 


preme and Infinite Good, He is infinitely happy 
in the possession of His own Essence.” 


The attribute of twepayabdrns implies that the Highest 
Good is not merely primus inter pares, but that It is 
transcendental, and, therefore, beyond comparison with 
other things that are good, and related to them not as a 
part to the whole, but as 6 éy to py dv." 


b) It remains for us to consider God’s relative 
goodness. 


As the primordial, universal, and transcendental good, 
God possesses in a higher degree than any of His crea- 
tures the ability and desire to communicate Himselt 
to others, and to enrich them with perfections drawn 
from the plenitude of His own essential goodness. 
Himself overflowing with goodness, He causes His crea- 
tures to share it by freely endowing them with being.” 
This relative goodness (4. e., communicability) of God, 
may be traced in a fourfold direction, according as we 
make the exemplary, the efficient, the final, or the formal 
cause our point of departure. 


a) As exemplary cause, God is the ideal and 
the archetype of all created goodness. Created 
goodness, therefore, is merely a faint imitation 
of the abounding goodness of the Divine Es- 
sence. | 


SCs Time VE arson Bee sit in eo excellentissimo modo et 
kdp.ios — He who is the Blessed.’ propter hoc dicitur summum_ bo- 
18 Cfr. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 6, art. num.” 
2: “Cum bonum sit in Deo sicut 19 Cfr. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, 


in causa non univoca, oportet quod ** De. Deo,”. cap. 13.can. 5. 


248 ABSOLUTE GOODNESS 


Created things are consequently good only in so far 
as they resemble, and correspond to, the ideal good in 
God. If the mere possibles (7. e., things which never 
come into being) can be said to possess a species of 
goodness distinct from their exemplary cause — which 
some theologians misdoubt — they derive that ideal good- 
ness, as they derive their ideal being, solely from God, 
Who is the plenitude of goodness. 

8) As creative or efficient cause, God endows His 
creatures with all their (absolute and relative) good- 
ness at the same time that He gives them being. It 
is plain that from the hand of the Lord there can come 
forth nothing but what is good.?° Hence it is more than 
a mere phrase to say: “ All creatures are an emanation 
of God’s goodness.” 


y) God is the fints absolute ultimus of the 
whole created universe. He is the end of all 
things, because He is for all, including His 
rational creatures, “‘the highest, the most beau- 
tiful, the best good—a good that is worthy of 
all love and honor for its own sake” (swmmum 
bonum nobis). 


Lessius proves this as follows: “ Quod est summum 
bonum honunis, necessario est ultimus eius fins. Rur- 
sum quod est summum bonum hominis, in eo necesse 
est consistere eius beatiiudinem, quae nihil est aliud 
quam summi boni possessio. Summum bonum et ulti- 
mus finis dicitur et res ipsa, cuius possessione et fruitione 
beati sumus, et ipsa huius rei possessio et fruitio, 
Simili modo et beatitudo accipitur et pro ipsa re, cuius — 


20 Cfr. Gen. I, 31: ‘‘ And God saw all the things that he had made, 
and they were very good.” 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 249 


unione beati eficimur, et pro ipsa unione: illa a doc- 
toribus vocatur beatitudo objectiva, haec formals — 
That which is man’s highest good, must necessarily be 
also his last end. Again, man’s beatitude, which is 
nothing but possession of the supreme good, must be 
identical with the highest good attainable by him. We 
also call supreme good and last end that particular ob- 
ject by whose possession and fruition we are rendered 
happy, and the possession and fruition of that object 
itself. Similarly the word beatitude designates both the 
object by the possession of which we are made happy, 
and the state of possession or union itself; the former 
is called objective beatitude, the latter beatitude in the 
formal sense.” 2. As veracity and faithfulness consti- 
tute the formal motive of theological faith and hope, 
so the summum bonum is the formal motive of the- 
ological love (charity), and at the same time the founda- 
tion and corner-stone of ethics, morality, and asceticism. 
The terms final end, highest good, and beatitude, are 
furthermore organically related to a fourth, the glory 
of God (gloria, glorificatio), because the attainment of 
the final end, by the creature that is to be endowed 
with beatific vision, necessarily tends to the glorification 
of the summum bonum. Rom. XI, 36: “Ex ipso per 
ipsum et in ipso (cis avrdv—=in ipsum) sunt omma: 
ipsi gloria in saecula— For of him, and by him, and 
in him, are all things: to him be glory for ever.” ‘The 
Schoolmen teach with St. Thomas that God’s creatures 
tend to their final end, 7. e., seek Him as their highest 
good, by the very fact that they labor at their own 
perfection. By seeking their own end they seek God, 
though not all in the same manner, some being endowed 
with life, others not; some being irrational, others 


21 De Summo Bono, I, 1. 


17 


250 ABSOLUTE GOODNESS 


enjoying the use of reason. Thus all creation tends, 
either consciously or unconsciously, towards God. 
While His irrational creatures objectively manifest His 
glory by their very existence, those that have the use 
of reason are bound to glorify Him formally by know- 
ing Him, loving Him, and praising Him; and thus, by 
glorifying God, work out their final Hester 


8) God is not the formal cause of creatural 
goodness in the strict sense of the term, be- 
cause essential goodness, with respect to its 
formal content, is quite as incommunicable as 
Divine Being itself. 


Only from the Pantheistic point of view is it possi- 
ble to confound created goodness with the absolute 
goodness proper to the Creator, thereby merging the 
infinite essence in the finite, which reflects its splendor, 
though inadequately. But when we consider God’s 
supernatural manifestations and the graces with which 
He has whelmed mankind, we must conceive Him 
philosophically as their formal cause, because in the 
supernatural order God surrenders Himself so com- 
pletely to His creatures that created goodness be- 
comes merged as it were in His own absolute good- 
ness. By exaggerating this truth Christian mysticism 
has more than once verged dangerously near the abyss 
of Pantheism.?? Without in the least identifying the 
creature with God, St. Peter speaks of its formal par- 
ticipation in the divine nature,?* and the Fathers speak 
of a “ deification ”’ (Oeiwors, not drobéwors) of the creature. 
In this class belongs the threefold elevation of man 


22 Citi iS. Dheéol.,/ ta; qu. 6, art, 4. 
23 Cfr. 2 Petr. I, 4: ‘ divinae consortes naturae.” 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 251 


through supernal grace: (1) The Hypostatic Union as 
the personal communication of the Divine Logos to the 
humanity of Christ; (2) the state of sanctifying grace as 
the supernatural transfiguration of the soul, and (3) the 
beatific vision as the immersion of the soul in the life 
of truth and love enjoyed by the Most Holy Trinity.** 


READINGS: —Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 84.— Franzelin, 
De Deo Uno, thes. 29—Lessius, De Summo Bono, 1. 2; De 
Perfect. Div., 1. 7—S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 5-6 (Bonjoan- 
nes-Lescher, Compendium, pp. 15 sqq.).—L. Janssens, De Deo 
Uno, t. I, pp. 253 saq., Friburgi 1900.— Lépicier, De Deo Uno, 
t. I, pp. 221 sqq., 242 sqq., Parisiis 1902— Humphrey, “ His 
Divine Majesty,’ pp. 95 saa. 


ARTICLE 2 


GOD’S ETHICAL GOODNESS, OR SANCTITY 


t. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—Men attrib- 
ute sanctity (sanctitas) to those persons only who 
lead a life pleasing to God. The definition of 
sanctity varies according as we consider either 
its proximate or its more remote elements. 


a) To begin with the most common and most pal- 
pable notion, sanctity is freedom from sin, coupled with 
purity of morals.?* Both these notes, the positive and 
the negative, belong together; for a being that is merely 
free from sin, as, é. g., a child that has not yet arrived 
at the use of reason, cannot be called holy, at least not 

24 Cfr, 2 Cor. III, 18—Damas- wavdyabos Kal twepdyados xal 
cene sums up the dogmatic teach- dws Ov dyadés,” (De Fide Or- 
ing of the Church on the on- thod., IV, 4). 


tological goodness of God in this 25 “‘ Immunitas a peccato cum pu- 
terse sentence: ‘'‘O ayados Ka ritate morum coniuncta.” 


252 ETHICAL GOODNESS, OR SANCTITY 


in the full sense of the term, even after it has received 
the sacrament of Baptism. Akin to, and practically 
identical with, this definition is the classical one given 
by Pseudo-Dionysius: “ Sanctitas est ab omni. scelere 
libera et perfecta et prorsus immaculata puritas (ayidrys 
bev obv eotw 4 mavrds ayous éehevOépa kai mavreAns Kal mdvry 
axpavtos kafapdrys ).” 28 

b) If we enquire into the deeper reason for that im- 
munity from sin and purity of the will which sanctity 
implies, we shall find that both are conditioned by 
conformity of the will to the moral, which is ultimately 
the eternal law (lex aeterna). Hence sanctity can be 
genetically defined as the ethical equation between the 
will and the divine law of morals.27 Thus conceived, 
sanctity runs exactly parallel to logical truth, except in 
that it has an additional necessary element in persever- 
ance. A merely temporary “ equation,” i, e., the occa- 
sional performance of acts conforming to the moral law, 
does not make a man holy; to rise to the level of sanc- 
tity, moral goodness must be continuous, lasting, and 
based on principle.?8 

c) In its highest sense sanctity is charity or the love 
of God (amor Dei, caritas). For whoever loves God 
truly above all things, will live in accordance with His 
law and avoid sin. Obedience to the divine law here 
below has no other end than union with God in Heaven 
in inseparable love. Hence eternal beatitude, as the 
status in which man enjoys the love of God without 
danger of ever again losing it, represents the very high- 
est degree of sanctity.?° 


26 De Divin. Nomin., ce. 12. videtur importare: primo mundi- 
27“ Adaequatio voluntatis cum  tiam, secundo firmitatem.” 
lege aeterna.”’ 2901 dyiur=the Saints. Cfr. 


28 Cfr. S. Theol., 2-2ae, qu. 81, Lessius, De Perf. Divin., VIII, 1. 
art. 8: “ Nomen sanctitatis duo 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 253 


2. THE Docma.—The Church has condemned 
as heretical the teaching of Gottschalk, Scotus 
Eriugena, and Calvin, that God is the author 
of sin. “St quis dixerit, non esse im potestate 
hominis, vias suas malas facere, sed mala ita ut 
bona Deum operari, non permissione tantum, 
sed etiam proprie et per sé, . . . anathema sit— 
If any one saith that it is not in man’s power 
to make his ways evil, but that the works that 
are evil God worketh as well as those that 
are good, not permissibly only, but properly, 
and of Himself, ... let him be anathema.” *° 
The essential sanctity of the Most Holy Trinity, 
4. e., the Godhead, is also implied in the dogma 
which defines the personal holiness of the Holy 
Ghost. Scientific theology develops the dogma 
of God’s sanctity in a twofold manner, consid- 
ering it first by itself, and secondly in its relation 
_ to created sanctity. 

a) According to the Roig atonal ins defini- 
tion God’s sanctity is in the first place 

a) “Absolute immunity from sin, and 1im- 
maculate purity.” The first (negative) note 
not only implies that God does not sin (wm- 
peccantia), but also that He cannot sin (wm- 
peccabilitas). It is plain that there can be no 
dissonance in a Being Whose Will coincides 


30 Conc, Trident., Sess. VI, c. 6. 


254 ETHICAL GOODNESS, OR SANCTITY 


with His Essence. Therefore God’s love of — 
moral goodness is synonymous with infinite — 
hatred of sin (infinitum odium peccati). There — 
are many passages in Holy Writ which prove 
this... Deut.:, XXXII,\ 4, we “read: “Deus: fi 
delis et absque ulla iniquitate—God is faithful 
and without any iniquity.” ** Ps. V,5: “Thou 
art not a God that willest iniquity. . 

Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity; thou 
wilt destroy all that speak a lie.” *? The “mys- 
tery of iniquity” (Hvorhpiov dvopias), of which St. 
Paul speaks in 2 Thess. II, 7, does not consist 
in this that God wills iniquity, either as an end 
Or as a means to an end, but rather in that 
He permits it at all. But although He permits 
it, He hates sin; and the sole reason why He © 
permits it is that it is objectively better to per- 
mit it than to prevent it absolutely, in order — 
that the divine attributes of love, mercy, and 
justice may have their proper scope.—The 
_ other (positive) note of sanctity, viz.: immaculate 
purity, is frequently mentioned in Sacred Scrip- 
ture. Thus Ps. CXLIV, 17: “Justus Dominus 
in omnibus vits suis et sanctus in omnibus operibus 
suis—The Lord is just in all His ways, and holy 
in all His works.” Deserving of special mention 
is the famous “Trisagion,”’ Is. VI, 3: “Sera- 


81 Cfr. Rom. IX, 14. 
82 Cir. Ps. XLIV, 8: “Dilexisti iustitiam et odisti iniquitatem.” 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 255 


phim clamabant alter ad alterum et dicebant: 
Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus, Dominus Deus exer- 
cituum—The Seraphims ... cried one to an- 
other, and said: Holy, holy, holy, the Lord 
God of hosts.” ** In the Primitive Church the 
Trisagion was seldom sung except at solemn 
Mass; since the sixth century it concludes the 
daily Preface. On Good Friday the choir sings 
in Greek: ‘“Ayvwos 6 @eds, aywos icyupds, aytos abavaros, 
éhénoov jas—O holy God, holy and strong, holy 
and immortal, have mercy on us.” 

B) If sanctity in general is “the ethical equa- 
tion between the will and the moral law,” the 
sanctity of God, being essential to Him and 
deeply rooted in His divine nature, must be sub- 
stantial. For as the will of God is absolutely one 
with His Essence, from which flows the lex 
aeterna, God cannot acquire sanctity;** He 
must be holy by His very nature and in His 
proper Essence.* Nor is sanctity an ethical 
perfection superadded to the Divine Essence; °° 
it is absolutely identical with God’s Substance.*’ 
Therefore God 1s Sanctity in the same way in 
which He is Absolute Reason. Holy Scripture 
adumbrates this aseitarian character of sanctity 
when it calls God “the alone holy.” Job XV, 
15: “Ecce inter sanctos eius nemo immutabths, 


83 Cfr. Apoc. IV, 8. 86 Sanciitas accidentalis. 
84 Sanctitas participata s. ab alto. 87 Sanctitas substantialis. 
35 Sanctitas a se s. per essentiam, 


256 ETHICAL GOODNESS, OR SANCTITY 


et coelt [angel] non sunt mundi in conspectu a 


evus—Behold among his saints none is un- 
changeable, and the heavens [angels] are not 
pure in his sight.” 1 Kings Il, 2: “Non est 
sanctus, ut est Dominus—There is none holy 
as the Lord is.” Consequently God alone is holy 
as He “alone is good.” * 

7) We penetrate even more deeply into the 
nature of divine sanctity when we define it as 
“the essential love that God has for His own 
goodness.” As identity of being and thought, 
of cognoscibility and cognition in God entails the 
highest form of truth-life, 7. e., the most com- 
plete comprehension of His own Essence (com- 
prehensio sui), so absolute identity of being and 
willing, His amiability and His love, involves 
the highest form of volitional life, 7. ¢., substan- 
tial, living; subsisting sanctity.*® Hence it is 
that the intrinsic product of God’s notional un- 
derstanding is “Hypostatic Wisdom” (i. e., the 
Son of God, or Logos) while the intrinsic 
product of His notional volition and love is 
“Hypostatic Love” (i. e, the Holy Ghost). 
God's sanctity, conceived as charity, is the main- 
spring of His volitional life, just as wisdom is 
the mainspring of His living knowledge. In the 


388 Luke XVIII, 19: “None is  Nomin., c. 4): “Est Deus amor 
good but God alone.’ Cfr. Ps. bonus boni propter bonum (Eoeriy 
XXXVIII, 6. 6 Oceds Epws dyabds dyabod dia 

89 Cfr. the profound dictum of 7d dyabdy).” 
the Pseudo-Dionysius (De Divin. 


‘THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 257 


light of these truths we understand the principle 
of moral theology, that “Charity is the fulfilment 
of the whole law,” and that love of God (caritas) 
must be considered as the “soul” and “queen” 
of all virtues, and, consequently, as absolute 
sanctity. This deeper conception of the divine 
attribute of sanctity as an affective and effec- 
tive transformation of the infinitely Loving One 
into the infinitely Lovable Good—rather than as 
a merely “ethical equation’’—is of the highest 
importance in aiding us to understand the es- 
sence of sanctifying grace as well as the Third 
Person of the Most Holy Trinity.” 


b) In its relation to those creatures which are endowed 
with intellect (angels and men) the sanctity of God, 
like His relative (ontological) goodness, is fourfold. 
In the first place, God is the inaccessible ideal and ex- 
emplar (causa exemplaris) of all created sanctity, es- 
pecially in the supernatural life of faith and glory.“ 
Secondly, He is the fount (causa efficiens) of natural 
justice and of supernatural sanctity through “ sanctify- 
ing grace.’ The Sacraments also derive their sanctify- 
ing power ex opere operato from God’s sanctity, or, 
by appropriation, from the Holy Ghost. Thirdly, di- 
vine sanctity is the causa finalis of creatural sanctity, 
inasmuch as the latter constitutes the aptest and most 
excellent medium of the glorification of God.*? Lastly, 
the divine sanctity must be called the quasi-formal cause 

40 Cfr. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I am holy.” Cfr. I Pet. I, 15 sq. 
Lp 34. 42 Compare Math. VI, 9: ‘* Sanc- 


41 Lev. XI, 44: “For I am the fificetur nomen tuum — Hallowed 
Lord your God: be holy because be thy name,” with : Thess. IV, 3: 


258. ETHICAL (GOODNESS, (OR ISANCTITY 


(causa quasi formalis, sed non informans) of creatural 
sanctity, inasmuch as sanctifying grace inheres in the 
soul as a formal principle, as the Holy Ghost indwells 
personally in the just.* 


3. THE OBJECTIVE SANCTITY OF Gop.—The 
term sanctity is sometimes employed in a non-eth- 
‘ical sense, to denote the dignity, the inviolability, 
or the sacredness of a person or thing (augustum, 
sacrum, Sowv), | 


a) This objective sanctity, which is closely related to 
ontological goodness (bonum quod), may be attributed 
both to persons and things. But since it grows in pro- 
portion with dignity, it is in the very nature of -things 
greater in persons than in objects (objecta sacra, dow). 
Therefore the Schoolmen were wont to designate the 
angels as “hypostases cum dignitate.” Creatures en- 
dowed with intellect are persons, and therefore sui iuris, 
inviolable, venerable, and deserving of particular honor. 
It is for this reason that slavery is so damnable. It is 
in this sense, too, that the Pope is called “ His Holiness ” ; 
that an asylum, or the last will of a dying man, is 
termed “sacred,” Palestine “the Holy Land,” and so 
forth. These persons or objects are sacred or holy in 
so far as they are honorable, and venerable, and alto- 
gether inviolable. 

b) Manifestly God, Who is “the supreme Good” 
sans phrase, because of His infinite dignity must be 
absolutely honorable and venerable, and therefore objec- 
“ Haec est autem voluntas Dei, per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus 
sanctificatio vestra — For this is the est nobis— The. charity of God is 
will of God, your sanctification.” poured forth in our hearts, by the 


43 Cfr, Rom. V, 5: “Caritas Holy Ghost, who is given to us.” 
Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris sy 


” 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 259 


tively sacred or holy, both to Himself and to His crea- 
tures. In fact, He is the Absolute Majesty, any violation 
of which by blasphemy, sacrilege, or formal hatred, 1s 
an awful crime. As God, out of respect for Himself, 
must needs honor His own dignity and majesty (4. @., 
objective sanctity), so the merest self-respect also com- 
pels Him to demand that every rational creature should 
honor and respect His absolute dignity and majesty by 
paying Him the highest possible form of worship, 
viz.: divine adoration (adoratio, latria). Under this 
aspect God’s objective sanctity may be regarded as 
the formal motive of the virtus religionis.4* The Bible 
frequently alludes to this divine attribute, as when, e. 
g., it refers to God as ‘‘ the Holy One of Israel,” that is, 
He Whom the Israelites must venerate; or in those texts 
where the name of God is spoken of as “holy and ter- 
rible.” 4® Creatures derive their objective sanctity from 
God as their exemplary and efficient cause. The dig- 
nity of civil rulers is sacred and inviolable, because 
all authority comes from God. The Bible sometimes 
refers to prophets and kings as “gods” on account 
of the dignity they had received from the Almighty. 
We often refer to churches, vestments, pictures, relics, 
rosaries, etc., as sacred (in the objective sense of the 
term), because, and in so far as, they are consecrated 
by God and to His use.“ In the same manner among 
the Israelites the Ark of the Covenant was called 
“ Sanctum Sanctorum,’ the place where Moses beheld 
the burning bush, ‘holy land,” and so forth. 


44 Mazzella (De Virtutibus In- 45 Cfr. Ps. CX, 9: “ Sanctum et 
fusis, n. 45, 4th ed., Rome 1894),  terribile nomen eius.” 
holds a different view. Cfr. S. 46 Consecrare = sacrum reddere. 


Thom., S. Theol., 2 2ae, qu. 81, art. 
4 8q. : 


260 MORAL GOODNESS, OR BENEVOLENCE 


Reapincs: — Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. I, § 201.— 
Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, 8§ 99, 104 (summarized in Wilhelm- 
Scannell’s Manual, pp. 205 sq.).— Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 
348 sqq.— Lessius, De Perfect. Div., 1. VIII.—J. Stufler, S. J., 
Die Heiligkeit Gottes und der ewige Tod, Innsbruck 1904.— 
Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 304 sqq— Humphrey, “ His Di- 
vine Majesty,’ pp. 98 saqq. 


ARTICLE 3 


GOD’S MORAL GOODNESS, OR BENEVOLENCE 


1. DEFINITION OF MorAL Goopness.—As 
sanctity refers to the bonwm quod, so moral good- 
ness, or benevolence, is related to the bonum cut. 
The basic note of benevolence is a gratuitous 
love *7 which promotes the happiness of others — 


out of sheer kindliness. It follows that benevo- gq 
lence can be attributed only to intelligent, per- 


sonal beings, whilst the simple bonitas alteri s. 
relativa is predicable also of irrational things (e. 
g., the sun is good for terrestrial life). The 
contradictory of benevolence is malevolence 
(malevolentia), a disposition or inclination to in- 
jure others and to deprive them of their belong- 
ings. 7 
As a moral attribute, 7. e. a virtue inherent in 
the will, God’s benevolence corresponds to His 
veracity and faithfulness. Like veracity and 
faithfulness, benevolence cannot be detached from 
its ontological basis, . 


47 Amor gratuitus, benevolentia. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 261 


2, THE Docma.—The Vatican Council has de- 
fined God’s benevolence in these terms: “Hic 
solus verus Deus bonitate sua... ad manijes- 
tandam perfectionem suam per bona, quae crea- 
turis impertitur, liberrimo consilo . . . utram- 
que de nihilo condidit creaturam. . . . Universa 
vero, quae condidit, Deus providentia sua tuetur 
atque gubernat, attingens a fine usque ad tinem 
fortiter et disponens omnia suaviter—This one 
only true God, of His own goodness... to 
manifest His perfection by the blessings which 
He bestows on creatures, and with absolute free- 
dom of counsel . . . created out of nothing... 
both the spiritual and corporal creature.... 
God protects and governs by His Providence all 
things which He hath made, ‘reaching from end 
to end mightily, and ordering all things sweet- 
ly.’ 99 48 ) 


a) In extension and essence God’s benevolence may be 
characterized as “the firm will which He has, out of 
pure but free love to confer natural as well as super- 
natural benefits upon His creatures, according to the 
nature and final destiny of each.” Its root lies in His 
ontological goodness.*® Its motive is God’s gener- 
ous love for His creatures; whatever contravenes this 
love, rms counter to His Divine Nature. Hence the 

48 Conc. Vat., Sess. III, c. 1  fitate, propendet ad sui communio- 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, nem, sicut vas perfecte plenum ad 
n. 1783). effusionem sui liquoris.” (De Perf, 


49“ Ex eo enim,” says Lessius, Divin., VIII, 1.) 
“ quod res sit perfecta in sua en- 


262 MORAL GOODNESS, OR BENEVOLENCE 


Bible says simply: “Deus caritas est (‘O @eds ayamn 
éortv) — God is charity.” °° St. Ignatius of Antioch had 
a beautiful motto to this effect: “ Amor meus cruci- 
fixus est ("Epos éuds éoravpwra)— My Love is cruci- 
fied.” Pseudo-Dionysius, in calling God benevolent and 
generous “not deliberately and by choice, but by His 
very nature,” * did not mean to deny the freedom with 
which He dispenses His favors, but only to emphasize 
that it is not a matter of free choice with God either 
to be or not to be love. In virtue of this essential char- 
acteristic, Divine Love is creative; for, “ Amor Dei est 
infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.” °2 

b) Considering the attribute of divine benevolence in 
respect of its comprehension, we must say that it com- 
prises all created beings, rational and irrational. God 
is “the All-Good One,” His benevolence is universal. 
To begin with, all irrational creatures constantly receive 
innumerable favors at His hands. For not only does 
He give food to the young ravens,®* but He clothes the 
lilies of the field, and without His will not a sparrow 
falls from the roof. Therefore there exists no more 
beautiful formula for saying grace at table than Ps. 
CXLIV, 15 sq.: “ Oculi omnium in te sperant, Domine, 
et tu das escam illorum in tempore opportuno; aperis 
tu manum tuam et imples omne animal benedictione — 
The eyes of all hope in thee, O Lord, and thou givest 
them meat in due season. Thou openest thy hand, and 
fillest with blessing every living creature.” It is char- 
acteristic of Dante’s profundity of conception that he 


50: John IV, 16. Dogmatik, Vol. III, § 202, and Les- 
51 De Div. Nomin., c. 4. sius, De Perf. Divin., IX, 3. 
52S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 53 Ps, ‘CX LVI o, 

20, art. 2-—QOn the “eight quali- | 54 Math. VI, 28, A wer 


ties ” of benevolence, cfr. Scheeben, 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 263 


closes his Paradiso with the line: “ L’amor che muove 
il sole e Valtre stelle.” *° 

But nothing can equal God’s love for man, both as 
a species and as an individual. The free creation of 
the human race and its immediate elevation to the 
supernatural plane, was the first and fundamental proof 
of divine benevolence towards man. Cfr. Ps. VIiLI;.6: 
“ Minuisti eum paulo minus ab angelis, gloria et honore 
coronasti ewm— Thou hast made him a little less than 
the angels, thou hast crowned him with glory and 
honor.” Even after man had fallen, God’s benevolence 
did not fail him. The Lord “raineth upon the just 
and the unjust,”®* and showers blessings upon the 
idolatrous gentiles, “ benefaciens de coelo, dans pluvias 
et tempora fructifera, implens cibo et laetitia corda nos- 
tra — Doing good from heaven, giving rains and fruitful 
seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness.” °7 
The acme of His love for humankind is reached in 
the Incarnation, this mystery of love, in the light of which 
the “ mysterium iniquitatis ” literally pales into insignifi- 
cancé. John III, 16: “ For God so loved the world, 
as to give his only begotten Son.” In His Son He 
gave us the most precious thing He had. Rom. VIII, 
32: “He that spared not even his own BON eter Math 
he not also, with him, given us all things?” With 
kindly care He consults for each and every indi- 
vidual man. Cfr. Is. XLIX, 15 sq.: “Can a woman 
forget her infant, so as not to have pity on the son 
of her womb? And if she should forget, yet will not 
I forget thee. Behold, I have graven thee in my 


55 “ But yet the will roll’d onward, That moves the sun in heav’n 
~ like a wheel and all the stars.” 
In even motion, by the Love (Cary’s Translation.) 
impell’d 56 Math. V, 45. 


57 Acts XIV, 16. 


264 MORAL GOODNESS, OR BENEVOLENCE 


hands.” The history of Divine Providence is an elo- 
quent commentary on Wisdom XII, 1: “ Quam bonus 
et suavis est, Domine, spiritus tuus in omnibus — How — 
good and sweet is thy spirit, O Lord, in all things.” Such 
boundless love should elicit a strong and ardent affection 
in return. “Let us therefore love God, because God 
hath first loved us.” 58 


REApDINGs : ~ Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. III, § 202— 
Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 98.— *Lessius, De Perfect. Divin., 
1, IX.— St. Thomas, Contr. Gent., I, 91 (Rickaby, Of God and 
His Creatures, pp. 67 sq.).— Ipem, S. Theol., ta, qu. 20. 


581 John IV, 19. 


SECTION 5 


GOD AS ABSOLUTE BEAUTY 


1. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—The nature 
of beauty has been the subject of much contro- 
versy. The safest thing for the theologian to 
do is to adopt the Patristic, which is also the 
Scholastic, view. 


a) The “ Angel of the Schools” describes the beau- 
tiful thus: “ Pulchra sunt, quae visa placent — Those 
things are beautiful which please when seen.” * Hence, 
clearly, cesthetic pleasure or delectation is of the es- 
sence of beauty. But this definition is merely ex 
effectu, as was already observed by St. Augustine : 
“Non ideo pulchra sunt quia delectant, sed ideo de- 
lectant, quia pulchra sunt — Things are not beautiful be- 
cause they please, but they please because they are 
beautiful.” 2 To determine the essence of beauty we 
must therefore seek out the cause of esthetic pleasure. 
This cause, according to St. Augustine, is unity amid 
variety ®>—“ Unitas in multiplicitate,’ but so that unity 
is the determining element: “Ommis pulchritudinss 
forma unitas.’ *— Now, if unity is to give pure pleasure 
to the mind of him who contemplates it, the beautiful ob- 
ject must needs be visible and evident. A hidden or im- 


1S. Theol., 1a, qu. 5, art. 4, ad 1. 8 Unitas in multiplicitate.” 
2De Vera Relig., c. 32, TN. 59- 4S. August., Ep. 18 ad Coelestin. 


18 ce 


266 ABSOLUTE BEAUTY 


perceptible unity, could not be productive of zsthetic 
pleasure. St. Thomas® resolves the Augustinian con- 
cept of beauty into the following three essential ele- 
ments: completeness of the whole (perfectio rei), har- 
monious relation of its parts (proportio debita partium), 
and, shed over all, a certain definiteness, clearness, lustre 
or splendor (claritas). Claritas renders a beautiful — 
object visible to the mind; the proportio debita partium — 
is the basis of “unity in variety”; and the perfectio 
ret is the necessary foundation of both, because that 
which is imperfect lacks both proportion and clearness.® 

b) From what we have said it follows that beauty 
is essentially related to the intellect and will, and 
also to truth and goodness. Truth and goodness are _ 
linked together by the notion of ens, with which they 
are both convertible; but they are still more closely - 


bound up with the concept of beauty, because Beauty, as it | i 


were, draws with one hand from the well of truth, and 
with the other from the fountain of goodness. It holds 
the middle between truth and goodness, St. Augustine 
calls it “splendor veri —the brightness of reality,” 7 
while St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that between beauty 
and goodness there is only a logical distinction. A 
beautiful object must above all else be good (4. é., per- 
fect) in order to be able to elicit from the beholder 
pure love of complacency (amor complacentiae). But 


5S. Theol., 1a, qu. 39, art. 8. 

6 Cfr. John Rickaby, S. J., Gen- 
eral Metaphysics (Stonyhurst Se- 
ries), pp. 147 sqq. 

7 Cfr. Ch. Coppens, S, J., Eng- 
lish Rhetoric, pp. 98 sq., 3rd ed., 
New York 1887. 

8Cfr. S. Theol., 1-2ae, qu. 17, 
art. 1;).ad > 3% 
bono, sola ratione differens. Quum 
enim bonum sit, quod omnia appe- 


“ Pulchrum est idem — 


tunt, de ratione bont est, quod in 
eo quietetur appetitus. Sed ad ra- 
tionem pulchri pertinet, quod in 
eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur 
appetitus.... Et sic patet, 
pulchrum addit supra bonum quen- 
dam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam, 


tta quod bonum dicatur id quod 


simpliciter complacet appetitui, pul- 
chrum autem id cuius ipsa appre- 
hensio placet.” 


quod 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 267 


it must also be clear and evident, because if it lacked 
evidence, the mind could not easily perceive the con- 
formity and grouping of the various parts around the 
central point of unity. Whence follows the important 
deduction, that the intellect, and the intellect alone, 
perceives beauty; while the will, and the will alone, is 
the seat of zsthetic pleasure. Beauty, therefore, is a 
supra-sensual quality; and this holds true not only with 
regard to spiritual beings, such as God, the angels, and 
the soul, but also in respect of material objects, such as 
painting, sculpture, music, etc. The irrational brute may 
perceive a beautiful object, but it can not perceive its 
(intelligible) beauty. We may therefore define beauty 
with Kleutgen® as “rei bonitas, quatenus haec mente 
cognita delectat —The goodness of an object, in so far 
as this affords pleasure when perceived by the mind.” 

c) As beauty and goodness materially coincide, the 
former must be a transcendental attribute of being like 
the latter.1° In matter of fact the elements of beauty, 
1. €., perfection, harmonious proportion, and clearness, or 
splendor, are proper to all objects in the same manner 
in which being is proper to them."? 


' 2. DoGMATIC APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCI- 
PLES.—Though the Church has never defined it 
as of faith, yet Sacred Scripture and Tradition 
make it quite certain that beauty is an attribute of 


9 De Ipso Deo, p. 418. 

10 Cfr. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Div. 
Nomin., c. 4: “‘ Eorum quae sunt, 
nullum est quin pulchri et bont par- 
ticeps sit—-No thing exists but 
what partakes of beauty and good- 
ness.” 

11 On the subdivisions of beauty, 
sublimity, elegance, charm, etc., see 


Jungmann, S. J., Asthetik, 3rd ed., 
Vol. I, Freiburg 1886; G. Giet- 
mann, S, J., Allgemeine Asthetik, 
Freiburg 1899; John Rickaby, S. J., 
General Metaphysics, pp. 147 sq4q.3 
Chas. Coppens, S. J., English Rhet- 
oric, 3rd ed. pp. 98 sqq., New 
York 1887. 


268 ABSOLUTE BEAUTY 


God. Perhaps no divine attribute has been so 
generally neglected by theologians as this, owing 
probably to the circumstance that in the unsettled 
state of the science of zesthetics it was not easy to 
determine whether beauty should be classed as a 
“pure” or as a “mixed” perfection of the Divine 
Essence. We claim that it is a pure perfection; 
that the notion of pulchrum is formally predica- 
ble of God; that beauty in its formal sense is 
proper to God; that He is primordial beauty, all- 
beauty, and beautiful in a higher sense than any 
creature, and that, precisely for this reason, He 
is the exemplar and the cause of all created 
beauty. 


a) Reason tells us that God must be beautiful; for if 
He contains within His Essence the elements of beauty 
(perfection, harmonious proportion, and splendor), the 
attribute which necessarily results from these elements 
must also be His. Now, God is infinite perfection; His 
infinitely numerous good qualities (not parts) coalesce 
in His Divine Essence into a most intensive unity; and, 
finally, He is all light, and pure clarity, and conse- 
quently, He must be beautiful. The Book of Wisdom 
concludes from the beauty manifest in the physical 
universe that the Creator is transcendently beautiful. 
Wisdom XIII, 3 sq.: “ Quorum [i. e., ignis, coeli, solis, 
etc.] st specie [pulchritudine] delectati deos putaverunt, 
sciant quanto his dominator eorum speciosior [ pulchrior | 
est; specter enim generator (6 rod KdéAXovs yeveoidpxys ) 
haec omnia constituit — With whose beauty [viz., that 
of fire, the sun, etc.], if they, being delighted, took them 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 269 


to be gods: let them know how much the Lord of 
them is more beautiful than they: for the first author 
of beauty made all those things.” Scripture frequently 
compares the beauty of God to a garment wrapped about 
the Divine Essence. Cfr. Prov. XXXI, 25: “ Forti- 
tudo et decor indumentum eius — Strength and beauty 
are her clothing.” Ps, CIII, 1 sq.: “ Decorem induistt, 
amictus lumine sicut vestimento — Thou ... art clothed 
with light as with a garment.” Ecclesiasticus compares 
“Eternal Wisdom”? to the splendor of exquisite flowers, 
and calls it “mother of beautiful love.” In the Can- 
ticle of Canticles Divine Beauty appears in the guise of 
a charming bride-groom.'? With the exception of St. 
Augustine, who has written on the subject with his usual 
profundity, the Fathers seldom descant on this divine at- 
tribute. 

b) God is not only beautiful, He is the very essence 
of beauty (pulchritudo a se), just as He is essential 
truth and goodness. And in the same manner that He 
is true in virtue of being Himself the Truth, He is 
beautiful in virtue of being Himself Beauty, because 
beauty is His very Essence. This proposition is demon- 
strable as a theological conclusion from the three ele- 
ments of beauty: perfectio, proportio partium, claritas. 
God is infinite perfection itself.1* He is the subsisting 
monas, comprising within Himself all being,“* and He 
is light and splendor.1® Consequently, He is substantial, 
subsisting, aseitarian Beauty. This becomes still clearer 
if we apply to Him St. Augustine’s definition of beauty, 
vig.: “Unity in variety.” There can be no greater 
variety than that implied in God’s infinite perfections ; 


12 Cfr. Cant. Cantic., I, 15: 13 Supra, pp. 180 sqq. 
“Ecce tu pulcher es, dilecte mi, et 14 Supra, pp. 196 sqq. 
decorus — Behold thou art fair, my 15 Supra, pp. 225 Sqq. 


beloved, and comely.” 


270 ABSOLUTE BEAUTY. 

nor a more intensive unity than the identity of the 
Divine Essence with its attributes, Consequently the 
notion of beauty is realized in God absolutely ; and all 
the more perfectly as the element of multiplicity is 
not confined to the virtually distinct properties of the 
Divine Essence, but applies in an even higher degree 
to the real distinction of the Divine Persons. Abso- 
lute unity in real trinity must culminate in absolute 
beauty.16 ; 

Because God is Primordial Beauty, therefore He is 
All-Beauty, and excels every species of created beauty, 
as Nazianzen intimates when he says: “Who is all 
beauty and far beyond all beauty.”27 We will not re- 
hearse the utterances of Pseudo-Dionysius, who has 
written so sublimely on the beauty of God, because we 
know now that this supposed “ disciple of the Apos- 
tles,’ whom the Schoolmen held in such high esteem, 
was not the real Areopagite, but a Christian pupil of 
the Neo-Platonist philosopher Proclus (+ 485). The 
sooner theologians cease quoting Pseudo-Dionysius as 
an authority, the better. He can at most serve as a 
witness to Tradition such as it existed in the latter part 
of the fifth and in the early part of the sixth cen- 
tury.18 

c) How is Divine Beauty related to created beauty? 
Divine Beauty is the ideal and source of all created 
beauty, both in the spiritual and the material order. 


16 Why beauty is especially ap- 
propriated to the Logos, is ex- 
plained by St. Thomas, S. Theol., 
Tay Gi, FO atte Se 

17 Or. Theol., 2. Cfr. IpEm, De 
Virginit., cap. 11: “No one is so 
obtuse as to be unable to see that 
God alone is beauty kar’ efox7nr, 
in the original and exclusive sense.”? 

18 Cfr. H. Koch, Pseudo-Diony- 


sius Areopagita in seinen Beziehun- 
gen zum Neuplatonismus und My- 
sterienwesen, Mainz 1900. Also the 
article ‘‘ Dionysius, the Pseudo-Are- 
opagite,” in the Catholic Encyclo- 
pedia, Vol. V, pp. 13 sqq. and 
Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, pp. 
535 sqq. Freiburg and St. Louis 
1908. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 271 


With reference to Wisdom XIII, 3 sqq., St. Hilary 
teaches: “De magnitudine enim operum et pulchritu- 
dine creaturarum consequenter generationum conditor 
conspicitur. Magnorum Creator in maximis est, et pul- 
cherrimorum conditor in pulcherrimis.’ Augustine con- 
fesses: “Nulla extra te pulchra essent, nist essent abs 
te — No beautiful objects would exist outside of Thee, 
had they not received being from Thee,” *® and deplores 
his own defection from the Source of Beauty thus: 
“Sero te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova. 
... Et ecce intus eras, et ego forts, et ibi te quaere- 
bam et in ista formosa, quae fecisti, deformis trrue- 
bam — Too late have I loved Thee, O Beauty so an- 
cient, O Beauty so new, too late have I loved Thee! 
And behold Thou wast within, and I was abroad, and 
there I sought Thee, and deformed as I was, ran after 
those beauties which Thou hast made.” #° Unfortunately 
for himself, the great Bishop of Hippo had not fol- 
lowed the advice of St. Isidore of Seville,?* who urged 
that fallen man should use the beauties of creation 
as a ladder whereby to ascend to Primordial Beauty. 
God’s beauty is most splendidly reflected, not by the 
mineral, or the vegetable, or the animal kingdom, nor 
yet by the fine arts, but by the immortal soul of man, 
which presents a likeness and an image of Divine Beauty. 
Origen says: “The human soul is most beautiful; in 
fact, it possesses a beauty that is truly marvelous; for 
the Artist Who created it said: Let Us make man 
according to Our image and likeness. What can be 
more beautiful than such beauty and similitude?” ?? 
Let it be added, however, that the soul is capable of 

19 Confess., IV. 10. 22 Hom. in Ezech., 7. (See S. 


20 Confess., X, 27. - Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 3, art. 1 
21 De Summo Bono, I, 4. sqq.) 


272 ABSOLUTE BEAUTY 


various degrees of beauty according as it is consid- 
ered as the natural or the supernatural image of its 
Creator. The infusion of sanctifying grace, the forma- 
tion in the soul of the image of Christ, the immersion 
of the spirit into the beatific light of the Divine Sub- 
stance — produce in man a degree of beauty which 
no tongue can utter and no pen is able to describe? 
Therefore ascetic writers justly claim that the attain- 
ment of moral perfection is the noblest of all arts, and 
that no masterpiece of art can be compared to a holy 
soul. The most beautiful product of Divine Art is the 
Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of God, in whose person 
innumerable privileges and perfections are harmoniously 
blended. Jesus Christ Himself. (as Adyos évoapxos = the 
Word made Flesh) would have to be called the apex 
of creatural beauty, and therefore the most perfect 
image of Divine Beauty, were it not for the fact that 
we must admire in Him rather the Hypostatic Union 
of created with Uncreated Beauty. For in His Divine 
Nature Christ is Substantial Beauty, while created beauty 
shines forth in His human nature only.?4 


Closely related to beauty is the divine attribute 
of sublimity (sublimitas, peyadonpéxaa), which is 
rooted in God’s infinity, incomprehensibility, 
and omnipotence. Several of the Psalms de- 
scribe this attribute in language of imposing 


23 Cir. Scheeben, Die Herrliche Cfr. Clem, Alex., Strom., II, 5: 
keiten der géttlichen Gnade, 6th “ Redemptor noster... est vera 
ed. Freiburg 1897. pulchritudo, nam erat lux vera — 

24 Cfr. Ps. XLIV, 3: “‘ Speciosus Our Saviour ... is the true Beau- 
forma prae filiis hominum, diffusa ty, because He was the true Light.” 
est gratia in labiis tuis — Thou art On the whole subject, cfr. J. Sou- 
beautiful above the sons of men: ben, Les Manifestations du Beau 
grace is poured abroad in thy lips.” dans la Nature, Paris 1901. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 273 


grandeur, and the famous “Prayer of Habacuc’”’ 
is rightly reckoned among the gems of litera- 
ture; 


READINGS: — Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 85 (Wilhelm. 
Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 206 sqq.).—*Kleutgen, De Ipso 
Deo, pp. 417 sqq.— Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 30— Nierem- 
berg, Della Bellezza di Dio— Petavius, De Deo, VI, 8— 
Thomassin, De Deo, III, 19 sqq.— *Stentrup, De Deo Uno, cap. 
VII, Oeniponte 1895.— H. Krug, De Pulchritudine Divina, Fri- 
burgi 1902.— Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,” pp. 113 sqq., Lon- 
don 1897. 


25 Habacuc, Ch, III. 


CHAPTER II 


GOD’S CATEGORICAL ATTRIBUTES OF BEING 


The so-called categories (xeryyopia, praedica- 
menta) differ from the transcendental attributes 
of being in that they are not univocally predicable 
of all being, but of certain determined classes of 
being only. By reducing all concrete beings to 
their highest genera, Aristotle arrived at the ten 
so-called categories: substance (oteia) and the 
nine accidents (ovmBeByxdra) : quality (mov), quan- 
tity (mooev), relation (pés 7), place (mov), time 
(more), position or attitude (situs, xeioOu), habitus 
or external belongings (xe == potency and fac- 
ulties), action (7oeiv), and passion (7éoxew, pati). 
In entering upon the discussion of the remain- 
ing attributes of God, we base the theological 
teaching concerning them upon these summa 
genera essendt, 1. e, “the two all-embracing 
classes (substance and accident), to one or other 
of which all terrestrial things capable of being 
conceived in thought belong.” We do not, of 
course, mean to apply the predicaments to God 
in their strict sense—God is beyond and above 


1Cfr. Clarke, Logic, pp. 187 sqq., and the article ‘‘ Category ” in the 
Catholic Encyclopedia III, 433 sqq. 


274 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 275 


all categories of being—but we employ them 
merely as points of departure and development. 
“Relation” (7pés ™) is omitted here, because 
it plays its part chiefly in the doctrine of the 
Blessed Trinity, with which we are not specially 
concerned in this volume.? “Quality” and “habi- 
tus’ we have already done with. Hence there 
remain to be considered only two groups of 
categories: (1) “Substance”? and “action,” 
which by the method of affirmative differentia- 
tion give us the two positive attributes of 
absolute substantiality and omnipotence; (2) 
“Quantity,” “passion,” “time,” and “space,” (704 
and «eio6a), which by the method of negative 
differentiation yield the four negative attributes 
of incorporeity, unchangeableness, eternity, and 
omnipresence. Hence we shall divide this chap- 
ter into six sections. 


2Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trinity, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1915. 


SECTION: 1 


GOD’S ABSOLUTE SUBSTANTIALITY 


I, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—An accident 
by its very nature inheres in some other being as 
its subject (esse in alio); while substance, on 
the other hand, essentially connotes inseity (esse 
im se); 1. @., it essentially excludes the notion 
of a subject in which to inhere. “Substance is 
being, inasmuch as this being is by itself (per 
se);* accident is that whose being is to be in 
something else.” ? 


Inseity must not be confounded with aseity, and a 
sharp distinction must be drawn between ens a se and 
ens im se. It was because he confused these two no- 
tions, after the example of Descartes, that Spinoza fell 
into the error of teaching that there is but “one sub- 
stance” with two attributes, viz., spirituality and exten- 
sion.? While it is quite true that the ens in se, like 
the ens a se, is “an independent being,’ they differ 


1The Schoolmen, in order to accident, which exists in alio, or 


leave per se applicable to both un- 
created and created substance, have 
chosen a se to signify the special 
character of the former. <A_ sub- 
stance is that which exists per se, 
or which has its own proper be- 


ing (“id cut ratione sui convenit’ 


esse, cut competit esse non in 
alio’”’); and thus it is opposed to 


which at least naturally, whatever 
may happen preternaturally, has its 
being only by inherence in a sub- 
ject. Cfr. Rickaby, General Meta- 
physics, p. 253. 

2S. Thom., De Potentia, a. 7. 

8 Spinoza, Ethic., p. I, def. 3. 
Cfr. Descartes, De Princip., I, 5. 


276 


THE. DIVINE: ATTRIBUTES 277 


essentially. For, while the ens a se is independent not 
only of any subject in which to inhere, but likewise of 
all extrinsic factors, the ens in se (1. e., substance) 
has the first-mentioned kind of independence, but not 
the latter, except when it possesses at the same time 
aseity. Hence the ens in se, like the ens in alio (1. é., 
accident), may well be dependent upon an external 
cause; that is to say, there is nothing in its essence 
which would prevent it from being an ens ab alio, or 
a contingent being. 

The foregoing explanation makes it clear that the 
quiddity of “substance” does not lie primarily in its 
function of being the subject (tzoxeipevov) of accidents. 
On the contrary, substance is substance because it is 
formally esse im se, no matter whether there are ac- 
cidents or not (though, of course, de facto, no created 
substance can exist without accidents). If we thus 
eliminate its accessory function of furnishing a subject 
for accidents, “ substance”’ immediately becomes a sim- 
ple perfection predicable of God; while “ accident,’ by 
its very nature, can connote only a mixed perfection, 
inasmuch as, in the words of St. Anselm, it is manifestly 
“better not to be an accident than to be an accident.” * 


2. THE Docma.—lIt is an article of faith 
that God is a substance: “Una essentia, sub- 
stantia seu natura simplex omnino—One es- 
sence, an absolutely simple substance or nature.” ° 
“Una singularis . . . substantia—One sole. . . 


substance.”’ ® 


4Cfr. John Rickaby, S. J., Gen- K. Ludewig, Die Substangtheorie 

eral Metaphysics, pp. 245  8qq.3 bei Cartesius, Fulda 1893. 
K. Gutberlet, Allg. Metaphysik, 3rd 5 Conc. Lateran. IV, cap. “ Firmi- 
ed., Chapter III, § 1, Minster 1897; ter.” 
i 6 Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. 1. 


278 ABSOLUTE SUBSTANTIALITY 


a) The Scriptural proof for this dogma is 
based on God’s aseity, from which His substan- 
tiality must of necessity follow, because the ens a 
sé must necessarily also be ens in se; for, if the 
ens a sé (MMI) were a mere accident, it would 
be intrinsically dependent upon some other being 
as its subject, and consequently would not be ens 
ase. In virtue of its self-existence, therefore, 
the Divine Substance necessarily is substantia a 
sé, and admits of no accidents. It is consequently 
pure substance without depending upon accidents 
for any, even the slightest perfection. In this 
sense St. Augustine teaches: “Alia quae di- 
cuntur essentiae sive siubstantiae, capiunt acci- 
dentia, quibus in eis fiat vel magna vel quanta- 
cunque mutatio; Deo autem aliquid huiusmodi 
accidere non potest, ideo sola est incommunica- 
bilis substantia—Other things that are called 
essences or substances admit of accidents, where- 
by a change, whether great or small, is produced 
in them. But there can be no accident of this 
kind in respect of God; and therefore He is the 
only unchangeable substance or essence.” ? This 
is also the teaching of the Schoolmen. 


b) Inasmuch, however, as God, being their exemplary 
and efficient cause, comprises within Himself virtually 
or eminently all finite substances, we might also desig- 
nate Him as the universal substance (substantia univer- 


? De Trinit., V, 2, 3. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 279 


salis), were it not for the danger of a pantheistic mis- 
interpretation of this term. To preclude any such mis- 
understanding, theology has recourse to a twofold method. 
On the one hand it proclaims God as dvovows (not-sub- 
stance), while on the other it refers to Him as tmepovous 
(super-substance). God as ens a se is a substance in a 
different and higher sense than any creature. Hence 
odcta as a predicament cannot be applied to Him univo- 
cally, but only analogically, and we may truly say 
that He is not a substance in the sense in which the 
term is applied to creatures. On the other hand, how- 
ever, the concept of substance may be attributed to Him 
in a far deeper and truer meaning than to any creature, 
because He is 6 év, while they are py év; and from 
this point of view it is correct to call Him the Super- 
Substance, in the sense that He is indeed a true sub- 
stance, but one which utterly transcends all categories. 
This is the express teaching of the Fathers and also 
of Boéthius.® 


c) From the foregoing exposition flows an 
important corollary; namely, that the concepts 
_of “super-substance” and “non-substance’” pre- 
clude the possibility of any commingling or com- 
position of God’s Essence with the essence of 
the created universe. The Church, therefore, 
dealt Pantheism a fatal blow when it defined, 
through the Council of Chalcedon, that “Christ 
is in both natures, the divine and the human, 


8Cfr. De Trinit., c. 4: “Sub- Thomas in his Summa Contra Gen- 
stantia in illo non est vere sub- tiles, I, 25 (summarized by Rickaby, 
stantia, sed ultra substantiam.” Of God and His Creatures, pp. 19 
The teaching of the Schoolmen is _ sq.). 
most effectively set forth by St. 


280 ABSOLUTE SUBSTANTIALITY 


dovyxiros, drpéxros (inconfuse, immuutabiliter) ,” ® 
and through the Vatican Council: [Deus] “prae- 
dicandus est re et essentia a mundo distinctus 

- + et super omnia, quae praeter ipsum sunt et 
concipt possunt, ineffabiliter excelsus —[God] is 
to be declared as really and essentially distinct 
from the world. . . and ineffably exalted above 
all things which exist, or are conceivable, except 
Flimself.” © In the light of these definitions it 
is inconceivable that God should become part of 
some other substance, as the Pantheists allege, 
or that He should assume the rdle of “world- 
soulyi? 


9 Denzinger-Bannwarth, Enchiri- 
dion, n, 148, 

10 Ibid., n. 1782, 

11It belongs to Christology to 
show that the ‘‘ Hypostatic Union ” 
does not neutralize this dogma, but 
rather postulates it. For a more 
detailed explanation, consult Schee- 


ben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, $76; Hein- 
tich, Dogm. Theol., Vol. III, §173; 
Schwetz, Theol, Dogmat., Vol. I, 
§15s. They all treat this attribute 
in connection with divine unity, 
On the teaching of St. Thomas, cfr, 
L. Janssens, De Deo Uno, t. I, pp. 
214 8qq. Friburgi rg00, 


SECTION, 2 


GOD’S ABSOLUTE CAUSALITY, OR OMNIPOTENCE 


1, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—a) Power 
or potency (potentia activa, Sivas) in its active 
sense signifies “the ability to make something” 
(facere, mo«iv), Its contradictory is powerless- 
ness or impotency (impotentia). Ommipotence 
or almightiness, therefore, denotes God’s ability 
to make all things.! But this is merely a nomt- 
nal definition and does not reach the proper es- 
sence of Almightiness, because the term all as 
indefinite. Nor can this defect be cured by say- 
ing, as do several of the Fathers and not a few 
theologians, that “God can do whatever He 
wills’: because this proposition is liable to mis- 
interpretation—namely, that God’s omnipotence 
does not extend beyond His actual will, while 
in reality the Divine almightiness embraces also 
such things as are de facto not willed by God, 
though He could will them if He would.? While 
God’s omnipotence thus has a much wider 


1€fr. S. Augustin., De Trintt. vult, nihil autem vult, quod non 
IV, 7: “ Omnipotens est, Qui om- potest — God can do many things 
nia potest.” which He does not actually will; 

2Cfr. S. Augustin., Enchir., c¢. but He wills nothing that it is not 
95: “Multa potest Deus et non in His power to do.” 


281 
19 : 


282 OMNIPOTENCE 


range than His actual volition, inasmuch as He 
can do whatever He can will, it is limited, on 
the other hand, by an insuperable barrier, in that 
God can neither will nor do that which js in- 
trinsically impossible. When the Calvinist Vor- 
stius undertook to include the impossible within 
the concept of divine omnipotence, he failed to 
see that to exclude the impossible does not limit 
but rather perfects God’s almightiness, as Hugh 
of St. Victor explains: “Deus omnia potest 
quae posse potentia est, et ideo vere omnipotens 
est, quia wmpotens esse non potest.” 3 


b) Theologians specify five classes of things which 
God cannot do because they are impossible. We have 
in the first place to exclude from the concept “ all 
things ” such contradictions as are involved in a square 
circle, a created ens a sé, a dual God, and the like. 
All such notions embody mutually exclusive notes, and 
therefore can denote no other object than “ pure noth- 
ing,” and it is therefore plain that by their very na- 
ture they cannot be included in the concept of almighti- 
ness. This concept, consequently, includes only what 
is intrinsically possible. In the second place there is 
the impossibility of making past things undone, e. Ts 
to delete the events recorded by history, or to “turn 
back the wheel of time.” “ Audenter loquar,” says St. 
Jerome,* “cum omnia possit Deus, suscitare virginem 
post ruinam non potest —I make bold to affirm that, 
though God is omnipotent, He cannot restore virginity 
once it has been destroyed.” For, as Kleutgen poign- 


3 De Sacram., I, 2, 22. 4 Ep. 22 ad Eustoch. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 283 


antly argues, “ Facta infecta facere perinde est atque 
facere, ut eadem sint et non sint, quod repugnat — To 
make a fact undone would be tantamount to making a 
thing to be and not to be, which is a contradiction.” ° 
Nor, in the third place, can God commit sin, because 
to sin implies not “facere’ but “ deficere,’ that 1s, 
a lack of perfection in action, which would annul His 
omnipotence.® Generally speaking, God can do nothing 
which would contradict His Essence or His attributes ; 
e. g., to change His substance, to die, or to move from 
place to place; for by any such action He would destroy 
Himself, and therefore also His omnipotence.’ Because 
of His unchangeableness God cannot revoke what He 
has once freely decreed,— such decisions, for instance, 
as to create a visible world, to redeem the human 
race, to permit Christ to die on the cross, ete.— though 
it is possible, of course, that some other Economy 
different from the present might be governed by en- 
tirely different divine decrees. The latter, therefore, in 
the language of the Schoolmen, are possible only po- 
tentid absoluta, not potentia@ ordinariad s, ordinata.® 


c) Omnipotence may consequently be defined 
as God’s power to do whatever He can will, in 
as far as it is not repugnant to His Essence. 
The moot question whether omnipotence as an 


5 De Ipso Deo, p. 384. 

6 Cfr. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 25, art. 
3: ‘Peccare est posse deficere in 
agendo, quod repugnat omnipoten- 
tiae.”’ 

1 Cfr. S. Augustin., 
Symbol. ad Catech., 1: “ Deus om- 
nipotens, et cum sit ommnipotens, 
mori non potest, falli non potest, 
mentiri non potest, et quod ait 
Apostolus, seipsum negare non po- 


Serm. de 


test. Et ideo omnipotens est, quia 
ista non potest—God is omnipo- 
tent, and- because He is omnipo- 
tent, He cannot die, or err, or lie, 
and, in the words of the Apostle 
(2 Tim. II, 13), He ‘cannot deny 
Himself” And He is omnipotent 
precisely for the reason that He 
cannot do these things.” 

SCirenS.. Lheol, ta, qu.25, att. 
Sa LS 


284 OMNIPOTENCE 


attribute is distinct from the intellect and the 
will of God,® or whether it coincides with the 
will (7%. e@., the practical knowledge of God), 
is of no dogmatic importance. We follow 
Scheeben in conceiving omnipotence as an at- 
tribute of being, not of divine life; for it is per 
sé a quiescent attribute. 

2. THE Docma oF Gop’s OMNIPOTENCE.— 
That God is almighty is a dogma affirmed by all 
the creeds. “Credo in Deum Patrem ommnipoten- 
tem—I believe in God, the Father almighty,” says 
the Apostles’. Creed: 4 The: Fourth Council of 
the Lateran defines: “Deus... omntpotens 
Goel’... is’ “almighty?  Abélard’s prop- 
osition: “Quod ea solummodo possit Deus 
facere vel dimittere, vel eo tantum modo vel eo 
tempore, quo facit et non alio,’ was condemned 
as heretical by Innocent IT, A. D. 1 ie 

a) Omnipotence may be called a standing at- 
tribute of God; for the Bible employs the epithet 
“omnipotens’ more than seventy times. The 
divine might is also the fundamental significa- 
tion of such names as ON, and especially ‘IW 5x. 
The way in which Holy Scripture paraphrases 
this attribute shows how we are to conceive it. 
Jobe Lin, a: “Scio, quia omnia potes—I 
know that thou canst do all things.” Mark 


9 Cfr.-S;' Thom.; 1. ci: “ Intel: 10 Conc. Lateran. IV, c. 1. 
ligentia dirigit, voluntas imperat, po- 11 Denzinger-Bannwarth, Enchiri- 
tentia exequitur.” dion, n. 374. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 285 


XXXVI, 14: “Father, to thee all things are 
possible.” Luke I, 37: “No word shall be im- 
possible with God.” Matth. XIX, 26: “With 
men this is impossible: but with God all things 
are possible.’ Christ Himself tells us that the 
divine power is not limited to the things that 
actually exist. “God is able of these stones to 
raise up children to Abraham.” ** Again, 
“Thinkest thou that I cannot ask my Father, 
and he will give me presently more than twelve 
legions of angels?” *® 


According to the Scriptures God’s omnipotence is 
self-existing power (potentia a se) which exceeds every 
other power. 1 Tim. VI, 15 sq.: “Solus potens 
... gui solus habet immortalitatem.’ That is to say: 
as God “alone” has immortality, because He alone is 
self-existing, i. e., has His existence a se; so, too, He 
alone is almighty, because His might is not derived 
from any extraneous being. His power exceeds all 
other power because of the sublime manner in which 
it sets itself in motion and operates by a mere com- 
mand of the Divine Will. God wills, and the thing 
is; He calls, and things are there.* A power which, 
by merely commanding, is able to summon into exist- 
ence beings both natural and supernatural, must be an 
infinite power. Therefore miracles, being the faithful 
exponents of an infinite potency, are called in Holy 
Scripture “virtutes” or “ magnalia Det.” *° 

12 Matth. ITI, 9. - et creata sunt — He spoke, and they 

13 Matth. XXVI, 53. were made: he commanded, and 


14 Cfr. Ps. CXLVIII, 5: “Ipse they were created.” 
dixit et facta sunt, ipse mandavit 15 Advamers ; Hebrew j4333- 


286 OMNIPOTENCE 


b) The Tradition concerning this divine at- 
tribute dates back, as the ‘Apostles’ Creed’ 
bears witness, to the Primitive Church, Origen 
testifies to its Apostolic character when he Writes: 
“We confess that God is incorporeal and al- 
mighty and invisible.” 2% St, Augustine proves 
that the belief in God’s omnipotence was uni- 
versal in his day.'’ St. Chrysostom character- 
izes this attribute as infinite power, exceeding 
every other power, when he says: “Asa painter 
who has painted a picture is able to make an 
unlimited number of copies thereof, so it would 
have been easy for God to create innumerable 
worlds.” ** It is for this reason that omnipo- 
tence ranks among the incommunicable attri- 
butes of God, in which, even by favor of divine 
grace, no creature can share.?® 


3. OMNIPOTENCE as Universal Dominion.— Do- 
minion, being “ power over persons and things,” 2° is not 
identical with potency or might in the sense of “ ability 
to do something.” Similarly, God’s universal dominion 
must be distinguished from His omnipotence, as an 
effect from its cause. God’s universal dominion over 
His whole creation is based primarily upon His om- 
nipotence as the Creator of all things. The Latin 


16 Hom. in Gen., 3. 


worshipper of idols who will not 
17“ Non dico, da mihi Chris- 


admit that God is omnipotent.” 


tianum, da mihi Judaeum, sed da 
miht idolorum cultorem, qui non 
dicat Deum esse omnipotentem — 
Show me, I do not say a Christian 
or a Jew, but show me a pagan 


Serm. de Temp., 240, 'C.. 2, 

18 In zt Cor., Hom. 17. 

19 Cfr. S. Thom., Contr. Gent., 
ET 2x: 

20 Potentia = potestas, Kparos, 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 287 


term “ ommnipotens” ?* emphasizes His creative power, 
while the Greek term “ zavroxpdtwp” chiefly brings out 
His universal dominion.2? To this distinction between 
the two notions corresponds a contradistinction be- 
tween omnipotence and impotence (impotentia) on the 
one hand, and the two different species of dominion, 
vig.: subjection (subiectio) and passive ownership 
(proprietas) on the other. God’s universal dominion 
comprises the two parallel elements of jurisdiction 
(dominium iurisdictionis) and divine proprietorship 
(dominium proprietatis). Both are important enough 
to warrant us to devote a page or two to their dis- 
cussion. | 

a) Jurisdiction comprises five functions: (1) to 
command; (2) to prohibit; (3) to permit; (4) to 
punish, and (5) to reward. God is entitled to ex- 
ercise all of these functions to their fullest extent by 
the very fact that He is the “Lord” (Dominus, 6 
xipws, ‘YIN) and the “King of kings and Lord of 
lords” (Rex regum et Dominus dominantium). The 
Bible draws a well-defined distinction between absolute 
sovereignty and omnipotence proper. Ecclus, I, 8: 
“ Unus est altissimus, creator omnipotens et rex potens 
et metuendus nimis, sedens super thronum illius et 
dominans Deus — There is one most high Creator Al- 
mighty, and a powerful king, and greatly to be feared, 
who sitteth upon his throne, and is the God of dominion.” 
The extent of His sovereignty is brought out in the 
famous prayer of Esther:?8 “ Domine Rex omnipotens, 
in ditione enim tua cuncta sunt posita et non est, qui 
possit tuae resistere voluntati—O Lord, Lord, al- 

21 Cfr. Wisd. XVIII, 15: “wav. mwdvtwv Kparav — He is the al- 
Todvvapos,”” mighty sovereign of all sovereigns.” 


22 Cfr. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, 23 Esth. XIII, 9. 
Catech., 8: “ ravroxpatwp éotly 6 


288 OMNIPOTENCE 


mighty king, for all things are in thy power, and there 
is none that can resist thy will;” and still more 
pointedly in the Apocalypse of St. John: “Omnem 
creaturam, quae im coelo est et super terram et sub terra 
et quae sunt in mari, omnes audivi dicentes: Sedenti 
in throno et Agno [scil. Christo] benedictio et honor 
et gloria et potestas (xpdros) in saecula saeculorum — 
And every creature, which is in heaven, and on the 
earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, 
and all that are in them: I heard all saying: To him 
that sitteth on the throne, and to the Lamb, benediction, 
and honor, and glory, and power, for ever and ever.” 24 
God’s sovereign dominion is unlimited both with re- 
gard to place and time. Ps. CXLIV, 13: “Regnum 
tuum regnum omnium saeculorum — Thy kingdom is a 
kingdom of all ages.” St. Paul 2® refers to God as the 
“King of ages.” 2¢ 
Lessius *? gives a vivid description of the “ descent 
of all jurisdiction” (descensus omnis iurisdictionis) 
from Heaven to earth. All secular sovereignty, as well 
as all spiritual jurisdiction, descends from God, the uni- 
versal Lord, to the various rational creatures whom 
He permits to share in His authority. So that a king 
in his kingdom, and a president in the republic over 
which he presides, exercise their powers only by virtue 
of a certain limited participation in the overlordship of 
God.** In the supernatural order the divine sovereignty 
descends from the Most Holy Trinity upon the sacred 
humanity of Christ, thence to His immediate representa- 
24 Apoc. V, 13. 27 De Perfect. Div., X, 2. 
251 Tim. I, 17. 28 Cfr, Rom. XIII, 1: “Og yap 
26 Bacite’s Tey aléovwy.— For eer éfovala, ef wh brd Ocod — 


the teaching of the Fathers on this For there is no power but from 
topic, consult Petavius, 1. c. God.” 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 289 


tive, the Roman Pontiff, and from him to the bishops 
and priests.?° 

b) The second note of universal dominion, the right 
of ownership (dominium proprietatis), belongs to God 
in a manner in which it cannot be claimed by even 
the most exalted earthly sovereign, because God is the 
absolute owner not only of the material universe, but 
also of the spiritual world and the entire human race. 
Strictly speaking there is no ownership in persons ex- 
cept that vested in God. All men are by nature 
“servants of God.” 8° Theologians distinguish a four- 
fold title of divine ownership: (1) that of creation; ** 
(2) that of preservation;*? (3) that of redemption, 
which is the most important of all, and may again 
be subdivided into the right which the victor in battle 
has over the vanquished,** the right of a buyer to that 
which he has bought,°4 the right to indemnification ; 
(4) the title of the final end, which bends all cre- 
ation under the yoke of the Creator.** The right by 
which man claims ownership in things movable and im- 
movable, is a mere emanation from the divine superright, 
just as all earthly jurisdiction, civil and spiritual, derives 
from the universal jurisdiction of God. Whence it is 


20Cfr.. Math, XXVIII, 18% 
“Data est mihi omnis potestas in 
coelo et in terra— All power is 
given to me in heaven and in 
earth.” 

30 Cfr. Ps. XXIII, 1: “ Domini 
est terra et plenitudo eius, orbis 
terrarum et universi, qui habtitant 
in eo—The earth is the Lord’s 
and the fulness thereof: the world, 
and all they that dwell therein.” 

BiGiric sth X LEDS ro rsass nt he 
fecisti coelum et terram et quidquid 
coeli ambiiu continetur: Dominus 
omnium es—Thou hast made 
heaven and earth, and all things 


that are under the cope of heaven: 
Thou art the Lord of all.” 

$2 (Cirawvilebrey te enis pépwy Te 
TA TAYTA TH pNuate THS Svvdmews 
avrov — Upholding all things by 
the word of his power.” 

$8;Cir, Ps, (LX VIL). 19, 

34 Cfr. 1 Cor. VI, 20. 

35 Cfr. Prov. XVI, 4: “ Universa 
propter semetipsum operatus est 
Dominus, impium quoque ad diem 
malum—The Lord hath made all 
things for himself: the wicked also 
for the evil day.” For the teaching 
of the Fathers, consult Lessius, 1. c. 


290 OMNIPOTENCE 


plain that the idea of ownership developed in the law 
of the Germanic nations is far more in harmony with 
the spirit of Divine Revelation than that embodied in 
the Roman pandects. ; 


Reapincs:—*S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu.. 25.— IpeM, Contr. 
Gent., II, 7 sqq. (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 80 
sqq.).— Suarez, De Deo, III, 9.— Petavius, De Deo, V, 69.— 
Lessius, De Perfect. Divin., 1. V.— Schecben, “Dogmatik, Vol. 
I, § 87 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 208 sqq.).— 
*Stentrup, De Deo Uno, thes. 52 sqq.— Boedder, Natural The- 
ology, pp. 319 sqq. 


SECTION 3 


GOD’S INCORPOREITY 


Although incorporeity is included in the 
divine attributes of invisibility and simplicity,* 
the sources of revelation and the history of dogma 
compel us to treat it separately. God’s imma- 
teriality (conceived as the negation of quantum, 
moody), can be traced through four stages, which 
we shall describe in the subjoined series of sys- 
tematic theses. 


Thesis I: God is not a body. 

This proposition embodies an article of faith. 

Proof. None but adherents of the crudest 
form of Materialism would assert that God is 
corporeal. This teaching flatly contradicts the 
concept of absolute being (ens a se). For, 
as Gregory of Nazianzus argues,” the Absolute 
cannot possibly be conceived as something dis- 
soluble into parts and, therefore, perishable like 
matter. Moreover, sense is superior to matter, 
and spirit is superior to sense. St. Thomas con- 
cludes that if God were corporeal, He would not 


1 Supra, pp. 82 sad i 2 Oniisas 
2g! 


292 INCORPOREITY 


be the first and greatest Being.? Finally, the 
Absolute must be “actus purus,” that is to say, 
immaterial, pure actuality, without any admix- 
ture of potentiality.* Consequently God cannot 
be matter, nor of the nature of matter.® 


Thesis II: God has no body. 


This is also of faith. 

Proof. The heresy opposed to this dogma 
was championed by the pagan Epicureans,® by 
the so-called Audians of the fourth century (ad- 
herents of the monastic founder Audius), and 
somewhat later by certain Egyptian monks called 
Anthropomorphites,’ who were involved in the 
Origenistic controversy and imagined that, like 
man, the Godhead was a compound of soul and 
body. The Church has always looked upon this 
error as heretical. 


3° Si igitur Deus est corpus, non is any way in potentiality has 
erit primum et maximum ens.” something else prior to it. But 
Conir. Gent. I, 20. (Rickaby, Of God is the First Being and the 


God and His Creatures, p. 16). 
4The use of the word “ poten- 


tiality ’ in this sense may sound 


harsh in English, but no other 
term is available. Fr.  Rickaby 
translates Ch. XVI, No. 2 of the 
Summa Contra Gentiles thus: ‘* Al- 
though in order of time that which 
is sometimes in potentiality, some- 
times in actuality, is in potentiality 
before it is in actuality, yet, abso- 
lutely speaking, actuality is prior 
to potentiality, because potentiality 
does not bring itself into actuality 
but is brought into actuality by 
something which is already in 
actuality. Everything therefore that 


First Cause, and therefore has not 
in Himself any admixture of po- 
tentiality.’” “To be in actuality,” 
as Fr. Rickaby points out in a note 
(ibid.), is something akin to the 
modern conception of “ energy.”— 
(See also the article ‘* Actus 
Purus” in Vol. I of the Catholic 
Encyclopedia, pp. 125 sq.) 

5 For the teaching of the Fathers 
on this point, see Petavius, De 
Deo Taian 

6 Cir, Cicero, De Nat. Deor., I, 
17. 
7 Cfr. J. J. Fox in the Catholic 
Encyclopedia, Vol. I, p. 559. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 293 


a) The Bible teaches that God is absolutely 
invisible after the manner of pure spirits. Cfr. 
Job X, 4: “Hast thou eyes of flesh; or shalt 
thou see as man seeth?” Upon this fact is based 
the impossibility of picturing God, so often in- 
sisted on in the Old Testament. It is only the 
material which can be pictured; hence that which 
cannot be pictured must be absolutely immaterial, 
and therefore incorporeal. 

b) The argument from Tradition presents 
some difficulty. While there can be no doubt 
that the majority of the Fathers adhered strictly 
to this dogma, modern critics question the or- 
thodoxy of such eminent writers as Melito of 
Sardes,® Tertullian, and Epiphanius. 


The accusation against Melito is based upon a pas- 
sage in Theodoretus,® in which the Bishop of Sardes 
is charged with writing an essay in defence of the cor- 
poreity of God. However, this seems to be a misun- 
derstanding. Melito published. a treatise, now lost, en- 
titled “Ilept rod évowpdrov @eoi,” but it is safe to assume 
that it dealt solely with the Incarnation of the Logos. 
St. Epiphanius was suspected of heresy on account of 
the excessive indulgence which he showed to the An- 
thropomorphites; but he expressly refuted their erro- 
neous teaching.?° Here is St. Augustine’s account of the 
matter: “ Audianos, quos appellant, alu vocant An- 
thropomorphitas, quoniam Deum sibi fingunt cogitatione 

8 Died about 195. Cfr. Barden: 9 Cfr. Origen., Quaest. 2 in Gen. 


hewer-Shahan, Patrology, pp. 6a sq. 10 Epiph., Haer., 70. 
Freiburg and St. Louis 1908. 


204 INCORPOREITY 


cirnali in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis, 
quod rusticitati eorum tribuit Epiphanius, parcens eis 
ne dicantur haeretici.”** Our greatest stumbling-block 
is Tertullian, whom modern writers on the history of 
philosophy class with such Materialists as Thales, 
Anaximenes, and Democritus. It is not an easy task 
to clear his skirts. On the one hand, Tertullian defends 
a crassly materialistic Traducianism,!? and asserts the 
‘soul to Pe material; ** nay, he even lays down the prin- 
ciple: “Quis enim negabit, Deum corpus esse, etst 
Deus spiritus sit? S piritus enim corpus sui generis 
in sua efigie — For who will deny that God is a body, 
although God is a spirit? For spirit has a bodily sub- 
stance of its own kind, in its own form.”?4 On the 
other hand, we see him stoutly championing the ortho- 
dox doctrine, for he defends the indivisibility of God ¥® 
against Hermogenes, and rejects the suggestion of cor- 
poreal generation in God by retorting: “ Nam et Deus 
spiritus est — For God, too, is a spirit.”2® Tertullian 
in this matter is a psychological enigma, a man seem- 
ingly with two souls, a bundle of irreconcilable con- 
tradictions. It is perhaps fair to assume that, in de- 
fending the reality of the substance of the soul and 
of the Divine Essence against the Stoics and the 
Gnostics,* he employed the term “corpus” (as the 
Stoics employed cdya), in the sense of concrete, real, 
compact, substantial being, as opposed to formless air, 
or nothing. “Potuit propterea putari corpus Deum 
dicere,” in the words of St. Augustine,!® “ quia non est 


11 Haeres., 50, 14\Conira Prasz.,.c. 7. Cfr. De 
12 Cfr. S. Augustin., De Anima Resurrect. Carnis, c. 17 and De 
et eius Origine, c. 4. Anima, c. 5. 
13 Cfr, Tertull., De Carne Christi, 15 Adv. Hermogen., ad 2. 
c. 11: “ Omne quod est, corpus 16 Apol., 21 
est sui generis; nihil est incorporale 17 Adv. Hermogen., 35. 


nisi quod non est.” 18 De Haer., c. 86. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 205 


nihil, non est inanitas.’ At any rate, Tertullian’s in- 
decision cannot reasonably be alleged as an argument 
either for or against the incorporeity of God. The 
dogma can be proved from Tradition without him.” 


_ Thesis III: God is a pure Spirit. 
This is likewise de fide. 

Proof. The Vatican Council defines: “Deus 
. una singularis, simplex omnino et mcom- 
mutabilis substantia spiritualis—God .. . is 
one, sole, absolutely simple and immutable spir- 
itual substance.” 2° This truth flows as a cor- 
ollary from our two preceding theses; for if God 
neither is a body, nor has a body, He must 
be a pure spirit. It is furthermore clearly con- 
firmed by the Saviour’s own words to the Samar- 
itan woman, John IV, 20 sqq. After explaining 
that the Samaritans will “neither on this moun- 
tain, nor in Jerusalem, adore the Father,’ He 
continues: “But the hour cometh, and now is,?* 
when the true adorers shall adore the Father in 
spirit and in truth??...God is a spirit,” 
and they that adore him, must adore him in 
spirit, and in truth.” ** It is plain from the con- 
text that Christ here does not mean to oppose 
internal to external worship (as if internal wor- 
ship were alone sufficient) ; but that, replying to 


19 Cfr. G. Esser, Die Seelenlehre 22 éy mveduare Kal ddnbelg, 
Tertullians, Paderborn 1893. 23 rvevpa 6 Oeds, 
20 Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, c. 1. 24John IV, 23 sq. 


21 kal viv éorwy, 


296 INCORPOREITY 


the query in the sense in which the woman had 
put it, He wishes to accentuate the spiritual 
character of the New Testament worship as op- 
posed to the corporeal worship in the Old; for 
the internal, invisible, spiritual worship of the 
New, is the antithesis of the external, visible, 
ceremonial law of the Old Testament. Now this 
“spiritual” and “true” worship is due to (God ) 
the Father, because He is a spirit. Surely, there- 
fore, since the supernatural life by faith, hope, 
and charity is a purely immaterial and spiritual 
life, God Himself, being the object of such wor- 
ship, must be a pure spirit, an immaterial be- 
ing”? 


Thesis IV: God is the Absolute Spirit. 

This is also de fide. | 

Proof. By “absolute spirit” we understand an in- 
finitely perfect, self-existing, metaphysically simple 
spiritual substance, in which cognition and truth, voli- 
tion and goodness are identical. Now God, as we 
have shown, is “ Absolute Intelligence,” that is, Sub- 
sisting Truth. He is furthermore Absolute Goodness 
and Sanctity — attributes which coincide with His love 
of Himself as the Supreme Good. Therefore, God is 
not only a spirit but the Absolute Spirit. He is more- 
over the Creator of Angels and spiritual souls; as such 
He must be infinite in power and consequently abso- 
lute also in His spirituality. Again, the existence of 
the Holy Ghost in the Godhead postulates Infinite 


25 Cfr, especially Franzelin, De III, 17: “'Q 88 KUptos TO mvetud 
Deo Uno, thes. 35.—Cfr. 2 Cor. éoriv — The Lord is a Spirit.” 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 297 


Spirituality, in as far as the nature of the Holy Spirit 
is none other than the Divine Essence. Lastly, it is 
only in an infinitely spiritual Being that a real Trinity 
of Persons is possible.”® 


ReApiIncs: — Heinrich, Dogmat. Theol., Vol. III, § 172— 
Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 135 sqq.— Franzelin, De Deo Uno, 
thes. 35.— Oswald, Dogmatische Theologie, I, 2, § 6.— Lépicier, 
De Deo Uno, pp. 152 sqq., Paris 1902.—Rickaby, Of God and 
His Creatures, pp. 15-16. 


26 Cfr, on the whole subject J. und thre modernen Gegner, pp. 34 
Uhlmann, Die Persinlichkeit Gottes sqq., Freiburg 1906. 


20 


SECTION 4 


GOD’S IMMUTABILITY 


I, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, — Change 
(mutatio) means, generally speaking, a transi- 
tion from one state to another, 


A change which affects the substance of a thing is 
called substantial; one which affects only its accidents, 
accidental. Substantial change is either a transition 
from potentiality to actuality (generari, fieri), or, vice 
versa, from actuality to potentiality (corrumpi). An 
accidental change is a transition from actuality to 
actuality (e. g., in cognition, volition), except where it 
is limited to mere privation (privatio, orépyows), as when 
one loses his eye-sight. Accidental change generally 
means alteration or variation. Underlying every change, 
especially if it be a substantial change, is passio (pati, 
maoxew), taking the term in its widest bearing, wz., as 
motion (motus, xivnois), 7, é., a transition from a terminus 
@ quo to a terminus ad quem. 


The concept of unchangeableness, or immuta- 
bility, excludes every mode of transition, and, 
in its absolute sense, even the possibility of 
transition. Such is the unchangeableness of 
God. : 

2. THE Docma.—tThe first General Council 
(Nicea, A.D. 325) anathematized the Arian 

298 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 299 


heresy that the Son of God is variabilis (ows ) 
aut mutabilis (tperrés), Later the dogma of di- 
vine immutability was expressly defined by the 
Fourth Lateran Council (A.D. 1215) and by 
the Council of the Vatican (A. D. 1870). 

a) The Scriptural text chiefly relied upon in 
this matter is Ps. CI, 27 sq.: “psi [coeli] pert- 
bunt, tu autem permanes. Et omnes sicut ves- 
timentum veterascent et sicut opertorium mutabis 
eos et mutabuntur: tu autem idem ipse es (4 
MAS ) et anni tut non deficient—The heavens 

. shall perish but thou remainest: and all 
of them shall grow old like a garment: and as 
a vesture thou shalt change them, and they shall 
be changed. But thou art always the seli-same, 
and thy years shall not fail.” That the attribute 
here applies absolutely is plain from the fact 
that the Immutable is described as the cause 
of creatural changes without being Himself 
subject to change. The Godhead is incom- 
patible with even the slightest shadow of 
alteration. Epistle of St. James, 1,17: “Apud 
quem non est transnvutatio (tapadrayn) nec vicis- 
situdinis obumbratio (tporjs drocxtacpa)—'The 
Father of lights, with whom there is no change, 
nor shadow of alteration.” Holy Scripture 
points to aseity as the ontological cause of God's 
immutability. Mal. III,6: “Ego enim Dominus 
mm ct [propterea] non mutor—I am the Lord, 


300 IMMUTABILITY 


and I change not.” Nor is this immutability 
limited to the intrinsic essence of the Godhead; 
it extends to the free counsels of God, of which 
the Bible tells us: “Consilium autem Domini in 
aeternum manet—The counsel of the Lord 
standeth for ever;”' and St. Paul speaks of the 
“immutability of his counsel” (immobilitas con- 
silit, sui—ro éperdberov THs Bovdjs avrov ) 

b) Tradition assures us that belief in the un- 
changeableness of God was part and parcel of 
the Christian faith from the earliest days. 


We have the testimony of Origen,® that it was be- 
lieved by Jews and Christians alike,t and Tertullian de- 
clares: “Deum immutabilem et informabilem credi 
necesse est—-We must needs believe God to be un- 
changeable and incapable of being formed.” *® There are 
a few difficult Scriptural texts with an anthropopathic 
tinge; but the Fathers explain them in consonance with 
this dogma. Thus St. Jerome says: “ Furorem, ob- 
livionem, tram, poenitudinem ita in Deo accipere debemus, 
quomodo pedes, manus, oculos, aures et cetera membra, 
quae habere dicitur incorporalis et invisibilis Deus.” ® 


St. Augustine explains the profound expression of the 


“ mobility of the Divine Wisdom,” by saying that Kivyats 
does not mean mutation, but pure activity,* combined 
with unchangeable repose.® 


i Ps XA XG, 23, tCfr. Wisdom VII, 24: “ Om- 

2Heb. VI, 17. nibus enim mobilibus  mobilior 

3 Contr. Cels., I. (rdons Kivjoews Kwyrtixdrepov) 

4“ Iudaeorum Christianorumque est Sapientia— Wisdom is more 
doctrina.”’ active than all active things.” 

5 Adv. Prax., 27. 8 Mobile = agile. 


6 Hieron., In Ps., 45. 9 De Civ. Det, XII, 17. “ Novit 


2 rt ‘ 
et a a i NE a Ne 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 301 

c) By developing certain arguments taken from 
the Fathers and the Schoolmen, theologians demon- 
strate the immutability of God from unaided human 
reason. It has its roots, they say, in the divine aseity, 
or autousia, which ex vi notionis precludes not only 
potentiality, but also any and every degree of per- 
fectibility, such as is involved in a transition from po- 
tentiality to actuality.° Hence a mutable God, a God 
subject to change, would not be God, but a mere crea- 
ture? The Aristotelian argument of the Prime Mover 
has ever occupied a prominent place among the proofs 
for the existence of God, because, starting from the 
changes constantly taking place in the created universe, it 
leads directly to the Motor immobilis (16 xivodv axivyrov), 
Who moves all things, without Himself suffering any 
mutation.!2. This is a notion rather difficult to grasp, 
but we meet it in the Book of Wisdom, VI, 27: “ Fé 
cum sit una [sapientia], omnia potest et in se permanens 
omnia innovat — And being but one, she [Wisdom] can 
do all things, and remaining in herself the same, she 
reneweth all things.” *% 

The immutability of God, therefore, is an absolutely 
incommunicable attribute — which is quite obvious when 
we consider that mutability is the most salient char- 


Quiescens agere et agens quiescere 
— He can act while He reposes, and 
repose while He acts.” 

10 Cfr. St. Bernard (Serm. 80 in 
Cantic.): “Omnis mutatio quae- 
dam mortis imitatio est — Every 
change is in a sense an imitation 
of death.” 

11 Cfr, S. Ambros., De Fide, I, 
9: “Arius dicit mutabilem Det 
Filium; quomodo ergo Deus, st 
mutabilis, cum ipse dixerit: Ego 
sum, ego sum et non mutor? — 


Arius says that the Son of God is 
mutable; but how, if God were 
mutable, could He have spoken: I 
am, I am and change not?” 

12 On this argument, see Rickaby, 
Of God and His Creatures, pp. 11- 


12, note. 

13 Cfr. the beautiful verse of 
Boethius: ‘‘ Immotusque manens 
dat cuncta moveri.” Cfr. also St. 


Augustine, Confess. I, 6; and De 
Trintt., V,. 2. 


302 IMMUTABILITY 


acteristic of creatures, and, consequently, really identical 
with contingency. The fundamental cause of the in- 
communicability of this divine attribute lies in the es- 
sences of God and the creatures respectively ; for creation 
which drew the universe from its original nothingness 
into the realm of existence, is the basis and fount of 
all other changes.14 

If we attempt to define the immutability of God 
in its relation to His outward activity, and particularly 
to His absolute liberty, we are confronted by a natural 
mystery, which philosophy is able to elucidate to a certain 
extent, but cannot fully explain. There is in the first 
place this difficulty. If God performs some external act, 
such as, e. g., the creation of the universe, does He not, 
by virtue of that very act, pass from the state of non- 
creator to that of creator, and consequently undergo a 
change? To solve this problem we have to distinguish 
between willing an effect to be produced in time, and will- 
ing an effect intended to exist from all eternity. “Itis 
quite plain that a temporal effect, calculated to occur at a 
certain specified time, can be willed by God from all 
eternity with the same immutable will with which He 
produces an effect destined to exist from all eternity (such 
as, €. g., an eternal world, the possibility of which is 
defended by some theologians). God’s operation ad 
extra, we must remember, in the words of the School- 
men, is an “actus immanens et virtualiter transiens,” 
which coincides with, and consequently is quite as immu- 
table as, the divine Essence — although, of course, the 
effect itself is produced neither sooner nor later than 

14 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Natura made out of nothing.” Cfr. St, 
Boni, c. I: “Omnia, quae fecit Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 9, art. 
Deus, quia ex nihilo sunt, mutabilia 2; Lessius, De Perfect. Divin., III, 


sunt — All things which the Creator 3 
has made are changeable, because 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 303 


the eternal will of God has decreed. This gives us the 
key for the solution of another objection, viz., that the 
activity of God, being eternally immutable, must needs 
invest the effects which it produces with the color of 
eternity; so that the eternity of the world, plainly 
denied in Holy Scripture, would really be but a logical 
deduction from the eternity of God. This is a sophism. 
God wills to posit either an eternal or a temporal effect. 
It is only in the first case that the external terminus 
of His action could be something eternal, as, e. g., an 
eternal world. In the latter case, the effect, though de- 
creed from eternity, is realized only at the precise mo- 
ment fixed by the immutable will of God." 

It is considerably more difficult to demonstrate the 
compatibility of the attributes of divine unchangeable- 
ness and absolute liberty. We have shown that the 
created universe is not necessarily eternal because its 
Creator is immutable; but how shall we prove that God’s 
immutability does not imply necessary existence on the 
part of His creatures? This is truly, in the phrase 
of Billuart, the Gordian knot of theology (“nodus 
totius theologiae intricatissimus’’), a veritable sacred 
puzzle (“aenigma sacrum”).® Let us first recapitulate 
the state of the question, It is an article of faith 
that God is absolutely free in His operation ad extra.** 
Now, either we can conceive God without this free act, 
or we cannot so conceive Him. If we cannot, He is 
not free; if we can, He is mutable— The kernel of 
this difficulty is to be found in the thoroughly an- 
thropomorphic conception of divine freedom which man 
forms after the analogy of his own free will (lberum 
arbitrium), without considering that the liberty of God 


15 Cfr. Billuart, De Deo Uno, 16 Billuart., J. c., diss. 7, art. 4. 
diss. 3, art. 7. 17 Vide infra, Chapter 4, § 1. 


304 IMMUTABILITY 


is something altogether different in kind. Human lib- 
erty consists in an active indifference by which the will 
is enabled either to act or not to act, or when it does 
act, to act either so or otherwise. The liberty of God, 
on the other hand, is not an active indifference with 
respect to several subjective acts. It is but the indiffer- 
ence peculiar to a single, absolutely simple, pure act, in 
relation to different. objects. This divine act, being in- 
trinsically necessary, immutable, and eternal, is extrin- 
sically free, inasmuch as it implies a non-necessary, and 
therefore a free relation to the created universe. “ Volun- 
tas Det,” says St. Thomas, “uno et eodem actu vult se 
et alia, sed habitudo eius ad se est necessaria et naturalis, 
sed habitudo ews ad alia est secundum convenientiam 
quandam, non quidem necessaria et naturalis, neque vio- 
lenta aut innaturalis, sed voluntaria — The will of God, 
by one and the same act, wills itself and other things, 
but its habitude to itself is necessary and natural, while 
its habitude to other things is after the manner of a 
certain fitness, which is not indeed necessary and nat- 
ural, nor yet violent or innatural, but voluntary.” 1® 
Hence we can formulate our answer to the difficulty 
under consideration thus: The liberty of God is noth- 
ing else than the indifference of a most simple act to- 
wards different objects—an act which, despite its 
formal simplicity, is nevertheless virtually multiplex; 
that is to say, it is at the same time, though under 


18 Contr. Gent., I, 82. The pas- in a foot-note on page 61: “The 
sage is unfortunately not translated one necessary actuality is God. 


by Father Rickaby in his excel- Though creatures are means to 
lent, though perhaps too much God’s end, they are not necessary 
“‘abridged ”’ translation of the means to any necessary end of 


Summa Contra Gentiles, published His: therefore their existence is 
under the title Of God and His not necessarily willed by Him, al- 
Creatures, London 1905. But Fr. beit their possibility is necessarily 
Rickaby brings out the point tersely discerned.” 


THESDIVINEO ATTRIBUTES 305 
different aspects, both necessary and free: necessary in 
itself, as a divine act, and free in its external relation to 
the created world. If this explanation is not wholly 
clear, it is because the liberty of God is a mystery which 
transcends the categories of our mortal mind.” 


Reapincs:— St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 9— Thomassin, 
De Deo, V, 6-10.— Lessius, De Perfect. Div., 1. I11].— Scheeben, 
Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 75 (Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual, pp. 188 
sqq.).— Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. I, nn. 382 sqq.— 
L. Janssens, De Deo Uno, t. I, pp. 339 saq., Friburgi 1900.— 


Lépicier, De Deo Uno, t. I, pp. 313 sqq., Parisiis 1902. 


19 For further information on 
this subject, consult Billuart, 1. c.; 
Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. 
Pie pps. 728) Saq.; | Mam) '18835° 
Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, 
pp. 56 sqq.— We may be permitted, 
because of the importance of the 
subject and the ‘‘ arguments ’”’ based 
upon this difficulty by infidels, to 
quote a suggestion towards a solu- 
tion from the last-mentioned work, 
p. 62, n.: ‘‘ The difficulty has its 
foundation in this, that, within our 
experience, evety new effect in- 
volves some antecedent change 
either in the agent or in the mat- 


ter acted upon. The more power- 
ful the agent, the less change is 
required, as when a strong man 
with little or no effort lifts a 
weight, which a weaker one would 
have to strain himself to raise from - 
the ground. Hence we may faintly 
surmise how ‘in the limit’ an al- 
mighty agent would act without 
being in the least altered by his 
action from the being that he 
would have been, had he remained 
at rest. Not that I take this sug- 
gestion to remove the whole diffi- 
culty.” 


SECTION s 


GOD’S ETERNITY 


I, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—Our concept 
of time (tempus, 7°ré) is prior to our concept of 
eternity (aeternitas), and we acquire the latter 
by a negation of the former. As space signifies 
co-existence, so time signifies succession, or, in 
its widest sense, motion (motus). 


a) Hence Aristotle defines time as “the number of 
movement, estimated according to its before and after.” 
It follows that the notion of time postulates mutability, 
nay, even mutation (change). Like space, time has three 
dimensions: past, present, and future. It is to be ob- 
served, however, that whatever actually exists, constitutes 
an “ever current now”; for the past exists no longer, 
and the future not yet. As this quality of being cur- 
rent, or flowing, as it were, inheres in and endures with 
an object, so constant duration (perduratio) constitutes 
an element of time as well as of eternity,— with this 
difference, that in the former it is successive, in the lat- 
ter simultaneous. Whence it follows that successiveness 
is the essential characteristic of time. 


b) Eternity, being the direct contradictory of 


time, must not be conceived as “endless time” 
LPhys. LV, x38 xpbvos éoripv 2Cfr. J. Rickaby, General Meta- 


apiOuos Kivhoews KaTd rd mpdrepov Physics, pp. 376 saq. 
Kai borepor, 
306 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 307 


or “absence of duration,’*® but as “limitless 
duration,’ without beginning or end. Eternity, 
therefore, has its immediate and proximate prin- 
ciple in absolute immutability,* and is conse- 
quently, like immutability, incommunicable. God 
alone is eternal. | 


If time be designated as “an ever current now” 
(nunc fluens), we must describe eternity as “a standing 
now” (nunc stans); that is, as pure presence without 
any admixture of past or future. Hence eternity and 
time are related to-each other, not as species of the 
same genus, but precisely as contingency is related to 
self-existence, or the creature to its Creator. They 
are contradictories. It was to eliminate succession not 
only from the divine Essence but likewise from the 
operation of God, that Boéthius introduced the concept 
of “life” into his famous definition:5 “ Aeternitas est 
interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio — 
Eternity is the possession, perfect and all at once, of 
life without beginning or end,’*® or “Eternity is a si- 
multaneously full and perfect possession of interminable 
lites /3 . 

As God is in eternity, or, more correctly, as He 
is His own eternity,® so all created beings, in so far as, 
and because, they are subject to incessant and real 
changes, exist in time. These changes constitute what is 
called “intrinsic time” (tempus intrinsecum). “ Ex- 
trinsic time ” (tempus extrinsecum) is the external stand- 


3 Klee, Oswald, e¢ al. 7 Hunter, Outlines, II, 78. 
4 Supra, § 4. 8 Cfr. W. Humphrey, “ His Divine 
8 De Consol. Phil., V, 6. Majesty,” pp. 120 sqq. 


6 Cfr. Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual, 
Pp. 195. 


308 ETERNITY 


ard or conventional unity of measurement (e. g., the 
uniform motion of the heavens) for gauging succes- 
sive duration (year, month, day, hour, minute, sec- 
ond). The real mutation to which all creatures are 
subject is not necessarily constant and uninterrupted. 
There are creatures which are relatively immutable, 
either in their essence (e. g., angels, the spiritual soul), 
or in their operation (the act of beatific vision). Such 
a state, more or less exempt from the mutations of 
time, is by theologians called aevum,® abstractly aevi- 
termitas, in opposition and contradistinction to time 
as well as to eternity proper. Aeviternitas, therefore, 
stands midway between tempus and aeternitas, It 
shares with aeternitas the negation of constant fluctu- 
ation, with tempus the possibility of fluctuation, 7. ¢., 
real mutability. Hence aevum differs in principle from 
eternity just as much as it differs from time. Being a 
creature, the ens aeviternum, too, though it will have 
no end, must have had a beginning; while on the other 
hand, it always remains mutable and capable of being 
immersed as it were in the constantly flowing stream 
of time.?° 


c) Finally we have to distinguish in God eter- 
nity and sempiternity. 


Eternity as such abstracts from actual time, just as 
immensity abstracts from actual space. God would 
be absolutely eternal and immense even if there were 
neither time nor space. However, just as, assuming that 
there is actual space, immensity becomes omnipresence ; 
so, assuming that there is real time, eternity must co- 


Saldy, from del dy. 
20 Cle, BaF ROONsy" Lay) QWs. 20, Alte 1S, 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 309 


exist with every time or instant of time.** As a coun- 
terpart to omnipresence, this is a new (hypothetical or 
relative) attribute, for which unfortunately theology has 
not yet coined a distinct term. We may call it “ sempi- 
terns 


2. THE DocMa oF Gop’s ETERNITY.—It is an 
article of faith that God alone is absolutely 
eternal. Already the first Council of Nicea 
anathematized ‘“‘those who say: There was a 
time when [the Son of God] was not (jv 6re ov« 
wv) 3? and the Athanasian Creed teaches: “de- 
ternus Pater, aeternus Filius, aeternus Spiritus 
Sanctus, et tamen non tres aeternt, sed unus 
aeternus—The Father eternal, the Son eternal, 
and the Holy Ghost eternal, and yet they are 
not three Eternals but one Eternal,’ Similarly 
the Fourth Lateran Council, and also that of the 


gent at that Whatever 


11 Cfr. St. Thomas, Contra Gent., 
I, 66, (Rickaby, Of God and 
His Creatures, ‘p. 48): *f Since 
the being of the eternal never 
fails, eternity is present to every 
time or instant of time. Some 
sort of example of this may be 
seen in a circle: for a point taken 
on the circumference does not co- 
incide with every other point; but 
the centre, lying away from the 
circumference, is directly opposite 
to every point of the circumference. 
[As between any two points you 
can draw a straight line, every 
point .in space is ‘directly oppo- 
site’ every other point. What St. 
Thomas means is that the line 
drawn from the centre of the circle 
to any point in the circumference 
makes a right angle, with the tan- 


point.] 
therefore is in any portion of time, 
co-exists with the eternal, as present 
to it, although in respect to an- 
other portion of time, it be past or 
future. But nothing can co-exist 
in presence with the eternal other- 
wise than with the whole of it, 
because it has no successive dura- 
tion. Whatever therefore is done 
in the whole course of time, the 
divine mind beholds it as present 
throughout the whole of its eter- 
nity; and yet it cannot be said 
that what is done in a definite por- 
tion of time has always been an 
existing fact.” i 
12Cfr, Alcuin, De Differentia 
Aeterni et Sempiterni; Oswald, 
Dogmat. Theol., Vol. I, pp. 130 saq. 


310 ETERNITY 


Vatican, enumerate “eternity” among the abso- 
lute attributes of God. 

a) The Bible often employs the predicate 
“eternal” to signify ‘without end”;'* hence in 
constructing the Scriptural argument for the 
dogma under consideration, we shall have to be 
careful to adduce only passages in which the 
term is strictly defined. However, it will not be 
difficult to show that Scripture expressly ascribes 
to God all three of the constitutive elements of 
eternity, vg., no beginning, no end, no succes- 
sion—together with their root, self-existence. 

a) That eternity has neither beginning nor 
end is often emphasized in Holy Writ. Cfr. 
Ps. LXXXIX, 2: “Priusquam montes ferent, 
aut formaretur terra et orbis, a saeculo et usque 
im saeculum tu es Deus—Before the mountains 
were made, or the earth and the world was 
formed; from eternity to eternity thou art God.” 
Ps, XCII,.2: “Ex tunc a saeculo tu es—Thou 
art from everlasting.” ** In this connection we 
can also adduce the expression “The Ancient 
of Days” (antiquus dierum) in Dan. VII, 9, 
which is not meant to express old age, but eter- 
nity. 

B) Secondly, the Bible does not conceive the 
attribute of having neither beginning nor end as 


13 EF. g., eternal fire, eternal hills; XXXII, 40: “Vivo ego in aeter- 
ciri’ Gen. (XOST) 333) se kw Lyn e8. num—TI live forever.” 
14 Compare this text with Deut. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 311 


infinite duration in time, but as a constant dura- 
tion without any admixture of successiveness, 1. é., 
as “nunc stans.’ Without insisting on the pre- 
dilection which the Sacred Book, in referring 
to God, shows for the present tense, we merely 
observe that the texts we have already cited 
to prove the immutability of God also prove 
that time does not enter into His essence or 
operation. St. Augustine acutely observes: 
“Oui sunt anni, qui non deficiunt, nist qui stant? 
Si ergo ibi anni stant, et ipsi anm, qui stant, 
unus annus est; et ipse unus annus, qui stat, 
unus dies est... sed stat semper ille dies.” 
Holy Scripture, in comparing time with eternity, 
repeatedly speaks of “one day,” of “the eternal 
to-day.” * 

vy) Immutability is the proximate and self-ex- 
istence the ultimate principle of eternity. In 
predicating aseity of God, therefore, we im- 
plicitly declare that He is without beginning 
and without end, and that there is in Him 
no succession of time. Holy Scripture leaves no 
doubt about this. Apoc. I, 8: “I am Alpha 
and Omega, the beginning and the end, saith 
the Lord God, who is and who was, and who is 


15 In Ps. CXXI, n. 6. LXXXIX, 4.) Ps. TT, 720°" Felius 

16 Cfr. 2 Petr. III, 8: “ Unus meus es tu, ego hodie genus te — 
dies apud Dominum sicut mille Thou art my Son, this day I have 
anni, et mille anni sicut unus dies begotten thee.” John Viliinsss 
— One day with the Lord is as a ‘“ Antequam Abraham fieret, ego 
thousand years, and a thousand sum-— Before Abraham was made, 
years as one day.” (Cfr. Ps. I am.” 


312 ETERNITY 


to come, the Almighty.” And still more preg- 
nantly Apoc. I, 4: “‘O 4p Kat 6 mv Kai 6 épxdpevos— 
He that is, and that was, and that is to come.” 
Is.. XLI, 4: “Ego Dominus "DR, primus. et 
novissimus ego sum—lI the Lord, I am the first 
and the last.” 


Holy Scripture likewise attributes to God sempiternity, 
1, e., eternity in contact with actual time (7. e., with the 
created universe).,: Jt. calls.Him, “the King of Ages,” 37 
and here and there even speaks of eternity as if it were 
subject to the categories of time. Cfr. Gen. I, 1: “Jn 
principio creavit Deus coelum et terram — In the begin- 
ning God created heaven and earth.” John XVI, 13: 
“ Quaecunque audict, loquetur — Whatsoever things he 
[the Holy Ghost] shall hear, he shall speak.’ St. 
Augustine appositely remarks: “ Fuit, quia numquam 
defuit; erit, quia nunquam deertt; est, quia semper est.” 8 


b) For the argument from Tradition, see 
our thesis on Immutability. Compare also Pe- 
tavius and Thomassin in their respective treatises 
De Deo. 


c) A theological controversy has arisen over the re- 
lation of divine eternity to creatural co-existence. Cer- 
tain Thomists?® hold that, because duration without be- 
ginning or end implies absolute indivisibility, every 
creature must co-exist with, and consequently from, all 
eternity. Alvarez attempts to prove this thesis as follows: 
“Tllud quod aliquando coexistit aeternitati, semper ill 
coexistit. ... Sed nato Antichristo verum erit dicere: 

U7 Cle Ser ey POs Doly 350; 19 FE. g., Alvarez, De Auxil. Grat., . 


II, 8; Billuart, De Deo, diss. 6, 


Cfr. 1 Tim. I, 17: “ Baoidebs trav ‘ 
art.'3; Gotti, De Deo, tr. a, an. 


alwywy,”’ 
18 Tract. in Ioa., 99. 4, dub. 2, 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 313 
‘Antichristus coexistit Deo in aeternitate secundum 
suum esse reale; ergo ab aeterno habet hanc coexi- 
stentiam in ipsa aeternitate.” It is easy to discover the 
fallacy. To co-exist with all eternity is by no means 
the same as to co-exist always with eternity. During the 
time of its physical life a creature truly co-exists with 
all eternity, because it co-exists with eternity, and eter- 
nity cannot be divided into parts. But it is manifestly 
wrong to conclude from this that, because it co-exists 
with all eternity, a creature’s physical co-existence is 
eternal. This would be tantamount to asserting that all 
existing creatures are formally eternal, thus contradict- 
ing the dogmatic teaching of the Church that no creature 
exists from eternity. Misunderstanding can easily be 
avoided by keeping in mind the Scholastic formula: 
“Creaturae coexistunt quidem toti aeternitati, sed non 
totaliter,’ 2° that is to say, All things which at any time 
exist, co-exist, so far as the actual being of them is con- 
cerned, with the whole of the divine eternity, although 
not from eternity.”* 


20Cfr, Chr. Pesch, Praclect. eternity, at that time when they 
Dogm., tom. II, pp. 87 sqq. Fri- were in existence. Those things 
burgi 1899. which are not yet in actual exist- 


21 ‘* Successive co-existence is not 
to be understood as if it implied 
succession in the eternal duration, 
but only as there is succession in 
the co-existing time. The several 
parts of its duration co-exist in 
actual reality with the eternal dura- 
tion, for that time only in which 
they actually exist. As regards 
actual reality, those things which 
now at this present exist, co-exist 
with the eternity of God. Those 
things which have passed away, and 
are now no more in existence, did 
co-exist with the same changeless 


21 


ence, but which will one day exist, 
will then co-exist with the same 
eternity; in that day when they 
shall begin to exist, and so long 
as they continue to exist in their 
actual being. It is not as if the 
past co-existed with one part, and 
as if the present co-existed with 
another part, while the future co- 
existed with yet another part of 
the eternal duration. The divine 
eternity does not consist of parts.” 
— Humphrey, “ His Divine Majes- 
ty,” pp. 122 sq. 


“ BI4 ETERNITY 


Reapincs: —*S, Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 10 (Bonjoannes-Les- 
cher, Compendium, pp. 26 sqq.).— Suarez, De Deo, II, 4—— Vas- 
quez, t. 1, disp. 31.— Petavius, De Deo, III, 3-6.— Thomassin, De 
Deo, V, 11-15.— Lessius, De Perfect. Divin., 1. TV.— Gillius, De 
Essentia Dei, tract. 10, c. 17.— Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 31- 
32.— Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 90 sqq., Paris 1895.— 
Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 14, 48.— Wilhelm- 
Scannell, Manual, pp. 195 sqq— Humphrey, “His Divine Maj- 


esty,’ pp. 119 sqq. 


SECTION 6 


GOD’S IMMENSITY AND OMNIPRESENCE 


I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—We can con- 
ceive eternity only as the negation of time, 
and immensity only as the negation of space 
(spatium, 7o¥). But what is space?* As time 
is a (successive) before and after, so space is 
(simultaneous) juxtaposition. Hence juxtapo- 
sition (positio partium extra partes) according 
to length, breadth, and thickness, forms the 
characteristic note of space, as well as of matter. 
The modern theory of an mth dimension is 
merely a metaphysico-mathematical gewgaw.” 


a) Space and body differ in many particulars. For 
while space, as the “container ” of bodies, is conceived 
as immovable, unlimited, uncreatable, and indestructible, 
bodies move about freely in space, are circumscribed by 
external surfaces, and susceptible both of being created 
and annihilated. Space as here described is usually 
called absolute or imaginary space. It must not be con- 


1 * Space’ scarcely engaged St. 
Thomas’s attention. Nor does he 
discuss immensity as an. attribute 
of God. He declares: ‘We say 
that there was no place or space 
before the world was’ (Sum. 
Theol., 1a, qu. 46, art. 1, ad 4). 
This is tantamount to saying that 


God is everywhere where creatures 
are; but that, apart from creation, 
there is no meaning in speaking of 
God as being everywhere.”— Rick- 
aby, Of God and His Creatures, p. 
239, n. 

2Cfr. Gutberlet, Die neue Raum- 
theorie, Mainz 1882. 


Bis 


316 IMMENSITY 


founded with real space, which depends on the existence 
of a real material world. Though this kind of space is 
also immovable, it does not extend beyond the limits of 
the physical universe. Outside of this there is no real, 
but only absolute or imaginary space. Real space began 
to exist simultaneously with the bodies which it contains ; 
and it would disappear if these bodies ceased to exist. 
Real space is consequently “real extension carried 
to the utmost limits of the universe, combined with the 
function of receiving and holding material bodies.” 
Similarly we may define absolute (2. €., possible) space, 
as the extension of merely possible bodies with regard 
to their position, 


~b) Place (locus, situs, xeic6a:) differs from 
space as a part from its whole. It is as it were 
a section of space.* A located or situated ob- 
ject, inasmuch as it occupies but a limited por- 
tion of space, can move or be moved from place 
to place. An object may exist in Space in a 
threefold manner: (1) circumscriptively or by 
formal extension (praesentia circumscriptiva), 
when to each separate portion of its substance 
(atoms, molecules) there corresponds a separate 
part of space; (2) definitely (praesentia defini- 
twa), if an object exists in its entirety through- 
out a given space (place) and in all its parts, 
as, é@. g., the soul in the body; (3) repletively 
(praesentia repletiva), if a being exists with the 
whole of its substance throughout a given space 


8 Father Rickaby calls it “the outline of a body.” (Of God and 
shell of space (x@pyn) marking the His Creatures, Pp. 100, n.) 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 317 


and in all its parts, in such manner that it 
cannot be circumscribed by any real space, no 
matter how vast; this kind of presence is pred- 
icable of God alone. 

c) Eternity, as we said before, must not be 
conceived as infinite duration in time. In like 
manner immensity must not be conceived as in- 
finite extension, expansion, or diffusion of the 
Divine Essence in space, because the Divine 
Essence is absolutely simple. 


ot. Augustine confesses that he entertained this mis- 
conception in his youth.4 Newton committed a similar 
blunder when, in his controversy with Leibniz, he con- 
founded the immensity of God with absolute (imaginary) 
space. The immensity of God cannot be measured 
with a yardstick in length, breadth, and depth. Lessius, 
it is true, refers to this divine attribute as “ uncreated 
space.”® But he merely wishes to assert that the im- 
mensity of God constitutes the foundation of space in the 
same way that eternity constitutes the foundation of 
time. In matter of fact immensity is the formal con- 
tradictory of space, and therefore can be conceived only 
by the negation of its essential characteristic, t..¢., juxta- 
position. God is not subject to space; He is beyond 
space; He has no extension, either formal or virtual: 
He is in no wise bound by the limits of space. This 
relation can be best understood by picturing the analogous 
mode in which truth exists in space. It is everywhere 
and nowhere; it is present in every portion of space, 
and yet not subject to space, because it is above space. 


4 Confess. ‘VIII, 6. 
5“ Spatium increatum.” De Perfect. Divin., II, 2. 


318 IMMENSITY 


Now, God, being the subsisting, absolute, living Truth, 
can be immense and omnipresent only in the manner that 
truth is immense and omnipresent. 


d) Immensity (immensitas) and omnipres- 
ence (omnipraesentia) are differentiated in the 
same manner as eternity and sempiternity. 


Immensity is an absolute attribute, which belongs to 
God regardless of existing space. Omnipresence, on the 
other hand, is a relative and hypothetical attribute, 
contingent on real extension. Is God, by virtue of 
His immensity, also present in absolute space? The 
query is futile, inasmuch as absolute space has no actual 
existence, no reality. But we can and must say that 
God is present even in possible space negative et funda- 
mentaliter, so that if new space came into existence, God 
would not begin to exist there, but, conversely, the newly 
created world would find the Immense Being already 
present when it came into existence. Since Divine 
Revelation itself discriminates between immensity and 
omnipresence, we shall consider them as two separate 
attributes, 


2. THE DoGMA oF Gop’s IMMENsItTy.—lIn re- 
citing the Athanasian Creed we profess: “Jm- 
mensus Pater, immensus Filius, immensus Spir- 
itus Sanctus—The Father is immense, the Son is 
immense, the Holy Ghost is immense.” °® The 


6In the English translation of |Incomprehensible, and the Holy 
the Athanasian Creed, transcribed Ghost Incomprehensible.” This is 
by J. J. Sullivan, S. J., in the mot a good rendition, Father Sul- 
Catholic Encyclopedia (Vol. II, p. livan, by the way, ascribes this 
33), this passage reads: ‘‘ The translation to the Marquess of 
Father Incomprehensible, the Son Bute, but the Marquess of Bute 


THE DIVINE: AT ERIBUTES 319 


Fourth Lateran and the Vatican Councils dis- 
tinctly enumerate immensity among the divine 
attributes. 

a) Holy Scripture teaches the immensity of 
God in terms similar to those which it employs 
in asserting His eternity. As eternity, having 
neither beginning nor end, extends beyond all 
time, both before and after; so immensity ex- 
ceeds all limits of space. Cfr. 3 Kings VIII, 27: 
“For if heaven and the heaven of heavens can- 
not contain thee, how much less this house [i. e., 
temple] which I have built?’ Job XI, 8 sq.: 
“Excelsior coelo est et quid facies? ... lon- 
gior terra mensura eius et latior mari—He is 
higher than heaven, and what wilt thou? .. 
The measure of him is longer than the earth, 
and broader than the sea.” Because He is be- 
yond space, God, according to Holy Scripture, 
cannot be measured by the dimensions of space. 
He is without measure, immeasurable, immense. 
As eternity, which is duration without succes- 
sion, combines the three measurements of time 
in one single “To-day,” so with God the dimen- 


merely took it, with a few slight 
alterations, from the Protestant 
Book. of Common Prayer. We 
have before us the Oxford edi- 
tion of 1834, where the “ Quicun- 


que vult” appears immediately 
before the ‘Litany, or General 
Supplication.” The pages are not 


numbered. Cfr. also F. J. Hall, 


The Being and Attributes of God, 
p. 263 n., New York 1909. On 
The Popular Use of the Athanasian 
Creed in the Catholic Church in 
England —a_ subject about which 
many strange and _ silly notions 
are current among Protestants — 
cfr. J. W. Legg’s pamphlet with the 
above title, London 1909. 


‘Cag IMMENSITY 


sions of space are reduced to one single point. Cfr. 
Jer. XXIII, 23: “Putasne, Deus e vicino ego 
sum... et non [etiam] Deus de longe?—Am 
Wd, think ye). a\\Ged) at) hand iin) and) nota 
God afar off?’ Is. LXVI, 1: “Heaven is my 
throne, and the earth my footstool.” Like eter- 
nity, immensity is rooted in self-existence. Cfr. 
Deut. IV, 39: “Scito ergo hodie et cogitato in 
corde tuo, quod Dominus ipse sit Deus in coelo 
sursum et in terra deorsum, et non sit alius— 
Know therefore this day, and think in thy heart 
that the Lord he is God in heaven above, and in 
the earth beneath, and there is no other.” 

b) The Fathers have developed this dogma 
scientifically, and their writings contain some 
exquisitely poetical passages in relation to it. 


The incorporeity of God they explain thus: “ Before 
the creation of the world God was His own place or 
site.” “ Ante omnia erat Deus solus,’ says Tertullian, 
“tpse sibt et mundus et locus et omnia— Before all 
things God alone was; He is to Himself world, space, 
and everything.”7 And Theophilus:® ‘‘ @cds ob ywpeirar. 
GAN adros éort Toros OAwv, adros S€ EavTov tO70s — God can- 
not be contained by space, for He Himself is the place 
of everything and of Himself” [7 e., He Himself is 
the place of all things, but with regard to Himself, He 
is His own place]. Augustine asks: “ Antequam faceret 
Deus coelum et terram, ubi habitabat? In se habitabat 
Deus, apud se habitabat, et apud se est Deus?”°® To 


t Adv. Prax. OM Psi" t29, Ts, 4 
8 Ad Autolyc., Il, 1. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES Rat 


explain that God is beyond space, the Fathers say we 
must conceive Him not as surrounded by, but as sur- 
rounding space.?° 


3. THE DocmMa oF Gopd’s OMNIPRESENCE.— 
Omnipresence is included in the dogma of God’s 
immensity as a part is included in the whole. 
Assuming the existence of real space, immensity 
involves omnipresence. God’s ubiquity must not 
be conceived either circumscriptive or definitive, 
but strictly repletive. His praesentia repletiva 
in space is not merely intellectual (per praesen- 
tiam scientiae), or dynamic (per potentiam), 
but substantial (per essentiam seu substantiam 
divmam). The pagan philosophers of antiquity 
were in error when they limited the presence of 
God to this or that locality (e. g., Mount Olym- 
pus, the Capitol). Equally erroneous was the 
belief of the Valentinian Gnostics, the Calvinist 
Vorstius, and the Greek Steuchus Eugubinus, 
who held that God is substantially present no- 
where except in Heaven." 

a). The Scriptural. locus - classicus “is Ps. 
CXXXVIII, 7 sqq.: “Whither shall I go from 
thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy face? 
If I ascend into Heaven, thou art there: if I 
descend into hell, thou art present. If I take 


10 Cfr. Pastor’ Hermae, II, 1: gens, deorsum continens, extra Ccir- 
“Els Oeds udvos, 6 wdvTa xwpev,  cumdans, interius penetrans,” 
udvos 5€ dxwpnros wy,” S. Greg. 11 Cfr. Petavius, De Deo, III, 7. 


M., Moral., II, 12: “ Sursum re- 


322 IMMENSITY 


my wings early in the morning and dwell in the 
uttermost parts of the sea, even there also shall 
thy hand lead me: and thy right hand shall hold 
me.’ Here we have both an accurate and a 
beautifully poetical description of the divine 
omnipresence.’* It is to be observed that the 
Psalmist does not limit omnipresence to the 
knowledge or power of God (which it, of 
course, includes); but expressly extends it to 
the divine Essence itself: “Zu illic es, ades.” 


Jer. XXIII, 24, removes every vestige of a 


doubt: 


“Numquid non coelum et terram ego 


impleo?—Do not I fill heaven and earth?” It 
is only on this assumption that St. Paul could 


12 Francis Thompson has elabo- 
rated it in his famous ode, ‘* The 
Hound of Heaven ’”’: 


I fled Him, down the nights and 
down the days; 
I fled Him, down the arches of the 
years; 
I fled Him, down the labyrinthine 
ways 
Of my own mind; and in the mist 
of tears 
I hid from Him, and under running 
laughter. 
Up vistaed hopes, I sped; 
And shot, precipitated 
Adown Titanic glooms of chasméd 
fears, 
From those strong Feet that fol- 
lowed, followed after. 
But with unhurrying chase, 
And unperturbéd pace, 
Deliberate speed, majestic in- 
stancy, 
They beat—and a Voice beat 
More instant than the Feet — 


** All things betray thee, who be- 
trayest Me.” 


To all swift things for swiftness did 
I sue; 

Clung to the whistling mane of 
every wind. 

But whether they swept, smoothly 

fleet, 

The long savannahs of the blue; 

Or whether, Thunder-driven, 

They clanged His chariot ’thwart a 
heaven, 

Plashy with flying lightnings round 
the spurn o’ their feet: — 


Fear wist not to evade as Love 


wist to pursue. 
Still with unhurrying chase, 
And unperturbéa pace, 
Deliberate speed, majestic in- 
stancy, 
Came on the following Feet, 
And a Voice above their beat — 
“ Naught shelters thee, who wilt 
not shelter Me.” 
(and so forth) 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 323 


say: '* “In ipso emm vivimus et movemur et 
sumus—For in him we live, and move, and 
Bie. 

b) Patristic theology not only re-echoed the 
teaching of Holy Scripture in regard to God’s 
omnipresence, but it engaged all the resources 
of science to explain the concept and to safe- 
guard it against misinterpretation. 


In this domain, as in so many others, the genius of 
Augustine shines with peculiar splendor. In his Con- 
fessions the Saint draws an impressive comparison be- 
tween God’s omnipresence and the waters which sur- 
round and fill the sponges growing at the bottom of the 
sea (t. e., the world). At the same time, in order to 
forestall a purely material conception of the “ diffusion ”’ 
of the Divine Essence, the great Bishop of Hippo en- 
deavors, with keen analytical acumen, to determine the 
true notion of God’s omnipresence as accurately as is pos- 
sible for the mind of man. “ Sic est Deus per cuncta 
diffusus,’ he says, “ut non sit qualitas mundi, sed sub- 
stantia creatrix mundi, sine labore regens et sine onere 
continens mundum. Non tamen per spatia locorum 
quasi mole diffusa, ita ut m dimidio mundi corpore sit 
dimidius et in alio dinidio dimidius, atque ita per totum 
totus; sed in solo coelo totus, et in sola terra totus, et 
im coelo et in terra totus, et nullo contentus loco, sed in 
se ipso ubique totus.” * 


13 Acts XVII, 28. 

14 Cfr. Amos, IX, 2 sq. 

EDIE Pa TOPs Wee lig | LN Dae Obs 
Chrysostom expresses the same 
truth more succinctly in these 
words: “Ildyrq mdnpots, mace 


maper, ob KaTd pépos, ddd waow 
Sos — Thou fillest all, Thou art 
present to all, not in part, but whole 
[Thou art present] to all.” (in Ps. 
138, n. 2.) 


324 IMMENSITY 


c) Scholastic theology, following the lead 
of Peter Lombard *® and Saint Thomas Aqui- 
nas," goes a step farther and extends the 
substantial omnipresence of God to the world 
of spirits—angels, demons, and the souls of 
men. ‘The Schoolmen distinguish a threefold 
presence of God in His creatures: (1) by 
essence (per essentiam s. substantiam) ; (2) by 
power (per potentiam); (3) by presence or in- 
habitation (per inhabitationem s. praesentiam 
specialem). 


a) God is substantially present when He is in spir- 
itual beings with His substance, totus ubique. Eras- 
mus’s objection, that it is derogatory to the divine maj- 
esty to be present in demons, the souls of the damned, 
and other horrid creatures, had already been refuted 
long before his time by St. Augustine,1* who com- 
pared God’s presence in such beings to that of the sun- 
light, which penetrates filth without suffering contami- 
nation. 

8) If God is present in all things substantially or 
“by essence,” it is evident that He must also be present 
in them dynamically or “by power”; for a substance 
can operate wherever it is. Is it equally logical to infer 
conversely that God is substantially present when 
we know Him to be present dynamically? His dy- 
namic presence is admitted by all, not so the possi- 
bility of “actio in distans.’ While the oft-quoted axiom 
that “actio in distans” is impossible is not fully evi- 


16 Liber Sent., I, dist. 37. 18 De Natura Boni, c. 29. 
17 Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 8, art. 3. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 325 


dent, yet in respect of divine things its validity is un- 
deniable; for as God’s power objectively coincides with 
His Essence, His Essence must be present wherever 
His power is operative. It follows that all the remain- 
ing attributes of God must likewise be present in every 
created being; and this is especially true of His om- 
niscience,’® which sees all things.2? We must not omit 
to point out, however, that an important distinction 
lies between God’s substantial and His dynamic presence. 
Substantial presence, being an emanation from the Ab- 
solute Essence, rests on metaphysical necessity, while dy- 
namic presence, so far as it manifests itself actively, is 
subject to the free will of the Almighty. This explains 
why God manifests His power variously in His various 
creatures, 

y) What we have said towards the end of the above 
paragraph is true in an even higher degree of God’s 
inhabitative presence, that is to say, His special mode 
of indwelling in His creatures. He indwells differently 
in the just, in sinners, in angels, in demons, in the 
Church and in the State; #4 on earth and in Heaven; and 
so forth. Therefore we pray in the “Our Father”: 
“ Pater noster, qui es in coelis — Our Father, Who art in 
Heaven.” St. Paul alludes to this truth when he says: 
“While we are in the body, we are absent from the 
Lord; . .. but we are confident, and have a good will 
to be absent rather from the body, and to be present 
with the Lord.’ ?? St. Bernard appositely observes: 
“Licet ubique esse Deus non dubitetur, sic tamen in 
coelo est, ut... nec esse videatur in terris, Prop- 

19Cfr, Ps. LXV, 7: “Oculi ence by the symbol of a “ seeing 
eius super gentes respiciunt,— His eye.” 
eyes behold the nations.” 21 Cfr. Math, XXVIII, 20. 


20 This explains why artists love 222 Cor. V, 6 sqa. 
to represent the divine omnipres- 


326 | IMMENSITY 


ter quod et orantes dicimus: Pater noster, qui es in 
coelis. Sicut enim anima, cum in toto quoque sit cor- 
pore, excellentius tamen et singularius est in capite, in 
quo sunt omnes sensus,... ita si praesentiam illam 
cogitamus, qua beati angeli perfruuntur, videmur vix 
aliquam Dei protectionem et nomen habere’’?? In 
Christ and in the Blessed Eucharist the Godhead, by 
virtue of the Hypostatic Union, indwells in an altogether 
singular manner, hence our churches are veritably and 
literally “ houses of God.” *4 


Reapincs:— S$. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 8—Ipem, Contr. 
Gent., III, 68 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 238 
sq.).— Lessius, De Perfect. Divin., 1, 11.—*Gillius, De Essentia 
Dei, tract. 9.— Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 33-34.— Scheeben, 
Dogmatik, Vol. I, §§ 77, 88 (Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual, pp. 
193 sqq., 211 sqq.).— Lépicier, De Deo Uno, t. I, pp. 286 sqq., 
Parisiis 1902— Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,” pp. 124 sqq.— 
Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 249 sqq. 


23 Serm. in Ps. “Qui habitat,” the treatise on Grace. It will 


Ty SA's 

24 For a refutation of the false 
teaching of Luther concerning 
God’s ubiquity we must refer the 
reader to Christology. The special 
indwelling of the Holy Ghost in 
the souls of the just belongs to 


hardly be necessary to add any- 
thing to what we have said above, 
to explain such Scriptural phrases 
as the “coming” and “ going of 
God,” the “descent of the Holy 
Ghost,” etc. 


1 ee 


Siete 


ie ee ee 


SS 


CHAPTER (TT 


THE ATTRIBUTES OF DIVINE LIFE—DIVINE 
KNOWLEDGE 


Considered dynamically, God’s fundamental 
attribute is purest activity; consequently the 
attributes of Divine Activity must be deduci- 
ble in the same manner as the attributes of 
Divine Being; and, since immanent activity 1s 
synonymous with life, the attributes of Divine 
Activity must be identical with the attributes of 
Divine Life.’ 

As God is a pure spirit, and spiritual lite 
utters itself in knowing and willing, it 1s 
plain that God’s vital activity can find expres- 
sion only in cognition and volition. This fur- 
nishes a natural division of the attributes of 
divine life, vig., attributes of the Understanding 
and attributes of the Will. In the words of the 
Vatican Council:? “Ecclesia credit et conhie- 
tur, unum esse Deum verum et vivum .. . m- 
tellectu ac voluntate omnique perfectione infini- 


1Cfr, Deut. XXXII, 40: “ Vivo eral, consult Scheeben, Dogmattk, 


ego in aeternum —I live forever.” Vol. I, § 89; St. Thomas, Summa 
John XIV, 6G: “Ego sum via et Theol., 1a, qu. 8. 
veritas et vita (% fwy)—1 am 2 Conc. Vatic., Sess, III, De Fide, 


the way, and the truth, and the cap, I. 
life.’—- On the Divine Life in gen- 


327 


328 DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


tum—The . . . Church believes and confesses 
that there is one true and living God, .. . in- 
finite in intelligence, in will, and in all perfec- 
tion 

In respect of the divine understanding, we 
will discuss (1) the manner in which it is ex- 
ercised, (2) its object, and (3) its medium. 
In treating of these three points we shall have 
to be very careful not to trench on the infinite 
perfection of the Divine Knowledge. Not only 
must we conceive it as self-existent, but like- 
wise as blending with all the other attributes of 
Divine Being, especially the negative ones, 
excluding from the Divine Understanding every 
imaginable imperfection of human cognition, 
such as supposition, doubt, discursive reasoning, 
and so forth. It is with a view to emphasizing 
the certainty and infallibility of Divine Cogni- 
tion that theologians generally speak of it as 
scientia divina, for scientia (science) is the cer- 
tain and evident knowledge of things by their 
causes. 


8 Cfr, Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 1782. 


SECTION: 1 


THE MODE OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


From what we have previously said about the 
manner in which created perfections are con- 
tained in God, it follows that every mixed 
perfection (such as, é. g., the faculty of dis- 
cursive reasoning), must be subjected to a 
process of logical refinement before it can be ap- 
plied to the Deity; and further that when we 
undertake to transfer a simple perfection, 1. e., 
one formally capable of being predicated of the 
Divine Essence (e. g., intellect), from the crea- 
ture to the Creator, we must abstract from the 
mode in which that perfection exists in the 
creature. The following theses are calculated 
to show how divine differs from human knowl- 
edge in regard to its mode. 


Thesis I: Because of the identity of being and 
thought in God, the Divine Knowledge is a substan- 
tial act of cognition, in which consciousness and self- 
comprehension co-incide. 


This is de fide. 


Proof. We have already shown, in treating 
329 


22 


330 MODE OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


of the Absolute Truth,’ that in God being and 
thinking really co-incide; that a notion which 
adequately comprehends its object, must be con- 
ceived as a substance; and that this entire process 
must culminate in a most complete comprehen- 
sion by God of His Essence, or of Himself. 
All three of these momenta are implicitly con- 
tained in the decree of the Vatican Council, ac- 
cording to which God is “infinite in intelligence, 
in will, and in all perfection,” and, at the same 
time, ‘one . . . absolutely simple and immuta- 
ble spiritual substance.”’* The absolute iden- 
tity of being and thinking in God is, indeed, an 
immediate consequence of His  self-existence, 
which altogether excludes a transition from 
faculty to act. The substantiality of the divine 
act of understanding is a corollary flowing from 
that metaphysical simplicity of the Divine Es- 
sence which does not admit of parts and ac- 
cidents; and, finally, resulting from both, the 
comprehension by God of His own Self or Es- 
sence, iS a consequence of the infinite, absolute 
spirituality, by virtue of which, in God, truth 
must co-incide with knowledge, goodness with 
volition.® 


1 Supra, pp. 230 sqq. et incommutabilis substantia spir- 
2Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, De  ttualis,” 
Fide, c. 1: ‘‘Intellectu ac volun- 8Cfr. Isidor. Hispal., Etymol. 


tate omnique perfectione infinitus VII, 1: “ Deus habet essentiam, 
- (et simul) simpler omnino habet et sapientiam; sed quod 


ea ee ee a 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 331 


The leading characteristic of God’s knowledge is 
doubtless His comprehension of Himself (comprehensio 
sui), which wholly governs and determines His intel- 
lectual life in itself as well as in its relations ad 
extra. From this comprehensive knowledge which God 
has of Himself, flows, as from a fruitful idea matrix, 
the knowledge of all truth and of all truths within and 
without the Divine Essence. The absolute incompre- 
hensibility of the Divine Essence makes it impossible 
for any created or creatable intellect, either in this life 
or in the life beyond, to form a comprehensive notion 
of God. God, and God alone, is able to compass Him- 
self and to exhaust His Essence as the Infinite Truth. 

Sacred Scripture attributes this comprehensive knowl- 
edge to each of the three Divine Persons in particular. 
er Math.) XT)27': “Nemo novit (értywaoxa) Filium 
nisi Pater, neque Patrem quis novit nisi Filius — No one 
knoweth the Son, but the Father: neither doth any one 
know. the’ Father’ but\.the Son:? :)1.\Cor; Il, 104sq.: 
“ Spiritus enim omnia scrutatur, etiam profunda Det (re 
Baby rov Oeov);... quae Det sunt, nemo cognovit 
(éyvoxev) nist Spiritus Det— The Spirit searcheth all 
things, yea, the deep things of God... the things also 
that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of 
God.” 

Among the Fathers it is especially St. Augustine who 
regards the Logos, or Son, as the adequately comprehen- 
sive image of the Father. For God, he says, to speak 
(dicere) is the same as to comprehend Himself (com- 
prehendere), “ Tanquam seipsum dicens Pater genuit 
habet, hoe et est, et omnia unus est have said supra, on the divine at- 
ac proinde simplex est, quia in eo tributes of substantiality and im- 


non aliquid accidentis est.’ The mutability. 
reader is also referred to what we 


332 MODE OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


Verbum sibi aequale per omnia; non enim seipsum in- 
tegre perfecteque dixisset, si aliquid minus aut amplius 
esset in eius Verbo, quam in ipso — As though uttering 
Himself, the Father begat the word equal to Himself 
in all things; for He would not have uttered Himself 
wholly and perfectly, if there were in His word any- 
thing more or less than in Himself.” 4 

If God comprehends Himself, He must be self-con- 
scious. Our inadequate human mode of conception dis- 
tinguishes the two, by conceiving of God’s self-compre- 
hension as directed to the Divine Essence (cognitio di- 
recta), and His self-consciousness as bearing on the 
operation of the Divine Intellect (cognitio reflexa). 
God knows Himself — His Substance, His Essence, His 
Nature, and everything that pertains to His knowledge 
or the exercise of His intellect; and this self-knowledge 
naturally implies consciousness of the Ego,—a truth 
which needs to be emphasized in view of the Pantheistic 
fallacy that the Divine self-consciousness is enkindled 
by God’s (immanent) production of the created uni- 
verse. This absurd and heretical notion of “a gradual 
awakening of the divine consciousness” is incompat- 
ible with God’s most fundamental attribute, 7. e., 
self-existence, and was refuted by Aristotle when he 
defined the Divinity as “ véyous vopoews.” God Himself 
has revealed the reality of His consciousness by His 
inimitable effatum: “Ego sum qui sum—I am who 
am.’”’* Not only the Godhead in the oneness of Its 
nature, but likewise each of the three Divine Persons 
possesses self-consciousness and gives expression to it 
by the word “I.”® However, we must beware of the 
“4De Trinit., XV, 14, 23 (Had- 6Thus the Father: Math. III, 


dan’s translation, p. 407). 17: “ Hic est filius meus dilectus, 
5 Ex, III, 14. in quo mihi complacui— This is 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 333 


gross error which the school of Gtinther at one time 
propagated among the theologians of Germany,— that 
consciousness formally constitutes personality. If this 
were so, then we should have to distinguish in Jesus 
Christ, who had both a divine and a human conscious- 
ness, two separate persons, and in the Godhead three 
distinct Natures, because of the trinity of the (relative) 
self-consciousness, and but one Person on account of 
the oneness of God’s (absolute) consciousness. This 
would spell, on the one hand, Nestorianism; on the 
other, Tritheism or Sabellianism. In matter of fact, 
as there is in God but one Nature, so He has only 
one consciousness, which belongs to all three Divine 
Persons per modum identitatis, and by virtue of which. 
each separate Hypostasis, and all three Hypostases to- 
gether, are aware of their existence and their infinite 
perfection. If, therefore, consciousness is multiplied ac- 
cording to natures, not according to persons, it follows 
inevitably that consciousness and self-comprehension in 
God coincide in the same manner as being and cogni- 
tion.? Hence in the Godhead: being = thought = com- 
prehensio sut = consciousness.® 


Thesis II: By virtue of His infinite comprehension 
of His own Essence, God in and through Himself 
also knows all extra-divine truths, in such manner that 
truth is dependent on Him, not He on truth. 


Proof. This thesis consists of two distinct 
parts. In the first, God’s self-comprehension is 


my beloved Son, in whom I am bam — Separate me Saul and Barna- 

well pleased.” The Son: John X, bas.” - 

30: ‘“‘ Ego et pater unum sumus — q Cfr. Franzelin, De Verbo In- 

I and the Father are one.” And carnato, 3rd ed., Rome 1881, pp. 

the Holy Ghost: Acts XIII, 2: 249 sqq. \ 

“ Segregate miht Saulum et Barna- 8Cfr. Otten, Apologie des gitt- 
lichen Bewusstseins, Paderborn 1897. 


334 MODE OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


made to comprise within its radius the entire 
domain of truth external to His Essence; while 
in the second, the relation of the former to the 
latter is defined more clearly by excluding. all 
real dependency of God on the objects of His 
knowledge. 


The question here at issue, therefore, is not: How 
many and what classes of truths form the object of 
Divine Knowledge, but: How does God know the sey- 
eral truths, the possible and the real, the present and 
the future, etc.? Our thesis answers this question in a 
twofold way. (1) Positively: God knows all truths 
in and through Himself, that is to say, by virtue of 
His own Essence and His self-comprehension; (2) neg- 
atively: the truths which He knows do not really affect 
His knowledge. Inasmuch as the Church has never 
defined the mode of divine cognition, and her magis- 
terium ordinarium teaches nothing definite on this sub- 
ject as of faith, we cannot assert our thesis to be de 
fide, though we can surely claim for it the value of a 
theological conclusion. All theological schools unani- 
mously uphold God’s absolute independence of the ob- 
jects of His knowledge, as a corollary from the divine 
attributes of self-existence and infinite perfection. 


I. It is not difficult to demonstrate that God 
must know all truths without exception by 
reason of His self-comprehension. According 
to the axiom: “Ens et verum convertuntur,” 
truth is co-extensive with being. Now, what- 
ever 1s, 1s either God, or something external to 
God. The things external to God can be di- 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 335 


vided into two classes: the possible and the 
actually existing. We know from the preceding 
thesis that God has an adequate knowledge of 
all divine being by reason of His comprehension 
of His own Essence. As for the two classes of 
extra-divine beings, the possibles depend on the 
Divine Essence as their exemplary cause, while 
the actually existing things depend on the same 
not only as their exemplary but also as their 
efficient and final cause. As, therefore, God 
comprehends His own Essence, which is the ex- 
emplary, the efficient, and the final cause of all 
things outside of Himself, so by virtue of His 
comprehensio sui He must envisage these things 
one and all in His own Essence. | 


To prove this thesis from Revelation, we must fall 
back on the attribute of divine omnipotence. If God can 
do whatever does not imply an intrinsic contradiction, 
then His omnipotence is co-extensive with being, that is, 
with the sphere of possible being. Even the things that 
now actually exist, prior to the moment of their creation 
or realization were merely possible. Now, God en- 
visages His omnipotence in His own Essence, of which 
it is an attribute; consequently he must also perceive 
in His Essence whatever comes within the.scope of His 
omnipotence, viz.: all real and all possible things. Cfr. 
Ecclus. XXIII, 29: “ Domino Deo, antequam crearen- 
tur, omnia sunt agnita, sic et post perfectum respicit 
omnia (xpw i xriocOjvat Ta mavTa éyvwotar dvTd, ovTws Kat 
peta. TO ovvreAnoOnver)— For all things were known to 
the Lord God, before they were created, so also after 


336 MODE OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


they were perfected he beholdeth all things.”® The 
following quotation from St. Augustine’s treatise De 
Genesi ad Lit., is often cited in this connection: “ Sicut 
vidit, ita fecit. Non praeter seipsum videns, sed in 
seipso, ita enumeravit omnia, quae fecit. .. . Nota ergo 
fecit, non facta cognovit. Proinde antequam ferent, 
et erant et non erant: erant in Dei scientia, non erant 
in sua natura.” 1° The Schoolmen, under the leadership 
of St. Thomas, defended the thesis: “ Deus intellectu 
suo intelligtt se principaliter, et in se intelligit omnia 
alia— God with His understanding knows Himself in 
the first place, and in Himself perceives all other 
things.” 14 | 


2. If God, as we have just shown, by virtue 
of His self-comprehension, knows all extra- 
divine things (or truths) in His Essence, it fol- 
lows as a matter of course that He is nowise de- 
pendent on the objects of His knowledge. 


A created intellect cannot perceive an object without 
being influenced by it. The object, as the Scholastic 
phrase runs, determines the intellect. Not so the 
Divine Intellect, which, in perceiving Itself as well as 
the things outside Itself, is determined only by Itself. 
‘Therefore no extra-divine truth in its relation to God 
can ever be a causa determinans, though it may be a 
conditio sine qua non. In other words: The things 
outside of God are merely the terminus, but in no 
sense the cause of Divine Knowledge. Or, as the 
Scholastics put it: “Objecta alia a Deo terminant 

9Cfr. Wisdom VII, 2:1 sqq.; 10 De Gen. ad Lit., V, 35 sa. 


Proy. VIII, 22 sqq.; John I, 3 11 Cfr. Rickaby, Of God.and His 
sqq., and other similar passages. Creatures, DP. 57. 


THE DIVINE ATT RIBUTHS 337 


quidem intellectum divinum, sed non determinant — The 
objects existing outside of God terminate, but they do 
not determine, the Divine Intellect.” To assume that 
the Divine Intellect could be influenced by truths ex- 
isting outside of Itself, would be tantamount to assert- 
ing that God is essentially dependent on the created 
universe, which would be to deny His self-existence. 
There is nothing outside the Divine Essence which 
can determine God’s knowledge, just as there is noth- 
ing external to Him that can determine His being; for 
both His knowledge and His being are self-existing. 
It follows that the Divine Intellect can be determined 
only from within, that is to say, by the Divine Essence 
Itself. However, we must not conceive of this process 
as a real influence exerted by God’s Essence upon His 
Intellect, lest we fall into the mistake, already censured, 
of taking aseitas to mean self-realization in the strict 
sense of that term. God, being pure actuality (actus 
purissimus), cannot in any sense be conceived as po- 
tential. Cfr. 1 John I, 5: “Deus lux est et tenebrae 
in eo non sunt ullae — God is light, and in Him there 
is no darkness.” To say that God is determined from 
within, can, therefore, only mean that His knowl- 
edge is determined by His essence in the same way 
as His existence.* The doctrine we are here defend- 
ing has found pointed, not to say graphic, expression 
in the writings of those Fathers of the Church who 
hold that God does not know the things outside Him- 
self because they exist, but they exist because He knows 
them. “ Universas creaturas suas, et spirituales et cor- 
porales,” says St. Augustine, “non quia sunt ideo novit, 
sed ideo sunt quia novit; non enim nescivit quae fuerat 
creaturus — And with respect to all His creatures, both 


12 Cfr, Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogm., Vol. II, p. 93. 


338 MODE OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


spiritual and corporeal, He does not know them because 
they are, but they are because He knows them. For 
He was not ignorant of what He was about to create.” 1% 
Similarly St. Gregory the Great: “Quae sunt, non in 
aeternitate eius ideo videntur quia sunt; sed ideo sunt 
quia videntur — The things that are, are not seen in 
His eternity because they are, but they are because He 
sees them.” ** These authorities do not mean to deny 
that the things outside of God are actually the terminus 
of Divine knowledge; for there can be no knowledge 
without an object; but they certainly do deny that the 
“objecta alia a Deo” exercise a causal influence upon 
the knowledge of God; in other words, that God’s knowl- 
edge is dependent upon its objects, 


3. The proposition of the Schoolmen: “Di- 
vina essentia est objectum formale et primarium, 
omnia alia vera sunt objectum materiale et se- 
cundarium divinae cognitionis,” is merely a dif- 
ferent way of formulating our thesis. 


The formal object of a vital faculty is that which 
determines the faculty to act and imparts to it its own 
specific perfection. Such is, for instance, color with 
respect to the eye. The material object is that which 
is viewed in the light of the formal object, and comes 
within the purview of a faculty only from that par- 
ticular coign of vantage, as, e. g., bodily substance and 
magnitude, which the eye.can perceive only ratione 
coloris. Similarly the primary object is that which is 
apprehended by a faculty primo et per se, and to which 

18S. Augustin., De Trinit., XV, 14Greg. M., Moral., XX, 29, n. 


13, 22. Haddan’s translation, p. 63. 
406. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 339 


whatever else is apprehended (obtectum secundarium) 
must be referred as to its principle. Hence a formal 
object must always be primary; a material object, sec- 
ondary. Mutatis mutandis the same terminology may 
be employed in defining the object of any other science, 
as, for instance, geometry or metaphysics. 

Now, if God’s knowledge receives its peculiar form 
and perfection not from without, but from the Divine 
Essence itself, and if it is the Divine Essence alone 
which determines the Intellect of God and so renders 
His knowledge truly divine; then the truths outside of 
God cannot possibly constitute the formal object of His 
knowledge; hence they must be its material object, be- 
cause, being truths, they cannot be unknown to Him 
Who is All-Truth. We say, material object, and nothing 
more; for, whether, e. g., the world exists or no, can- 
not in any wise affect the perfection of God’s knowl- 
edge, because in neither case would God’s knowledge 
be increased or diminished, either materially or formally.*® 
For precisely the same reason God’s Essence is the 
primary, and the things that exist outside of it are 
merely secondary objects of His knowledge. 

Kleutgen?® points out a beautiful parallel. If we 
take theology as the subjective knowledge of things di- 
vine, he says, the most accomplished theologian can be 
none other than God Himself, whereas theological knowl- 
edge on earth grows in nobility and perfection accord- 
ing as a man learns to consider all things in the light 


15 Cfr. St. August., De Trinit. way than He knew them when still 
XV, 13: ‘Non aliter ea scivit to be created, for nothing accrued 
creata quam creanda; non enim to His wisdom from them; but that 


eius sapientiae aliquid accessit ex 
eis, sed illis existentibus sicut opor- 
tebat et quando oportebat, illa per- 
mansit, ut erat Nor did He know 
them when created in any other 


wisdom remained as it was, while 
they came into existence as it was 
fitting and when it was fitting.” 

16 De Ipso Deo, p. 259. 


340 MODE OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


of the Divine, and reaches its final culmination in the 
beatific vision vouchsafed only in Heaven.1? 


Thesis III: God knows the things external to Him- 
self not only in His own Essence, but also as they are 
in themselves. 

Proof. The things outside of God have a two- 
fold being, to wit: ideal or eminent being, in the 
Essence and Knowledge of God, and real or 
formal being, in their own reality and individual 
determination. 


1. Purely possible being (ens possibile) has objective 
existence only in the first-mentioned sense. It is some- 
thing ideal, lacking actual existence, though capable of be- 
ing conceived as existing; e. g., a galloping centaur. 


Actual being, on the other hand, besides ideal also has 


real being, inasmuch as that which was merely possible 
has become actually existing. It is easy to see that the 
ideal being of the possibles objectively coincides with 
the Divine Essence itself. The infinitely variable imi- 
tability of that Essence furnishes the basis for an 
infinite number of prototypes, which the Divine Intel- 
lect conceives as archetypes of creatable things, and 
which the Divine Will by its creative power is able to 
posit outside of itself as so many ectypes. It must be 
noted, however, that the purely possible, even before 
its realization, does not merely possess an indistinct sort 
of being, but is as definitely stamped and as individually 
determined in its archetype as after it has become exist- 
ent. Goethe was able with his eyes closed to summon 
before his imagination a full-blown rose and he derived as 


17 Cfr. also Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 38; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. 
Dogmat., Vol. II, thes. 33. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 341 


much pleasure from contemplating its various beauties 
as though he held a real flower in his hand. 

The question next suggests itself, whether the knowl- 
edge of the omniscient God is limited to the ideal or 
eminent being of extra-divine things as reflected in His 
Essence, or whether His intellectual vision penetrates 
to the real, formal or individually determined being 
which objects have, or can have, in themselves. In 
formulating the question thus, we do not, of course, 
mean to deny the independence of the Divine Knowl- 
edge, which we have proved in the preceding thesis. 
Like the individually determined being of the purely 
possible, the real or formal being of actually existing 
things can be the terminus, but never the cause of 
divine cognition, Hence we have formulated our pres- 
ent thesis in this wise: “God knows the things out- 
side of Himself, not only in His own Essence, but 
also as they are in themselves (not: but also in them- 
selves).” I know of but one theologian who denies 
that God’s knowledge extends to things as they are 
in themselves; viz.: Aureolus, who says:18 “Si quae- 
ratur, an Deus sic intelligat quod intuitum suum ferat 
super essentiam [suam] et ex hoc procedat ulterius 
usque ad creaturam, ita quod sint duo intuita: Deus 
et creatura, sic nullo modo concedi potest, quod Deus 
intelligat creaturas.”® It is not difficult to refute this 
obviously false view. 


2. If God knew the things outside Himself 
only in their ideal or eminent being, He would 
really know nothing beyond His own Essence; 
the real, formal being of existing things, and 


18In Mag. 1, dist. 35, p. 2, art. 2. 


342 MODE OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


the concretely individualized being of the purely 
possibles, as they are or can be m themselves, 
would remain hidden from Him. Consequently, 
there would be something knowable which God 
did not know, and it would be precisely that 
which created intelligences are so well able to 
know, because they direct their mind’s eye to the 
real, formal, and determinate being as it exists 
outside the Divine Essence. Now, the assump- 
tion that anything knowable eludes the knowl- 
edge of God, or that the created mind com- 
mands a wider range than the infinite intellect 
of the Creator, is preposterous as well as de- 
rogatory to the dignity of the Most High. 
There is this further consideration. God must 
needs know created things in the same manner 
in which He creates, or can create, them. Now, 
the object and end of God’s creative activity is 
not the ideally-eminent, but the really-formal 
being of extra-divine objects. Consequently, 
God not only knows the former but also the 
latter. It is solely from this point of view that 
we can understand such revealed texts as these: 
“For he beholdeth the ends of the world, and 
looketh on all things that are under heaven, who 
made a weight for the winds, and weighed the 
waters by measure, when he gave a law for the 
rain, and a way for the sounding storms. Then 
he saw it, and declared, and prepared, and 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 343 


searched it.” *® Again: ‘Who telleth the num- 
ber of the stars, and calleth them by all their 
names ... and of his wisdom there is no num- 
a a ey 


A question quite apart from the one just treated is 
whether God perceives the real and formal being of the 
things outside His Essence immediately in these things 
themselves, or mediately in and through His own Es- 
sence. We shall treat this point later, when we come 
to discuss the medium of divine cognition.” 


Thesis IV: God’s knowledge of the things outside 
Himself is an adequately comprehensive knowledge, 
and is invested with that absolute infallibility which 
flows from metaphysical certainty. 

This thesis enunciates an article of faith. 

Proof. God has an adequately comprehensive 
knowledge not only of His own Essence, but 
of whatever exists or can exist. By an ade- 
quately comprehensive knowledge we mean one 
which exhausts its object so completely that the 
entire cognoscibility of that object becomes as 
it were absorbed by cognition. A knowledge 
that is not adequately comprehensive always in- 
cludes some remnant of uncomprehended being. 


Thus a mathematician has no adequately comprehen- 
sive knowledge of a triangle so long as he has not thor- 


19 Job XXVIII, 24 sqq. Cfr. also S. Thom., Contr. Gent. 
20 Ps, CXLVI, 4 sq. Cfr. Hebr. I, c. 49 sqq. 
IV, 13. For the teaching of St. 21 § 3, infra. 


Augustine, see the preceding thesis, 


344 MODE OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


oughly mastered the geometrical propositions concerning 
triangles and their relations to parallel lines, the circle, 
the square, etc.,— a mastery which, needless to say, can- 
not be acquired in this life. 

1. We call God’s knowledge scientia, in order to 
indicate that it excludes, on the one hand, doubt, and 
on the other, mere opinion and suspicion. Doubt 
(dubium) is that state of mind in which one hesitates 
between two contradictory members of a judgment, as, 
for instance, in trying to solve the question whether 
the number of existing stars is odd or even. Opinion 
(opimo) is a judgment which the mind accepts for 
weighty reasons, though unable to rid itself of the fear 
that its contrary may be true; as, for instance, in as- 
senting to a proposition regarding space in the mth 
dimension. Suspicion (suspicio), like doubt, is no true 
judgment, but merely an inclination, based on weak 
grounds, to prefer one member of an alternative to the 
other, as, for instance, that this particular person has 
committed “a certain specified crime. Certitude (certi- 
tudo) absolutely excludes the possibility of error, and 
hence spells the true ideal state of the intellect, as, for 
instance, the certainty a man has concerning his own 
existence. We cannot, consequently, conceive of real 
knowledge except as based on certainty. Be it re- 
marked, however, that subjective certitude does not of 
itself engender knowledge, but must have a foundation in 
fact. A man who is moved by prejudice, or swayed 
by his passions, may be subjectively certain, and yet err. 
Subjective certitude must be based upon objective cer- 
tainty, because it is the latter that furnishes the grounds 
for the former. It follows from what we have said 
that certainty may inhere not only in judgments and 
conclusions, but also in the very objects themselves, as 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 345 


when I say: “The fact is certain,” “ This proposition 
is sure.” It is objective certainty that furnishes the 
basis for knowledge and thereby engenders true sub- 
jective certitude. Now, what is objective certainty? It 
is nothing else than the intestine necessity of a thing, 
or, in other words, the impossibility of its contradictory 
being true, as, ¢. g.. 2X 2—4. When this necessity 
remains hidden, there can be no certitude or true knowl- 
edge. When perceived by the intellect, this necessity 
is called evidence, and the intellect must bow to it. 

2. There are three kinds of certitude: metaphysical, 
physical, and moral. The first, which is the strongest, 
rests upon the intrinsic impossibility of the contradictory 
proposition, and is often called mathematical. Physical 
certitude is based upon the necessary operation of the 
contingent laws of nature (¢. g., the sun is hot). It 
is inferior to metaphysical certitude, because the mo- 
mentary suspension of any law of nature (as, e. g., 
in the case of the three children in the fiery fur- 
nace), diminishes the impossibility. The weakest of the 
three is moral certitude, which rests merely on the con- 
stancy and universality governing the conduct of free 
beings, who — despite occasional exceptions — as a rule 
follow their inborn inclinations (as, e. g., mothers 
love their children). Though the necessity upon which 
moral certitude rests, and which may ultimately be 
traced to the watchfulness of Divine Providence, may 
at any moment be broken through by the free will of 
man, yet the propositions derived from it remain cer- 
tain in their moral generality, as, e. g., that the majority 
of mothers will always love their offspring. Verisimili- 
tude, or probability (verisimilitudo, probabilitas) dif- 
fers from certitude in all of its three stages, though 


we often refer to a particularly high degree of it as 
23 ae 


346 MODE OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


“moral certitude.” It lacks necessity: there is no 
guaranty that the contradictory proposition may not be 
true. The mathematical formula for probability is 
W =: 2 (p designating favorable, possible instances). 
With the number of favorable instances (the denomina- 
tor remaining the same), probability increases until, p 
becoming equal to n, it changes into certitude: W= 
f= 52=1. The figure 1 is consequently termed 
“the symbol of certitude.” Probability does not rest 
on necessity, and therefore does not per se engender 
certitude; but it is to be noted that a mathematical 
judgment concerning the a priori degree of prob- 
ability of an event is always metaphysically certain, 
even though concrete predictions based upon a probable 
calculation frequently miss the mark. Inasmuch as 
God knows all things with metaphysical certitude, it is 
not sufficient to attribute to His intellect the absolute 
certainty proper to mathematical judgments. He has and 
must have an absolutely infallible knowledge of each and 
every individual event; else His knowledge would be 
little more than a calculation based on probabilities. 

3. An intelligence is infallible if it cannot err. From 
this definition it is evident that the formal characteristic 
of infallibility (infallibilitas) is not the mere fact of not- 
erring (imerrantia), just as the formal characteristic of 
impeccability (impeccabilitas) is not actual freedom 
from sin (impeccantia). Infallibility not only implies 
posse non errare, but non posse errare. It may be 
either absolute or relative, according as it is unlimited, 
comprising all truths without exception, or limited in 
extension and derivative in regard to its contents. Ab- 
solute infallibility postulates an infinite being, in whom 
truth and subsistent reason are identical. Relative 
infallibility is proper to the human intellect, which, 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 347 


created as it is for the truth, is infallible when guided 
by the general criterion of evidence. To deny this 
would plunge mankind into scepticism. Besides the 
natural infallibility, which we have been considering, 
there is a supernatural infallibility, which is a gift of 
Divine Grace. Such was the prophetic and charismatic 
infallibility of the Old Testament seers, and of the 
Apostles; such to-day is the infallibility of the ecclesias- 
tical teaching office in matters of faith and morals, no 
matter whether it enunciates its decisions by the magis- 
tertum ordinarium of daily instruction, or in a solemn 
definition by an ecumenical council, or in an ex cathedra 
pronouncement on the part of the Roman Pontiff. This 
explains the practical importance of divine, as the foun- 
dation of derived, infallibility. 


4. After the foregoing explanations it will not 
be difficult to prove our thesis, which not only 
avers that God knows all things outside Him- 
self im globo,” but that He has an adequate 
comprehension of each one of them individually. 
If He had no such adequate comprehension, 
some things would be unknown to Him, and 
He would either remain in eternal ignorance 
of them, or be compelled constantly to acquire 
new knowledge. The former assumption is 
repugnant to His infinite perfection, the lat- 
ter to His absolute immutability. Cfr. Ecclus. 
AMATX | 24. sqq:: <The works:of all flesh, [2, ¢., 
all men] are before him, and there is nothing hid 
from his eyes; he seeth from eternity to eternity, 


22 Cfr. First Thesis, supra. 


348 MODE OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


and there is nothing wonderful before him.” In 
its innermost essence this comprehensive cog- 
nition is true knowledge—exempt from doubt, 
opinion, and suspicion. It is in consequence 
metaphysically certain ; for metaphysical certitude 
alone can wholly eliminate the possibility of 
error. For the same reason the knowledge of 
God must ultimately culminate in absolute in- 
fallibility, which positively excludes all possi- 
bility of error. Cfr. Hebr. IV, 13: “Non est 
ulla creatura invisibilis in conspectu eius; omnia 
autem nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius—Neither 
is there any creature invisible in his sight; but 
all things are naked and open to his eyes.” The 
possibility of erring would entail the possibility 
of correcting errors, and this could not be made 
to square with the immutability of God’s knowl- 


edge and Essence.?? 


eran e EF Es 
23 Consult here the passages from cited in § 2. Cfr. also Conc. Vati- 
Sacred Scripture and the Fathers can., Sess. III, cap. 1, “ De Deo,” 


Dee PEON, 2 


THE OBJECTS OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE— 
OMNISCIEN CE 


Being absolutely simple, and therefore indivisi- 
ble, God’s Knowledge can be distinguished only 
in respect of its objects. Inasmuch as, and be- 
cause, God knows whatever is and can be, He 
is called the Omniscient (ommiscwus). 


A common division of the Knowledge of God is that 
into scientia necessaria and scientia libera, according as 
its object is something absolutely necessary (e. g., 
God, or the purely possible), or exists by virtue of the 
free will of the Creator (¢. g., the physical universe). 

Of particular importance is the distinction between 
God’s Knowledge of simple intelligence (scientia sim- 
plicis intelligentiae), which has for its object the purely 
possible (1 e., the metaphysical essences, abstract 
truths) ; and His knowledge of vision (scientia visionis), 
which, as a spiritual “ seeing,’ terminates on every thing 
actually existing. Between these two, the Molinists 
have placed a third, the famous scientia media, which, 
holding the “middle” between the purely possible and 
the really actual, is supposed to comprehend the free 
acts of the future which intelligent beings would perform 
under certain conditions, though as a matter of fact 
many of them never will be performed, because the con- 


349 


350 OMNISCIENCE 


ditions will not be realized. The Thomists refuse to 
admit the scientia media; but by disputing among them- 
selves whether the conditionally future free actions of 
rational creatures (actus liberi futuribiles) belong to 
the scientia simplicis intelligentiae or to the scientia 
visionis,: they seem virtually to admit that there is room 
for such a distinction. 

A further distinction, between scientia approbationis 
and scientia improbationis, is based upon the Will of God 
rather than upon His Knowledge. God wills and ap- 
proves all good things and deeds which He sees, while 
He disapproves —or, in the language of Holy Scrip- 
ture, “knows not,’ “ignores”—the bad. Cfr. Math. 
XXV, 12: “Amen dico vobis, nescio vos — Amen I 
say to you, I know you not.” 


Abstracting from the Divine Substance, which, 
after what we have already said, we may leave 
out of consideration here, there are to be dis- 
tinguished four groups of objects outside of God, 
viz.: (1) the purely possible; (2) those which 
actually exist, including the free actions of ra- 
tional creatures past and present; (3) the free 
future acts of these creatures; and (4) the free 
acts conditionally future, which are held to form 
the object of the scientia media. 


1 Billuart, De Deo, diss. 6, art.5, obj. 3. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 351 


ARTICLE T 


OMNISCIENCE AS GOD’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE PURELY 
POSSIBLE 


I. [HE TEACHING OF DIVINE REVELATION.— 
Whatever has real existence was before its real- 
ization merely possible, and after its disparition 
will return to that state. Hence the possible is 
co-extensive with truth or being. 

Intrinsic possibility is predicable of the Di- 
vine Essence, though, needless to insist, it nec- 
essarily coincides with the existence of God. 
From these considerations it is manifest that the 
possible constitutes the adequate and total object 
of the scientia simplicis intelligentiae. The as- 
sumption that any truth whatsoever can elude 
the Divine Omniscience, has been condemned as 
heretical. Consequently it is an article of faith 
that God knows whatever is possible. This 
dogma can be easily proved from Holy Scrip- 
ture. Job XIII, 9: “Deum celare nihil potest 
—God ... from whom nothing can be con- 
cealed | Ds. CXMNYV LP ige Te Copnovisyt 
omnmia—Thou hast known all things.” Or the 
prayer of Esther (Esth. XIV, 14): “Domine, 
qui habes omnium scientiam—O Lord, who hast 
the knowledge of all things.” If these passages 
left any doubt as to whether or not the knowl- 
edge of God includes the realm of the purely 


352 OMNISCIENCE 


possible, such doubt would be dispelled by 
Ecclus. XXIII, 29: “Domino Deo, antequam 
crearentur, omnia sunt agniia—For all things 
were known to the Lord God, before they were 
created,” and Rom. IV, 17: “Vocat ea quae 
non sunt, tamquam ea quae sunt—God... 
calleth those things that are not, as those that 
are.’ Moreover, it is plain that God’s adequate 
conception of His own omnipotence must neces- 
sarily exhaust the fullness of that attribute, 7. ¢., 
comprise everything possible. Cfr. Matth. XIX, 
26: “Apud Deum ommia possibtlia sunt—W ith 
God all things are possible.” ? 

2. THE INFINITE MULTITUDE OF POSSIBLE 
Tuincs.—As there is a confusing multiplicity of 
possible things (species, individuals, series, ac- 
tions, etc.), God’s knowledge actually extends to 
a multitude which is infinite. 


a) Ruiz calls this deduction “certissima et fidet 
proxima.”® It is obvious that the totality of possible 
objects, at the attempted contemplation of which the 
human intellect reels,t cannot be expressed by any finite 
number, and that it must, therefore, be infinite. St. 
Thomas expressly teaches this: “Deus scit non solum 
ea quae actu sunt, sed etiam quae sunt in potentia vel 
sua vel creaturae; haec autem constat esse infinita.” © 

2 For further information, consult Deo, IV, 3 sqq.) and Ruiz (De 
our chapter on the attribute of Scientia Dei, disp. 9, sect. 3). 
Omnipotence; also § 1, proposition 8 De Scientia Det, disp. 20, sect. 1. 
2, supra. Many pertinent quotations 4Cfr. Lessius, De Perfect. Div., 


from the writings of the Fathers Nites 
have been collected by Petavius (De 55. Theol., ta, qui 14, artf-12. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 353 


Long before him St. Augustine had written: “ Infinitas 
itaque numert, quamvis infinitorum numerorum nullus 
sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei, cuius 
imtelligentiae non est numerus.’*® Though it is impossible 
that there should actually exist an infinite number of sub- 
stances and accidents, yet their possible qualities and 
mutations, nay, even their real variations and actions in 
the course of an infinitely prolonged existence — God 
destroys no essences— cannot be expressed in finite 
numbers.” 

b) There is another question of a more philosophical 
character, which cannot be solved by theological argu- 
ments; namely, whether the multitude of objects com- 
prised by the Knowledge of God is actually or only 
potentially infinite* The older school of theologians, 
headed by Aquinas,® and comprising the famous Jesuit 
writers Pallavicini, Suarez, De Lugo, etc., held that 
it is actually infinite. Of late years, however, it has 
become the fashion to deny that there can be such a 
thing as an actually infinite multitude, because “ the 
very term involves an intrinsic contradiction.” Until 
lately Msgr. Gutberlet and the author of this volume 
were probably the only theological writers among mod- 
erns who defended the possibility of an actually in- 
finite multitude° To my mind the following argu- 
ment is absolutely irrefutable: The possible things of 
which God has knowledge are either finite, or poten- 
tially infinite, or actually infinite. That they are not 
finite, is self-evident. They cannot be potentially in- 

6 De Civitate Dei, XII, 18. 8 Vide supra, p. 190. 


% Cici St. Thom.,. 2.3" Deus 9 Contr. Gent., I, 69; De Verit., 
Scit etiam cogitationes et affectiones Qe Dis art. so. 


_ cordium, quae in infinitum multi- 10 Cfr. Der Katholik, Mainz 1880. 


blicabuntur, creaturis rationalibus 
bermanentibus absque fine.” 


354 OMNISCIENCE 


finite, because God does not conceive an infinite multitude 
after the manner of creatures, 7. e., by a series of succes- 
sive concepts, but simultaneously in one act. Conse- 
quently, they must be actually infinite. Those who 
ascribe to the Divine Intellect a distributive, but deny it a 
collective, knowledge of all possibles, and who try to jus- 
tify this subtle distinction by pointing to the impossibility 
of the whole collection co-existing, confuse the logical 
with the physical order. The possibility of co-existing in 
the intellect does not argue the possibility of co-existing 
in rerum natura. The fact that God perceives an in- 
finite multitude of things, does not argue that all these 
things, with their various contradictory determinations, 
can actually exist as an infinite multitude. Though 
God might, for example, in His Divine Intellect. com- 
bine into one infinite multitude the future acts of Judas 
the traitor, nevertheless these acts in reality constitute 
a series which is always actually finite and only po- 
tentially infinite. As Ruiz pointedly puts it: “ Actus 
ili constituunt unum totum infinitum potentiale succes- 
sivum quantum ad realem essentiam et existentiam; sed 
hoc totum in scientia est simul infinitum actuale, quoniam 
simul totum cognoscitur.” #2 All these acts can be gath- 
ered into a logical whole, because they coincide in the 
general note of being, and also in another note, which 
may be called “ homogeneous psychic coincidence.” ** 


Vp Cir StiPhomi; Se Theols sh -c.; 
ad. 1: ‘‘ Deus autem non sic cog- 
noscit infinitum vel infinita, quasi 
enumerando partem post partem, 
cum cognoscat omnia simul, non 
successive.” 


12 De Scientia Dei, disp. 20, sect. 
3. 

13 Cfr. Gutberlet, Das Unendliche, 
metaphysisch und mathematisch be- 
trachtet, Mainz 1878; E. Illigens, 
Die unendliche Zahl und die Mathe- 
matik, Miinster 1893. 


THE. DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 359 


ARTICLE 2 


OMNISCIENCE AS GOD’S KNOWLEDGE OF VISION OF ALL 
CONTINGENT BEINGS — CARDIOGNOSIS, OR 
SEARCHING OF HEARTS 


I, STATE OF THE QUESTION.—In the innumer- 
able multitude of possible things there are some 
which the creative will of God has (either im- 
mediately or mediately) endowed with actual 
being. In so far as these exist, they form the 
object of the scientia visionis. 


a) Contingent actuality, that is to say, the created 
universe, consists of two large groups of beings, viz.: 
the free intelligences (angels, men), and the unfree 
creatures (plants, brute animals, inanimate matter). 
The latter are determined by intrinsic necessity, while 
the intelligent beings of the first-mentioned group gen- 
erally speaking have free control over their actions. 
These actions cannot for this very reason be known a 
priori, as effects necessarily flowing from a cause. De- 
spite this fact, however, the Omniscient God has just 
as clear and definite a knowledge of the acts of such 
free beings, as he has of those of His unfree creatures, 
no matter whether these acts are past, present, or 
future. To Him time is not. In virtue of His un- 
divided eternity, which co-exists with all three modes 
of time, He contemplates the past and the future as 
though they were actually present. We, because of the 
imperfect character of our conception of divine things, 
are compelled to make a distinction between the after 
knowledge by which God knows the past, the knowledge 


356 KNOWLEDGE OF VISION 


whereby He contemplates the present (especially car- 
diognosis, so-called, whereby He knows the innermost 
secrets of the human mind and heart), and His knowl- 
edge of the future, in particular of the free acts of His 
rational creatures. The last-mentioned mode, on account 
of its importance and difficulty, we shall treat in a series 
of separate Articles. 

b) To our creatural knowledge of contingent beings 
it is by no means immaterial whether an event belongs 
to past history, or happens before our eyes, or will 
take place in the future. God is by His very essence 
determined to the knowledge of all truths, including 
the future, but the created intellect is causally de- 
pendent upon the things themselves. It is for this 
reason that, while historical research familiarizes us 
with many facts of the past, and daily experience un- 
rolls to our gaze a great variety of contemporary 
events, our predictions of the future are perforce vague 
guesses and uncertain conjectures. There is but one 
extremely limited sphere in which men are able to 
forecast future events, viz.: that division of astronomy 
which deals with eclipses of the sun and moon, to 
which may be added meteorological forecasts of the 
weather for a few days ahead. Such predictions are 
sure only because, and in so far as, they are based 
upon laws of nature whose uniform and necessary ac- 
tion we are able to some extent to gauge. Laplace’s 
fictitious magician, who by means of a magic “ world 
formula” was able to control the course of events 
forward and backward, and to indicate the precise pos- 
ture of all atoms at any given moment, was nothing 
but a fine product of his author’s imagination ; — unless 
indeed we identify him with the Creator of the uni- 
verse, though even the Creator Himself would find the 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 357 


Laplacian “world formula” utterly inadequate to 
fathom the free decisions of intelligent beings. For 
where there is no necessary connexion between cause 
and effect, there can be no infallibly certain foreknowl- 
edge. The free will of man, even when strongly in- 
clined to a certain decision, may yet, at the last mo- 
ment, make a different choice, and thus belie the 
cleverest prognostication based on a knowledge of 
causes and motives. In considering the knowledge of 
God, therefore, it is absolutely necessary that we dis- 
tinguish between free and necessary causes, since only 
the latter offer a sure basis of calculation, Nothing but 
the false theory of absolute determinism can disre- 
gard this essential distinction, which is rooted in the 
very Essence of God. True, from the well known bent 
of a person a good judge of human nature can predict 
his free-will actions with more or less certainty; but 
no such forecast is ever infallible, since even the most 
determined and obstinate person will sometimes sud- 
denly and unaccountably “change his mind.” Further- 
more, while we may form a fairly correct opinion of 
a man’s character and ethical leanings from his known 
utterances and deeds, yet no mortal can penetrate the 
recesses of the human heart and gain an a priori knowl- 
edge of its most intimate affections. Cardiognosis is a 
prerogative reserved to God alone. 


2, THE TEACHING OF REvVELATION.—Holy 
Scripture contains many and various passages 
which prove that the all-seeing eye of God pierces 
the whole universe, with all its attributes and 
relations, even the most hidden and minute. 
He “telleth the number of the stars,” He “cov- 


8e8 KNOWLEDGE OF VISION 


ereth the Heaven with clouds,” He “maketh 
grass to grow,” He “giveth to beasts their food” 
(Ps. CXLVI); He “beholdeth the ends of the 
world, and looketh on all things that are under 
heaven” (Job XXVIII, 24); “all things are 
naked and open to his eye” (Hebr. IV, 13), etc., 
etc. Such providence, extending to the minut- 
est details of workaday life, necessarily supposes 
a most comprehensive knowledge of all things. 
What is said Gen. I, 31: “And God saw all 
the things that he had made,” is true of all time, 
—past, present, and future. Cfr. Wisdom VIII, 
8: “And if a man desire much knowledge: she 
[7. e., Uncreated Wisdom] knoweth things past, 
and judgeth of things to come: she knoweth the 
subtilties of speeches, and the solutions of argu- 
ments: she. knoweth signs and wonders before 
they be done, and the events of times and ages.” 

3. THE ARGUMENT FROM TRADITION.—It is 
not difficult to prove this truth from Tradition. 
The reader will find the arguments well mar- 
shalled by Petavius, De Deo, IV, 3, and Ruiz, De 
Scientia, de Ideis, de Veritate ac de Vita Dei, 
disp. 9. A hermeneutic difficulty arises from a 
passage in St. Jerome, who would spare “God’s 
majesty” the task of regulating the number of 
enats, fishes, etc., and of watching over their in- 
dividual antics. 


THE ‘DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 359 


“ Absurdum est,’ he says, “ad hoc deducere Det 
maiestatem, ut sciat per momenta singula, quot nascan- 
tur culices quotve moriantur; quae cimicum et pulicum 
et muscarum sit in terra multitudo, quanti pisces in aqua 
natent.” (In Hab., I, 14). This phrase had perhaps 
better have remained unwritten, though it cannot justly 
be cited to impugn the universally accepted Catholic 
teaching, which St. Jerome himself defends in his com- 
mentaries In Jer., XXXII, 26, and In Math., X, 28. 
No doubt he did not wish to deny that God is omnis- 
cient, but merely to say that He does not bestow the same 
paternal care on His itrational creatures as on those 
whom He has endowed with reason and redeemed by the 
Blood of His Son.1* | 


3. CARDIOGNOSIS, or SEARCHING OF HEarts.— 
It is a separate and distinct part of the teaching 
of Divine Revelation that the knowledge of God 
extends to the most secret thoughts and affec- 
tions, the most hidden impulses, inclinations, and 
decisions of the human heart. “The searcher 
of hearts and reins is God.” He is therefore 
called “6 KapSoyrierns,” 1* This knowledge of 
hearts is His exclusive privilege. Cfr. 3 Kings 
VIII, 39: “Tu nosti solus cor omnium filiorum 
hominum—Thou only knowest the heart of all 
the children of men.” Divine Revelation does 
not describe “cardiognosis” as a posteriori knowl- 
edge derived from external manifestations, such 


14 Cfr, the question asked by St. God take care for oxen?” See 
Paul in his First Epistle to the also Suarez, De Deo, III, 3, 3. 
Corinthians (IX, 9): ‘“ Numquid EOP Sua des TO. 
de bobus cura est Deo? — Doth 1s Acts XV, 8. 


360 KNOWLEDGE OF VISION 


as speech, facial expression, conduct; but as an 
a priori intuition, which enables God to pierce 
the innermost recesses of the human heart and 
to know man even more intimately than he knows 
himself. Consequently it is preposterous to refer 
to modern thought-reading as an analogous 
phenomenon, :,) Cir): .Eeclus:n XX Th 27 ieque 
“And he [the sinner] understandeth not that 
his [God’s] eye seeth all things ... that the 
eyes of the Lord are far brighter than the 
sun, beholding round about all the ways of men, 
and the bottom of the deep, and looking into the 
hearts of men, into the most hidden parts.” 
Cir. alsovjer. X VIL, 10:0"L am the Lord. who 
search the heart and prove the reins.” 

To illustrate the unanimous teaching of the 
Fathers it will suffice to quote the two oldest 
extant texts bearing on our subject. St. Ig- 
natius of Antioch says: “Ovdey AavOave. tov Kvpov, 
GANG Kal Ta Kp_TTa Huov eyx’s aiTo eorw— Nothing is 
hidden from the Lord, but even that which is 
hidden in us [7. e., our secret thoughts] are near 
to Him.” *7 St. Polycarp expresses himself even 
more clearly: “Tldvra fpov oxoreirar Kat A€AnOev adrov 
ovdey ode AOyiopaV OSE EvvoLwy OSE TL TOV KpUTTaV THS Kapdias 
—RHe clearly perceives all things, and nothing is 
hid from Him, neither reasonings, nor reflections, 
nor any one of the secret things of the heart.” ** 


17 Ad Eph., XV, 3 (ed. Funk). 18 Ad Phil., 4. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 361 


The divine searching of the heart and reins is 
defined by some theologians as supercomprehen- 
sio cordis, that is, a full and “adequate knowl- 
edge of the nature and faculties of the free 
created being, and of all the attracting and re- 
pelling impulses to which it will be subjected pre- 
viously to its choice.” 


ARTICLE 3 


OMNISCIENCE AS GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE FREE 
ACTIONS OF THE FUTURE 


1. THE Docma.—The dogma that God fore- 
knows the free future actions of His intelligent 
creatures comprises two propositions, both of 
which are de fide, viz.: (1) that His Knowledge 
is actual, and (2) that it is infallible. Cfr. Conc. 
Vatte., Sesse [11, cap. tj De Deo: "Omnia 
nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius, etiam ea, quae 
libera creaturarum actione futura sunt—All 
things are naked and open to His eyes, even those 
which are yet to be by the free action of crea- 
tures.” 


We should deny this dogma were we to assert that 
God’s foreknowledge is merely a morally certain knowl- 
edge, or that it is purely presumptive. Sixtus IV 
condemned a proposition put forth by Peter of Rivo, 

19 Boedder, Natural Theology, p. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 


282. For the philosophical argu- I, 68 (summarized by Rickaby, Of 
oe the reader may consult St. God and His Creatures, p. 51). 


362 FUTURE FREE ACTIONS 


to the effect that “Deus non habet notitiam certam de 
significato, quod importat propositio fidei de futuro (e. 
g., Petrus negabtt Christum).”?° The Socinians and 
the followers of Giinther trenched on this dogma by 
questioning the infallibility of God’s foreknowledge. 


a) Holy Scripture not only ascribes to God 
a general foreknowledge of future things,’ but 
it expressly declares that His prescience extends 
to the free acts of the future. 

The classical passage in Psalms CXX XVIII, 
(CXXXIX), 3 sqq.: “Untellexristi cogitationes 
meas de longe ( PITID) . . . omnes vias meas 
praevidistt. . . . Ecce Domine, tu cognovisti om- 
mia, novissima [i. e., futura] et antiqua—Thou 
hast understood my thoughts from afar off, 

. and.thou hast forseen all my ways... . 
Behold, O Lord, thou hast known all things, the 
last (4 e., future) and those of old.” Firmly 
convinced of this truth, the chaste Susanna, 
asserting her innocence against the two wicked 
elders, cried out: “O eternal God, who know- 
est hidden things, who knowest all things before 
they come to pass (pv yevqoews abtév), thou know- 
est that they have borne false witness against 
me.) *?\7 Cir John. Vie 68% 1 Bor Jesus, emew 


20 On Peter a Rivo, cfr. H. Hur- 
ter, Nomenclator Literarius Theolo- 
giae Catholicae, t. II, ed. altera, 
col, 1034, Oeniponte 1906, 

21 Cfr. ‘Is.’ XLVI,, 9. sq.: 
sum Deus... 


“ Ego 
annuntians ab ex- 


ordio novissimum et ab initio quae 

necdum facta sunt—-I am God, 
. who shew from ancient times 

the things that as yet are not done,” 
22 Dan, XIII, 42 sq. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 363 


from the beginning (ie yap &€ dpxns), who they 
were that did not believe, and who he was that 
would betray him.” 

b) In confirmation of this dogma the Fathers 
began early to point to the fulfilled prophecies 
of the Old and New Testament. Prophecy 
manifestly supposes a knowledge of the future 
actions of free agents, so that we may say with 
Tertullian, that all the prophets are witnesses 
to God’s foreknowledge.”* St. Justin Martyr ** 
emphasizes the fact that Christ Himself had 
predicted the persecutions that came upon His 
Church: “Dei opus est, res antequam ferent 
praedicere easque, quemadmodum  praedictae 
fuerunt, ita factas exliber1— And this is the 
work of God, to foretell a thing before it hap- 
pens, and as it was foretold, so to show it hap- 
pening.” 25> Other Fathers infer God’s fore- 
knowledge from His providence, rightly hold- 
ing that there could be no “providentia’ without 
“praescientia.” St. Jerome points out that “Cu 
praescientiam tollis, tollis et divinitatem—lf you 
take away God’s foreknowledge, you deny His 
divinity,” °° and St. Augustine further empha- 
sizes this truth when he writes: “Confiteri esse 
Deum et negare praesciuum futurorum, apertis- 


23 Contra Marcion., Il, 5: ‘“* De 24 Apol., I, n. 12. 

_ praescientia vero quid dicam? 25 Cfr, S. Hilar., De Trinit., IX, 
Quae tantos habet testes, quantos n. 59. 

fecit prophetas.” 26 Adv, Pelag. Dial., 1. ITI. 


304 FUTURE FREE ACTIONS 


sima imsania est... . Qut non est praescius 
omnium futurorum, non est utique Deus—To 
confess that God exists, and at the same time to 
deny that He has foreknowledge of future things, 
is the most manifest folly. ... He who has 
no foreknowledge of all future things, can not 
be God.” "The future, according to Augustine, 
is present to the Divine Intellect in the same 
manner as is the now: “Novit omnia ita, ut 
nec ea quae dicuntur praeterita, 1bi praetereant, 
nec ea quae dicuntur futura, quasi desint, ex- 
spectentur ut veniant, sed et praeterita et futura 
cum praesentibus sint cuncta praesentia—God 
knows all things in such wise that neither what 
we call things past are past therein, nor what 
we call things future are therein waited for as _ 
coming, as though they were absent, but both © 
past and future with things present are all 
present,'! #7 

2. Gop’s FoREKNOWLEDGE IN Its RELATION TO 
Free Witui.—That intelligent creatures are en- 
dowed with free will is as much a revealed 
dogma as that God foreknows their future 
actions, Hence there devolves upon speculative 
theology the duty of reconciling these two dog- 
mas. Does not an infallibly certain prescience on 


2% De Civ. Det,..V,' 9, Me) ly he effective summary of the philosoph; 
28 De Trinit., XV, 7, 13. Oswald ical arguments in proof of this 
(Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. I, pp. 168 dogma. 
sqq., Paderborn 1887) presents an 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 368 


the part of the Almighty destroy, or at least di- 
minish, the freedom of the created will with re- 
gard to its future actions? Future events must 
occur just as God foreknows them, else His 
knowledge would be fallible. 


This objection was first raised by Celsus, who de- 
clared that Jesus was the author of His own betrayal 
at the hands of Judas.?® But if the free actions of 
the future are subject to the law of necessity, they are 
no longer free. Let us first remark that even were 
human reason unable to solve this apparent antinomy, 
this would not be sufficient cause to relinquish either 
of these seemingly contradictory truths. “ Ignorantia 
modi non tollit certitudinem facti.” In matter of fact, 
however, the objection can be solved. 

a) In attempting a solution we must remember that 
God’s foreknowledge no more exercises a compulsory 
influence on the free acts of the future, than does the 
contemporaneous knowledge of any observer on an 
event happening at the present time. The future act 
is not the effect, but the terminus of the divine fore- 
knowledge, which cannot therefore be regarded as 
the determining cause of such act, but is merely di- 
rected to it as a faculty to its object. The foreknowl- 
edge of a future act of the free will no more destroys 
its freedom than would the recollection of a past act 
or the witnessing of a present one.2° Hence many of 
the Fathers, in attempting to solve the difficulty, pro- 
ceed from this principle: “ The future free acts of the 


20 Cfr. Origen., Contr. Celsum, Arb., III, 4: “ Sicut tu memoria 


II, n. 20: ‘‘ Praedixit et omnino tua non cogis facta esse, quae prae- 
fiert debuit (mdvrws expnv ye- terierunt, sic Deus praescientia sua 
péoOat).”” non cogit facienda, quae future 


30 Cfr, St. Augustin, De Lib sunt.” 


366 FUTURE FREE ACTIONS 


will do not come to pass because God foreknows them; 
but, contrariwise, God foresees them because they will 
happen.” As Origen puts it: “Non enim quia cog- 
nmitum est, idcirco fit; sed quia futurum est, est cogni- 
tum;” ** or St. Jerome: “ Non enim ex eo, quod Deus 
scit futurum aliquid, idcirco futurum est; sed quia 
futurum est, Deus novit quasi praescius futurorum,; ” * 
or St. John of Damascus: “[God’s] prescience is not 
the cause of future events; He merely foresees this or 
that act because we shall ib ip ee 
b) The Schoolmen solved the problem by distinguish- 
ing between antecedent and consequent necessity. The 
necessitas antecedens annuls the freedom of the will, 
the necessitas consequens does not; it is merely that his- 
torical necessity which constitutes a free act once per- 
formed as performed and incapable of being undone. 
Future events and acts are also subject in advance to 
this same consequent and historical necessity, because, 
and in as much as it is infallibly certain that they will 
occur, either freely or of necessity. The Portuguese 
revolution of the year 1910 was as historically certain 
twenty years ago as now that it belongs to past. history. 
Yet if some divinely inspired seer had predicted it, would 
any sane man have claimed that the psychological free- 
dom of the anti-clerical Republicans had thereby been 
annulled? The same distinction, though somewhat dif- 
ferently worded, occurs in the writings of the older 
Schoolmen, when they speak of a necessitas consequen- 
tis, which necessitates, and a necessitas consequentiae, 
31 Quoted by Eusebius, Praep. n. 1), Epiphanius (Haer. I, 38, n. 
Evang., 1. VI, p. 287. 6), Cyril of Alexandria (Jn TIoa., 
32 In Ier., XXVI, 3. XL,:9),, and’ many, others.) Cir: 
33 Contr. Manich., n. 79. Simi- also St. Anselm, De Concordia Lib. 


lar passages might be quoted from (4rb., qu. 1, c. 2; Humphrey, “ His 
Chrysostom (In Matth., Hom. 60, Divine Majesty,” pp. 155 sqq. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 367 
which does not. The latter belongs to the divine fore- 
knowledge of free acts.** St. Thomas explains this 
point very luminously in his treatise De Veritate:* 
“Quamvis res in seipsa sit futura, tamen secundum 
modum [Dei] cognoscentis est praesens, et ideo magis 
est dicendum: st Deus scit aliquid, illud est — quam: 
hoc erit. Unde idem est iudicium de ista: si Deus scit 
aliquid, hoc erit—et de hac: si ego video Socratem 
currere, Socrates currit; quorum utrumque est neces- 
sarium, dum est.’ Or, as Father Wm. Humphrey, S. 
J., puts it: ‘‘ God’s foreknowledge stands to our acts, 
as our knowledge stands to objects which are present 


to us. 
consequent. 


not exist because we see them. 
of the future, because they will be. 
He knows them that they will be. 


34S, Thom., Contr. Gent., I, 67 
(Rickaby, Of God and His Crea- 
tures, pp. 49 sq.).—‘‘ Since every- 
thing is known by God as seen 
by Him in the present, the neces- 
sity of that being true which God 
knows, is like the necessity of Soc- 
rates’s sitting from the fact of his 
being seated. This is not neces- 
sary absolutely, ‘by necessity of 
the consequent,’ as the phrase is, 
but conditionally, or ‘by neces- 
sity of the consequence.’ For this 
conditional proposition is  neces- 
sary: ‘He is sitting, if he is seen 
seated.’ Change the conditional 
proposition into a categorical of 
this form: ‘What is seen sitting, 
is necessarily seated’: it is clear 
that the proposition is true as a 
phrase, when its elements are 
taken together (compositam), but 
false as a fact, when its elements 
are separated (divisam). All 


His knowledge, therefore, is not antecedent but 
We see things because they are. 


They do 
God knows our acts 

It is not ‘because 
They are future as 


these objections against the divine 
knowledge of contingent facts are 
fallaciae compositionts et divisionis.” 
(Rickaby, Of God and His Crea- 
tures, p. 50.) Fr. Rickaby adds 
this curious foot-note: ‘‘ This. dis- 
tinction appears in modern logic 
books as in sensu composito and 
in sensu diviso. It has its value 
in the disputes on efficacious grace. 
There is a _ tradition of Father 
Gregory de Valentia, S. J., faint- 
ing away when it was administered 
to him by a Dominican disputant. 
Bolsover Castle in Derbyshire was 
built by ‘the building, countess,’ of 
whom it was said that she would 
never die, while she kept on build- 
ing. True in sensu composito only. 
In point of fact the lady died in 
a great frost, which stopped her 
building and her breath together.” 

85 De Verit., qu. 2, art. 12, ad 7, 


368 FUTURE FREE ACTIONS 

regards passing time, but they are present to the divine 
eternity.” *® From what we have so far said, the reader 
may infer how untenable is the opinion of Johannes 
Jahn, an otherwise praiseworthy writer, who says in 
his Introductio in Libros Vet. Test.,3* that God was 
compelled to veil the Old Testament prophecies, lest 
they should be crossed by the free action of men. The 
pagan oracles (e. g., the answers of the Pythian priestess 
at Delphi) were couched in such indefinite, obscure, 
and ambiguous phraseology that they were sure to 
come true in one sense or another. This cannot be 
said of the divine prophecies recorded in the Old Testa- 
ment, which contain so many well defined details.* 


3. THE CAUSALITY OF GoD’s KNOWLEDGE.— 
But do not the two Patristic axioms we have 
quoted (“God foresees future things because they 
will come to pass,’ and: ‘“‘Things are because 
God knows them’’), involve a contradiction? 


The apparent discrepancy is all the greater because 
both phrases occur in the writings of the same Father.*® 
We have too much respect for the Fathers of the 
Church to follow certain Thomists, who reject the first- 
mentioned axiom as “ false,” because it does not hap- 
pen to fit into their system.*° The axiom: “God 
foresees future things because they will happen,’ does 


36 ‘‘ His Divine Majesty,” pp. 174 authority is Ruiz De Scientia Dei, 
sq. disp. 22 3q 


St Bo ALI; sect.,:2, )§!:80: 

88 Cfr:.,Matth. XXVII, 3s, and 
other well-known passages. On this 
whole subject the reader may pro- 
fitably consult Franzelin, De Deo 
Uno, thes. 42 and thes, 44. Like- 
wise Schwane, Das géttliche Vor- 
herwissen, Mister 1885. The best 


39 St. Augustine, De Trinit., X, 
6; De’ Civit. Dei, Vy) 10, . 2. 23 
De Lib. Arb., III, 4, et passim. 

40 Cfr. Alvarez, De Auzx., disp. 
XVI, n. 6: “ Causalis ista: quia 
res futurae sunt, ideo cognoscuntur 
a Deo, est falsa; haec autem est 
wera: quia Deus scientia libera 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 369 


not square with the Thomist teaching on grace, which 
holds that the free actions of the future are subject to 
the divine foreknowledge only in so far as God, by an 
antecedent and absolute decree, has physically prede- 
termined the will to perform this or that free act (prae- 
determinatio physica). We prefer to solve the apparent 
contradiction by distinguishing a speculative and a prac- 
tical knowledge of God, applying the first-quoted Patris- 
tic axiom to the scientia speculativa, the second to the 
scientia practica. In regard of His speculative knowl- 
edge, God may be compared to a savant and is called 
“omniscient ”; in regard to His practical knowledge, on 
the other hand, He rather resembles an artist who 
has knowledge of that which he is to produce before he 
makes it; and in respect of this knowledge God is called 
“all-wise.” Being omniscient, He knows whatever is 
knowable (scibile) ; being all-wise, He knows whatever 
is feasible (operabile). Waving established this funda- 
mental distinction, we proceed to lay down the follow- 
ing principles. 


_a) In the first place we must firmly hold as 
an article of faith, that the practical knowl- 
edge of God, when it has the Divine Will with 
it, operates creatively and thus, as sapientia 
creans, is the cause of all things. Cfr. Wisdom 
VII, 21: “Omnium enim artifex docuit me 
sapientia—Wisdom, which is the worker of all 
things, taught me.” Ps. CIII, 24: “Omnia in 
sapientia fecisti—Thou hast made all things in 
wisdom.” John I, 3: “Wérra 8’ adrod [7, ¢., Adyov] 


scivit aliquid esse futurum, ideo 41 Cfr, St. Thomas, Summa The- 
futurum est.” ¢ ologica, 1a, qu. 14, art. 16. 


370 FUTURE FREE ACTIONS 


éyévero—A ll thing's were made by him [1. e., the 
Logos.” 


The Sapiential books of the Old Testament furnish 
a running commentary on this important truth.** But 
it is also in its rdle of sapientia disponens that the 
practical knowledge of the Most High exercises a 
causal influence upon the various contingent beings, 
imparting to them “intrinsic order, harmony, and a 
suitable organization,” and “uniting them all in one 
harmonious whole.” It is to this specific feature of 
God’s practical knowledge that Holy Scripture alludes 
when it speaks of Him as “ordering all things in 
measure, number, and weight.’ ** That legislative 
wisdom, on the other hand, which imposes upon irra- 
tional creatures the immanent laws of their being and 
operation, while it inscribes into the hearts of rational 
beings the natural law of right and wrong,** is merely 
a separate function of the sSapientia disponens, The 
same is true of that educative wisdom which, as “ doc- 
trix disciplinae Det et electrix operum illius,’ *® guides 
intelligent creatures (angels and men) to their super- 
natural end. Viewed from still another point of vantage, 
the practical knowledge of God exercises a truly cau- 
sal influence, inasmuch as it acts as governing Wis- 
dom (sapientia gubernans) and, objectively, as Divine 
Providence, rules the universe. Cfr, Wisd. VIII, 1: 
“ Attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit 
(SvowKet) omnia suaviter —She reacheth from end to 
end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly.” ** Sup- 


42 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, 44 Rom, II, 15. 
qu. 14, art. 8. 45 Wisd. VIII, 4. 

43 Wisdom XI, 21: “ Omnia in 46 Cfr. Conc. Vatic., Sess. II, 
mensura et numero et pondere dis- cap. 1, De Deo (Denzinger-Bann- 


posuisti.” Cfr. Job XXVIII, 20 sqq. wart, Enchiridion, n, 1785). 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 371 


ported as it were by holiness and benevolence, God’s 
wise Providence reaches the apex of its glory in the 
supernatural order of grace. But we cannot hope to 
penetrate its depths. “O the depth of the riches of 
the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How in- 
comprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearch- 
able his ways!” 47 | 

In all three of the respects we have indicated above, 
God’s practical knowledge, considered more especially 
as creative wisdom, is in the fullest and truest sense 
the cause of all things. From this particular point of 
view, therefore, we may unconditionally assent to the 
proposition that God knows things not because they 
are, but, conversely, things are because God knows 
them. It was thus understood by St. Augustine ** and 
St. Gregory the Great,*® as is quite plain from the fact 
that whenever they quote this axiom these Fathers ex- 
pressly treat of creation in general, not of the free ac- 
tions of rational beings.*° 


b) The case is quite different when we con- 
sider the speculative knowledge of God, whether 
as scientia simplicis intelligentiae or as scientia 
visionis. In neither of these two relations can 
it be strictly designated as the cause of things. 
Being the intellectual expression of a perceived 
object it is reproductive rather than productive; 
it does not create, but presupposes its object. 

47 Rom. XI, 33. 


On the attri- 48 De Trinit.. XV, 13. 


bute of wisdom, cf. Scheeben, Dog- 


matik, Vol. I, §§ 93 and 94; Hein- 
rich, Dogm, Theologie, Vol. III, § 
205; Vigener, De Ideis Divinis, 
Monast. 1869. 


49 Moral., XX, 32. 

50 Cfr. Greg. M., Moral., XXXII, 
6: ‘‘ Non existentia videndo creat, 
existentia videndo continet.” Cfr. 
also St. Anselm, Monol., c, 33 saq. 


372 FUTURE FREE ACTIONS 


Were this not so, God in creating would co ipso sin, 
because He has a speculative knowledge of all creatable 
things including sin. “ Scientia,” says Aquinas, “ signifi- 
catur per hoc, quod est aliquid in sciente, et ideo a 
scientia nunquam procedit effectus nisi mediante volun- 
tate.” "* This principle— after being duly purged, of 
course, of all creatural imperfections — also applies to 
the Divine Intelligence. Although things outside the 
Divine Essence would be neither possible nor real 
without God’s scientia simplicis intelligentiae, they 
constitute a part of the divine knowledge only for the 
reason that God has previously beheld their proto- 
types in His own Essence as the exemplary cause of 
all things. His knowledge does not create the possibles, 
but rather supposes them. Similarly, too, the scientia 
visionts, like the scientia simplicis intelligentiae, can see 
contingent beings only on the supposition that they exist 
in rerum natura. It does not follow that in this hy- 
pothesis God would derive His knowledge from existing 
objects rather than from His own Essence. The distinc- 
tion, already noted, between causa and terminus, will 
preserve us from falling into this error. By way of 
illustration let us consider the creation of light as de- 
scribed in the first chapter of Genesis. In this act God’s 
speculative co-operated with His practical knowledge. 
In virtue of His (speculative) scientia simplicis intel- 
ligentiae He perceived in His own Essence the intrinsic 
possibility (creatability) of light; thereupon His creative 
Will united with His Wisdom in uttering the com- 
mand: “Let there be light.” As soon as light had 
sprung into being, it became the terminus ** (not the 

51 De Verit., qu. 2, art. 14. is that which is known,,.. The 


52 Supra, pp. 336 saqq. Divine Knowledge is changeless, as 
68“ The terminus of knowledge regards all things outside God 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 373 


cause) of the scientia visions. “ And God saw the 
light, that it was good.” *4 

Not a few of the Fathers, on the other hand, cham- 
pioned the principle that ‘‘ Things do not exist because 
God knows them, but God knows them because they 
exist.” In doing this they had in view solely His spec- 
ulative knowledge. It cannot be too often nor too 
strongly insisted that, like the Molinists, these Fathers 
never meant to assert that the free acts of the future 
are the cause or determinant of divine foreknowledge, 
but rather that they are its terminus or indispensable con- 
dition.*® 


ARTICLE 4 


OMNISCIENCE AS GOD’S FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE CONDI- 
TIONALLY FREE ACTS OF THE FUTURE; OR 
THE “‘ SCIENTIA MEDIA’? 5¢ 


I. STATE OF THE QuEstTion.—The knowledge 
of God not only comprises those future free acts 
which rational creatures will some day actually 
perform, but likewise those which they would 


which .are knowable. All change things, see Billuart, De Deo, diss. 
is in the termination of the Divine 5, art. 3. Cfr. also Kleutgen, De 
Knowledge in the objects known.” Ipso Deo, pp. 290 sqq., Ratisbonae 


(Humphrey, " His Divine Majesty,” 
164 sq.) 

54Gen. I, 3. 

BS. Cir pmoatns) Damascry inch tees 
“Ac vis quidem Det praescia a 
nobis causam haudquaquam habet; 
at vero, ut ea quae facturt sumus 
praesciat, id a nobis proficiscitur.” 
On the Thomist view, according 
to which the knowledge of vision 
(scientia visionis) in union with 
the Divine Will is the cause of all 


18813 Chr. Pesch, De Deo Uno, 2nd 
ed., pp. 153 sqq., ‘Friburgi 1899. 

56 “ Middle knowledge” would 
be the English equivalent for 
* scientia media,”’—‘ but it is not 
in use.”— Cfr. Sylvester J. Hunter, 
S. J., Outlines of Dogmatic” The- 
ology, Vol. II (end ed.),.p. 90.— 
Humphrey in “ His Divine Majesty ” 
employs the term ‘‘ mediate knowl- 
edge.” 


374 GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE 


perform if certain circumstances would concur or 
certain conditions were fulfilled. Acts of the 
first-mentioned order are called free acts abso- 
lutely future (actus liberi absolute futurt). Such 
an act was Judas’s betrayal of our Lord. Acts of 
the latter group we term free acts conditionally 
future (actus liberi hypothetice futurt seu futur-_ 
tbiles). Such an act was, e. g., the conversion 
of Tyre and Sidon, which Jesus said would cer- 
tainly have ensued if the inhabitants of those 
cities had witnessed His miracles. 


a) The question here at issue may be concretely for- 
mulated thus: Does God foreknow every single free 
(or semi-free) act which some particular student would 
perform if he were to spend the present semester at the 
Catholic University of America rather than at Harvard? 
There can. be no foreseeing a conditionated future 
event °” except on the basis of an actually existing rela- 
tion between the condition and the conditioned (ratio 
conditionis et conditionati), so that from the positing of 
the one the positing of the other may somehow be 
inferred. Where there is no such relation, we have two 
incoherent events, ontologically independent and there- 
fore also logically unconnected. | 

On the other hand, however, the connexion existing 


57 ‘ Conditionated events of the 
future are those which will occur, 
given certain adjuncts. Those ad- 
juncts are the circumstances of the 
thing or action — who? — what? — 
where? — with what aids? — why? 
—how?—and when? Under the 
circumstance with what aids, is to 
be included the divine co-operation 


or concurrence in order to the do- 
ing of the action as a _ physical 
act. This is a condition which is 
always required, and which is, 
therefore, always supposed, in every 
act of every. creature.’”’ (Hum- 
phrey, “ His Divine Majesty,” p. 
175, London 1897.) 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 375 


between the condition and the conditioned is not neces- 
sary (either metaphysically or physically); if it were 
necessary we should not be dealing with a free but with 
a predetermined process; e. g., “If a triangle would 
appear on this sheet, the sum of its three angles would 
be equal to two right angles;” or, “If it were to rain 
now, the ground would get wet.” Hence there can be 
question only of a condition which in some manner 
(hypothetically) moves, without compelling the free 
will; as, for instance: “Had Jesus given to Judas the 
look He gave Peter, Judas too would have experienced 
a change of heart.” 

b) Special emphasis must be laid on the imfallibthty 
of God’s foreknowledge. It would be manifestly un- 
becoming to ascribe to the Omniscient God a merely 
probable or presumptive knowledge of the conditional 
future. True, some of the older Thomists taught: 
“Potest quidem Deus iudicare, quid foret verisimilius 
vel probabilius in tali eventu, non tamen potest defimtum 
iudicium ferre: hoc esset aut erit, si tllud fiat seu 
fieret.’°8 This teaching is excusable only on the sup- 
position made by the Thomist system, that God can 
know the contingent events of the future solely through 
His will (decreta praedeterminantia). The Thomists 
felt the ridiculousness of indefinitely multiplying the 
number of hypothetical determinations, and therefore 
were logically led to deny the truth, and hence also the 
knowableness, of conditional future events. For that 
which is not, God cannot know. And yet, rather than 
deny Him an infallible knowledge of all these things, one 
would prefer with the Salmanticenses °° to have recourse 
to the “ ridiculous” assumption of an infinite number of 


58 Ledesma, De Div. Grat. Aux., 59 De Deo, Tr. III, disp. 9, dub. 
PP. 574 saq., Salmant. 1611. 5> § 4- 


376 GOD’S FOREKNOWLEDGE 


hypothetical decrees. If the Almighty Himself were 
questioned about these things, would He perhaps an- 
swer: “I do not know, for I have not made any de- 
crees with respect thereto”? The later Thomists, be 
it remarked, are unanimous in holding with the Molinists 
that God knows all conditioned future actions (futuri- 
bilia) without exception, and with metaphysical cer- 
tainty.°° While the Church has not yet dogmatized 
this teaching, it must be regarded as doctrina certa, since 
it is clearly contained both in Sacred Scripture and Tra- 
dition. 


2. THE TEACHING OF DIVINE REVELATION.— 
a) A thoroughly conclusive passage from Holy 
Writ seems to be 1 Kings XXIII, 1-13.°' In es- 
caping from Saul, David had fled to Ceila, whither 
his royal persecutor followed him, seeking his 
life. Thereupon David got Abiathar, the priest, 
to bring him the ephod; and he interrogated 
Jehovah: “Will the men of Ceila deliver me 
into his hands? And will Saul come down, as 
thy servant hath heard?’ And the Lord an- 
swered: “He will come down” (descendet = 
Ti), and: “They will deliver thee up” (tradent 
== 0! ). Then David arose and departed 
from Ceila with his six hundred men. In con- 
sequence, of course, Saul did not come down to 
Ceila, nor did the Ceilaites deliver up David. 


60 Cfr. Billuart, De Deo, diss. certain difficulties as to the trans- 
6, artes. lation. See Hunter, Outlines of 

61 We say, “seems to be,” be- Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II (2nd 
cause the passage is not free from ed.), p. gt. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 377 


The Lord’s reply referred to a conditionate 
futurum, something which would have happened 
had David tarried in Ceila, instead of leaving 
that city. God must have had infallible knowl- 
edge of what the men of Ceila would have done 
had Saul remained; else He could not have de- 
clared so positively: “descendet,”’ “tradent.” 


Another Scriptural proof for our thesis may be drawn 
from Matth. XI, 21: “ Woe to thee, Corozain, woe to 
thee, Bethsaida: for if in Tyre and Sidon had been 
wrought the miracles that have been wrought in you, 
they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes.” 
As a matter of fact, no such miracles were wrought in 
Tyre and Sidon,®* nor did these cities do penance in 
sackcloth and ashes. Hence we have here again a mere 
futuribile,— a contingent future event which Jesus fore- 
saw as clearly and definitely as if it had really come to 
pass.°* Other pertinent Scriptural texts are Wisd. IV, 
11: “He was taken away lest wickedness should alter 
his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul.” Jer. 
XXXVIII, 19: “And King Sedecias said to Jeremias: 
I am afraid because of the Jews that are fled over to 
the Chaldeans, lest I should be delivered into their 
hands, and they should abuse me. But Jeremias an- 
swered: They shall not deliver thee.” % 

Vainly do the Socinians and Ledesma ® pretend that 
the particles “forte” and “ fortasse,’ which the Vul- 
gate occasionally prefixes to the divine prediction of 


62 Cir, Luke X, 13. 64 Cfr. also Gen, XI, 6; Acts 
63 The commentaries of the Fath- XXII, 17 sq. : 
ers on these various passages are 65 De Div. Grat. Aux., pp. 590 
reproduced by Ruiz, op. cit., disp. sqq. 
62, sect. 1. 


25 


378 GOD’S FOREKNOWLEDGE 


futuribilia, furnish a Scriptural basis for the theory 
that God’s foreknowledge of conditioned free acts of 
the future is uncertain. The only passage that seems 
to support their claim is Jer. XXVI, 3: “sv forte [ Six 
= if not= perhaps] audiant et convertantur.” But 
this whole passage is manifestly anthropomorphic,® as 
the expression “I may repent me” (ibid.) shows. St. 
Jerome commentates this verse as follows: “Verbum 
ambiguum ‘ forsitan’ maiestati Domini non potest con- 
venire; sed nostro loquitur affectu, ut lberum homim 
servetur arbitrium, ne ex praescientia eius quasi necessi- 
tate vel facere quid vel non facere cogatur.” In all the 
other texts which Ledesma and the Socinians allege, 
the “ne forte” of the Vulgate is a somewhat too free 
rendition of the Hebrew }B = ne, “in order that not,” 
while where the Vulgate has “si forte,’ the Hebrew 
text reads DN = si, “if.” In neither case does the He- 


brew particle connote doubt.*? Where the Vulgate ver- 
sion of the New Testament in such instances has “ forte,” 
the Greek nearly always has dy, indicating an impossible 
condition, as, e. g., Matth. XI, 23; “forte mansissent 
(guevev dv) usque in hanc diem.” Elsewhere the Vul- 
gate employs the word “ utique” instead of “ forte,” °* 
or, where the conditional clause is negative, “ nunquam,” 
equivalent to the Greek “ ov« dy.”’°® Cir. also Luke VII, 
39: “Hic si esset propheta, sciret utique (éyivwoxe 
dy).” From all of which it is quite obvious that Holy 


68 This and similar expressions 67 Cfr. Gesenius’s Hebrew Lexi- 


in the Bible are called anthropo- 
morphic, because they represent 
God under the form of a man 
(dvOpwros, pwopoy), Cfr. Hunter, 
Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, 
Vol. II (2nd ed.), pp. 63 sqq. Pe- 
tavius, De Deo, II, :. 


COUSNSe Ha Vs 

68 Compare John XIV, 7: 
“ Utique cognovissetis = éyyaxerre 
&y,” with John VIII, 19: “ For- 
sitan sciretis= dy hdere,” 

691 Cor. II, 8 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 379 


Scripture does not countenance any doubt as to the in- 
fallibility of God’s foreknowledge of the futurtbila. 


b) The Fathers, in their controversies with 
heretics, expressly recognize God’s scientia fu- 
turibilium and treat it as an undoubted ingredient 
of the revealed faith. 


a) To establish their heretical theory of the creation 
of the universe through the instrumentality of a 
Demiurge, the Manicheans, the Gnostics, and the Mar- 
cionites argued thus: “ Either God foresaw that angels 
and men would sin, or He did not foresee it; if. He 
foresaw it, He is not good; if He did not foresee it, 
He is not omniscient.” In solving this difficulty not one 
of the Fathers, from Irenzeus down to St. John Damas- 
cene, dreamed of denying. that God foresaw the sin of 
angels and men in the event of their creation. Their 
argument is that, although God clearly foresaw that 
millions of angels would become devils, and that Adam 
by transgressing the divine command would involve his 
entire posterity in original sin, He nevertheless created 
those particular angels and this particular human race. 
For, as St. Isidore says: “Sicut praescivit Deus lap- 
sum, ita praescivit, quomodo posset ili subvenire.”’ 
That the sin of angels and men was a mere futurtbile, 
which did not become a futurum until God had decreed 
the creation of the universe, is made evident by a con- 
sideration of the eternal plan of. creation. If God 
would create these angels and those men, then many of 
the former would fall away, and all of the latter would 
sin,” 


70 Quoted by Suarez, Opusc. De 71 Ruiz gives numerous Patristic 
Scientia Div., Il, 2. : quotations bearing on this topic in 


~ 380 GOD’S FOREKNOWLEDGE 


8) Thomassin claimed that the scientia futuribilium 
was an invention of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, 
and that it was on this account that St, Augustine 
fought it so bitterly. But this is an altogether gratuitous 
assertion. Replying to the question, “ Why does God 
not take from this life the just before they fall into 
sin (which He foresees) ?” the “Doctor of Grace” ex- 
pressly declares that this omission is not due to nescience. 
“ Respondeant, si possunt, cur illos Deus, cum fideliter 
et pie viverent, non tunc de vitae huius periculis raputt, 
ne malitia mutaret intellectum eorum. ... Utrum hoc 
in potestate non habuit, an eorum mala futura nescivit? 
-..Nempe nihil horum nisi perversissime et insanis- 
sime dicitur — Let them answer, if they can, why God 
did not, when these were living faithfully and piously, 
snatch them from the perils of this life, lest wickedness 
should change their minds. ... Had He not this in 
His power or was He ignorant of their future sins? 
- ++ To assert either the one or the other would be 
most wicked and foolish.” 72 And still more clearly in 
another work: “Certe poterat illos Deus, praesciens 
esse lapsuros, antequam id feret, auferre de hac vita 
— Assuredly God, foreknowing that they would fall, was 
able to take them away from this life before that fall 
occurred.” "* Thomassin mistook the point at issue 
in St. Augustine’s controversy with the Semi-Pelagians. 
Semi-Pelagianism taught that infants who die unbap- 
tized are held responsible by God for the sins they 
would have committed had they reached maturity ; 
so much so that their dying without the grace of 


his famous work De Scientia, de 72 De Corrept. et Grat., cap. 9, 
Ideis, de Veritate ac de Vita Dei, N, 10, ; 
disp. 65-67. See also Petavius, De 78 De Dono Perseverantiae, c. 


Deo, IV, 8. Qj Ne y2ai 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 381 


Baptism is really a punishment for these hypothet- 
ical sms which in reality they had never committed; 
while on the other hand the salvation of those who 
were baptized is attributable to the good deeds which 
God foresaw they would have performed in after life 
had they continued in this world. Augustine rightly 
protested against this absurdity. “Unde hoc talibus 
viris in mentem venerit, nescio, ut futura, quae non sunt 
futura, puniantur aut honorentur merita parvulorum.” ™4 
He did not deny God’s scientia futuribilium as such, 
but protested against its being put on the same level 
with His scientia futurorum. Cfr. De Anima et eius 
Orig., I, 12,n. 15: “Ipsa exinanitur omnino praescien- 
tia, st, quod praescitur, non erit. Quomodo enim recte 
dicitur praescirt futurum, quod non. est futurum?” 
From Augustine’s point of view, therefore, there is, be- 
sides the scientia futurorum (== visionis) and the scientia 
mere possibiium (= simplicis: tntelligentiae), another 
intermediate species of Divine Knowledge, namely, the 
scientia futuribilium, which was later called scientia 
media by the Molinists. 


-c) The theological argument for our thesis is 
partly based on the intrinsic perfection of the 
Divine Knowledge, partly on the indispensable- 
ness of the scientia futuribilium for the purposes 
of providence. 


To know precisely what circumstances, conditions, 
and situations the created will can encounter, and how 
it would conduct itself in each and every possible junc- 
ture, is doubtless a wonderful prerogative of the Divine 
Intellect, which it could not relinquish without ceasing to 


74 De Praedest. SS., c. 12, n, 24, 


382 GOD’S FOREKNOWLEDGE 


be divine. As St. Jerome says: “Cui praescientiam 
tollis, aufers et divinitatem.” In matter of fact nescience 
of conditionally future acts would entail a woful igno- 
rance of many important truths that are essential to 
that infinite knowledge which evolves harmony out of 
confusion. Even a mere doubt as to how free creatures 
as yet uncreated would deport themselves under all 
possible combinations of circumstances, would be utterly 
incompatible with God’s Knowledge and destructive of 
His Providence, If stich a doubt were possible, the 
Creator could not consistently carry out any fixed plan 
of governing the universe. He would simply have to 
trust to “ good luck,” because His creatures, by reason 
of their free will, would be in a position to disturb all 
His calculations. Like ‘‘the best laid plans of mice 
and men,’ His most wise counsels would “gang aft 
aglee.’”’ Unable to provide against unforeseen surprises, 
Divine Providence would be fated to grope in the dark 
and to steer an ever-changing zigzag course. The Lord 
of the universe would be dependent on the moods of 
mortal men, and oftentimes could not set the machinery 
of His omnipotence in motion until it was too late to 
accomplish His designs. What an utterly unworthy 
conception of the Deity all this implies! Cicero 7° denied 
God’s foreknowledge, because he saw no other way of 
preserving the liberty of man. A convinced theist would, 
on the contrary, sacrifice the doctrine of free-will rather 
than attenuate the divine omniscience. The Catholic 
Church has always clung to the conviction, so beautifully 
voiced in her liturgical prayers, that Divine Providence 
(providere = praevidere) not only knows what will 
actually happen in the future, but also what would 
happen if individuals were placed in different circum- 


75 De Divinat., II, 7. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 383 
stances. Imbued with this persuasion we pray God to 
ward off injury from our souls and to afford us op- 
portunities for doing good. We console the Christian - 
mother who has buried a beloved child, by telling her 
that Providence disposes all things wisely, that her child 
is spared much suffering and would perhaps, had God 
permitted him to live, have wrought his own destruc- 
tion and broken the hearts of his parents.7° The Jesuit 
theologian Ferdinand Bastida very eloquently set forth 
these and similar considerations in the presence of Pope 
Clement VIII, at one of the meetings of the famous 
“ Congregatio de Auxiliis.” 7 Molina has unfolded the 
divine plan of governing the universe in the light of the 
scientia media, in language which may truly be called 
sublime.7® 


3) THe Morinist._ THEORY OF THE SCIENTIA 
Mep1a.—The historic controversy between Thom- 
ism and Molinism, which is latterly showing signs 
of a revival, has its proper place in the treatise on 
Grace rather than in that part of dogmatic the- 
ology which deals with God and His attributes. 
Nevertheless, the contending parties rightly feel 
that the roots of their respective systems reach 
deep down into the dogma of the divine omnis- 


which the prescient Intellect fore- 
sees should come about in him, 
should his life be prolonged.” Cfr. 
also St. Aug., De Corrept. et Gratia, 
CoN RG 2 Eat Rey 

77 Cfr. Livinus Meyer, Historia 


76 Thus St. Gregory of Nyssa 
says (De Morte Praemat. Infant., 
circa finem [Migne, P. G. 46, 184]): 
**It belongs to the perfection of Di- 
vine Providence, not merely to heal 
diseases, but also to prevent them. 


It is fitting that He, to whom the 
future is no less known than the 
past, should stay the child’s ad- 
vance to his full age, lest the evil 


Congr. de Aux., V, 43 saq. - 
78 Concordia, etc., qu. 23, art. 4- 
5, disp. 1. 


384 THE MOLINIST THEORY 


cience. As a matter of fact the doctrine of the 
scientia media marks the very heart of Molinism, 
just as the Thomistic system centres in the 
theory of the praemotio physica. 


a) Scientia media, as the very term indicates, has 
reference solely to the Knowledge of God, while prae- 
motio physica primarily regards the Divine Will; though, 
of course, ultimately there can be no physical premotion 
without the action of the Divine Intellect. This explains 
the transparent endeavor of both parties in the very 
vestibule of dogmatic theology so to adjust their teaching 
on the causal influence of God’s knowledge, as to make 
it fit into, and furnish a basis for, their respective sys- 
tems of grace, and so to interpret the Patristic sayings 
about God’s knowledge, as to support those systems. 
Both parties, it is true, are on common ground in ac- 
cepting it as a revealed dogma that the omniscient God 


from all eternity definitely foresaw whether His free crea- _ 4 | 


tures would co-operate or refuse to co-operate with His 
grace, and that He disposed His eternal scheme of 
grace, salvation, and reprobation in accordance with 
this foreknowledge. They have also come to an agree- 
ment on the proposition that God foresees the condi- 
tionally future acts of His free creatures as infallibly 
as He foreknows their absolutely future acts (actus ab- 
solute futuri), and both schools consequently employ the 
term scientia conditionate futurorum seu tea iti in 
precisely the same sense, | 

This being so, how is it that the Thomists so — 
hotly reject the term scientia media, which the Molinists 
have coined for the purpose of designating that sczentia 
futuribiliwm which both schools admit??? Is the whole 


79 Cfr. Billuart, De Deo, diss. 6, art. 6. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 385 


controversy a mere war of words? The character and 
ability of the theologians engaged on both sides com- 
pels us to reject this assumption. Or is the Thomist 
opposition to the scientia media perhaps due to the 
novelty of the term? It is true, scientia media, as a 
technical term for God’s scientia futuribilium, was un- 
known before Molina, whose teacher, Peter Fonseca, S. 
J., still employed in its stead the expression scientia 
mixta®®? But is not the Thomistic term praemotio 
physica, or praedeterminatio physica, likewise a coin of 
comparatively recent mintage? Who ever heard of it 
before Bafiez? And does not the gradual development 
of dogma, which results from the action of the ecclesias- 
tical magisterium and the discussions of the theological 
schools, necessitate the adoption every now and then of 
some new dogmatic term to give accurate and precise 
expression to a more clearly defined concept Ai tiNor 
are there wanting instances in the history of dogma 
where a middle term was invented to bridge a chasm 
between two extremes. While the ancient creeds, for 
example, divide all created beings into visibilia and in- 
visibilia, the Fourth Lateran Council saw fit to insert 
‘between these two a third category, which it designates 
as humana creatura quasi communis ex spiritu et cor- 
pore. Now, the division into things visible and invisible 
is fully as adequate as the division of the divine Knowl- 
edge into scientia simplicis intelligentiae and scientia 
vistonis. If, therefore, it was possible to find middle 
ground between the two first-mentioned extremes, there 
is no reason why middle ground should not be found 
between God’s knowledge of simple intelligence and 

80 Metaph., 1. VI, c. 2, qu. 4, Sib Ng duoovator,” © transsub- 


sect. 8. Ed. Colon, 1615, Vol. III, stantiatio,” “ex opere operato,’”’ 
Ppp. 119 sqq. etc. 


386 THE MOLINIST THEORY 


His knowledge of vision. The sharp rejection of the 
scientia media by the Thomists, therefore, must be due to 
some strong objective motive. This motive is that the 
Molinists have loaded the. term sctentia media with a 
number of connotations which extend its meaning far 
beyond that of simple knowledge. 

b) If we review the history of the long and acrimo- 
nious dispute, we find that both parties, in attacking the 
problem under consideration, forthwith went to the root 
of the matter by searching for the medium in which 
God perceives the infallible connexion of the efficacy of 
His grace with the free consent of the created will. Ac- 
cording to the Thomists, this medium is found in the 
eternal decrees of His Divine Will, or in His natural or 
supernatural predeterminations, which in time, as prae- 
motiones physicae, physically predetermine the created 
will freely to perform the action willed (or, in case of 
sin: permitted) by God. Therefore God knows the ra- 
tional creature’s free decisions, which He has predeter- 
mined, as infallibly as He knows His own will and its de- 
crees. Molinism, on the other hand, regarding physical 
premotion, or predetermination, as a grave peril to free- 
will, nay as its absolute negation, rejects the Thomist hy- 
‘pothesis and seeks to explain God’s infallible foreknowl- 
edge of creatural concurrence with His grace by. the 
scientia media, in virtue of which God, before He utters 
His decrees, and altogether independently of them, fore- 
sees how each (actual or possible) rational creature 
would freely conduct itself in any conceivable junc- 
ture of circumstances, were He to offer this or that 
grace to the supernaturally equipped will. Hence con- 
currence or refusal, virtuous or sinful conduct, are 
known to His omniscience, not only before the creature’s 


82 Cfr. Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 284 sqq. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 387 


free will has begun to exist, but even before He Him- 
self has formed any decree (be it positive or merely per- 
missive) with regard to it. According to this theory, 
therefore, the proper object of the scientia media are 
the conditionally future free actions of all rational crea- 
tures in so far as they are still absolutely free and un- 
influenced by any antecedent decrees of the Divine Will. 
These explanations will enable the reader to grasp the 
full significance of Tournely’s definition: “ Scientia 
media est scientia conditionatorum independens ab omni 
decreto absoluto et efficact eoque anterior.’ * This 
peculiar concept of the scientia conditionatorum con- 
tains the very quintessence of Molinism, and also its 
antithesis to Thomism. This fundamental divergence 
at the outset widens into an abysmal chasm when the- 
ological speculation arrives at the doctrine of divine con- 
currence and the efficacy of grace. While Thomism ad- 
mits merely a concursus praevius and a gratia ab intrinseco 
eficax, Molinism insists on a concursus simultaneus and 
a gratia ab extrinseco efficax. ; 

c) It will be helpful to illustrate the difference be- 
tween the two systems by a concrete example. We 
choose for this purpose the conversion of St. Paul. Ac- 
cording to the Thomist view, God (supposing for a 
moment that He reasoned humanwise), would put 
the case thus: I will absolutely, from all eternity, that 
at a certain time Saul shall be physically predetermined 
by the efficaciousness of my grace to become converted 
of his own free will; and in this predetermination I 
foresee his actual conversion as infallibly certain. Ac- 
cording to the Molinist theory, God would argue in-this 
wise: Independently of any decree of my will, I know 
with infallible certitude from all eternity that, if I give 


83 De Deo, qu. 165) artes. 


eae 


388 THE MOLINIST THEORY 


Saul this particular grace of conversion, he will freely 
co-operate with it, and thus become transformed into 
Paul; on the basis of this previous knowledge (= scientia 
media) I now decree to give him this particular grace, 
and no other, and by means of creation, preservation, 
concurrence, and providence, in course of time to posit 
all those conditions which are requisite to bring about 
that end. Thus the scientia media becomes scientia 
visions, 1. é@., infallible knowledge of an actual event, 
only after God’s consequent decree has supervened. 
Whereas Thomism, therefore, under the leadership of 
Bafiez, posits the knowability (= truth) of both the 
absolutely future and the conditionally future free acts 
of rational creatures in the Essence, or, more proxi- 
mately, in the Will of God; Molinism holds that it does 
not lie proximately and primarily in the Divine Will, 
but in the historical truth of the absolute or con- 
ditioned future, for the certain cognition of which 
truth God’s Intellect is eternally determined by His 
own Essence, as the faithful mirror of all truths. 
Others give still other explanations.** From what we 
have so far said it is plain that both systems aim at 
a scientific conciliation of the seemingly contradictory 
dogmas of grace and free will. This is a sublime aim, 
though perhaps beyond the reach of human ingenuity! 
It is as important that the dogma of grace be kept intact 
as that the dogma of free-will be safeguarded and de- 
fended to its fullest extent. While Thomism, with due 
regard to the absolute sovereignty, causality, and om- 
nipotence of God, erects a mighty bulwark for the de- 
fense of grace, Molinism is busily at work throwing | 
a rampart around the equally important dogma of 
the free will of man. It was for this reason that 


84 Cfr, supra, § 3. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 389 


Molina entitled his epochal work Concordantia Libert 
Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Provi- 
dentia, Praedestinatione et Reprobatione.® 

d) Molina (+ 1600) had cherished the hope that 
his scheme of harmonizing the two dogmas in question 
(grace and free-will, providence and predestination), 
would deal a death blow to all heresies and put an end 
to controversy. History shows this expectation to have 
been unfounded. Molinism did not succeed in over- 
throwing Bajanism, nor did it avail against Jansenism, 
which arose soon after, and joined forces with the heret- 
ical determinism of the Protestant Reformers in a 
terrible onslaught on the dogma of free-will; nor was 
it able to bridge the deep chasm which separated the 
adherents of Bafiez from those of Molina, the Domini- 
cans from the Jesuits. The battle is still on, though for- 
tunately the combatants engaged in it at present evince far 
‘more humility and moderation than their protagonists. 
This gratifying development we are inclined to attribute 
largely to the conviction, which is steadily growing on 
both sides, that if pushed to its extreme logical con- 
clusions, either system is certain to arrive at a point 
where human reason is confronted by an unfathom- 
able mystery. Several eminent champions of the newer 
Molinism,** while strenuously upholding the scientia media, 
admit that it is a hopeless undertaking to try to explain 
its “How” and “ Why.” In this they follow Billuart, 
who replied to the question: How are we to conceive 
the harmony between praemotio and free-will? by say- 
ing: “Respondeo, mysterium esse.’ *" Under these 

85 Olyssipone 1588; Parisiis 1876. non (Bafiez et Molina, pp. 113 

86 Notably Kleutgen (De Ipso sqq., Paris 1883.) 


Deo, p. 319), Cornoldi (Della 87 De Deo, diss. 8, art. 4, § 2, ad 
Liberta Umana, Roma 1884), Rég- 6. 


390 


THE MOLINIST THEORY 


circumstances the paternal admonition which was uttered 
by Paul V in 1607, when he closed the sessions of the 


“Congregatio de Auxiliis ” 


(1598-1607), before that 


famous body had arrived at a final conclusion, may 
be said to be doubly important to-day. He counselled 
the defenders of both systems “ Ut verbis asperioribus, 
amaritiem animi significantibus, invicem abstineant.” 88 


88 The following bibliographical 
references may prove useful to 
those who wish to go into the 
subject more deeply: Platel, Auc- 
toritas contra Praedeterminationem 
Physicam pro Scientia Media, Duaci 
1669.— Henao, Scientia Media His- 
torice Propugnata, Lugd. 1655.— 
Ip., Scientia Media Theologice De- 
fensa, I and II, Lugd. 1674-76.— 
De Aranda, De Deo Sciente, Prae- 
destinante et Auxiliante, seu Schola 
Scientiae Mediae, Caesaraug. 1693. 
— Of modern authors we mention: 
Schneemann, S. J., Controv. de 


Divinae Gratiag Liberique Arbitrit 
Concordia Initia et Progressus, 
Frib. 1881; Dummermuth, O. P., 
S. Thomas et Doctrina Praemotionis 
Physicae, Parisiis 1886; Gayraud, 
Thomisme et Molinisme, Paris 
1890.— Cfr. also Ude, VDoctrina 
Capreoli de Influxu Dei in Actus 
Voluntatis Humanae secundum Prin- 
cipia Thomismi et Molinismit Col- 
lata, Graecii 1905.— On the “‘ Con- 
gregatio de Auxiliis,” see A. As- 
train, S. J., in the Catholic Ency- 
clopedia, Vol. IV, pp. 238 sq. 


SECTION 3 


THE MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


1. According to St. Thomas Aquinas,’ there 
are three different media of higher cognition. 
“Unum, sub quo intellectus videt, quod dispomt 
eum ad videndum, et hoc est nobis lumen in- 
tellectus agentis.... Aliud medium est, quo 
videt, et hoc est species intelligibilis. . . . Ter- 
tium medium est, in quo aliquid videtur, et hoc 
est res aliqua, per quam in cogmtionem alterius 
devenimus, sicut in effectu videmus causam.” 
Applying this theory to bodily vision, we have 
as medium sub quo light, which renders a body 
proximately visible; as medium quo the species 
sensibilis through which the eye sees; and, 
lastly, as medium in quo the mirror which reflects 
material objects to the eye. The medium quo is 
also called medium incognitum, because the 
impression or concept received into the eye or the 
intellect is not perceived qua species, but merely 
conveys a knowledge of that which it represents. 
The medium tn quo, on the other hand, is in- 
variably also medium cognitum, because in this 


1 Quodib., VII, art. 1. 
391 


392 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


case the medium (e. g., a mirror, a cause), must 
first be perceived before the mind can apprehend 
that which it reflects (e. g., a tree, an effect). 
Such a cognition is by its very nature not imme- 
diate but mediate. 


In turning our attention to the Divine Understanding 
we must first recall? that none of its three media can 
lie outside the Divine Essence. God, in the first place, 
is His own mediwm sub quo, that is to say, He is 
in Himself the clearest and purest light of truth and 
understanding, the infinite lumen intellectuale for Him- 
self as for others, “‘O @eds gas éort Kat oxoria év adr 
ovk éoTw ovdeuia — God is light, and in him there is no 
darkness.” Ecclus. X‘XIII, 28: “ Oculi Domini multo 
plus lucidiores sunt super solem — The eyes of the Lord 
are far brighter than the sun.”—“ Lumen de lumine” 
(Creed ).— God is likewise His own medium quo, in so 
far as only by His own Essence can His Intellect be 
determined to the intellectual expression (verbum, 
species intelligibilis) of Himself and of all other truths.‘ 
Chr. Pesch® rightly insists that the technical phrase: 
“Divina essentia ipsa est species intelligibilis intellectus 
divint sew medium quo Deus cognoscit”—a phrase 
which has been adopted by all theological schools with- 
out exception — be not sacrificed without stringent rea- 
sons. Up to now no such stringent reasons have been 
produced.— Lastly, God is also His own medium in 
quo, hecause He perceives all extra-divine truths, in- 
cluding the actus liberi futuri et futuribiles, in Himself 
alone as the faithful mirror reflecting all things possible 

2 See supra, § 1. 5 Praelect. Dogmat., II (2nd ed.), 


8 1 John‘I,'5, Pp. III sqq. 
4 Supra, § 1, prop. 1-3. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 393 


and actual. The created intellect, in acquiring its medi- 
ate knowledge of things, proceeds from truth to truth, 
either by a mere transition, as in the case of antitheses, 
or by the aid of a middle term, as in the case of syl- 
logistic reasoning. But Almighty God, in the words of 
St. John of Damascus, “ knows all things with a sim- 
ple and inscrutable knowledge — simplict et inscrutabili 
cognitione cognoscit omnia.” * His cognition, therefore, 
is immediate or intuitive, not mediate or discursive,’ ex- 
cept perhaps in this sense that it has for its sole and 
necessary medium the Divine Essence, 7. e., God’s knowl- 
edge of Himself. Considered in itself, God’s knowledge 
is a calm, simple, immediate intuition of things. 


2. There is no noteworthy difference of opin- 
ion among theologians as to the medium sub 
quo and the medium quo of divine cognition. 
With regard, however, to the medium in quo of 
God’s understanding of the truths external to 
Himself, there are decided divergencies. Here 
we have to deal with a most complicated, diff- 
cult, and obscure problem. Leaving aside all 
useless subtleties, and adhering to the familiar 
classification of extra-divine things which we 
have adopted in Sect. 2, we will confine ourselves 
to the subjoined theses: ? 

Thesis I: Although God perceives the purely pos- 
sibles exactly as they are in themselves, He does not 
know them immediately in themselves, but mediately 
in His own Essence as medium in quo. 

6 De Fide Orth., I, 3 7 Cfr. Hebr. IV, 13. 

26 | , 


394 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


This teaching is common to all theological 
schools. 


Proofs. Our thesis is a development of proposition 
3, page 340, where it was shown that God perceives 
the extra-divine things — including those that have actual 
existence — not only in His own Essence, that is to say, 
merely according to their ideal-eminent being, but like- 
wise as they are in themselves, i. e., according to their 
real and formal being. We have now to consider the 
question whether God perceives this real and formal 
being,— a being in which the possibles, too, participate 
as soon as they become actual—tmmediately in the 
things themselves, or mediately in and through His own 
Essence. Either view has its defenders. In the 17th 
century still another solution was suggested which aims 
at combining both modes of cognition. 

a) Becanus, Vasquez, and others hold that, as there 
is no ontological, so there can be no logical nexus be- 
tween the Divine Essence and purely possible beings, for 
the reason that God must be conceived as “res plane 
absoluta, sine ulla connexione cum creaturis possibili- 
bus;” and that, consequently, He knows all things 
outside of Himself immediately and without the agency 
of any medium in quo (prius cognitum). It will ap- 
pear from our subsequent explanation that this view is 
untenable.® 

b) A second view, which is defended by all Thomists 
and leading Molinists, regards the Divine Essence as the 
sole medium of God’s cognition, and holds that so far 
as this cognition comprises the purely possible (and 
also the actually existing) beings, it is not immediate, 
but mediate. St. Thomas formulates the main argu- 


8 Cfr. also Billuart, De Deo Uno, diss, 5, art. 4. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 395 


ment for this thesis succinctly as follows: “ Deus seip- 
sum videt in seipso, sed seipsum videt per essentiam 
suam,; alia autem a se videt non in tpsis, sed im seipso, 
inquantum essentia sua continet similitudinem aliorum 
ab ipso.’ ® The Divine Essence being the exemplary 
cause of all possibles, and likewise the efficient and final 
cause of whatever actually exists, it is impossible to 
assume that God, in directing His vision to the things 
outside His Essence, should so to speak overlook His 
Essence and apprehend those extraneous objects directly 
and immediately. Only in His own Essence, which 
most clearly reflects all beings possible and actual, 
does He understand all that is not Himself. The 
position of most of the later Molinists?® was outlined 
by Molina, when he wrote: “Deus cognoscit alia a 
se non in rebus ipsis, sed in seipso, h. e. intuitus divint 
intellectus non fertur aeque primo in suam essentiam ut 
in rem cognitam et in naturas, quas aliae res setpsis 
habent; sed primo fertur in suam essentiam ut in obiec- 
tum primarium, in quo virtute continentur naturae 
aliarum rerum, et mediante essentia ita cognita illo 
eodem intuitu cognoscit ac intuetur ulterius ut obtectum 
secundarium naturam cuiusque aliarum rerum propriam. 
Itaque cum dicimus Deum non cognoscere alia a se in 
ipsismet rebus, non negamus Deum cognoscere illud 
esse quod res habent in seipsis, sed negamus cognoscere 
illud immediate atque ut obiectum primarium.’™ This 
argument gains strength from the consideration that the 
divine Intellect must needs possess the most perfect 
knowledge which it is possible to have. Now, the most 
perfect knowledge is that which is drawn from the 

9S. Theol, 1a, qu. 14, art. 5. 11 Com. in S. Theol., 1a, qu. 14, 


10 EB. g., Suarez, Lessius, Ruiz, art. 5-6, concl. 2, Lugd. 1593, p. 
Petavius, Franzelin. 165. 


396 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


deepest depths and ascends to the highest cause, which 
is God Himself. Consequently the Divine Intellect can- 
not possibly draw its knowledge from any other source 
than the Divine Essence, which is de facto the supreme 
and ultimate cause of all things. Wherefore, as St. 
Augustine beautifully remarks, “In comparatione lucis 
illius, quae in Verbo Dei conspicitur, omnis cognitio qua 
creaturarum quamlibet in seipsa [sc. cognitione vesper- 
ting] novimus, non immerito nox dici potest —In com- 
parison with that light which is seen in the Word of 
God, all knowledge by which we know any whatever 
creature in itself, may rightly be called ‘night.’ 2 
The Holy Doctor is careful not to posit in the Divine 
Cognition, besides the cognitio matutina (sc. “in 
Verbo”’), that cognitio vespertina (“in rebus”), which 
he ascribes to the angels.?3 

c) What we have said above is sufficient to disprove 
the opinion of certain Scotists** and Molinists ** who 
hold that God’s understanding of the possible and 
the actual is both mediate and immediate. Is this not 
equivalent to saying that He simultaneously possesses 
both the most perfect and a less perfect knowledge of 
things? No wonder St. Thomas rejects such teaching. 
In view of the fact that Molinist theologians are among 
the most ardent defenders of the mediateness of divine 
cognition, Billuart must have been ill-advised when he 
wrote: “Si Deus non cognoscat alia a se nisi in se 
ut causa, corruit scientia media: e contra si Deus cog- 
noscat alia a se immediate in seipsis, locus erit scientiae 
mediae.” No Molinist would dream of denying the 


12 De Gen. ad Lat., IV, 23. 14 EF. g., Henno, Poncius. 

13 For other arguments in sup- 15 E, g., Arriga, Viva, Carleton, 
port of this view the reader is re- Platel, Mayr. 
ferred to J. Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, 16 Contr. Gent., I, 48. 


Ppp. 300 sqq. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 397 


principle that there is, and that there can be, no truth 
independently of God. 


Thesis II: God perceives the actually existing 
things, including free actions, present and past, in His 
own Essence as medium in quo. 


This thesis also embodies a teaching common 
to all theological schools. 


Proof. The argument by which we have established 
the preceding thesis applies with equal force to this one, 
so far as it embraces actually existing beings that are 
not free (such as inanimate matter and brute animals ) 
and likewise free intellectual creatures (men and angels) 
so far forth as their actions are determined by in- 
trinsic necessity, as, e. g., in their tendency towards 
happiness. The threefold division of time makes no 
essential difference, because the free will of the Creator 
univocally determines all operations of the past, present, 
and future in the necessary causes that depend on God 
alone, and is consequently knowable in God. 

The only real difficulty in connection with our thesis 
arises from free actions,— not so much from those which 
are past, as from those which occur hic et nunc in the 
present. (The free actions of the future we shall con- 
sider separately farther on). Free and necessary actions 
manifestly stand in an altogether different relation respec- 
tively to the Divine Essence regarded as a medium of cog- 
nition. For while necessary causes have a sufficient medi- 
um in quo in the decree of the Creator by which they are 
determined ad unum, and all their effects are minutely 
predefined ; free-will actions are neither necessarily con- 
tained in, nor a priori cognoscible by, their causes. 
“ Ouia voluntas est activum principium non determinatum 


398 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa,’ says St. 
Thomas, “sic Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessi- 
tate ad unum determinat, sed remanet motus eius con- 
tingens et non necessarius, nisi in his ad quae naturaliter 
movetur.” ** Whence it follows that “quicunque cog- 
noscit effectum contingentem in causa sua tantum, non 
habet de eo mist coniecturalem cognitionem; Deus autem 
cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum prout sunt in 
suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est 
actu in seipso.’1® Now, if free acts cannot be known 
from their cause (i. ¢., the will of the free agent), whence 
does God derive His infallible knowledge of them? Must 
Fe wait till the free will has made a decision, and is He 
compelled like mortal men to learn by observation? 

a) The Thomist solution appears simple enough. 
God in His physically predetermining decrees, that is 
to say, in His absolute Will, knows the actions of 
free agents with the same mathematical certitude with 
which He knows those of necessary agents. Bound 
and directed: by the decrees of His Will, His Essence 
becomes the sure medium in quo of His cognition. 
However, this solution is not altogether satisfactory. 
For does not such absolute predetermination derogate 
from, not to say destroy, the self-determining power 
of free will? Again, several passages from the writ- 
ings of St. Thomas are distinctly unfavorable to this 
theory.?® , 


17S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 4. 

18 S. Theol., ta, qu. 14, art. 13. 

19 To quote but one: “ [psa po- 
tentia voluntatis, quantum in se est, 
indifferens est ad plura; sed quod 
determinate exeat 
vel illum, non est ab alio determi- 
nante, sed ab ipsa voluntate. Sed 
in naturalibus [sc. non liberis] ac- 
tus progreditur ab agente, sed tamen 


in hunce actum 


determinatio ad hunc actum non 
est ab agente, sed ab eo [sc. Deo], 
qui agenti talem naturam dedit, per 
quam ad hunc actum determinatum 
est: et ideo propriissime actus vo- 
luntatis a voluntate esse dicitur. 
Unde si aliquis defectus sit in actu 
eius, ipsi voluntati in culpam et 
peccatum imputatur.” (In 1 Dist. 
39, qu. I, art. 1.) Cfr. Frins’s ob- 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 309 


Cardinal Bellarmine tried to solve the difficulty by 
cardiognosis: “Deus, quia cognoscit omnes propen- 
siones et totum ingenium anim nostri... infalli- 
biliter colligit, quam in partem sit animus inclinaturus.” ?° 
But the real crux is not whether God, by means of 
His supercomprehensio cordis, can calculate with moral 
certitude at what free decisions the creature will arrive; 
but whether He can foreknow these decisions with that 
metaphysical certainty which they possess after they 
have once been made. Now, to know an effect with 
metaphysical certainty from its cause, is to know a nec- 
essary effect. In this case, therefore, the will would 
no longer be free,—a flaw which has led theologians 
to relinquish this hypothesis, though it had the support 
of such authorities as Molina and Becanus.?? 

b) To the Molinist, on account of the peculiar char- 
acter of the free-will actions of rational creatures, God’s 
understanding of these actions appears not as causally 
antecedent, but as consequent. It is here that the 
famous axiom of the Fathers is brought into play: 
Actus liberi non sunt vel erunt quia Deus videt, sed 
e contra videt, quia sunt vel erunt.”’ However, God 
perceives the free actions of creatures in His own Es- 
sence, not only because, as obiectum materiale et secun- 
darium, they are merely the terminus and not the cause 
of the divine cognition; but especially because, (pre- 
supposing the scientia media), they are contained in, 
and hence knowable through, the divine decrees of 
creation, preservation, and concurrence. If this ex- 
planation is not as clear as it might be, this is due to the 
concept of the scientia media, or, which comes to the 
servations on this important pas- 20 De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., IV, 15. 


sage in De Actibus Hwmanis, nn, 21 For further details, consult 
93 sqq., Friburgi 1897. Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 322 sqq 


400 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


same thing, to the knotty problem of the knowability of 
the futuribilia, which we defer to a future chapter. 


Thesis III: God foresees the free actions of the 
future not in His physical predeterminations, but in 
His concurring will, which is directed by the scientia 
media. 


Proof. This thesis, which is defended by numerous 
Molinist theologians, consists of two parts; one polemical, 
directed against the Thomist view; the other positive, in 
support of Molinism. Both schools agree that the will 
of God is the medium of His foreknowledge of the free 
acts of the future. They differ in this that Molinism 
assumes a “ decreeless”’ scientia media as a sort of torch 
preceding the decree of the divine Will; while Thomism 
vigorously rejects the theory of a scientia media or mid- 
dle knowledge, and bases the reality and cognoscibility 
of the free actions of the future solely and entirely on 
the absolute Will of God. 

a) We refrain from a detailed refutation of the 
Thomistic position in this volume, because the matter 
belongs properly to the treatise on Grace. Let us 
merely observe that the logic of the Thomistic system 
—we do not impugn the intentions of its thoroughly 
honorable and orthodox defenders — is sure to lead to 
the destruction of free-will and to a conception of the 
origin of sin which it would be difficult to harmonize 
with the sanctity of the Most High. Compare these 
two utterances. Alvarez, one of the ablest among 
the Thomist theologians, says: “ Deus. certo et infalli- 
biliter cognoscit omnia peccata futura in decreto [abso- 
luto, antecedente|, quo statuit praedeterminare volunta- 
tem creatam ad entitatem actus peccati, in quantum 
actio et ens est, et permittere malitiam moralem peccatt 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 401 


ut peccatum est, non dando auxilium efficax ad illud vitan- 
dum.” ?? Bafiez: “Voluntas creata infallibiliter deficiet 
circa quamcunque materiam virtutis, nist efficaciter de- 
terminetur a divina voluntate ad bene operandum.” 8 
Between these two determinations the will finds itself 
in a quandary from which there is no escape. Assum- 
ing that it is absolutely predetermined to the entity of 
the sinful act,— how can the will escape formal sin, 
if to resist temptation it needs a new predetermination, 
over whose existence or non-existence it has no more con- 
trol than over its premotion to the positive entity of sin? 
It is because they dread this logical consequence of their 
theory, that several of the followers of Bafiez ** restrict 
the praedeterminatio voluntatis creatae ad entitatem 
actus to such actions as are morally good. Before 
Bafiez’s time, by the way, Thomists generally did 
not explain God’s foreknowledge of the free actions of 
the future on the theory of decreta praedetermunantia.*® 
Among modern Thomists Cardinal Zigliara deviates from 
the beaten track of what is called pure Thomism.?* If 
these and other grave objections (to be treated in the 
volume on Grace), could be satisfactorily solved, the 
praemotio physica would afford a sure and infallible me- 
dium of divine knowledge, and we could confidently say 
with Billuart: “ Deus cognoscit futura absoluta contin- 
gentia et libera in suo decreto eorum futuritionem deter- 
minante, sive in essentia sua huiusmodi decreto deter- 
minata.”’ 27 | , 

b) One might be tempted to seek a way out of the 


22 De Aux. Grat, disp, XI, n. 3. tione Det cum Omni Natura, prae- 

23 Com. in S. Theol., 1a, qu. 14,  sertim Libera, pp. 344 saqq., Parisiis 
art. 133 Concl.|\2; iad :25 1892. = 

24 EB. g., Mendoza and Zumel. 36°T heols Nate WITk;) ce. 4) arts 3. 

25 Cfr. Schneemann, Controv., 27 Op. cit., diss, 6, art. 4... Fora 


pp. 98 sqq.; V. Frins, De Coopera- refutation of the theory, see G. B. 


— 


402 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


difficulty by regarding eternity, 7. ¢., that attribute in 
virtue of which God coexists with the past, present, and 
future, as the medium of His cognition of the free 
actions of the future, and to say that to the Eternal 
God the future as well as the past is present. As God 
truly intues the present, with all events occurring therein, 
so by virtue of His eternity or, more correctly, sem- 
piternity, He sees the past and the future as clearly 
and distinctly as if they were present. St. Thomas 
employs a beautiful simile to illustrate this truth.?° 
Take an army corps marching past a given point. 
Those who are in line see each only a few individuals 
ahead. But an observer stationed on a high coign of 
vantage outside, would be able to take in the whole 
corps at a glance. Similarly, God is not carried away 
by the current of time. He exists outside of, and above 
time, because He is eternal. Whatever has occurred or 
will occur, in the course of time, past and future, He 
views from His sempiternal coign of vantage as if it 
were happening hic et nunc. In the more accurate lan- 
guage of theology, therefore, we ought not to speak of 
God’s fore-knowledge or after-knowledge, but rather of 
His unchanging co-knowledge, based on an immutable 
and immediate intuition of actuality. 

The explanation just suggested, however, fails to 
solve the question as to the medium of God’s fore- 
knowledge of the future free actions of His rational 
creatures. All it enables us to say is that, because He 
is eternal, it cannot be more difficult for Him to have 
an infallible knowledge of the past and future, than of 
the present. But beyond this many questions remain 
Tepe, S. J., Instit. Theol, t. II, Chr. Pesch, S. J., Praelect. Dog- 


pp. 177 sqq., Parisiis 1895; and mat., II (ed. 2a), pp. 125 sqq. 
28 De Verit., qu. 2, art, 12. 


ee eet ae Re Pe ae eR ee ee - eae eee neem i cae oer _ eee — ~ " re 
ae ae CE TT Aaa SRI ete NR a i SR Ge ee Ee ee ee 
=: = z = ot SS a ee eee = eae rs oe = es N ge Ca Pce ie eee 


SSS 


_ 


is x Nie, an 
SS Ee 
SS SSS 


THE DIVINE: ATTRIBUTES 403 


open and unsolved. Eternity (sempiternity) can no 
more be the proper medium of God’s knowledge of the 
free acts of the future, than can His omnipresence, 
which is often emblemed by an all-seeing eye. Both 
sempiternity and omnipresence presuppose the physical 
world with its temporal succession and local juxtaposi- 
tion, just as the scientia visionis has for its necessary 
condition actual existence in time and space. That 
which actually exists God can see as actually existing 
only on condition that it exists. Speculative knowledge 
is necessarily a scientia consequens, 1. @., a knowledge 
which follows things actually existing in the various di- 
visions of time; not a scientia antecedens, which precedes 
them, either by nature or causally. Sin in particular, as 
St. Augustine insists, must be conceived as an object 
of consequent knowledge: “‘ Neque enim ideo peccat 
homo, quia Deus illum peccaturum praescivit, ... qui 
si nolit, utique non peccat, sed si peccare noluerit, etiam 
hoc ille praescivit—For a man does not therefore 
sin, because God foreknew that he would sin,... 
man, if he wills not, sins not; but if he shall not 
will to sin, even this did God foreknow.”*® It is 
furthermore easy to see that if God’s (speculative) 
Scientia visionis has from all eternity a real object in 
space and time, this can only be for the reason that 
God had determined from all eternity to create such 
an object. Consequently the speculative knowledge of 
God, which assumes things as existing, has for its nec- 
essary antecedent His practical knowledge, which is the 
cause of all being, 7. e., the free Will of God, de- 
termining that at such and such a time there shall 
come into being such and such an intelligent crea- 
ture, privileged to shape its own conduct freely with 


29 De Civ. Dei, Vis 10, n. 2e 


404 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


the concurrence of the Prime Cause. Hence it is mani- 
fest that God foreknows the future free actions of 
His intelligent creatures not in His quiescent eternity, 
but in His operative knowledge, 7. ¢., in an act of His 
divine Will decreeing to create beings endowed with 
free will, to preserve their free will, and at all times 
to co-operate with it, either positively or permissively.* 

c) It is on the conclusion just set forth that Molinism 
bases its contention that the medium of God’s knowl- 
edge .of the free actions of the future must be 
sought for, remotely in His creative and preservative 
Will, proximately in His will of co-operating or con- 
curring with His rational creatures. The whole question 
at issue is thereby transferred to the domain of the 
concursus divinus, into which we cannot at present 
enter.** According to the Molinist theory, the con- 
cursus divinus does not cause the free determination 
of the will promovendo, but rather includes it per modum 
conditionis —else the will would not be free—and 
hence, in order to safeguard the infallibility of the 
knowledge which God draws from His concursus, Molin- 
ism finds itself constrained to supply the latter with 
the scientia media as with a torch, in the light of which 
the Almighty, even before He offers and confers His co- 
operation is enabled to know how under existing cir- 
cumstances the free will of the creature will receive it, 
and also how it would receive it under all conceivable cir- 
cumstances. “Deus ex vt suae essentiae,” says Lessius, 


30 The terms creation, preserva- 
tion, and co-operation, or concur- 
rence, are more fully explained in 
Pohle-Preuss, The Author of Nature 
and the Supernatural. 

31 On the important distinction 
between the (Thomistic) concursus 
praevius and the (Molinistic) con- 


cursus simultaneus, and likewise on 
the distinction between concursus 
oblatus and concursus collatus, the 
student will find it profitable to 
consult Jos. Hontheim, S. J., In- 
stit. Theodicaeae, pp. 621 sqq., 731 
sqq., Friburgi 1893. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 405 


“ante omne decretum liberum ... omnia ex hypothest 
futura cognoscit [== scientia media], qua cogmitione 
posita accedente decreto libero quo vult creare causas 
liberas et permuttere eas suis motibus in talibus circum- 
stanttis, statim in suo illo decreto effectivo et permussivo 
videt, quid absolute sit futurum.’ **? This hypothesis, 
which manifestly owes its existence to a desire to 
safeguard the freedom of the will, is tenable only on 
the assumption that the free actions of rational crea- 
tures are from everlasting univocally true, or knowable 
in themselves objectively and independently of any de- 
cree of the Divine Will. Hence the eager efforts of the 
Molinists to establish the determinata veritas of the free 
acts of the future (absolutely and conditionally), and 
hence also the equally transparent endeavor of the 
Thomists to deny the existence of such a determinata 
veritas, except on the assumption of absolute and hy- 
pothetical predeterminations. Later Molinists argue 
something like this: 

d) When Christ said to Peter in the night of His 
sacred Passion: “In hac nocte ter me negabis,’ and 
Peter obstinately insisted: ‘Non te negabo,”’** it is 
quite plain that one of these contradictory propositions 
was certainly and eternally true, while the other was 
equally false. The outcome might have been logically 
formulated thus: (1) Peter will either deny Jesus, 
or he will not deny him; (2) Peter will not deny 
Jesus; (3) , Peter ; wall \ideny, “Jesus. Of-) these: ithree 
propositions the first, being merely a concrete applica- 
tion of the principle of contradiction, while evidently 
true, is so imdefimte as to be valueless. As the Molinist 
Martinez told Gonet: “Sit hoc esset, spiritus propheticus 
esset omnibus innatus.” ** The second proposition, on 


82 De Perf. Div., VI, 1, n. 7. 34 De Scientia Dei Controv., 3, 
83 Math. XXVI, 34 sq. \ disp. 3, sect. 5. 


406 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


the other hand, is as certainly false as the third is true. 
For if Christ had prophesied: “Non me negabis,” He 
would have uttered a definite untruth, just as He uttered 
a definite truth when He said: “Ter me negabis’ To 
assert, therefore, that before its actual occurrence, 
Peter’s denial of the Saviour was neither definitely true, 
nor definitely untrue, but at best indefinitely true, after 
the manner of a disjunctive proposition, would be 
tantamount to giving the lie to divine Revelation, which 
foretells definite truths, and to denying the eternal co- 
existence of God with His free creatures in the past, 
present, and future. Nor could this condition of af- 
fairs be altered by a decree of the Divine Will, be- 
cause even omnipotence cannot reconcile contradictories. 
When Peter was called upon to declare himself either 
for or against His Divine Master, the circumstances of 
the case (which God had foreseen from all eternity ) 
were such that he had either to take His part or deny 
Him. To do both indefinitely, or to do neither defi- 
nitely, would have been as contradictory as it would be 
for a material body to exist without definite quantity 
or color. This contradiction not only reaches back into 
the past, but it also reaches forward into the future, 
for time — especially in relation to the Eternal God — 
cannot alter an objective truth. The indefiniteness which 
attaches to the free actions of the future, therefore, 
is not inherent in these actions themselves, but only in 
our knowledge of them, which must await the fact in 
order to have a determinant. Consequently, all abso- 
lute future events are just as definitely determined 
from all eternity as if they were present or past, and 
therefore belong to the category of definite truths, 
which must be knowable as such. And even though 
God in some other Economy could have preserved Peter 


THE DIVINE (ATTRIBUTES 407 


from his fall by giving him an efficacious grace, never- 
theless, in this last-mentioned hypothesis his loyalty 
would not have been less definitely true than his dis- 
loyalty and sin are now; and God would have fore- 
known the former as definitely from all eternity as 
He foreknew the latter. While God’s decision to create 
the present Economy, in preference to any other which 
He might have chosen, simply resulted in Peter’s denial 
of Christ becoming an historical fact, in some other 
Economy this crime would have been just as much a 
definite objective truth, though, of course, only as a 
futuribile or futurum sub hypothesi. 

e) In matter of fact conditionally future actions 
(liberum futuribile) are in the same category with ab- 
solutely future actions (liberum vere futurum), inas- 
much as God has revealed truths of either class in the 
most definite manner, e. g., the conversion of Tyre and 
Sidon, the surrender of David to Saul by the inhabitants | 
of Ceila,** etc. For God foresees the future free actions 
of His rational creatures precisely in the same signum 
rationis by which they assume the shape of definite 
truths, namely, through the self-determination of the 
free will. Before the existence of St. Peter, nay even 
before the making of the divine decree to which He 
owed his existence, it was definitely true that he would 
betray Christ if, furnished with no more than sufficient 
grace, he would be exposed to this definite temptation 
under the particular circumstances with which we are 
acquainted from the Gospel; for even in the merely 
imaginary order of the futuribilitas it would be im- 
possible to conceive Peter as acting under the indefinite 
disjunction either —or. Consequently, God’s free de- 
cree to create and preserve Peter, and to allow him 


85 Supra, p. 376. 


408 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


to fall into sin, presupposes on the Creator’s part an 
infallible foreknowledge of the conditional future (i. e., 
scientia. media). What is true of this typical example, 
applies likewise to all others. 

There remains the question: What is the medium of 
that cognition by which God infallibly foreknows the 
conditionally future free actions of His creatures? Are 
these actions themselves, as the Thomists assert, true 
and knowable only in consequence and by virtue of 
the hypothetical decrees of the Divine Will which pre- 
cede and determine them? Or does God know them 
without the agency of such decreta praedeterminantia, 
and quite independently of His determining Will, as 
the Molinists allege? These are questions which lead 
us into the innermost sanctuary of His Divine Majesty, 
and no matter how we may answer them, we shall find 
ourselves in the long run enveloped by a mystic dark- 
ness such as that which obtains in the mighty vestibule 
of some great cathedral, into which only a little win- 
dow shaped like a “ mystic rose” admits a few subdued 
rays of light. Human theology seems doomed to disap- 
pointment in its efforts to fathom the mystery of the 
divine knowledge of Him Who dwells in inaccessible 
light.%¢ 


Thesis IV: God does not foresee the conditionally 
free actions of the future in any hypothetical decrees 
of His divine Will, but in their own objective truth, 
univocally determined from all eternity. 


Proof. For a better understanding of the Thomistic 
doctrine expressed in the first part of this thesis we will 
premise the following explanations. There are two 
kinds of decrees of the will, absolute and hypothetical. 


361 Tim. VI, 16. 


eC Oe, ee ae 


8 ee ae a ne 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 409 


a) An absolute decree is one which is unconditional, 
both on the part of its subject and on the part of its 
object, as e. g., “I will create.” A hypothetical decree, 
on the other hand, is dependent upon some previous 
condition, either on the part of the determining sub- 
ject, or on the part of the determined object. We 
have to do with a conditional decree of the first kind 
if the law-giver has no real will (voluntas) to act, but 
would have it (velleitas) in case some condition were 
fulfilled; for example, “I would fly, if I had wings.” 
We should have a conditional decree of the second 
kind, if the lawgiver had a real will to act, but was 
determined to await the fulfilment of some objective 
condition; for instance, “I will spare Sodom, if ten 
just men can be found therein.” The fulfilment of such 
a condition may lie in the power either of the one mak- 
ing the decree, or of some other independent will. God’s 
will that all men should be saved is of the last-men- 
tioned species: “1 will that all men be saved, if they 
will co-operate with my grace.” According to the 
Thomists a conditional decree of the first-mentioned 
order is that regarding the conversion of Tyre: “I 
decree to predetermine the inhabitants of Tyre to do 
penance, if I send them the Messias.” Thomism holds 
that the decrees of the Divine Will in which God 
infallibly foresees the, conditionally free actions of the 
future, are subjectively absolute, in so far as God makes 
a real decision; but objectively conditioned, in so far 
as they depend on a condition the fulfilment of which 
lies solely in God’s power. Moreover of themselves 
they have a predetermining power, which, however, 
cannot produce its effect because the requisite condition 
is wanting. Inasmuch as the deternunatio ad unum 


is not dependent on the free self-determination of 
27 B 


410 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


the conditionally future will of the creature, but 
solely on the predetermining will of the Creator, the 
latter must be the sure and infallible medium of. divine 
cognition for which we are seeking. This solution of 
a much mooted difficulty was unknown to the older 
Thomists, such as Ledesma, Curiel, etc.; it was excogi- 
tated and developed by such later Thomists as Alvarez, 
Gonet, Joannes a S. Thoma, Gotti, Billuart, etc. 

The theory just developed has one weak point, how- 
ever. It seems to involve the inevitable, though alto- 
gether unintentional and expressly disavowed inference 
that the freedom of both the conditional and the abso- 
lutely future actions of rational creatures is destroyed 
by the Thomistic assumption of subjectively absolute 
and objectively conditioned predeterminations on the 
part of God. Another, even more serious consequence 
is that according to this theory all conditionally future 
sins seem to fall back upon God as their author, Both 
these conclusions appear to flow with irresistible logic 
from the very notion of praemotio physica, which Molin- 
ism therefore sharply combats, in order to preserve the 
freedom of the will. If we admit them as logically 
flowing from the Thomistic premises, we must reject 
these premises. Then such predetermining decrees do 
not, nay cannot, exist in God, and consequently cannot 
serve Him as the medium for knowing the conditionally 
future free actions of His creatures. 

Even aside from the two capital objections just indi- 
cated, there are other serious difficulties that can be urged 
against these hypothetical decrees. What could be 
their purpose? Their only conceivable purpose could 
be to insure to the omniscient Creator an infallible knowl- 
edge of the conditionally free acts of the future, for the 
ends and purposes of His wise Providence. For, as 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AII 


we have already pointed out, without a knowledge of 
the futuribilia God could not rule and govern the actual 
world which He has created. But besides the present 
universe and Economy, there are conceivable innumer- 
able others, which eternally remain in a state of pure 
possibility and in the contemplation of which there can 
be question solely of hypothetical acts performed by hy- 
pothetical creatures. The dilemma arises: Either God 
has uttered subjectively absolute and objectively con- 
ditional decrees with respect to all possible rational crea- 
tures in all possible Economies; or He has not. It He 
has not, then His omniscience is limited proportionately 
to the absence of such decrees; for without decrees 
He can have no foreknowledge. If we choose the other 
horn of the dilemma, then we must assume that there 
exists in God an actually infinite number of decrees of 
His Divine Will, which have no other purpose than to 
enlarge and to safeguard His knowledge. This assump- 
tion seemed indecens et superfluum even to some Thomist 
theologians,*? who preferred to hold with John a 5. 
Thoma: “ Deum statuisse nihil de illis [combinationibus 
possibilibus] decernere, sed sub sola possibilitate con- 
cludere, utramque contingentiae partem aestimans pro- 
babilem.’ *8 Thus Thomism pendulates to and fro be- 
tween an altogether incongruous conception of God and 
a very serious limitation of His omniscience. 

There is furthermore something unbecoming and un- 
intelligible in the Thomistic system, because, according 
to its tenets, most, if not all, decrees of the Divine 
Will seem to lack a rational and wise motive. Once 
God had determined absolutely not to send the Messias 

37 Cfr. Gonet, De Aux. Grat., 2. Cfr. Billuart, De Deo, diss. 6, 


GISp. 5) art. 2,795 0: art. 5, sub finem, 
88 De Scientia Dei, disp. 20, art. 


412 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


to Tyre and Sidon, the matter must have been at an 
end, so far as the Divine Will was concerned. Why, 
then, shall we assume the existence of a second decree 
to this effect: “ Had I not decreed not to send the 
Messias to Tyre and Sidon, then I would decree to 
send Him thither (but I will not send Him thither), 
and to predetermine the inhabitants of these cities to 
do penance”? 

Perhaps a Thomist theologian will answer: With- 
out some such decree God would lack that knowl- 
edge which is absolutely requisite to govern the uni- 
verse under the present Economy. But this only 
proves that the Thomistic theory, which derives God’s 
scientia futuribilium entirely from the decrees of His 
Will, moves in a vicious circle, something like this: 
‘iL decree an order that I may, know, what] ,decree.’ 
Nor can Thomism be spared the reproach of innovation ; 
for nowhere in the writings of the Fathers or of St. 
Thomas do we find mention made of such hypothetical 
decrees. Had they believed in their existence, these 
authors would surely have adverted to them when writ- 
ing on the sanctity of God and on sin. 

b) We do not mean to convey the idea that the 
Molinist position is quite satisfactory. On the contrary, 
when its defenders proceed from criticism to posi- 
tive construction, the difficulties of their system grow 
apace. Strictly speaking the Molinists are fully agreed 
only on two cardinal points: (1) In opposing the 
theory of praemotio physica, and (2) in unalterably 
upholding the doctrine of scientia media. Both aim 
solely at preserving free-will. As soon as the question 
arises: Whence does the sctentia media derive its in- 
fallibility? or, in other words, What is the objective 
medium in which God infallibly foreknows the condi- 


SS Se Pe Sa = oMe Sc § Brahe: 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 413 


tionally free acts of the future?—the theologians of 
this school forthwith part company. The inherent diffi- 
culties of their position are such that some later Molin- 
ists, notably P. Kleutgen, prefer to plead ignorance as 
to the medium of God’s knowledge of the futuribilia. 
They draw a sharp line of demarcation between the 
actuality of the scientia media on the one side, and its 
origin and mode of operation on the other, insisting 
solely on the first and leaving the second an open ques- 
tion. This is tantamount to admitting that Molinism, 
too, in its last deductions arrives at the door of that 
great temple of mystery to which God alone holds the 
key. In view of these facts we need hardly say that the 
explanation contained in the following paragraphs can- 
not claim to be more than a diffident attempt at groping 
a way. 

To reconcile the manifold and apparently contra- 
dictory explanations given by different Molinist the- 
ologians, it will be useful to follow the example of 
Hontheim,*® who shows their objective agreement by 
treating them as different stages in the development of 
the same fundamental idea. From this point of view we 
may distinguish four stages of Molinism, each of which 
attempts a deeper explanation than the preceding. 

First Stage. It is certain beyond a doubt, first, that 
the divine Intellect is infinite, and, secondly, that all 
the absolute or conditional future actions of free 
creatures are univocally predetermined from all eternity, 
and are consequently cognoscible. An infinite intellect 
must needs know all truth. Hence God knows all 
absolutely or conditionally future actions of His free 
creatures. But how? Surely not through the mediation 
of absolute or hypothetical decrees of predetermining 


89 Institutiones Theodicaeae, pp. 640 sqq. 


414 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


effect. Such decrees would destroy the freedom of the 
will; for the determinatio ad unum must rest on the 
self-determination of the free will. It follows that 
God must know the absolutely and conditionally fu- 
ture actions of His free creatures in these actions them- 
selves; or, in other words, in their objective truth. I 
those Molinists who halt here be asked: How, then, 
can God know all free actions in His own Essence as 
medium in quo? they will return the unsatisfactory an- 
swer: That is a mystery. 

Second Stage. To clear up this mystery other Molin- 
ist theologians go a little farther. They begin by lay- 
ing down two principles: First, God perceives all the 
truths which He knows immediately in His own Es- 
sence as the medium of. cognition; second, His Essence 
is the absolutely faithful mirror of all truth (“Deus 
est speculum absolutum omnis veritatis”). Now, inas- 
much as the absolutely and conditionally future ac- 
tions of free creatures are objectively true, and there- 
fore knowable, they must be vitally represented in the 
divine Essence, and consequently form part of the 
knowledge of God. Accordingly, while God perceives 
the free acts of the future terminatively in themselves, 
determinatively He perceives them in His own Essence 
as medium in quo. “ Divinus intellectus ab aeterno cog- 
noscit res, non solum secundum esse quod habent in 
causis suis, sed etiam secundum esse quod habent in 
seipsis. Nihil igitur prohibet ipsum habere aeternam 
cognitionem de contingentibus infallibilem.” But the 
manner in which those free actions of the future are rep- 
resented in the divine Essence is wrapt in mysterious 
darkness; except that we may not assume a praemotio 
physica, 

40S. Thom., Contr. Gent., I, 67. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES : AI5 


Third Stage. We can best realize the difficulty of ex- 
plaining this “mode of reflection,” if we turn our at- 
tention to the relation of the futura and futuribilia to 
the divine Essence as the “mirror of all truth.” The 
future actions of free creatures can become an object 
of cognition only if, like all truth, they have a founda- 
tion in reality. Where are we to find this foundation 
if we reject the Thomistic hypothesis of decreta prae- 
determinantia? Are we to find it in the actuality of the 
free act itself? But this free act does not yet exist; in- 
deed, in the case of most futuribilia, it never will exist. 
Or are we to find it in the creatural cause of the future 
act? But not even the will as cause exists as yet; it will 
not exist till later; and even if it did already exist, it 
would not necessarily contain the free effect. (“ Defi- 
ciente fundamento deficit veritas.’) From all of which 
it would appear that the divine Essence is an inadequate 
mirror of the free actions of the future. St. Thomas 
helps us to solve this difficulty. He teaches that God’s 
eternity reflects the future as clearly and distinctly as it 
reflects the present. The free self-determination of the 
will, even if it still lies (absolutely or conditionally) in 
the future, is continually present to the eternal Essence 
of God. He does not foresee, He sees always. The fact 
of His co-existence with His creatures — not their co- 
existence with Him— raises Him above and beyond all 
divisions of time. “ Futurum dupliciter potest cognosci,’ 
says St. Thomas. “ Uno modo in causa sua, et sic futura 
quae ex necessitate ex causis suis proveniunt, per certam 
scientiam cognoscuntur, ut solem oriri cras.... Alio 
modo cognoscuntur futura in seipsis. Et sic solius Dei 
est futura cognoscere, non solum quae ex necessitate 
proveniunt, ... sed etiam casualia et fortuita, quia 
Deus videt omnia in sua aecternitate, quae cum sit sim- 


416 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


plex, tott tempori adest et ipsum concludit. Et ideo 
unius Det intuitus fertur in omnia quae aguntur per 
totum tempus, sicut in praesentia, et videt omnia, ut in 
seipsis sunt.” *+ This agrees perfectly with the teach- 
ing of St. Augustine: “Deo, qui omnia supergreditur 
tempora, nihil est futurum—To God, Who transcends 
all time, ' nothing ‘1s’ “future.’?#*""Or, as’ St?’ Bernard 
beautifully expresses the same thought: “ Futura non 
expectat, praeterita non recogitat, praesentia non experi- 
tur —[God] does not expect the future, He does not re- 
member the past, He does not experience the present.” #8 
From this important truth it follows that the absolutely 
and conditionally future actions of free creatures are 
a determinata veritas from all eternity, not indeed by any 
divine predetermination, but in virtue of the free-will 
decisions of the creatures themselves. Let us again 
quote St. Thomas: “Deus est omnino extra ordinem 
temporis, quasi in arce aeternitatis constitutus, quae est 
tota simul, cut subiacet totius temporis decursus secun- 
dum unum et simplicem eius intuitum; et ideo uno in- 
tuitu videt omnia quae aguntur, secundum quod 
(unumquodque) est in seipso existens, non quasi sibi 
futurum, ... sed omnino aeternaliter sic videt unum- 
quodque eorum quae sunt im quocunque tempore, 
sicut oculus humanus videt Socratem sedere in seipso, 
non in causa sud, ... quia unumquodque, prout est 
in seipso, tam determinatum est. Sic igitur relin- 
quitur, quod Deus certissime et infallibiliter cognoscat 
omnia, quae fiunt in tempore; et tamen... non sunt 
vel fiunt ex necessitate, sed contingenter.’** It is the 
eternal power of reflexion inherent in the Divine Es- 
41 Cfr. S. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, 43 Serm. in Cant., 80. 


qu. 57, art. 3. 44 Comment. in Aristot. &e Inter- 
42 Ad Simplic., 1. 2, qu. 2. pret., lib. I, lect. 14. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 417 


sence, which in conjunction with the self-determina- 
tion of the creatures’ free will—a_ self-determination 
in itself temporal but always present to the eternal God 
—constitutes the truth-reality of the absolutely and 
conditionally future acts of free creatures. Thus the 
Molinist theologians, at this third stage, by calling to 
their aid the mystery of eternity, succeed in securing 
a real basis for the truth of the free acts of the future. 
But there remains an unexplained residuum, viz.: the 
concept of vis repraesentativa aeterna. 

Fourth Stage. To resolve this residuum other the- 
ologians of the same school have shaped a still subtler 
argument. They proceed from the principle that with- 
out the active co-operation of God as the prime mover 
of all things, no free act of any sort is possible; nor 
consequently true and knowable. According to this 
theory God foreknows the absolutely future actions of 
His free creatures in His Essence (Will) as the medium 
in quo, in so far as, by virtue of His co-operation, He 
is the cause of every free act. As to the conditionally 
future acts of His free creatures, which chiefly concern 
us here, their knowability, or truth, must consequently 
depend on God’s hypothetical will of concurrence, and 
it is the latter which constitutes the medium of His 
cognition of the futuribilia.*® This brings us to the final 
terminus of the Molinist system, where we again find 
ourselves on the brink of an impassable abyss. For 
as the hypothetical concursus divinus, like the real con- 
cursus, according to Molinist teaching does not causally 
produce but merely presupposes the hypothetical self- 
determination of the will; so at bottom it also pre- 
supposes that God has an infallible knowledge of this 
hypothetically free act by virtue of the scientia media, 


45 Cfr. Chr. Pesch, 2. c., pp. 118 sqq. 


418 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


without basing the explanation of the latter on the con- 
cursus hypotheticus. Hence the scientia media in the 
Molinistic sense is a valuable and, if you will, indis- 
pensable postulate, though it defies every attempt to prove 
it by strictly scientific argumentation. Thus the famous 
controversy, which was at one time carried on with so 
much acrimony, lands us in an impenetrable mystery. 
“ Mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me; confortata est, 
et non potero ad eam.’ * 

Having reviewed both systems at some length, we 
are now prepared to give a brief characterization of 
Thomism and Molinism. Thomism is undeniably a 
grand and strictly logical system, which conveys an im- 
posing conception of the omnipotence, the omni-causality, 
and the sovereignty of God. But in ruthlessly driving 
its fundamental principles to their ultimate conclusions, it 
is led to enunciate some harsh propositions which un- 
pleasantly disturb the harmony of the Thomist system. 
Its psychological effects are great moral earnestness and 
a fearsome conception of God, which, while it deeply 
impresses persons of strong faith, easily drives weak 
natures into a slough of despair. Hence Thomism as 
a theological system is adapted to the professor’s chair 
rather than to purposes of popular exhortation. Molin- 
ism, on the other hand, is characterized by its mild and 
gentle features,—an exalted conception of the loving 
Providence of God, His merciful will to save all men, 
His encompassing grace, His condescension to the weak- 
nesses of human nature. Psychologically it produces 
trust in God, strengthens man’s confidence in his own 
power of co-operation, spurs him on to work out his 
salvation, engenders peace of mind and joy of heart. 
These qualities make it the natural language of the 


46 Ps. CXXXVIII, 6, 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 419 
preacher and the unconscious idiom of the catechetical 
instructor in addressing little children. There are 
ample indications in his writings that the holy Bishop 
Francis de Sales, one of the most amiable Saints in 
the Church’s calendar, was a Molinist. Irreconcilable 
in their leading principles, far-reaching in their prac- 
tical consequences, yet based equally on the orthodox 
teaching of the Church, the two systems are likely to 
retain their recruiting power. They will continue to have 
their adherents and defenders among theologians, and 
to exercise a benign influence each within its own circle 
so long as blind passion and a spirit of disastrous par- 
tisanship do not disturb the good relations existing be- 
tween their respective champions.*” 


READINGS: —S. Thom., Summa Theol., ta, qu. 14 sq. (Bon- 
joannes-Lescher, Compendium, pp. 39 sqq.)—In_ elucidation 
thereof especially Didacus Ruiz, De Scientia, de Ideis, de Veritate 
ac de Vita Det, Parisiis 1629.— Summa Contr. Gent., I, 66, 70 
(Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 36.n., 48 sqq.).— Suarez, 
Opusc. II De Scientia Dei, Matr. 1599.— Ramirez, De Scientia 
Dei, Matr. 1708.— Of later authors: *Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, 
pp. 251 sqq. Ratisbon 1881.—Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., 
Vol. II, pp. 91 sqq., 2nd ed., Friburgi 1899.— Franzelin, De Deo 
Uno, pp. 375 sqq., 3rd ed., Romae 1883.— L. Janssens, De Deo 
Uno, t. II, Friburgi 1900. Ceslaus Schneider, Das Wissen 
Goties nach der Lehre des heiligen Thomas von Aquin, 4 vols., 
Ratisbon 1884-1886.— Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual, I, pp. 214 sqq. 
— Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 262 sqq.— Hunter, Outlines, 
II, pp. 81 sqq.— Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,’ pp. 130 sqq.— 


47On the position of St. 
Thomas, consult A. M. Dummer- 
muth, O. P., S. Thomas et Doe- 
trina Praemotionis Physicae, Re- 
sponsio ad R. P. Schneemann Alios- 
que Doctrinae Thomisticae Impug- 
natores, Paris 1886; Vict. Frins, 
S. J., S. Thomae Doctrina de Co- 


operatione Dei cum Omni Natura 
Creata, Praesertim Libera; seu S. 
Thomas Praedeterminationis Phy- 
sicae Adversarius, Paris 1892; against 
him: Dummermuth, Defensto Doc- 
trinae S. Thomae de Praemotione 
Physica, Paris 1896. 


420 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE 


Jos. Rickaby, S. J., Free Will and Four English Philosophers, pp. 
166 sqq., London i906. Also Billuart, De Deo, dissert. 5 sq.— 
B. Mulleady, O.D.C., “ New Phases of an Old Controversy,” 
in the Irish Ecclesiastical Record, Vol. XXX, No. 524, pp. 164- 
179. For the literature on Thomism and Molinism, we must 
refer the student to the treatise on Grace. Other references in 
the text. Peary 


CHAPTER IV 


THE ATTRIBUTES OF DIVINE LIFE-—THE DIVINE 
WILL 


That there is a Divine Will is a logical de- 
duction from God’s pure spirituality, the concept 
of which, besides cognition, includes also voli- 
tion. It can furthermore be proved from a 
number of Scriptural passages, such as Matth. 
XXVI, 39: “Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu 
—Not as I will, but as thou wilt,’ and Matth. 
XXVI, 42 (VI, 10): “Fiat voluntas tua (76 
GédAypa cov)—Thy will be done.” The dogma was 
formally defined by the Vatican Council. 

The objective parallelism existing between the 
Divine Understanding and the Divine Will jus- 
tifies a division of the subject-matter of the pres- 
ent chapter into three sections, of which the first 
inquires into the mode of divine volition, the 
second into its objects, and the third into its at- 
tributes (virtutes). As in connection with the 
knowledge of God, so here the chief point to be 
emphasized is the infinite perfection of the Divine 
Will, at which we arrive partly by the threefold 


1Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. 1, De Deo; quoted by Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, Enchiridion, n. 1782. 


421 


422 THE DIVINE WILL 


way of affirmative differentiation, negative dif- 
ferentiation, and intensification ; * partly by a con- 
sideration of the divine attributes of being, more 
particularly self-existence, simplicity, and immu- 
tability. 


2 Supra, pp. 67 sqq 


pe TON at 


THE MODE OF DIVINE VOLITION—NECESSITY AND 
LIBERTY OF THE DIVINE WILL 


Analogously to the mode of divine cognition, 
the mode of divine volition can be established 
by the aid of certain fundamental or leading 
principles. Our most important task will be to 
prove the freedom of the Divine Will, whose 
basic act is Charity. 


Thesis I: Like God’s conception of Himself, the 
love He has for Himself is really identical with His 
Essence. 


This thesis embodies an article of faith. 

1. Proof. As with mortal men, so too with 
Almighty God, all volition culminates in love. 
Therefore the basic act of the Divine Will is 
God’s Love of Himself. Being the supreme and 
infinite good, God is infinitely lovable. This 
lovability must be adequately exhausted by an 
equally infinite act of love. Consequently, God 
is pure substantial Love. Cfr. 1 John IV, 8: 
“God is charity.” Now, since the Supreme Good 
is nothing but the Divine Essence considered 
sub ratione bonitatis, Substantial Charity must 

"a 23 


424 MODE OF DIVINE VOLITION 


co-incide with the Divine Essence.! Following 
the analogy of Aristotle’s famous axiom: “‘@«ds 
cor, vonows voqoews,”’ some of the Schoolmen have 
justly called God dilectio dilectionis. We need 
hardly point out that the relation between God’s 
self-comprehension and His self-love is a relation 
of absolute identity: Infinitum nosse = infini- 
tum velle = infinitum esse? 


2. Several important conclusions flow spontaneously 
from the truths above stated. Inasmuch as the divine 
volition is identical with all other divine attributes, and 
consequently admits of neither composition nor poten- 
tiality, the Will of God cannot be conceived as a fac- 
ulty; it must be purest act. This one substantial act, 
by virtue of which the loving subject (i. ¢., God), ade- 
quately encompasses and apprehends the loved object 
(7. @, God) is both immutable and eternal,— not 
only as considered in itself, but likewise in relation 
to creatures, A transition from love to hatred, there- 
fore, can not take place in God, but solely in the crea- 
ture, in so far as it sometimes renders itself deserving 
of God’s love, and sometimes of His hatred. Ps. XXXII, 
11: “Consilium Domini in aeternum manet — The 
counsel of the Lord standeth for ever.” Furthermore, 
the Divine Will, being absolutely independent because 
self-existent, does not strive for, or aspire after, any 
object whatsoever. Hence there exists in God neither 
desire in the strict sense of that term, nor love of 
concupiscence. In other words, He is pure Love re- 


2. Cit,'S. Thom... S.'/T heals? 2a! est suum esse, ita et suum esse est 
qu. 19, art. 1: “ Oportet in Deo suum velle,.” 
esse voluntatem, cum in eo sit in- 2Cfr. our remarks on the sim 


éellectus. Et sicut suum intelligere  plicity of God, supra, pp. 200 sqq. 


THE DIVINE. ATTRIBUTES 425 
posing in itself, without any admixture of desire. Only 
in so far as He desires the well-being of His crea- 
tures, can we metaphorically ascribe to Him an amor 
quasi concupiscentiae* Lastly, the Divine Will, be- 
ing infinitely perfect, is susceptible only of such de- 
terminations as do not essentially involve an imperfec- 
tion, such as is implied in some affections (e. g., sad- 
ness), and in some virtues (¢. g., obedience, contrition). 
Holy Scripture sometimes attributes such predicates to 
the Divine Will, but they must be understood as tropes 
or metaphors, or taken anthropomorphically.* Our 
guiding principle must be: Only pure perfections of the 
will exist in God formaliter; mixed perfections exist in 
Him merely virtualiter et eminenter. 


3. This important axiom affords us a sure 
criterion for valuing rightly the so-called affec- 
tions of the divine Will. 


a) After the analogy of the so-called passions (pas- 
siones) of the sensitive appetency, we may distinguish 
in intelligent creatures (angels and men) eleven affec- 
tions of the will, viz.: love and hatred, joy (or de- 
light) and sadness, desire and aversion (or abhorrence), 
hope and despair, courage and fear, and lastly anger.® 
In their last analysis they are all reducible to love. 
Of these eleven affections those only can be formally 
applied to God which contain no admixture of im- 


bonitatem et .nostram wutilitatem. 
Concupiscimus enim aliquid et nobis 


3 Cfr. S. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, 
Mit. 20.0 afte! 2, aa 3s, Deus 


proprie loquendo non amat crea- 
turas irrationales. amore -amicttiae, 
sed amore quasi concupiscentiae, in- 
quantum ordinat eas ad rationales 
creaturas et etiam ad seipsum, non 
quasi eis indigeat, sed propter suam 


28 


et aliis.’” 

4 Cfr. the note on p. 378. 

5 Cfr. Maher, Psychology: Em- 
pirical and Rational, 4th-ed., pp. 
426. sqq. London and New York 
1900. 


426 MODE OF DIVINE VOLITION 


perfection. Even the pure perfections must be purged 
of their “creatural mode” by the process of negative 
differentiation before they can be formally predicated 
of the Creator. There is some divergency among the- 
ologians with regard to the application of certain of 
these affections to God; but this is due solely to a 
difference of opinion as to whether or not they are to 
be regarded as perfectiones simplices. The following 
principles are pretty generally accepted: 

b) The affections proper before all others to the 
divine Will are love (amor) and joy (gaudium), for 
the reason that love really constitutes Its essence,® and 
joy is nothing but complacency in the possession of 
what is good. Of the contrary emotions, hatred (odium) 
and sadness (tristitia), the last-mentioned being the 
involuntary sufferance of present evil, are mixed per- 
fections (perfectiones mixtae) and must therefore be 
formally excluded from the Divine Will, to which we 
may attribute “ displeasure,” but not sadness in the strict 
sense of the term. The moral emotion of hatred is either 
a hatred of abomination (odiwm abominationis) or a 
hatred of enmity (odium inimicitiae), according as it 
is directed against evil as such, or against persons. It 
is certain that the Divine Will bears an infinite hatred 
against the evil of sin, first, because the concept of such 
hatred implies a pure perfection, and, secondly, be- 
cause it constitutes an essential element of God’s sanc- 
tity. As to whether God hates the person of the sin- 
ner, theologians are not agreed. Some take Wisd. XI, 
25: “Diligis omnia, quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum 
quae fecisti— Thou lovest all things that are, and 
hatest none of the things which thou hast made,” lit- 
erally, while others point to such texts as Ps. V, 7: 


6 Cfr. 1 John IV, 8. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 427 


“ Odisti omnes, qui operantur iniquitatem — Thou hatest 
all the workers of iniquity,” as opposed to this view. 
The correct interpretation of these apparently contra- 
dictory texts probably is, that God loves the. sin- 
ner in so far as he is His creature, and hates Him in 
so far as he transgresses His commands. “ Nihil 
prohibet,’ says St. Thomas, “unum et idem secundum 
aliquid amari, et secundum aliquid odio habert. Deus 
autem peccatores, inquantum sunt naturae quaedam, 
amat; sic enim et sunt et ab ipso sunt. Inquantum vero 
peccatores sunt, non sunt et ab esse deficiunt, et hoc im 
eis a Deo non est; unde secundum hoc ab ipso odio 
habentur.’* The affections of desire (desiderium) and 
aversion (fuga) may be ranged in the same class with 
concupiscible love (amor concupiscentiae), because God 
cannot desire any created good for Himself, nor 
flee from approaching evil. There is nothing to pre- 
vent us from assuming, however, that, (without of 
course experiencing anything like human emotion), He 
ardently desires the happiness of His creatures, and has 
an aversion to that which is apt to hurt or destroy 
them. Cfr. Ez, XXXIII, 11; “I desire not.the death 
of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way 
and live.’ On account of the imperfections they imply, 
the four affections known as hope (spes), courage 
(audacia), desperation (desperatio), and fear (timor), 
must likewise be excluded from the Divine Will. 
Neither the notion of difficulty implied in the first-men- 
tioned two, nor that of danger connoted by the others, 
is compatible with God’s omnipotence. As for anger 
(ira), if we define it as “the determination to avenge 
wrong from which one has suffered,” there is no room 
for it in the Divine Will, and the Fathers and theologians 


7S. Theol., 1a, qu. 20, art. 2, ad. 2, 


428 MODE OF DIVINE VOLITION 


are perfectly right in interpreting the respective pas- 
sages of Holy Scripture anthropomorphically, i. ¢., as ex- 
pressing merely God’s will to punish evil.® 


Thesis II: By virtue of His infinite love God loves 
whatever is good; Himself as the supreme good He 
loves with absolute necessity, whatever is good in His 
creatures He loves with a free will. 


This is also de fide. 

Proof. Both parts of this thesis have been 
formally defined by the Vatican Council: ® “Deus 
-. .. liberrimo consilio utramque de nihilo con- 
didit creaturam—God ... with absolute free- 
dom of counsel, created out of nothing both 
[the spiritual and the corporeal] creature.” 
“St quis Deum dixerit non voluntate ab omni 
necessitate libera, sed tam necessario creasse, 
quam necessario amat seipsum ... anathema 
sit—If any one shall say that God created, 
not by His will, free from all necessity, but by 
a necessity equal to the necessity whereby He 
loves Himself... let him. be anathema.” 
Freedom here means not merely freedom from 
restraint (libertas a coactione), but more par- 
ticularly freedom from intrinsic necessity (liber- 
tas a necessitate), which is also called freedom 
of indifference (libertas indifferentiae)."° 


8 For a more detailed treatment quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 
of this subject, see Suarez, De Deo, 1783. 


tract. 1, lib. ITI, c. 7; Gonet, Clyp. 10 On the liberty of the Divine 
Thomist., tract. 4, disp. 6; Kleutgen, © Will in creating the universe, see 
De Ipso Deo, pp. 343 sqq. the dogmatic treatise on God as the 


9Sess. III, cap. 1, De Deo; Author of Nature and the Super- 
natural. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 429 


i. God is Substantial Love, and love by its 
very nature tends to that which is good, in so 
far as it is good. Hence God must love Himself 
as the Infinite Good, and must do so from the 
intrinsic necessity of His nature, not merely as a 
matter of moral duty. But what is the relation 
of the Divine Will to created good? To find 
the answer to this question we must first draw 
a distinction. Whatever there is of good be- 
sides God, may be considered as either actually 


existing, or as merely possible, that is, as not 


yet existing, or as something that never will 
exist. Once God by an act of His free will has 
called creatures into being, He cannot but love 
whatever is good in them with the same love 
with which He loves Himself as the highest 
good; for whatever is good besides Himself 
is so by participation in His Divine Essence. 
Cfr. Wisd. XI, 25: “Diligis omnia, quae sunt, 
et nihil odisti eorum, quae fecisti—Thou lovest 
all things that are and hatest none of the things 
which thou hast made.” Prov. VIII, 31: “De- 
liciae meae esse cum filtis hominum—And my 
delights were to be with the children of men.” 
St. Thomas offers this beautiful argument 
drawn from unaided human reason: “Quicun- 
que enim amat aliquid secundum se et propter 
ipsum, amat per consequens omnia, in quibus illud 
invenitur: ut qui amat dulcedinem propter ipsam, 


430 FREEDOM OF WILL 


oportet omma dulcia amet. Quum igitur Deus 
amet bonitatem suam. propter ipsam, omnia autem 
quae sunt hance aliqua ratione participent, ex 
hoc ipso quod vult et amat se, vult et amat alia 
—Whoever loves anything in itself and for itself, 
wills consequently all things in which that thing 
is found: as he who loves sweetness in itself must 
love all sweet things. But God wills and loves 
His own goodness in itself and for itself; and all 
other being is a sort of participation by nea 
of His being.” ™ 

2. In the actual outpouring of Its goodness 
ad extra (as in the processes of Creation, Re- 
demption, and Sanctification), the Divine Will 


is absolutely free. Such is the unmistakable | | 


teaching of Holy Scripture.. Cfr. Ps. CXXXIV, 
6: “Omma quaecunque voluit Dominus fecit in 
coelo, in terra, in mari et in omnibus abyssis— 
Whatsoever the Lord ‘pleased he ‘hath done, in 
heaven, in earth, in the sea, and in all the depths.” 
St. Paul teaches that redemption, too, and 
the call of the human race to salvation, are 
effects of God’s absolutely free will. Cfr. Eph: 
I, 5-11: “Qui praedestinavit nos in adoptionem 
hliorum per’ Iesum Christum in ipsum secundum 
propositum voluntatis suae (Kati thy ed8oxiay roi 
Oernparos airod), . . . ut notum faceret nobis sa- 
cramentum voluntatis suae secundum beneplaci- 


11 Contr. Gent., I, 075 (Rickaby’s translation). 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 431 


tum eis quod proposuit in eo, ... in quo 
etiam et nos sorte vocati sumus, praedestinati 
secundum propositum eius, qui operatur omnia 
secundum consilium voluntatis suae («ard mpdbeow 
Tov Ta TavTa évepyovyTos Kata THY BovAyv Tod OeAnpatos adrod) 
—Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption 
of children through Jesus Christ unto himself: 
according to the purpose of his will: . . . That 
he might make known unto us the mystery of 
his will according to his good: pleasure, which 
he had purposed in him, ...in whom we 
also are called by lot, being predestinated ac- 
cording to the purpose of him who worketh all 
things according to the counsel of his will.” In 
the same manner is the outpouring of the 
charismata, which is ascribed to the Holy Ghost, 
due to the free will of God. Cfr. 1 Cor. XII, 11: 
“Haec autem omnia operatur unus atque idem 
Spiritus, dividens singulis; prout vult (xobas 
Bother.) —But all these things one and the same 
Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according 
as he will’ Adhering closely to these and 
similar passages from Holy Scripture, the 
Fathers unanimously defended the liberty of 
the Divine Will in its external operations. St. 
Ambrose, e. g., says: “Apostolus quoque dicit, 
quia omnia operatur unus atque idem Spiritus, 
dividens singulis, prout vult, i.e. pro libero vo- 


432 FREEDOM OF WILL 


luntatis arbitrio, non pro necessitatis obsequio.” * 
St. John of Damascus voices the belief of the 
Greek Fathers when he writes: “The Divine 
Nature is endowed with will and freedom, upon 
which there falls neither sin nor change.” * 
Hippolytus expresses himself tersely and accu- 
rately as follows: ‘‘Tdvra wowy ads OéAc, Kabos Gre, 


Ore Gére.”? 14 


3. The revealed doctrine set forth above was con- 
densed by the Scholastics into this axiom: “ Divina 
bonitas [= essentia] est obiectum formale et primarium, 
bonitas rerum autem obiectum materiale et secundarium 
voluntatis divinae.’ Indeed, as none but an infinite ob- 
ject (1 e@., the Divine Essence itself) can be propor- 
tionate to the Divine Will, the formal and primary ob- 
ject of God’s love can be none other than the Divine 
Essence itself. But God’s love of Himself is no cold, 
calculating egoism; it is an intestine vital law, in virtue 
of which God must love the Infinite Good, that is Him- 
self. As regards the nature of this divine Self-love, 
being a truly divine love it cannot be amor concupt- 
scentiae in the strict sense, but must be amor compla- 
centiae, and, in its relation to the three Divine Persons, 
also amor amicitiae. This can be proved a posteriort 
from the character of love as a theological virtue. For 
if Christian charity loves the highest, best, and most 
beautiful Good for His own sake, it does so for the sole 
reason that it is in its very essence a supernatural par- 
ticipation in God’s divine Self-love. Consequently, a 


12 De Fide, II, 6, n. 48. . fuller treatment, consult Kleutgen, 
13 De Duab. Christ. Volunt., n. De Ipso Deo, pp. 333 sqq., and 
28 Simar, Dogmatik, Vol. I, pp. 181 


14 Contr. Noet., c. 8—For a _ sqq., Freiburg 1899. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 433 


fortiori, God must love Himself as the Infinite Good 
for His own sake. This conclusion runs counter to the 
assertion of Durandus, that the formal object of divine 
Love is not the bonum infimtum taken concretely, but 
an abstract bonum im communi,—a teaching which is 
analogous to another error, vig.: that the formal object of 
God’s knowledge is not His Essence, or infinite Truth, 
but being in its abstract sense.1® The second part of 
the above-quoted axiom (“ bonitas rerum autem obiectum 
materiale et secundarium voluntatis divinae”) flows as 
a corollary from the first. If God’s own Goodness 
constitutes the determining and specificatory formal 
object of the Divine Will, then He cannot love His 
creatures for their sake, but must love them for His own 
sake. Hence creatural goodness can be neither the motive 
nor the final goal of the Divine Will, because in either 
case the latter would be indigent and perfectible. The 
final end of the created universe consists solely in 
the glorification of the Infinite Good. Cfr. Apoc. XXI, 
6: “Ego sum a et wo, initium et finis—I am Alpha 
and Omega, the beginning and the end.’ 1 Cor. VIII, 
6: “Ex quo omnia et nos im illum (eis aibrév)—[The 
Father], of whom are all things, and we unto him.” Prov. 
XVI, 4: “Universa propter semetipsum operatus est 
Dominus — The Lord hath made all things for himself.” 
Cfr. ‘Conc.’ Vatican., Sess. HT, De Deéo, can! 55> St 
quis mundum ad Dei gloriam esse conditam negaverit, 
anathema sit —If any one shall deny that the world was 
made for the glory of God, let him be anathema.” 
From these considerations it also follows that the Divine 
_ Willis free, as St. Thomas shows briefly but convincingly 
thus: “Quum divina bonitas sine aliis esse possit, 
guinimo nec per alia ei aliquid accrescat, nulla inest es 


15 Cfr. Gonet, Clyp. Thomist., tract. 4, disp. 2, art. 1, § 4. 


434 GOD’S LOVE OF CREATURES 


necessitas, ut alia velit ex hoc, quod vult suam bonitatem 
— Since the divine Goodness can be without other be- 
ings,— nay, other beings make no addition to it,— God 
is under no necessity of willing other things from the 
fact of His willing His own Goodness.” 1 Consequently, 
whatever good exists external to God, can be only a 
secondary and material object of His Divine Will. 


Thesis III: Although God loves His creatures un- j 


equally, each according to the measure of its good- 
ness, He does not love them for their sake, but solely 
because of His own goodness. 


Proof. This thesis, which embodies the com- 
mon teaching of theologians, is a pendant to the 
one regarding the mode of God’s cognition. God 
knows all extra-divine things in themselves, but 
only through the medium of His own Essence. 
In like manner, though He loves His creatures un- 
equally, according to the degree of their intrinsic 
goodness, yet His love for them is such that His 
own goodness (== Essence) is the sole formal 
motive of His Will. 


1. In saying that God loves different creatures un- 
equally, we do not wish to imply that there are de- 
grees in the operation of divine Love. This is impossible, 
because the act of divine Love is immutable, eternal, in- 
tensively infinite, and uniform. The expression has 
reference solely to the objects of divine Love. God 
cannot but love His creatures unequally, that is accord- 
ing to the degree of goodness which each contains, be- 
cause it was He as Creator who imparted to them 


16 Contr. Gent., I, 81. 


THE! DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 435 


varying degrees of goodness by endowing them with 
varying degrees of being.17 Therefore, to deny that 
God loves one creature more than another, would be 
tantamount to asserting that all creatures are equally 
good, which is repugnant to both right reason and ex- 
perience. It plainly appears from various texts of the 
Bible that God makes a distinction between His’ crea- 
tures: that He loves those endowed with reason more 
than those which are destitute of intelligence;*® that 
He prefers the goods of the supernatural to those of. 
the natural order; that. He prefers the just to the sin- 
ner; that He looks with particular favor upon the Blessed 
Virgin Mary “ full of grace,” and so forth. 

2. In spite of all this, however, even the best beloved 
and most favored of God’s creatures are no more than 
material objects and mere termini of divine Love, in- 
asmuch as they do not incite or determine the divine 
Will to love, but merely constitute its aim or object. 
The controverted question whether God could love His — 
creatures on account of the excellencies they bear within 
themselves, must therefore be answered in the negative. 
Assuming that God could love a creature (even one 
so magnificently endowed by Him as was the Blessed 
Virgin Mary), because of its immanent creatural beauty, 
sanctity, or benevolence,— this creatural goodness would 
eo ipso be absorbed into the formal object of the divine 
Will, and the latter would in consequence become at 
least partly dependent in its operation upon something 
existing outside Itself, which is repugnant to the divine 


17 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, 
qu. 20, art. 2: ‘“‘ Amor noster, quo 
bonum alicut volumus, non est 
causa bonitatis ipsius, sed e@ con- 
verso bonitas eius vel vera vel 
aestimata.  provocat - amorem. «+ » 


Sed amor Dei est infundens et 
creans bonitatem in rebus.” 

18 Cfr. 1 Cor, IX,. 9: .“* Num- 
quid de bobus cura est Deo? — 
Doth God take care for oxen?” 
Cfr. St. Thomas, I. c., art. 4. 


436 SANCTITY OF WILL 


Essence. Therefore, while God loves His creatures in 
precisely the measure in which each deserves to be loved, 
according to the degree of its intrinsic amiability, He 
loves them not for their sake, but for His own sake. 


Thesis IV: As infallibility is the fundamental and 
distinguishing characteristic of God’s knowledge, so 
the operation of His Will is governed by sanctity. 


Proof. To infallibility in the sphere of knowl- 
edge corresponds impeccability in the domain 
of the will. Impeccability is the negative ele- 
ment of holiness. The infallibility of that cog- 
nition which is based upon the ultimate causes of 
things, culminates in divine Wisdom (in the 
larger sense of the term), which rules and domi- 
nates the entire domain of divine knowledge. 
The impeccability of the will culminates in 
that sanctity which gives to the life of the divine 
Will its peculiar stamp. Hence the intrinsic 
product of God’s notional cognition (1. e., the 
“Word of God” or “Logos”), is also called 
sapientia genita, while the intrinsic product of 
His notional volition (1. e., the Holy Ghost), 
is described as amor personalis and sanctitas 
hypostatica.® It follows that infallibility and 


19 Cfr, St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, 
qu. 19, art. 2: “ Sic igttur wvult 
Deus et se et alia; sed se ut finem, 
alia vero ut ad finem.” Idem, ibid., 
ad 2: “ Sicut aha a se intelligit 
intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia 
a se vult volendo bonitatem suam.” 
This teaching does not exclude 
either the possibility or the actual 


existence on the part of God of 
a love of benevolence and friendship 
towards His rational creatures; on 
which point consult Lessius, De 
Perfect. Div., XIV, 3. 

20 For further information on this 
subject the reader is referred to 
the dogmatic treatise on the Divine 
Trinity. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 437 


impeccability, considered as modes of the divine 
Understanding and the divine Will, stand in the 
same relation to each other as wisdom and holi- 
ness. Holiness is the fundamental virtue of 
God and love is His fundamental affection, But 
the two are not only related, they are identical 
in concept, in so far as holiness in its last 
analysis coincides with the Love which God 
has for Himself. From this peculiar concatena- 
tion of love and holiness in God we must con- 
clude that all the so-called moral attributes or 
virtues of God spring from His holy Love as 
their common root, and are completely dominated 
Dee tt. 


21 Cfr. supra, §3. 


St TION 2 


THE OBJECTS OF THE DIVINE WILL 


It. We have shown that God’s Will is a most 
simple, immutable, eternal act, which cannot be 
split up or divided. It is manifest, then, that 
any division we may make must be based upon 
the objects to which the Will is directed. 


Aside from God’s necessary will (voluntas necessaria) , 
His free will (voluntas libera) can be conceived either 
as voluntas beneplaciti or voluntas signi, according as it 
remains an intrinsic act or is by some sign manifested 
externally. There are five such signs, which are enu- 
merated in the Scholastic hexameter: 


Praecipit et prohibet, permittit, consulit, implet. 


It is possible, by misunderstanding one of these signs, 
to mistake the will of God, as Abraham did when he 
proceeded to sacrifice his son Isaac, or Jonas in view 
of the presumptive destruction of Nineveh, 

An almost equipollent division is that into voluntas 
arcana and voluntas revelata, both of which Calvin so 
shamefully distorted by declaring the former to be 
God’s secret will to condemn men, while the latter sig- 
nified His (false and hypocritical) determination that 
they be saved. 

The most common division of the divine Will is 


1Cfr. Calvin’s Instit., I, 18, 4. 


438 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 439 


that into voluntas conditionata and voluntas absoluta, 
according as It appears bound to the fulfilment of a 
condition, or not. 

Closely related to this division is that into voluntas 
antecedens seu prima and voluntas consequens seu Seé- 
cunda, which has provoked some acrimonious con- 
troversies in regard to predestination. According to 
Molinism the “antecedent or first will” originates im- 
mediately in the love of God (e. g., the will to save) ;? 
while the “consequent or second will” accommodates 
itself entirely to the behavior of the creatures them- 
selves, and consequently coincides with God’s determina- 
tion to reward the just and punish the wicked.* This 
was no doubt the meaning of St. John Damascene, who 
first introduced the division of the divine Will into 
GéXnpa mponyovpevoy 7 mparov and Anya éxopevov 7) Vorepov. 
He was followed by St. Thomas Aquinas, who writes 
in his little work De Veritate: “ Aliquem hominem vult 
Deus salvari voluntate antecedente ratione humanae na- 
turae, quam ad salutem fecit; sed vult eum damnart 
voluntate consequente propter peccata quae in eo m- 
veniuntur.’* It is to be noted, however, that the 
Thomists, under the leadership of Alvarez,> interpret 
this passage in a manner which leads to the theological 
doctrine of absolute predestination and negative repro- 
bation.® 

Lastly, we may divide the divine Will into voluntas 
eficiens and voluntas permitiens, a distinction important 
for clearing up God’s relation to sin. The will of God 
is ‘efficient’ only in regard to the naturally or super- 


Mie Sad We o's Be BY DE 6 This point will receive a more 
8 Cfr. Matth. XXV, 34 saq. detailed treatment in the treatise 
4De Verii., qu. 23, art. 2, ad 2. on Grace. 


&De Aux. Gratiae, disp. 24. 


440 THE OBJECTS OF THE DIVINE WILL 


naturally good or indifferent actions of His creatures, 
Sin He merely “permits” by shielding the freedom of 
the will, without which there could be neither sin nor 
virtue. It is for this reason that some theologians? cor- 
relate the voluntas permittens with divine justice (jus- 
titia permissiva), which not only renders to every one 
his own, but also leaves every one in possession of his 
liberty. 


2. As regards the special objects of the divine 
Will, we can distinguish as many decrees of the 
Will as there are external operations of God, 
e. g., the will to create, the will to save, etc. 
They will all be duly considered in their proper 
places. Here we must confine ourselves to the 
exposition of certain general principles which 
govern the divine Will and shadow forth its in- 
trinsic perfection. These principles all apper- 
tain to the material and secondary object of 
divine volition. 

Thesis I: It is highly probable that God loves the 
merely possible good with the love of simple com- 
placence. 

Proof. While some theologians, like Suarez ® 
and Cardinal Gotti, willingly admit that God 
loves the merely possible good, others, like 
Gonet ° and Oswald,*® deny this on the ground 
that the possibles, coinciding as they do with 
the divine Essence, can have no independent 


7 E. g., Scheeben. 9 Clyp. Thomist., disp. 2, art. 4. 
8 De Attrib. Posit., TI, 6. 10 Dogmat. Theol., Vol. I, p. 213. 


2 
£ 

3 
Ny) 

z 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 441 


goodness or amiability of their own. This last- 
mentioned reason, however, is not well chosen. 
For, as the divine Intellect perceives the pure 
possibles in their ideal-eminent being as extra- 
divine truths," so the divine Will can love these 
possibles in the same way, provided only that 
they possess a certain degree of goodness— 
which they undoubtedly do; else how should 
we explain the fact of Creation had not the 
Creator previously taken delight in contem- 
plating a universe which was merely possible? 
To this must be added the consideration that 
the pure possibles, holding as they do mid- 
dle ground between nothing and that which 
has actual existence, possess true, even though 
only ideal, being,—which being as such is not 
only true, i. e., cognoscible, but likewise good, 
i. e., lovable. (“Ens et bonwm convertuntur.”) 
Now, God loves whatever is good; therefore He 
also loves the purely possible. It is indeed in- 
conceivable that God should take no delight in 
the infinite number of possible things which He 
comprehensively understands,” seeing that even 
the created intellect takes profound pleasure in 
contemplating the purely ideal order of meta- 
physical, zesthetic, and mathematical truths. To 
this not a few Thomists object that Aquinas, 
following the example of his master Aristotle, 
11 Supra, Pp. 340 12 Supra, pp. 351 Sqq- 


29 


- 442 THE OBJECTS OF THE DIVINE WILL 


seems to deny the existence of goodness in the 
domain of mathematics.'? Explain this as we 
will, it is certain that St. Thomas nowhere denies 
the principle that goodness is a transcendental 
attribute of being, which, gua being, includes the 
realm of the purely possible.* As for purely 
possible evil, it is most difficult to decide whether 
the divine Will remains absolutely motionless in 
the presence of it, or is affected by displeasure.*® 


Thesis II: God loves all existing creatures with 
the love of simple complacency; those endowed with 
intelligence He also loves with the love of benevo- 
lence. 

This thesis embodies a certain truth. The ar- 
guments for it will be found in the chapter which 
treats of the divine attribute of moral goodness 
or benevolence.*® 


Thesis III: Regarding God’s relation to evil, we 
must hold that He can will natural evil, and evil in- 
flicted as a punishment, only per accidens; and that 
He can never will sin, but merely permits it. 


Proof. Evil is twofold: the moral evil of sin | 
(malum culpae) and physical evil, which latter | 
can be subdivided into natural evil (malum 
naturae) and the evil of punishment (malum 


13 Cfr. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 5, art. 3, wards actually existing evil, see 
ad 4. infra, third thesis. 

14Cfr. De Verit., qu. 21, art. 2. 16 Supra, pp. 260 sqq. Cfr. also 

15 Regarding God’s attitude to- Sect. 1, thesis 2, pp. 428 sqq. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 443 


poenae)."’ The will may take one of three dis- 
tinct attitudes towards evil. It may will evil as 
an end in itself (velle malum per se, seu ut 
finem); or it may will evil as a means to an 
end (velle malum per accidens); or it may will 
evil not at all, but merely permit it (mere per- 
mittere malum). Applying this distinction to 
the divine Will, we can infer the following 
propositions, which embody both revealed truths 
and deductions of human reason. 

1. The divine Will cannot will evil, either 


physical or moral, per se for its own sake, or 


as an end in itself. For God 1s the Substantial 
Love of goodness, and His volition is dominated 
by the attribute of sanctity. But can He will 
evil as a means to an end, or per accidens? In 
answering this question we must first eliminate 
sin, because it is quite manifest that with God 
no end, no matter how noble or sublime, can 
possibly justify sin as a means. For the holi- 
ness of God involves an infinite hatred of sin, 
no matter whether it be considered as an end 
or aS a means to an end. Céfr. Ecclus, XV, 
a1: “Ee hath commanded no man to do wick- 
edly, and he hath given no man license to sin: 
for he desireth not a multitude of faithless and 
unprofitable children.” Epistle 6f, Sai james, 


17 Cfr, A. B. Sharpe in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Voli! V, art. ‘“ Evil.” 


444 GOD’S RELATION TO EVIL 


13: “Ipse autem neminem tentat—For God 


- .. tempteth no man.” The Church has in- 
dignantly repudiated the contrary teaching of 
Calvin as heretical and blasphemous. 

Now as to physical evil. God can will phys- 
ical evil only as a means to an end, and only in 
so far as it can be subordinated to a higher 
purpose, the attainment of which completely out- 
weighs the evil means. Physical evil, as we 
have already pointed out, is twofold, penal (pun- 
ishment for sin) and natural (e. g., pain, illness, 
death). God owes it to His punitive justice to 
inflict physical evil upon sinners, for the reason 
that justice is a greater good than the happiness 
of the sinner, which punishment destroys. Ec- 
clus. XXXIX, 35: “Ignis, grando, fames et 
mors, omnia haec ad vindictam creata sunt— 
Fire, hail, famine, and death, all these were 
created for vengeance.” As for natural evil, 
the general order of nature is a higher good 
than, e. g., the life of an individual transgres- 
sor, which is sometimes sacrificed to it. It is 
in this light that the so-called cruelties of nature 
must be viewed. Cir. Ecclus. XI, 14: “Good 
things and evil, life and death, poverty and riches 
are from God.” Wisd. I, 13: “God made not 
death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction 
of the living.” 

God, therefore, cannot will sin (malum culpae), 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES A45 


neither as an end in itself nor as a means to an 
end. He merely permits it with a view of 
deriving good therefrom. Cfr. Gen. L, 20: 
“You thought evil against me: but God turned 
it into good, that he might exalt me, as at present 
you see, and might save many people.” It is an 
article of faith that sin can happen only with 
the permission of God.” 


2. These considerations on the relation of God to evil 
could easily be spun out into a brilliant apology for 
divine Providence against Deism. They also furnish 
the outlines for an effective refutation of Pessimism, 
which exaggerates evil beyond all reasonable bounds.” 

a) The existence of physical evil in the universe 
“would be repugnant to the Christian idea of God if 
it could be shown, first, that the ills in question 
are absolute, and not merely relative, and, secondly, 
that God wills them as an end rather than as a means 
to an end, or merely the sequel of a higher good, 
by which they are more than counterbalanced. But it 
is impossible to establish either of these propositions. 
All physical evils are intrinsically so constituted that 
they do not disfigure the heart of creation, but only 


18 Cfr. Ecclus, XXXIX, 35. 

19 Supra, pp. 251 sqq. Cfr. St. 
Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 19, art. 
9. Also St. Augustine, Enchir., 
c. 46: “Nec dubitandum est, 
Deum facere bene etiam sinendo 
fieri, quaecunque fiunt male. Non 
enim hoc nisi iusto iudicio sinit; 
et profecto bonum est omne quod 
iustim est — Nor can we doubt that 
God does well even in the permis- 
sion of what is evil. For He per- 


mits it only in the justice of His 
judgment. And surely all that is. 
just is good.” Cir, Jos. Nirschl, 
Ursprung und Wesen des Bosen 
nach der Lehre des hl. Augustinus, 
Ratisbon 1854. 

20 Respecting Deism and Pessi- 
mism, consult the dogmatical treatise 
on “God, the Author of Nature 
and the Supernatural,” which forms 
the third volume of this series. 


446 GOD’S RELATION TO EVIL 


certain portions thereof along its outer fringe; they 
have their seat not in the nobler parts, but in a lower 
and subordinate realm, where they serve the higher pur- 
poses of the Creator. Consequently they are not absolute, 


but merely relative defects. Thus corporeal pain and 


disease are a necessary concomitant of the sensitive fac- 
ulties, whose purpose it is as a minor good to serve the 
higher good of intellectual knowledge; at the same time 
they are useful signals of warning, since suffering and 
disease frequently herald death. Conflagrations and 
inundations, with all their disastrous consequences, are 
merely accidental concomitants of essentially benign 
forces of nature— such as specific gravity and chem- 
ical combustion — which, as such, are indispensable to 
the structure and existence of the physical universe. 
Nor do malformations, deformities, and abortions in 
the realm of organic living beings disprove this argu- 
ment, because they are intended neither by Nature nor 
by the Author of Nature, but have their origin in acci- 
dental obstacles in the way of the formative and con- 
structive powers of Nature, which ever aims at its 
proper end, but is sometimes disturbed in its course 
by extrinsic vicissitudes. The so-called cruelties of 
nature appear to offer a serious difficulty. Especially do 
the ‘bloody encounters of predatory animals seem in- 
compatible with God’s goodness. Yet Nature with all 
her cruelties aims at higher ends, viz., the stability of 
the universe and the harmonious equilibrium of all its 
parts. The bloodthirsty disposition of certain wild 
beasts presupposes cunning, artifice, rapacity, and to 
eliminate it from nature would mean the destruction of 
many of the finest and most useful species of our fauna. 
There is ample justification for enquiring how the im- 
pertinent critics of His Divine Majesty would recon- 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 447 


struct the physical universe, had they the power to carry 
out their crude notions. Would they make all beasts 
herbivorous, in order to preserve animal life? This 
would compel men to practice vegetarianism, and perhaps 
even something more extreme; for do not some of 
these smart criticules assert that plants, too, have a 
sentient soul which must. not be injured? Thus ulti- 
mately both men and beasts would develop into “ geo- 
phagi,” drawing their nourishment solely from the mineral 
kingdom. Meanwhile, what would be the lot of animals? 
Would they not multiply beyond all bounds, destroy vege- 
tation, and poison the atmosphere with the stench of 
their carcasses? No sane observer can fail to perceive 
that the existing order of the cosmos is the product of 
a marvellous wisdom, which automatically sustains its 
equilibrium and subordinates the lower forces of na- 
ture to the higher ones, which center in man, the king 
of the physical universe. For the rest it may be well 
to call attention to the fact that the “ wasteful cruelty of 
nature” is exaggerated by many modern writers, who 
overlook the circumstance that carnivorous and other 
brute animals almost invariably, either by the fright they 
inspire, or by stinging or biting, stupefy or hypnotize 
their intended victims, thus rendering them incapable of 
suffering protracted pain.?* 

But what of human ignorance and poverty? Are they 


21 The wasteful cruelty of nature 
is thus described by Tennyson: 


Are God and Nature then at strife, 

That Nature lends  such_ evil 
dreams? 

So careful of the type she seems, 

So- careless of the single life. 

“*So careful of the type”? ? but no, 

From scarpéd cliff and quarried 
stone : 


She cries, ‘‘ A thousand types are 
gone, 
I care for nothing, all shall go.” 


The obvious reply is that this 
process, of struggle and survival of 
the few, in fact works for the per- 
fecting of things; and this is a 
higher end than the momentary hap- 
piness of individual beings.— See 
Butler’s Analogy, Pt. I, ch. Vi— 


- 448 GOD’S RELATION TO EVIL 


not absolute evils, even though the Creator employ them 
as means to a higher end? We do not think so. Lack of 
knowledge spurs humanity on to diligent study, prompts 
the erection of schools and other institutions of learn- 
ing, and brings about a general improvement of social 
conditions; while poverty is one of the strongest incen- 
tives to work and self-help, to the cultural development 
of the slumbering energies of the masses, entailing the 
progress of industry, craftsmanship, and. art, inspiring 
charitable undertakings of every kind. I£ these factors 
remained latent, the human race would’ soon decay. 
Imagine a world into which all men were born as mil- 
lionaires or savants! The blessings of hard labor and 


the law of progressive development would be unknown. 


Ethnologists point out that the belt of civilization which 
girdles the globe coincides with the snow zone, and 
claim that this is due to the circumstance that the ever- 
recurring combat with severe cold compels men to exert 
themselves to the utmost, thereby keeping the human 
mind inventive, active, buoyant, and elastic. Nor 
must we overlook another important consideration. 
The existence of physical evil is designed to remind 
man constantly that his final aim and happiness lie be- 
yond this terrestrial sphere, and that he must labor and 
suffer, battle and endure like one who may not snatch 
the palm of victory unearned. It is his divinely-ap- 
pointed lot, amid manifold hindrances, to attain to 
eternal felicity by dint of his own efforts, journeying 
through a vale of tears, where all the hardships of a 


“There is abundant reason,” says 
Hall, “for doubting the possibility 
of constituting a world which shall 
at once be suited for free and 
progressive creatures and be perfect 
in itself, Infinite power is after 


all limited by the nature of power, 
which is meaningless when applied 
to the impossible.” (F. J. Hall, 
The Being and Attributes of God, 
pp. 163 sq., New York 1909.) 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 449 


laborious pilgrimage weigh upon him. Imagine for a 
moment that men enjoyed pure happiness here below 
and lived beyond the reach of physical evil; would they 
not, even the best of them, lose sight of their true 
destiny and miss their highest end? Such a universe, 
forsooth, though free from poverty, disease, ignorance, 
and misfortune, could not. justly be considered a mas- 
terpiece of divine Wisdom, unless indeed men were 
permanently constituted in a state of paradisaical inno- 
cence. In the light of these reflexions we must admit 
that it would not be incompatible with either the in- 
finite wisdom or the holiness of God, purposely to 
create a world in which physical evils (which are al- 
ways relative, never absolute) would either serve as 
means to higher ends, or occurred accidentally as con- 
comitants of higher goods. In matter of fact, we know 
from Revelation that God in creating the world intended 
it to be free from suffering and merely permitted phys- 
ical evil to supervene as a punishment for sin. It 
is characteristic of His infinite goodness that He turns 
into good even those evils which man has incurred 
through his own fault.?? 

b) It is more difficult to explain God’s relation to 
moral evil, in comparison with which physical evil 
is as nothing, because sin alone is evil in the absolute 
sense of the term. The mystery of sin lies in this that 
God permits it despite the fact that it is absolute evil; 
for it is self-evident that He who is All-Holy cannot 
will sin either as an end or as a means to an end. In 


22Cfr. St. Aug., Enchir., ec. Keppler, Das Problem des Letdens 
11: “Deus omnipotens...nullo in der Moral, Freiburg 1904; 


modo sineret malum aliquod esse 
in operibus suis, nisi wusque adeo 
esset omnipotens et bonus, ut bona 
faceret etiam de malo.” Cfr. P. 


B. Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 
398 sqq.; Th. J. Gerrard, The Way- 
farer’s Vision, pp. 44 sqaq., London 
1909. 


450 GOD’S RELATION TO EVIL 


permitting sin God wills that His intelligent crea- 
tures, while in the wayfaring state, should be free 
to decide either for or against Him. The sins they 
commit He subsequently, by the external governance 
of His Providence, converts into a source of good 
which amply compensates for, nay, exceeds the evil that 
sin necessarily entails.2? There are goods of which, on 
the one hand, sin is an indispensable condition (such 
as contrition, penance, redemption, martyrdom), and 
which, on the other hand, in their tout ensemble out- 
weigh the evil existing in the world to such a degree 
that some theologians assert that a world full of sins 
permitted by God is more perfect than would be a 
world without sin.2* St. Thomas teaches: “Si enim 
omnia mala impedirentur, multa bona deessent untverso , 
non enim esset vita leonis, si non esset occisio animalium, 
nec esset patientia martyrum, si non esset persecutio 
tyrannorum.” 7® Hold what we will on the controverted 
point just mentioned, it is certain that in permitting 
sin God does not contradict His wisdom, or His good- 
ness, or His sanctity. To begin with, He does not 
contradict His wisdom; for it would, on the con- 
trary, be most unwise for Him to offer violence to His 
rational creatures by obstructing the exercise of their free 
will, especially since He has given them the voice of 
conscience, which loudly protests against sin. He does 
not contradict His goodness, but rather proves it by 
strengthening and testing the virtues of the just by the 
misdeeds of the wicked. As St. Augustine says: 
“Prosunt ista mala, quae fideles pie perferunt, vel ad 


23 Cfr. Toletus, Comment. in S. 24Cfr. Ruiz, De Provid., disp. 
Theol., I, p. 264 (ed. Romae, 1869): 2, -sect. 2, 
“Deus non dicitur velle peccata 25S. Theol., 1a, qu. 22, art. 2, 


fiert nec velle non fiert, sed per- ad 2. 
mittere fieri.” 


& 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 451 


emendanda peccata vel ad exercendam probandamque 
iustitiam vel ad demonstrandam vitae huius miseriam, 
ut illa, ubi erit beatitudo vera atque perpetua, et de- 
sideretur ardentius et instantius inquiratur — Those evils 
which the faithful endure piously, are profitable either 
for the correction of sin, or for the exercising and 
proving of righteousness, or to manifest the misery of 
this life, in order that the life of perpetual blessed- 
ness may be desired more ardently, and sought more 
earnestly.” 2° Lastly, in permitting sin God does not 
contradict His sanctity. He never ceases to forbid 
sin, to detest it with an infinite hatred, and to punish 
it with the full severity of His punitive justice. It 
may be objected: If God has such a hatred of sin, 
and is constrained to punish it so severely, why did 
He not leave the present sinful world deep down in 
the abyss of its original nothingness and in its place 
create one of which He foresaw that it would never devi- 
ate from the path of rectitude and virtue? By refraining 
from the creation of sinful beings He could have pre- 
vented sin. This objection is as temerarious as it is 
silly. To carry out the implied suggestion would mean 
to limit God’s omnipotence by making the Creator de- 
pendent upon His creatures, because in that hypothesis 
He could not have created the present universe, and 
would simply cease to be God. Furthermore, our op- 
ponents forget that God is not for the sake of the world, 
but the world exists for the sake of God. No mat- 
ter how we poor creatures employ the free will which 
He has given us, whether to glorify or to dishonor Him, 
we cannot possibly rob Him of His extrinsic glory. 
For whoever obstinately rejects God’s mercy and love, 
will sooner or later be compelled to proclaim His 


26 De Trimit., XIII, 16, 20. 


452 GOD’S RELATION TO EVIL 


justice. We are like clay in the hands of a divine 
artist.” It is not for the Sovereign Lord, Who is the 
Supreme Good, to inquire into our preferences. The 
creature is bound to do the will of the Creator, not 
the Creator the will of the creature. A human superior, 
it is true, must prevent sin on the part of his subordi- 
nates. He has no right to permit it, because a superior 
exists for the good of the community which he is 
called to govern, not vice versa. The case is different 
with God. He can permit sin without detriment to His 
holiness, in order that good may come therefrom, because 
He is Himself the ultimate end of all Creation, and all 
things have their final goal in Him. It cannot, how- 
ever, be said that with God the end justifies the means, 
because in permitting sin God does not choose a bad 
means to attain a good end, but with the power of an 
absolute sovereign disposes of the universe for His own 
glory. Consequently sin is no argument against Theism, 
but, on the contrary, a proof for the existence of a 
supreme and infinitely good God, Who rules the uni- 
verse wisely and disposes all things so that they ulti- 
mately converge in Him. 


Thesis IV: ‘God has no will with regard to what 
is intrinsically impossible. 

This thesis voices the common teaching of the- 
ologians of all schools. 

Proof. Every act of the will tends either to 
a good end or to a bad. Now, what is impos- 
sible (e. g., a man-ape or a wooden steel-pen), 
is neither good nor bad. It is not good, because 
the impossible, being pure nothing, has no be- 


27 Cfr. Rom. IX, 20 sqa. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 453 


ing, and therefore cannot possess goodness, 
which is a transcendental attribute of being. It 
is not bad, because badness or evil, being a 
negation, can inhere only in a positive entity as 
in a subject which lacks some perfection it 
ought to possess. Pure nothingness cannot be 
the subject of a privation.”* 


Reapincs: —Cfr. S. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 19 sdq., and 
the Commentators.— Ip., Contr. Gent., I, cc. 72-96.— The most 
complete treatment of the subject will be found in *Ruiz, 
De Voluntate Divina— Of the later dogmaticians the student 
is advised to consult especially Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, 8§ 96- 
104 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, I, pp. 227 sdq.); Kleutgen, 
De Ipso Deo, pp. 326 sqq., Ratisbonae 1881; L. Janssens, De 
Deo Uno, t. Il, pp. 228 saq., Friburgi 1900.— For the philosoph- 
ical questions involved, see *Jos. Hontheim, Instit. Theodicaeae, 


pp. 661 sqq., Friburgi 1893. 


28 Cfr, S. Thomas, Contr. Gent., nec volita a Deo, qui non vult nisi 


I, 84: ‘ Secundum quod unum- ea, quae sunt vel possunt esse 
quodque se habet ad esse, tta se bona.” Cfr, also what has been 
habet ad bonitatem. Sed impossi- said above in connection with di- 


bilia sunt quae non possunt esse; vine Omnipotence, pp. 281 sqq. 
ergo non possunt esse bona, ergo 


SECTION 3 


THE VIRTUES OF THE DIVINE WILL, AND IN PAR- 
TICULAR, JUSTICE AND MERCY 


Virtue (virtus, éperh) is defined as “a habit 
that a man has got of doing moral good, or 
doing that which it befits his rational nature to 
do.” * It is quite clear that those virtues only 
can be predicated of God which contain no ad- 
mixture of imperfection; all others are applied 
to Him merely in a metaphorical or figurative 
sense. 


The various virtues can be reduced, on the one hand, 
to the three theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity; 
and, on the other, to the four cardinal virtues: prudence, 
justice, temperance, and fortitude. Of these seven 
there must be excluded from the Divine Will in the first 
place those virtues which connote either subordination 
to a higher principle, as, e. g., faith and hope (hu- 
mility, obedience); or composition of soul and body, 
as é. g., temperance (chastity, sobriety) ; or some pas- 
sion, as, é. g., bravery (ambition, lust of power). Pru- 
dence, being primarily an intellectual virtue,? is more 
nearly related to wisdom and providence, of which we 


1 Jos. Rickaby, S. J., Moral Phi- tellectual and moral virtues, cfr. St. 
losophy. New Impression, London Thomas, S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 56, 
1908, p. 69. art. 3, im corp. (Rickaby, Moral 

2On the difference between in- Philosophy, pp. 73 qq.) 


454 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 455 


will not treat in this chapter. There remain as the 
proper virtues of God those which, in the words of 
Scheeben, “do not tend to increase the inner perfec- 
tion of the virtuous subject, but manifest and bring 
into action His dignity.” Now, the dignity and majesty 
of God are one with His objective holiness, which is 
the basis of ethical holiness. Consequently, holiness (or, 
what is the same, God’s infinite love for Himself) is 
the fundamental virtue of the divine Will. Cfr. 1 John 
IV, 8: “Deus caritas est —God is charity.” This 
holy love, when directed towards the universe, engenders 
goodness, of which the chief offshoot is mercy. Divine 
justice, too, has its root and foundation in God’s Sanc- 
tity. Under it St. Thomas ® subsumes chiefly truth 
(veracity) and fidelity. Since we have already dealt 
with the virtues of sanctity, goodness, truth (veracity), 
and fidelity in previous chapters, there remain to be con- 
sidered justice and mercy, the mutual relations of which 
St. Jerome tersely characterizes as follows: “ Misert- 
cordia iustitiam temperat, iustitia misericordiam.” * St. 
Thomas, too, treats both these virtues as organically 
related to each other. 


ARTICLE 1 


GOD’S JUSTICE 


t. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—Both in pro- 
fane and in sacred usage the term justice (iusti- 
tia, Sxaootv7) has many meanings. In its widest 
sense it is synonymous with rectitude, or moral 
perfection, which is the same as sanctity. Here 


8 S. Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 3. 41In Malach., Ill, 1. 


456 GOD’S JUSTICE 


we take justice in its narrowest sense, as that 
cardinal virtue which the famous Roman legist 
Ulpian defines as “constans et perpetua voluntas 
us suum cuique tribuendi—A constant and abid- 
ing will to give every one his due.”® In this 
sense the concept of justice has four essential 
notes, wiz.: (1) debt or obligation (debitum) ; 
(2) a certain proportion or equality between 
what is rendered and what is received igh Wie ty biel 
plurality of persons, or the existence of one who 
metes out and another who receives right treat- 
ment; (4) the firm will of the former to per- 
form his obligations towards the latter. 


a) The chief function of justice is to equalize a per- 
formance and its quid pro quo. It is this note which 
formally constitutes the concept of justice. Hence the 
Sacred Writers frequently designate justice as “ truth.” 
Now, there are two kinds of equality, and consequently, 
also two kinds of justice. If the equality aimed at implies 
geometrical proportion, we have distributive, if it im- 
plies arithmetical proportion, commutative justice. Dis- 
tributive justice by its very nature “is the virtue of 
the king and of the statesman, of the commander- 
in-chief, of the judge, and of the public functionary 
generally”; the matters it distributes are public emolu- 
Inents and honors, burdens, rewards, and punish- 
ments.° Its contrary is not injustice, which entails the 
duty of restitution, but rather personal favoritism (ac- 
ceptio personarum), which has no regard for “ the eter- 
nal fitness of things.” Commutative justice, on the other 


5L. X de Lust. et Iure. 6 Cfr, Rickaby, lL c., p. 104. 


- . = Z a SY ey ag ae ee ee ee een “ 
a oe ~ —— a ce acai ors ee NE et San eee ——_— a, 
a a Ee EIS = IS SE he eg Fe SR Sareea FETA ek ae 
ea en ee er a ream eh hn a a a Boe - + 
=. ee a ne ee aS. Se et & Por ee “a 


Snes 


ne 
Se eS. 


Sa sees 


: eee 2 
ae 


toe 


esses 


Poe a 


eee 


uN 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 457 


hand, which alone is justice strictly so called, requires 
a rigorous equality, and its violation imposes the duty of 
restitution. 

b) Retributive justice may be treated as a species 
of distributive justice. It is called remunerative when 
it rewards, and vindictive when it inflicts punishment. 
As judge a superior is bound to reward merit and to 
punish crime; in other words, to treat each subject ac- 
cording to his deserts. As arithmetical proportion can 
hardly ever be attained, it is sufficient to observe geo- 
metrical proportion. 


2, Divine Justice.—Though strictly speaking 
there can be no commutative justice in God, yet 
His distributive justice is bound by His veracity 
and fidelity to such a degree that we may con- 
sider the retribution He metes out by rewarding 
good and punishing evil as an analogue of com- 
mutative justice. , 

a) Right reason tells us that God, as the 
Creator, Preserver, and Sovereign Proprietor 
of the universe, can have towards His creatures 
no obligation which would correspond to a math- 
ematically equivalent right. Whatever a crea- 
ture is and has, it possesses as a free gift 
from God. There was not on His part any 
obligation to create, just as little as there ex- 
isted on the part of any creature a right to be 
created. Hence there is no common basis on 
which to establish a strict parity between obli- 


gation and service rendered. “Quis prior dedit 
30 


458 GOD’S JUSTICE 


lh et retribuetur ei?—Who hath first given to 
him, and recompense shall be made him??? 
“Quaecunque sunt bona opera mea, abs te mihi 
sunt et ideo tua magis quam mea sunt—What- 
ever are my good works, I have them from 
Thee [God], and therefore they are Thine 
rather than mine,” says St. Augustine’ We 
have absolutely nothing that we can call our 
own, except sin. Hence there can be no obli- 
gation of strictly commutative justice on the 
part of God. 

b) The virtue of distributive justice, on the 
other hand, may doubtless be ascribed to God, 
though not, of course, in its creatural sense. 
As the Creator, Preserver, and Governor of the 
world God owes it, not indeed to His creatures, 
but to His own attributes, to give to each 
created being whatever is due to it, according 
to the measure of its being and its final destiny. 
“Suum cuique.” It follows that, since God has 
of His own free will assigned to rational man a 
supernatural destiny in the beatific vision of the 
Most Blessed Trinity, He is obliged to grant 
him the means (graces) that are absolutely 


necessary for the attainment of this end; that is: 


to say, at the very least sufficient grace (gratia 
sufticiens). God likewise owes it to His veracity 
and fidelity to give His creatures the promised 


@ Rom, X45 35. 8in Ps., 37. 


sie 


— 


hoe oS 


ra be 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 480 


reward and to inflict on them the threatened 
punishment in just proportion to their deserts.° 
When God made Himself the debtor of men, He 
can have acted from no other motive than that 
it so pleased Him. The duty of justice which 
springs from such a relation rests entirely upon 
a free basis. The creature did not bind the 
Creator; He bound Himself. 

c) Given this free juridical relation between 
God andthe creature, it is easy to see why Holy 
Scripture conceives retributive justice in a man- 
ner analogous to commutative j ustice, Phere ex- 
ists a sort of contract between the Creator and 
His creatures, by virtue of which the creature 
has a legal claim (taking this term in an analo- 
gous sense) to be rewarded for his merits, and 
must expect to be punished for his crimes. 

a) Not only is God frequently termed “the 
Just/One/)*"), but’ the Bible expressly enforces 
His retributive justice, both remunerative and 
vindictive. In respect. of. the: dormer «it will 
suffice to quote 2 Tim. IV, 8: “In reliquo re- 
posita est miht corona iustititae, quam reddet 
mihi Dominus in illa die iustus index — As to the 
rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice 
which the Lord the just judge will render to 
me in that day.” ’! His punitive or vindictive 


9Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, tus es Domine, et rectum iudicium 


qu. 21, art. 4. ‘ tuum.” 
10 Cfr. Ps. CXVIII, 137: “ Ius- 11 Cfr. also Hebr. VI, 10. 


460 GOD’S VINDICTIVE JUSTICE 


justice clearly appears from Rom. I, 52... SThow 
treasurest up to thyself wrath, against the day 
of wrath, and revelation of the just judgment 
OF Godin) Cir Dent Xi x) 35: “Revenge is 
mine, and I will repay them in due time.” 2 As 
historical proofs for the vindictive justice of 
God we may mention: the expulsion of our 
First Parents from Paradise ; the Deluge; the 
destruction of Sodom and Gomorrha ; the de- 
struction of Jerusalem; and, most terrible of all, 
the Passion and death of our Saviour, in Whom 
all the sins of the human race were vicariously 
punished. 

6) The argument from Tradition is equally 
clear and stringent. We can trace the dogma 
back to the most ancient creeds. Thus the so- 
called Apostles’ Creed says of Jesus: “Out ven- 
turus est wdicare vivos et mortuos.’™® St. 
Augustine faithfully interprets the belief of Prim- 
itive Christianity when he says: “Deum iustum 
negare sacrilegum est, et de eius iustitia dubitare 
amentia.” ** 

3. THEOLOGICAL CONTROVERSIES REGARDING 
THE DoctRINE or Gop’s VINDICTIVE JUSTICE.— 
In defining the nature of God’s vindictive justice 
we must avoid the two extremes of attenuation 
and exaggeration. It would be an attenuation to 


12 Cfr, also Rom. XII, 19. 
13 For other passages see Eschatology. 
14De Lib. Arbit., I, 1. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 461 


claim that God aimed only at correcting and de- 
terring, and not at punishing the sinner; and an 
exaggeration to assert that God is obliged to 
punish even the contrite sinner according to the 
full measure of His justice. Both the attenuation 
and the exaggeration of divine justice are re- 
pugnant to the teaching of the Church. 


a) Certain philosophers and rationalist theologians, 
holding God’s vindictive justice to be incompatible with 
His Divine Love, reduce it to the level of a mere 
corrective and deterrent. Those who adopt this wrong 
attitude are forced to explain all the Scriptural texts 
that assert God’s vindictive justice in a purely figura- 
tive sense. If we eliminate the notion of atonement 
and restoration of the disturbed moral order, God's 
vindictive justice loses its proper character and sinks 
to the level of a mere make-believe. This theory 
furthermore squarely contradicts the clear teaching of 
Scripture, that virtue will be definitively rewarded, and 
vice punished, on the day of the last judgment, “ the 
day of wrath,’—a teaching which is enforced particu- 
larly in the Epistles of St. Paul. Cfr. Rom., XIII, 4: 
“Dei enim minister est, vindex in tram ei, qui malum 
agit — For he is God's minister: an avenger to execute 
wrath upon him that doth evil.” ™ The so-called com- 
minative Psalms appeal directly to the vindictive and 
avenging arm of divine justice. 

Hermes asserts that the justice of God is not vindic- 
tive, but merely “ medicinalis et emendatrix.” He sup- 
ports this assertion by a tissue of utterly futile argu- 
ments. God, he says, is pure Love, which seeks nothing 


15 Cfr. Ps, LXXIII, 22. 


462 GOD’S VINDICTIVE JUSTICE 


for itself. Hence, if He threatens and inflicts punish- 
ment, it can only be to correct the sinner and to deter 
others from committing sin. We reply: God’s Love is 
in the first place and above all a Love of Himself, of 
His own dignity and majesty, which has the right, and 
eventually the duty, to avenge the crimen matestatis of 
mortal sin. Besides, how could the eternal pains of 
Hell serve as a corrective, or as a means of deterring 
sinners, after the “ day of wrath”? Who will remain on 
earth to be corrected or deterred after the Last Judg- 
ment? But, says Hermes, wrath is an imperfection, 
because it delights in punishing others, while God, ac- 
cording to His own assurance, does “not delight in 
our being lost”"—“non enim delectaris in perditionibus 
nostris.’1® Hermes’s objection was refuted many cen- 
turies ago by St. Prosper of Aquitaine: “Non concupiscit 
Deus poenam reorum, tamquam saturari desiderans ul- 
tione, sed quod iustum est, cum tranquillitate decernit 
et recta voluntate disponit, ut etiam malj non sint inor- 
dinatt.” 1" ° St, Gregory the Great remarks in a similar 
vein: “Ommnipotens Deus, quia pius est, miserorum 
[t. ¢., damnatorum] cruciatu non pascitur; quia autem 
iustus est, ab iniquorum ultione in perpetuum non se- 
datur,”’ 18 i 

b) Certain other theologians have fallen into the op- 
posite error of pushing the notion of iustitia vindica- 
tiva beyond its proper limits, Thus, following St. An- 
selm,"® Tournely 2° and Liebermann 24 teach that God is 
in duty bound to punish all sins, even those for which 
the sinner ‘is sincerely sorry, without grace or mercy 


16 Tob. III, 22, 20 De Deo, qu. 19, art. 1. 
17 Sent. August., 12. 21 Instit. Theol., TLE lib. I, cap. 
18 Dial., IV, 44. 3, $5. 


19 Cur Deus Homo? 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 463 


and according to the strictest measure of His divine 
Justice; and that He can forgive them only on con- 
dition that they be fully expiated. Hence the absolute 
necessity of Christ’s vicarious atonement, without which 
forgiveness of sins would be absolutely impossible. 
Now, while it is a divinely revealed truth that God 
de facto insisted on adequate atonement as an indis- 
pensable condition of forgiveness ;— to assert that he 
could have forgiven sin on no other condition whatso- 
ever runs counter to the common opinion of the- 
ologians, with the solitary exception of St. Anselm, who 
perhaps should be interpreted more mildly than was 
customary until a short time ago.?? Of the Fathers 
of the Church not one can be quoted in support of 
this strange theory. The common opinion of the 
Schoolmen (with the possible exception, already noted, 
of St. Anselm, and perhaps also Richard of St. Vic- 
tor), is thus voiced by St. Bernard: “ Quis negat, 
omnipotenti ad manum fuisse alios et alios modos no- 
strae redemptionis? — Who will deny that there were 
available to the Almighty, other and yet other ways to 
redeem us?” 2* All other theologians, with St. Thomas 
at their head, oppose this view of St. Anselm.* They 
argue thus: Every sovereign has the right of pardon, 
by virtue of which he can annul or commute the sen- 
tences of criminals, at least of such as show sorrow 
for their misdeeds. Surely this right cannot be denied 
to God, Who is infinite mercy as well as infinite jus- 
tice. Now, whoever makes use of a right commits no 
injustice. 


22 Cfr. B. Funke, Grundlagen 23 Ep. 194, sive Tract. de Error. 
und Voraussetzungen der Satisfak- Abelardi, c. 8. 
tionstheorie des hl. Anselm, Min- 24 Cfr. S. Theol., 3a, qu. 1, art. 


ster 1903. 2; qu. 46, art. 2. 


464 GOD’S MERCY > 


Tournely, by the way, entangles himself in a manifest 
contradiction when, on the one hand, he insists on the ne- 
cessity of an infinite atonement even for such sins as have 
been properly expiated by penance and sorrow ; while, on 
the other hand, he admits vicarious as a full equivalent 
for personal atonement. If God’s vindictive justice 
were so inexorable that it could not be appeased by 
anything short of adequate satisfaction, He would surely 
insist that the guilty criminal himself, not a stranger or 
a substitute, should atone for his crime. This would 
not argue the necessity but, on the contrary, the im- 
possibility of Christ’s vicarious atonement; for no mere 
creature can give adequate satisfaction to an offended 
and wrathful God. | 


ARTICLE 2 


GOD’S MERCY 


I. DEFINITION oF Mercy.—Without entering 
into the altogether unimportant question whether 
mercy (misericordia, éeos) is an independent 
virtue, with a formal motive of its own, or 
merely a special form of goodness,?° we will be- 
gin this final subdivision of our treatise by point- 
ing out that the Latin term misericordia contains 
its own definition. Misericordia is that virtue 
which moves the heart (cor) to compassion for 
the misery (miseria) of others. Inasmuch as 
it involves suffering and sadness, mercy is, 
of course, a mixed perfection, which cannot 


25 Cfr. Lessius, De Perfect. Moribusque Divin., 1, XII, 1. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 465 


be predicated of God;—though it is no doubt 
a touching reflection that the Divine Logos, 
moved by infinite love for humankind, created 
for Himself in His most Sacred Heart an organ 
by which He was enabled to feel as we do and 
to share in our sufferings. Cfr. Hebr. Il, 17: 
“Debuit per omnia fratribus similart, ut misert- 
cors fieret et fidelis pontifex ad Deum — It be- 
hooved him in all things to be made like unto 
his brethren, that he might become a merciful 
and faithful high priest before God.” Taking 
mercy as “the effective will to remove or re- 
lieve the misery of others” (and we can employ 
it in this sense without destroying its essence), 
it is a pure perfection which must be attributed 
to God in an infinitely exalted degree. “De mis- 
ericordia si auferas compassionem,” beautifully 
says St. Augustine, “ita ut remaneat tranquilla 
bonitas subveniendi et a miseria liberandi, insi- 
nuatur divinae misericordiae qualiscunque cog- 
nitio.”’ 2° In this sense God is truly merciful. 
2. Gov’s Mercy As A REVEALED Docma.—The 
principal forms of God’s goodness converge to- 
wards His mercy as their pivot. They are: 
magnanimity (magnificentia), — graciousness 
(pietas, gratia), kindness (humanitas), and 
especially that indulgence towards the misery 
of sin which Holy Scripture sometimes calls 


26 Ad Simpl., 1. 2, que 2. 


466 GOD’S MERCY 


clemency (clementia) or meekness (mansue- 
tudo), sometimes patience (patientia) or long-: 
suffering (longanimitas). Cfr. Ps. CII, 8: 
“Miserator et misericors Dominus, lon ganimis et 
multum misericors — The Lord is compassionate 
and merciful: long-suffering and plenteous in 
meroy..)y 2 Ret dl Eee he Wand delayeth 
not his promise, as some imagine, but dealeth 
patiently for your sake, not willing that any 
should perish, but that all should return to pen- 
ance.” Holy Scripture gives a sublime de- 
scription of divine mercy, both as to its essence 
and its comprehension, in the Book of Wisdom.2? 
The full import of this divine virtue will impress 
the student when he comes to consider God’s 
will to save humankind (voluntas salvifica), 
which belongs to the treatise on Grace. 

In lieu of an extended argument from Tra- 
dition, which is unnecessary, we will only quote 
St. Augustine’s beautiful dictum: “Mator est 
Dei misericordia, quam omnium miseria.” 

3. Tue RELATION OF Gop’s Mercy To His 
Justice.—How can justice and mercy, conceived 
as infinite attributes, co-exist in the Divine Will? 


The simultaneous exercise of infinite justice and in- 
finite mercy seems indeed to involve a contradiction. 
For a solution of the difficulty we must recur to the 
proposition, which we demonstrated on a previous page, 


27 Wisd. XI, 24 sqq. 


THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 467 


that both these divine virtues have their measure, 
end, and corrective in God’s sanctity, borne by His 
Divine Love, from which they spring as a germ from 
the mother seed. Being “a jealous God,” the All-Holy 
can neither allow His mercy to degenerate into undue 
leniency or unmanly weakness, nor His justice into ex- 
cessive harshness or inconsiderate cruelty. Thus both 
extremes repose in God’s Holy Love as their immovable 
centre, balanced in the calm security of an eternal 
equilibrium. 

But the difficulty is only half solved. The subjoined 
brief hints will help the student to clear it up fully. 
Whenever God allows His justice to hold sway, He 
simultaneously exercises mercy, in so far as He rewards 
the just beyond their deserts, and punishes the wicked 
more leniently than they would have a right to expect. 
Conversely, God’s mercy is always allied with His jus- 
tice, inasmuch as He forgives sin only on condition 
that the sinner do penance.*® We have a living example 
of the simultaneous exercise of both these attributes to 
the full extent of their infinity in the agonizing death of 
our Saviour on the Cross. This reveals God’s infinite 
mercy. ‘“ For God so loved the world, as to give his only 
begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in him, may not 
perish, but may have life everlasting.” *° But it also 
exemplifies His truly infinite justice; for our sins were 
terribly avenged upon the Son of God made Flesh, Who 
had to make adequate atonement for them before they 


28 Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., 14, 
qu. 21, art. 4, ad 1: “Et tamen 
in damnatione reproborum apparet 
[etiam] misericordia, non quidem 
totaliter relaxans, sed aliqualiter 
allevians, dum punit citra condig- 
num.” : 

29Cfr. St. Thomas, 1. c.: “In 


iustificatione impit apparet [etiam] 
iustitia, dum culpas relaxat propter 
dilectionem, quam tamen ipse mis- 
ericorditer infundit, sicut de Mag- 
dalena legitur: Dimissa sunt et pec- 
cata, quia dilexit mulium.” 


30 John ITI, 16. 


~ 468 GOD’S MERCY 


were forgiven. Both features are emphasized in Ps. 
LXXXIV, 11: “ Mercy and truth [i. e., justice] have 


met each other: justice and peace [i. ¢., mercy] have 
kissed.” 


Reapincs:—*St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 21; Ip. Contr. 
Gent., I, 92-04, and the Commentators,— Scheeben, Dogmatik, 
Vol. I, §§ 100-101 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, I, pp. 241 sqq.). 

— *Lessius, De Perfect. Moribusque Div., lib. 12-13, Antwerpiae 
1626.— Heinrich, Dogmat. Theol., Vol. III, §§ 202-204.— *Ruiz, 
De Voluntate Div., disp. 55 sqq.—*Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 
352 sqq.— L. Janssens, De Deo Uno, t. II, pp. 323 sqq., Friburgi 
1900.— J. Hontheim, Jnstit. Theodicaeae, pp. 717 sqq., Friburgi 
1893.— B. Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 308 sqq., 402 sqq. 


INDEX 


ue 


ABRAHAM, 136, 218. 
Absolute Reason, God as, 230 


saq. 
Accidents, 277. 
Accidents, None in God, 206 sq. 
Actio in distans, 324. 
Activities, No composition of 
in God, 207. 
Actus liberi futuri, 374 sqq., 392. 
Actus purus (purissimus), 162, 
1 169, 175, 200, 203, 205, 
2 


Adonai, 135 sq., 140. 
Aesthetics, 268. 

Aétius, 113 sq. 

Aevum, aeviternitas, 308. 
"Avyevynola, 114 sqq., 174. 
Agnosticism, 49. 

Ahriman, 222. 

Albertus Magnus, Psychology 


of, 67. 

All-Truth, God the, 227. 

Alvarez, 312, 400, 410. 

Ambrose, St., 97, 100, 184, 245, 
431. 

Analogous concepts, 58. 

Angels, 86, 97, 101, 209, 258, 
206, 355- 

Anger, The Divine, 427 sq. 

Animism, 220. 

Anomoeans, 113. 

"Avdmowos, 114. 

’Avovowos, 170. 

Anselm, St., 3, 31, 32, 277, 462; 
463. 


Anthropomorphism, 142. 

Anthropomorphites, 83 sq., 292. 

Anti-God, 222. 

Apologetics, Scope of, 7, 17. 

Apostasy, The psychological 
process of, 52 sq. 

Apostles’ Creed, 41, 284. 

Arguments for the existence of 
God, 26, 30 sqdq. 

Argumentum ex gradibus per- 
fectionum, 184. 

Arianism, 114, 204, 298 sq. 

Aristotle, 10 sq., 66 sq. 115, 
IQI, 2090, 241, 274, 301, 306, 
332, 424, 441. 

Ark of the Covenant, 259. 

Aseity, The Metaphysical Es- 
sence of God, 78, 162 sqq.; 
Definition of, 169 sq.; A true 
attribute of God, 170 sqq.; 
His fundamental attribute, 
172 sqq.; Attributes derived 
immediately from, 175 sq.; 
The cause of God’s immuta- 
bility, 2909; Involves immuta- 
bility, 311. 

Athanasian Creed, 214, 309, 318. 

Athanasius, St., 29, 204, 223. 

Atheism, Definition of, 49; 
Possibility of, 50 sqq.; Why 
intrinsically impossible, 53 
sq.; Condemned formally, 
213: Polytheism is really 
atheism, 217. 

Atheists, Can there be theoret- 
ical, 51 sq.; Number of, 54. 

Athenagoras, 24. 


469 


470 INDEX 


Attributes, The Divine, How 
Distinguished from the Di- 
vine Essence, 156 sqq.; Aseity 
the fundamental, 165 sqq.; 
Attributes derived imme- 
diately from aseity, 175 sq.; 
Division of, 177 sqq.; The 
transcendental attributes of 
being, 180 sqq.; Attributes of 
Divine Life, 421 sqq. 

Audians, 83, 292. 

Augustine, St., No Ontologist, 
127 sqq.; Quoted, 29, 31, 46, 
52, 63, 65, 75, 84, 85, 100, 148, 
155, 174, 204, 222, 223, 226, 
227, 233, 240, 265, 266, 260, 
270, 278, 286, 293, 204, 300, 
Bil; 342,317,020, 323; 838, 
330, 337, 363, 368, 380, 381, 
396, 403, 416, 445, 449, 450, 
466. 

Aureolus, 341. 

Atrayadérns, 244, 

Avradnéea, 227. 

Avroredys, 181, 

Avrovaia, 162, 166, 169, 172, 174, 
175, 301. 

Avrotcws, 176, 

B 

BAADER, 120. 

Bafiez, 389, 401. 

Barlaam, Abbot, 147. 

Basil, St; 24, 26, 64, 76, 97; 99; 
116, 150. - 

Bastida, Ferd. (S. J.), 383. 

Bautain, 30. 

Beatific Vision, 86, 92 sqq.; In 
its relation to the incompre- 
hensibility of God, 107 sqq. 

Beauty, Definition of, 265 sqq. 

Beauty, God as absolute, 265 
sqq. 

Becanus, 86, 390. 

Billuart, 303, 380, 306, 401, 410. 

Beghards, 102 sq. 

Beguines, 102 sq. 

Being, Concept of, 166; Abso- 
lute vs. abstract, 168 sqq.; 
Hegel’s concept of pure, 168; 
Possible and actual, 340. 


Bellarmine, Cardinal, 9, 309. 

Benedict XII, 93, 108, 

Benevolence of God, 260 sqq. 

Bernard, St., 12, 145, 147, 174; 
184, 199, 325, 463. 

Biel, Gabriel, 110, 148, 238. 

Billot, 11. 

Blasphemy, 259. 

Body, God is no, 291; God has 
no, 292; How body differs 
from space, 315. 

Boéthius’s definition of eternity, 
307. 

Bonaventure, St., 10, 12, 42, 
194. 

Bonnetty, 30, 45. 

Bomitas, 243. 

Bonum, 241 sq. 

Branchereau, Abbé, 120, 125. 

Brownson, O. A., 120, 


C 


CaLvin, 438. 

Cappadocian Fathers, The, 63. 

Cardiognosis, 356, 357, 359 sqq., 
399. 

Caritas, 252, 256, 262. 

Categories, The, 274. 

Causality, absolute, God as, 281 
sqq.; of His knowledge, 368 
sqq. 

Causa sui, Deus, 167. 

Certitude, 345 sq. 

Chalcedon, Council of, 279. 

Charity, 252, 256, 257, 262. 

Christ, See Jesus Christ. 

Chrysostom, St. John, Was he 
guilty of material heresy in 
his teaching on the beatific 
vision, 98 sqq.; Quoted, 24, 
62, 91, 97, 116, 239, 286, 323. 

Cicero, 382. 


Clement of Alexandria, 24, 29. 


Clement V, to2. 

Clement VIII, 383. 

Coexistence of creatures with 
the Creator, 312 sq. 

Commandments, The first of 
all, 215. 

Composition, Species of, 200 
sqq., None in God, 206 sqq. 


ee oe eae 
ee ST Ont 
ad 


an 
Bites das nm 


ae oe 
eer ae 


INDEX 471 


Concepts, Different kinds of, 
8 


Concursus praevius — simulta- 
Neus, 387. 

“ Congregatio de Auxilus,” 383, 
300. 

Consciousness, Our, 123. 

Consciousness, The Divine, 332 
sq. 

Constantine, 37. 

Constantinople, Council of, 146. 

Coppens, Charles (S. J.), 9. 

“ Corpus,’ as used by Tertul- 
lian, 294. 

Creatures, God can be known 
from His, 18 sqq.; “% 4v, 167, 
279; Not necessarily eternal 
because the Creator is immu- 
table, 303 sqq.; Coexistence 
of with divine eternity, 312 
sq.; Whence they derive their 
sanctity, 259; God’s love for 
His creatures, 428 sqq. 

Criticism, 40. 

Cruelties, The so-called of Na- 
ture, 446 sq. 

Curiel, 410. 

Cyril of Alexandria, St., 97, 


204. 
Cyril of Jerusalem, St., 62, 97, 
100, 204. 


D 


D’ AGUIRRE, 42. 

Dante, 189, 262 sq. 

David, 376, 407. 

De Bonald, 45. 

Decalogue, The, 19. 

Deification of man, 220, 250. 

Deism, 445. 

Delitzsch, F., 35, 137. 

De Lugo, Francis, 353. 

De Lugo, Card. John, 42. 

Demiurge, 379. 

Descartes, R., 27, 28, 276. 

Determinata veritas of the free 
acts of the future, 405. 

Deus causa sui, Meaning of the 
phrase, 167 sq: 

Devil Worship, 220. 


Diaus-Pitar, 141. 

Dignity of God, 259. 

Dilectto dilectionis, 424. 

Diognetus, Epistle to, 37. 

Dionysius the Areopagite, 270 
(See also Pseudo-Dionysius). 

Distinction, Formal, 144; Vir- 
tual, 156 sqq. 

Distinctions, 144, 148, 153. 

Dogmatic Theology, Definition 
of, 6 sq., 8, 13; Division of, 
7 sq.; Positive and Scholastic, 
g sq.; The principal subject 
Grits: 

Dominium, 287. 

Doubt, 344. 

Dualism, 213, 221 sqq. 

Durandus, 2, 86, 433. 


E 


EckHart, Master, 149. 

El, 138, 140. 

Elevatio Extrinseca, 105. 

Eloim, 138 sq., 140. 

Ens @ se, 165, 211, 276, 279. 

Ens non ab alio, 175. 

Ens perfectissimum, 184. 

Epiphanius, St., 293. 

Essence and existence, No com- 
position of in God, 212. 

Essence of a thing as compared 
to its nature, 162. 

Essence, The Divine, 133 sqq.; 
In its relation to God’s at- 
tributes, 144 sqq.;  God’s 
metaphysical, 159 sqq.; Phys- 
ical, 162. 

Esther, 287. 

Estius, 42. 

Eternity of God, 306 sqq., 402 


sq. 

Eugene III, 145, 200. 

Eunomianism, 26, 61 sqq.; 76 
sqqd.; 97 sqq-; 113 sqq.; 148 
Sag. ic 

Eunomius, 113, 174. (See also 
Eunomianism. ) 

Evil, Definition of, 222; Phys- 
ical and moral, 223; God’s 
relation to, 442 sqq. 


472 


Existence of God, 30. 

Extra-Divine Truths, How God 
knows them, 333 sqq. 

Eye, God invisible to the bod- 
ily, 82 sqq. 


F 


Fasre, Abbé, 120, 

Faculty and act, No composi- 
tion of in God, 207. 

Faith, 3; Preamble of, 38 Sq.3 
Indispensable for salvation, 
40; vs. knowledge 41 sqq. 

Faithfulness of God, 237 sqq. 

Father of Heaven, 142, 

Fetishism, 220. 

Fichte, 122. 

Ficino, Marsilio, 117, 

Fidelity of God, 239 sq. 

Florence, Council of, 108, 

Fonseca, .Poi¢ S.J), 38e. 

Foreknowledge, God’s, Of the 
free actions of the Future, 
361 sqq.; In relation to free- 
will, 364 sqq.; Infallibility of, 
375 sqd. 

Ror eGR The, of the Sco- 
tists, 151 sqq., 156. 

“ Formalitates” in God, 152, 


154. 
Francis de Sales, St., 4109. 
Franzelin, Card., 11. 

Frassen, 70, 

Free-Will, God’s  foreknowl- 
edge in relation to, 364 sqq. 

Freising, Otto von, 146. 

Fundamental Theology, 

Apologetics. 

Future, God’s knowledge of 
the, 361 sqq. 
Futuribilia, 375 sqq. 


G 


Gent, Henry of, 168, 

Gentiles, 36. 

Genus and specific difference, 
No composition of in God, 
210. 

Geometry, 2. 

Gerdil, Cardinal, 118. 


See 


INDEX 


Germanic Law, 290. 

Gilbert de la Porrée, The her- 
esy of, 145 sqq., 200. 

Gioberti, V., 117, 121, 123. 

Glory of God, 249 sq. 

Gnosis, Persian, 222, 

Gnosticism and Gnostics, 68, 

_ 220, 221, 204, 321. 

God, Can be considered from a 
twofold point of view, is: 
Knowability of, 16.sqq.; Idea 
of, spontaneous, 123; Argu- 
ments for the existence of, 
26 sq.; Our idea of, not in- 
born, 27 sqq.; Necessity of 
proving the existence of, 30 
sqq.; Existence of, an article 
of faith, 39 sqq.; Threefold 
mode of knowing Him here 
below, 67 sqq.; Composite 
character of our conception 
of, 75 sq.; Our conception 
of, is a true conception, 77 
sq.; Our knowledge of Him 
as it will be in Heaven, 80 
sqq.; Fourfold visibility of, 
81 sq.; Threefold Invisibility 
of, 82 sqq.; His Incompre- 
hensibility in relation to the 
beatific vision, 107 sqq.; The 
Name, 140 sqq.; God as Pure 
Being, 168 sq.; His Tran- 
scendental Attributes of Be- 
ing, 180 sqq.; Perfection of, 
180 sqq.; Unity of, 196 sqq.; 
Absolute Simplicity of, 200 
sqq.; Incompositeness of, 206 
sqq.; Unicity of, 212 sqq.; 
The Absolute Truth, 225 
sqq.; Absolute Goodness, 241 
sqq.; His love for man, 263 
sq.; His categorical Attri- 
butes of Being, 274 sqq.; Ab- 
solute Substantiality, 276 
sqq.;. Absolute Causality or 
Omnipotence, 281 sqq.; In- 
corporeity, 291 sqq.; Immu- 
tability, 298 sqq.; Eternity, 
306 sqq.; Immensity, 315 
sqq.; Omnipresence, 321 sqq.; 
Attributes of Divine Life, 


INDEX 


327 sqq.; Knowledge, Mode 
of, 329 sqq.; Comprehension 
of Himself, 331; Objects of 
divine knowledge, 349 sqq.; 
Omniscience as the knowl- 
edge of the purely possible, 
351 sqq.; As the knowledge 
of Vision of all contingent 
beings, 355 saq.; Cardiogno- 
sis, 359 sqq.;  Foreknowl- 
edge of the free actions of 
the future, 361 sqq.; Will of, 
423 sqq.; Relation to evil, 
442 sqq. 

Goethe, 340. 

Gonet, 405, 440. 

Goodness, God as absolute, 241 
sqq.; Ontological, 241 sqq.; 
Ethical, 251 sqq.; Moral, 260 
sqq. 

Gotti, Card., 410, 440. 

Gottschalk, 253. 

Grace before meals, 262. 

Gratry, Pere, 120. 

Gregory Nazianzen, St., 29, 65, 
74, 91, 97, 116, 171, 270. 

Gregory of Nyssa, St., 62, 64, 
76, 116, 149, 174, 193, 383. 

Gregory I, the Great, 24, 204, 
338, 462. 

Gregory XVI, 30. 

Gregory Palamos, 146. 

Gregory of Rimini, 148. 

Giinther, 208, 333, 362. 

Gutberlet, Msgr., 353. 


H 


HABACUC, 273. 

Hegel, 122, 168. 

Heinrich, 39. 

Herbart, 205. 

Hermes, 461. 

Hermogenes, 204. 

Hesychasts, 146, 147. 

Hilary, St., 174, 194. 

Hippolytus, 432. 

Holiness, See Sanctity. 

Holy Ghost, The, 106, 256, 257, 
296, 430. 

Holy Land, The, 258. 
31 


473 


Holy Office, The, 124. 
Hontheim, J. (S. J.), 413. 
Hound of Heaven, Quotation 
from Thompson’s, 322. 
Hugonin, Bishop, 120, 
Humphrey, W. (S. J.), 367. 
Hunter, S. J. (S. J.), 9. 
Hymn to God, 74. 
Hypostases cum dignitate, 258. 
Hypostatic Union, 280. 


I 


IpEA of God, Not inborn, 27 
sqq.; Spontaneity of, 29, 53. 

Idealism, Critical, 66. 

Idolatry, 218, 219 sqq. 

Ignatius of Antioch, 262, 360. 

Immensity of God, 315 sqq. 

Immutability of God, 283, 2098 
sqq.; How compatible with 
His liberty, 303 sqq. 

Impeccability, God’s, 253 sqq. 

Impossible to God, What is, 


282. 
Inaccessibility of the Divine 
Substance, 87. 
Incarnation, 140. 
Incompositeness of God, 206 


sqq. 

Incomprehensibility of God in 
its relation to the beatific 
vision, 59, 107 sqq., 176. 

Incorporeity of God, 83 sq., 291 
sqq., 320 sq. 

Independence, God’s, 176. 

Individuation, Principle of, 200. 

Indivision and _ Indivisibility, 


195. 
Ineffability, God’s, 74 sqq., 176, 


‘387 Se 

Infallibility, 346 sq. 

Infants, Unbaptized, 380. 
Infinitum, actuale, potentiale, 


190, 
Infinity, God’s, 190 sqq. 
Innocent X1, 41. 
Inoriginateness, God’s, 175. 
Inseity, 276, 278. 
Intellectio subsistens, 161, 163 
Sh. 231232: 


474 


Intuitive vision of God, 80 sqq. 

Invisibility, Threefold of God, 
82 sqq., 176, 293. 

Irenzus, St., of Sq., 204, 216, 


223, 379. 
Isidore of Seville, St., 271, 370. 
J 


JAHN, Johannes, 368. 

Janssens, L, (O. S. B.), 11. 

Jehovah, 176, 

Jerome, St., 100, 174, 239, 282, 
300, 358 sq., 363, 366, 378, 382, 


455. 

Jesus Christ, The Person of, 
35 sq.; The author and finish- 
er of faith, 40; True God, 
140; Inconfuse in both na- 
tures, 280; Divine sovereign- 
ty of, 288; On the spirituality 
of God, 295 sq.; Error of 
Giinther regarding, 333. 

Jews, History of the, 34 Sq. 

Johannes a S. Thoma, 410, 411. 

John Damascene, by) 20,’ 62, 
64, 72, 172, 204, 223, 366, 393, 
432, 430. 

John XXII, 149, 

Jupiter, 141. 

Jurisdiction, Descent of all 
from God, 288 sq. 

Jurisdiction, Functions of, 287. 

Justice, 455 sqq.; The divine, 
457 sqq.; Vindictive, 460. 

Justin Martyr, St., 26, 27, 02: 


K 


Kant, Immanuel, 66, 122. 

Kivyots, 300. 

Kleutgen, J. (S. J.), 267, 282, 
339, 413. 

Knowability of God, 16 sqq.; 
Ultimately resolves itself in. 
to His demonstrability, 30. 

Knowledge of God, Popular vs. 
Scientific, 22; Our, as de- 
rived from the supernatural 
order, 33 sqq.; Quality of 
our, 55 sqq.; As it is here on 
earth, 57 sqq.; Imperfection 


IN DEX 


of our, 57 sqq.; Threefold 
mode of knowing God here 
below, 67 sqq.; Our knowl- 
edge of God as it will be in 
Heaven, 80 sqq. 

Knowledge, The Divine, Mode 
of, 329 sqq.; Objects of, 349 
sqq.; Of all contingent be- 
ings, 355 sqq.; Cardiognosis, 
359 sqq.; Of the free actions 
of the future, 361 sqq.; Cau- 
sality of, 368 sqq.; Medium 
of, 391 sqq. 

Knowledge vs. faith, 41 sqq. 

Krause, 50, 120, 

Kuhn, 27. 

Kvpvwos, 140, 287. 


L 


Lambert, Rey. L, A., Notes on 
Ingersoll, 54. 

Laplace, 356. 

Lateran Council, The Fourth, 
ion 202, 213, 277, 209, 319, 


365. 
Law, Moral, 18, 
Ledesma, 377 sq., 410, 
Leibnitz, 205, 317. 
Lépicier, 11. 
Lessius, 235, 248, 288, 317, 404 
S 


Liberty, God’s, In relation to 
His immutability, 302 sqq.; 
In relation to His love for 
created goodness, 428 sq. 

Liebermann, 462. 

Life, Attributes of Divine, 327, 
421 sqq. 

Light of Glory, See Lumen 
gloriae. 

Logos, The, o2, 106, 113, 114, 
II5, 235, 251, 256, 270, 293, 
331, 436. 

Adyos OTEPLATLKES, 26, 

Louvain Semi-Traditionalist 
school of, 46, 47. 

Love of God for Himself iden- 
tical with His Essence, 423 
sqq.; For His creatures, 434 
sqq. 


INDEX 


pees gloriae, 55, 82, 101 sqq., 

120. 

Lying repugnant to God’s Es- 
sence, 238. 


M 


Magesty of God, 259. 

Malebranche, N., 118. 

Malum, 442 sq. 

Manes (Mani), 222. 

Manichaeism, 221, 223. 

Martinez, 405. 

Mary, B. V., 181, 272, 435. 

Materialism, 49, 2901. 

Materia prima, 191, 206. 

Mathematics, 192, 229, 442. 

Matter and form, God not com- 
posed of, 206. 

Maximus, Confessor, St., 
205. 

Medium of Divine Knowledge, 


204, 


301. 
Melito of Sardes, 293. 
Mendaciousness, 236. 
Mercy, 464 sq.; The divine, 
465 sqq. 
Messiah, The, 35 sq. 
Metaphysics, 2 
Meteorology, 356. 
Michelangelo, 189. 
Miracles, 285. 
Molina, 385, 389, 395, 399. 
Molinism, vs. Thomism, 383 
Ssdq@.s)/ Stages Of;) 413 Sad. ; 
Characterization of, 418 sq. 
Monarchia, The divine, 213, 


214. 

Monas, The primordial, 199. 
Monism, 49. 
Monotheism, 139, 212 sqq. 
Moral Law, 19. 
Moral Theology, The principle 

of, 257. 
Moses, 136, 174, 223, 259. 
Motor immobilis, 301. 
Miller, Max, 141. 
Multiplicity, 197 sq. 
Mutatio, 208. 
Mystery of Iniquity, The, 254. 
Mystic Theology, 12. 


475 
N 


Names of God, The Biblical, 
134 sqq.; The symbolic, 142 


sqq. 

Nature, The so-called cruelties 
of, 446 sq. 

Nature and person, No com- 
position of in God, 209. 

Nature Worship, 220. 

Necessity, Antecedent and con- 
sequent, 366 sq. 

Necessity, God’s, 176. 

Neo-Platonism, 65, 68, 72, 73; 
117. 

Nestorianism, 333. 


Newton, 317. 

Nicza, Council of, 192, 2098, 
oe 
Nicholas of Cusa, Cardinal, 


De Docta Ignorantia, 73. 
Nénows vonoews, 332, 424. 
Nominalism, 148 sqq., 160, 161. 


O 


OcKHAM, II0, 148. 

Old Testament, 35. 
Omnipotens, 284, 287. 
Omnipresence of God, 318, 321 


sqq. 

Omniscience, As God’s knowl- 
edge of the purely possible, 
351 sqq.; As God’s fore- 
knowledge of the free actions 
of the future, 361 sqq.; As 
God’s foreknowledge of the 
futuribilia, 373 sqq. 

Opudardpuxor, 147. 

Ontological Argument of St. 
Anselm, 31. 

Ontologism, 116 sqq. 

Opinion, 344. 

Oracles, Pagan, 219. 

Origen, 204, 270, 286, 300, 366. 

Ormuzd, 222. 

Oswald, 173, 440. ; 

* Our Father,” The, 325. 

Ownership, God’s absolute of 
all things, 289 sq. 


476 
P 


PAGANISM, 37, 

Palamites, Source of the heresy 
of the, 101; Quintessence of 
same, 146 sq. 

Pallavicini, 353. 

Tlavaryéea, 227, 220. 

Pandects, 290. 

Panentheism, 49. 

Ilavrehys, 182, 

Pantheism, 40, 120, 
188 sq., 234, 250, 270. 

Tlavroxparwp, 287. 

Ilarap, 140, 

Paul, St., Sermons at Lystra 
and Athens, 22 sq., 215; Pre- 
‘eminently a protagonist of 
Monotheism, 215 sq. 

Paul V, 390. 

Pelagians, 380. 

Perfection, God’s, 180 Sqq., 244. 

Perfections, Created, How con- 
tained in God, 185 sqq. 

Per se, Use of the term, 276, 

Besch) Chri( Sty), II, 392. 

Petavius, 9, 206, 358. 

Peter, St., 405 sqq. 

Peter Lombard, 117, 324. 

Peter of Rivo, 361. 

Pierre d’Ailly, 238, 

Pharaoh, 223. 

Philosophia Perennis, EL; 12: 

Philosophy, How distinguished 
from theology, 3; In what 
sense the handmaid of the- 
ology, 5; Truths borrowed 
from, 58; On aseity, 175 sq. 

Place, 316. 

Plato, 11, 117 sq., 141. 

Platonic Philosophy, 10, 130. 

Pleroma, 216. 

Polycarp, St., 360. 

Polytheism, 49, 147, 213,217 


sqq. 

Pope, The, 258, 280. 

Porrée, Gilbert de la, 145 sqq., 
200. 

Portugal, Revolution in, 366. 

Possibles, God’s knowledge of 
the, 351 sqq., 393 sqa. 


2) \ESr. 


INDEX 


Potentia, 281. 

Potentiality, 292. 

Praeambula Fidei, 38 sqq. 

Praemotio physica, 384 sqq. 

Presence, 316. 

Prime Mover, God as the, 301. 

Primitive Revelation, 46 sqq. 

Privatio, 222. 

Probability, 345. 

Proclus, 270, 

Prophecies, . Fulfilled, 363 sq. 

Prosper of Aquitaine, St., 462. 

Providence, Divine, 264, 382 
Sq-, 410 sq., 445 sq. 

Pseudo-Athanasius, as. 

Pseudo-Dionysius, 228, 252, 262, 
270. 


R 


REALISM, Heretical, 145. 

Reason, God as absolute, 230 
sqq. 

Reason, Human, Able to know 
God, 17 sqq. 

Rheims, Synod of, 145, 209. 

Richard of Middletown, 112, 

Ripalda, 86 sq. 

Rom. I, 18 sqq., analyzed, 18 
sq., 89, 

Rom, I, 20, analyzed, 89. 

Roman Empire, The, a7. 

Rosenkranz, W., 30. 

Rosmini-Serbati, A., LIQ) 533: 
125. 

Rothenflue, P. (S. J.), 120, 

Ruiz, 352, 354, 358. 


S 


SABAISM, 220, 

Sabellianism, 151, 933) 

Sacraments, 257. 

St. Victor, Hugh of, 12, 282. 

St. Victor, Richard of, 282, 463. 

Salmanticenses, 375. 

Samaritans, 295. 

Sanctum Sanctorum, 259. 

Sanctity of God, 251 sqq.; Sub- 
stantial, 255 sqq.; Objective, 
258 sq.; Of His Will, 436 
sqq. 


INDEX 


“ Sans-Fiel,” 120. 

Sapientia creans, 369 sq.; Dis- 
ponens, 370. 

Satanism, 220, 222. 

Satolli, Card., TT. 

Scepticism, 49. 

Schadai, 137 sq. 

Scheeben, 8, 11, 134, 284, 455. 

Schelling, 122. 

Scholasticism, 10 sq., 66, I9I. 

Science, Notion of, 2, 328. 

Scientia approbationis et im- 
probationis, 350. 

Scientia conditionatorum, 387. 

Scientia media, 373 sqq., 383 
sqq.; Tournely’ s definition of, 


307. 

Scientia simplicis intelligentiae, 
349, 351, 371, 372. 

Scientia visionis, 349, 355 sqq., 
371, 372. 

Scotism, Formalism of,’ ISI 
sqq., 154; On God’s meta- 
physical essence, 160 sq., 162 
Sq., 390. . 

Scotus Eriugena, 253. 

Scotus, John Duns, 152. 
also Scotism.) 

Self-Comprehension, The Di- 
vine, 334 sqq. 

Self-Existence, See Aseity. 

Self-Sufficiency, Divine, 183. 

Semi-Pelagianism, 380. 

Semi-Traditionalism, 46 sq. 

Sempiternity of God, 308 sqq.; 
312. 

Sensualism, 49. 

“Seven Holy Names of God,” 
The, 134 sqq. 

Simplicity of God, 153, 200 sqq. 

Sin, God not the author of, 
223, 253; Sin a lie, 229; God’s 
hatred of, 426 sq.; God can 
never will sin, 442; Why He 
permits it, 449 sqq. 

Sinlessness, God’s, 253. 

Sixtus IV, 361. 

Socinians, 362, 377 sq. 

Socrates, His philosophy, II, 

Space, 315. 

Spencer, Herbert, 65. 


(See 


477 


Spinoza, 276. 

Spirit, God a pure, 295 sq.; 
God the absolute, 296 sq. 

Steuchus Eugubinus, 321. 

Stoicism, 294. 

Suarez, 40, 42, 158, 238, 353, 


440. 

Subject and essence, No com- 
position of in God, 209. 

Sublimity of God, 272 sq. 

Substance and accidents, God 
not composed of, 206. 

Substantiality, God’s absolute, 
276 sqq. 

Substantial Truth, God the, 
eats 

Substantia universalis, 278 sq. 

Supercomprehensio cordis, 301. 

Supernatural Facts, The, as a 
preamble to our belief in the 
existence of God, 38. 

Supernatural Substance, Ripal- 
da’s theory of a, 87. 

Super-Truth, God the, 229 sq. 

Super-Unity. of God, 199 sq. 

Suspicion, 344. 

Symbolic Names of God, 140 
sqq. 

Syncatabasis, 91. 

T 

TENNYSON, 447. 

Tertullian, 25, 28, 29, 36, 216, 
217, 223, 203, 204, 320. 

Tetragrammaton, The, 135 sq., 
172; 

Gelwors, 250. 

Theodicy, 3, 175. 

Theodoretus, I01, 203. 

Theology, General definition 
of, 1 sqq.; High rank of, 4; 
Controversial, 93 Scholastic, 
9 sq.3 Mystic, 12) 

Theophanies, OE 92! 

Theophilus, 320. 

Oeceés, 140, I4I. 

Theosophy, 233, 235. 

Thomas Aquinas, St., On the 
definition of theology, 2; On 
the a posteriori demonstra- 


478 INDEX 


bility of God, 31; On knowl- 
edge vs. faith, 42; On the 
imperfection of our knowl- 
edge of God, 66; On the 
three modes of knowing God, 
72; On the incomprehensibil- 
ity of God in relation to the 
beatific vision, 111 sq.; And 
Ontologism, 117; On St. 
Augustine, 130; On the sym- 
bolic names of God, 143; On 
the unity of the Divine Es- 
sence, 150; On the virtual 
distinction between God’s 
essence and attributes, 156 
sqq.; On the divine perfec- 
tions, 175; On God, the ens 
berfectissimum, 184; Qn 
God’s infinity, 194; On 
God’s unity, 199; On God’s 
simplicity, 205, 211; On the 
angels, 209; On polytheism 
and idolatry, 219; On God 
as dmrepovacos, 228; On the 
participation of finite reason 
in divine knowledge, 234; On 
beauty, 265, 266; On the di- 
vine will, 304; On space, 
315; On the divine omni- 
presence, 324; On the divine 
knowledge, 336, 352, 367, 372; 
On the media of intellectual 
cognition, 391; On the divine 
essence as the sole medium 
of God’s knowledge, 394 sq. : 
On the knowability of free- 
will actions, 397 sq.; On 
God’s knowledge of the 
futuribilia, 414, 415, 416; On 
God’s love of goodness, 430; 
On the liberty of the divine 
will, 433 sq.; On the volun- 
tas antecedens et consequens, 
439; On goodness, 441 sq.; 
On evil in the world, 450; 
On God’s vindictive justice, 
463; On the divine mercy, 
co eae 

' Thomassin, 9, 106, 109, 380. 

Thomism vs. Molinism, 383 


sqq. 


Time, 306 sq. 

Toletus, 109. 

Totemism, 220, 

Tournely, 387, 462, 404. © 

Traditionalism, 44 sqq. 

Traducianism, 294. 

Trinity, The Divine, 89 sq., 94, 
99, 108, 126, 138, 151, 210, 
214, 215, 253, 288, 297, 331, 
333. 

Tritheism, 2to, 358: 

Truth, 225; God the absolute, 
225 sqq.; Ontological, 225 
sqq.;_ Logical, 230 sqq.; 
Moral, 236 sqq. 

Tyr, 141. 

Tyre and Sidon, 377, 407, 409 
Sq., 412, 

Truth, 225. 


Usacus, P., 46, 119. 

Ulpian, 456. 

Umbilicans, 147. 

Unbelief, 52 sq. 

Unchangeableness of God (See 
Immutability). 

Unicity of God, 21z sqq. 

United States, Ontologism in, 
120. 

Unity, Different species of, 196 


sqq. 
Unity of God, 1905 sqq. 
Universal Dominion, God’s, 286 
sqq. 
Universale in re, 120. 
Unum, 195. 


V 


VALENTIA, Gregory de, 367. 
Vasquez, Gabr. (S. J.) SrA. 
cusations against the Fathers, 


sqq. 

Vatican Council, 42, 47,76, 
192, 202, 213, 261, 277, 299, 
309, 319, 327, 330, 361, 428. 
entura, P., 45. 

Veracity, 236. 

Veracity of God, 238 sqq. 

Vercellone, 130. 


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INDEX 479 


Veritas a se, 227. 

Veritas prima ontologica— 
logica, 117. 

Via afirmationis, negationis et 
superlationis, 69 sqq. 

Victor, See St. Victor. 

Vienne, Council of, 86, 102. 

Vindictive Justice, God’s, 460 


sqq. 

Virtual Distinction, 157 sq. 
Virtues, 454. 

Visibility, Fourfold of God, 81 


q 
V sen of God, Intuitive, 80 
sqq.; St. Irenzus on, 91 saq. 
Voluntas salvifica, 466 
Vorstius, 321. 
Vulgate, 377 sq. 


WwW 


WEDDINGEN, Van, 32. 


Will, The Divine, 421 sqq.; Af- 
fections of the, 425 sqq.; 
Freedom of the, 430 sqq.; 
Sanctity of the, 436 sqq.; Ob- 
jects of the, 438 sqq.; Virtues 
of the, 454 sqq. 

Wirceburgenses, 11. 

Wisdom XIII, 1 sqq., analyzed, 
20 sq. 

World, The material, a means 
of knowing God, 24 sqq. 


sg 


YAHWEH, God’s proper name, 


135, 139, 170, 172, 173, 174, 
176, 220. 


Z 
Zeds-warnp, 141. 
Zigliara, Card., 401. 
Zoroaster, 221. 


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